Pub Date : 2023-06-23eCollection Date: 2023-06-01DOI: 10.36519/idcm.2023.233
Betül Çopur, Serkan Sürme, Gülşah Tunçer, Osman Faruk Bayramlar
Objective: Predictors of mortality that indicate disease severity plays an important role in COVID-19 management and treatment decisions. This study aimed to investigate the association between fibrosis-4 (FIB-4) score, aspartate aminotransferase-to-platelet ratio index (APRI), and novel biomarker-based score (SAD-60) with mortality in COVID-19 patients treated in a tertiary hospital.
Materials and methods: In this single-center retrospective study, patients ≥18 years of age who were admitted to our hospital for COVID-19 between December 1 and 31, 2021, were included. Patients were divided into two groups as deceased and survived. A comparative analysis was applied. Predictive abilities of the FIB-4, APRI, and SAD-60 scores for in-hospital mortality were evaluated.
Results: Of the 453 patients enrolled in the study, 248 (54.6%) were male, and the mean age was 52.2±14.7 years. Mortality was recorded in 39 (8.5%) of the patients. The median values of APRI (0.43 and 0.58; p=0.001), FIB-4 score (1.66 and 2.91; p<0.001), and SAD-60 (2 and 8.25; p<0.001) were higher in deceased patients than in survivors. The optimal cut-off value for predicting mortality in the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve analysis was 0.58 for APRI (sensitivity=56.4%, specificity=63.6%); 2.14 for FIB-4 score (sensitivity=79.5%, specificity=68.2%); 4.25 for SAD-60 (sensitivity=90%, specificity=73.8%). In Cox regression analysis with a model that included gender, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), and coronary artery disease (CAD), FIB-4 (hazard ratio [HR]=4.013, 95% confidence interval [CI]=1.643-9.803; p=0.002), and SAD-60 (HR=8.850, 95% CI=1.035-75.696; p=0.046) were independent risk factors for mortality.
Conclusion: SAD-60 and FIB-4 scores are easily applicable and may be used to predict mortality in COVID-19 patients.
{"title":"The Role of APRI, FIB-4, and SAD-60 Scores as Predictors of Mortality in COVID-19 Patients.","authors":"Betül Çopur, Serkan Sürme, Gülşah Tunçer, Osman Faruk Bayramlar","doi":"10.36519/idcm.2023.233","DOIUrl":"10.36519/idcm.2023.233","url":null,"abstract":"<p><strong>Objective: </strong>Predictors of mortality that indicate disease severity plays an important role in COVID-19 management and treatment decisions. This study aimed to investigate the association between fibrosis-4 (FIB-4) score, aspartate aminotransferase-to-platelet ratio index (APRI), and novel biomarker-based score (SAD-60) with mortality in COVID-19 patients treated in a tertiary hospital.</p><p><strong>Materials and methods: </strong>In this single-center retrospective study, patients ≥18 years of age who were admitted to our hospital for COVID-19 between December 1 and 31, 2021, were included. Patients were divided into two groups as deceased and survived. A comparative analysis was applied. Predictive abilities of the FIB-4, APRI, and SAD-60 scores for in-hospital mortality were evaluated.</p><p><strong>Results: </strong>Of the 453 patients enrolled in the study, 248 (54.6%) were male, and the mean age was 52.2±14.7 years. Mortality was recorded in 39 (8.5%) of the patients. The median values of APRI (0.43 and 0.58; p=0.001), FIB-4 score (1.66 and 2.91; p<0.001), and SAD-60 (2 and 8.25; p<0.001) were higher in deceased patients than in survivors. The optimal cut-off value for predicting mortality in the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve analysis was 0.58 for APRI (sensitivity=56.4%, specificity=63.6%); 2.14 for FIB-4 score (sensitivity=79.5%, specificity=68.2%); 4.25 for SAD-60 (sensitivity=90%, specificity=73.8%). In Cox regression analysis with a model that included gender, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), and coronary artery disease (CAD), FIB-4 (hazard ratio [HR]=4.013, 95% confidence interval [CI]=1.643-9.803; p=0.002), and SAD-60 (HR=8.850, 95% CI=1.035-75.696; p=0.046) were independent risk factors for mortality.</p><p><strong>Conclusion: </strong>SAD-60 and FIB-4 scores are easily applicable and may be used to predict mortality in COVID-19 patients.</p>","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":"9 1","pages":"144-152"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10985813/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85179440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Unplanned Visitors: Queering the Ethics and Aesthetics of Domestic Space. Olivier Vallerand. Montreal, Quebec, and Kingston, Ontario: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2020 (ISBN: 978-0-2280-0185-0)","authors":"R. Kennedy","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2023.42","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2023.42","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41924196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Standpoint Theory and the Psy Sciences: Can Marginalization and Critical Engagement Lead to an Epistemic Advantage? – Corrigendum","authors":"Phoebe Friesen, Jordan Goldstein","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2023.45","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2023.45","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"450 - 450"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48208954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The recent debate in feminist philosophy about an adequate concept of woman presupposes the distinction between sex and gender, and most proposals operate on the gender level. Building on Simone de Beauvoir, Toril Moi suggested an account of “woman” that does not rely on the distinction between sex and gender (Moi 1999a). She criticizes that this distinction suggests too strong a separation between the bodily and social dimensions of a person's identity. Instead, her account of “woman” centers around the phenomenological concept of the “body as situation” or the lived/living body (Leib). This understanding of the body emphasizes a person's subjective experience of their own body rather than a third-personal (for example, medical) perspective on humans’ bodies. With her proposal, Moi aims, on the one hand, to resist biological determinism, and, on the other, to avoid the dualism of the sex/gender distinction. In this article, I re-introduce Moi's position to the recent debate and examine how it fares regarding the “inclusion problem” (Katharine Jenkins) toward trans women. I suggest that Moi's account provides resources for an attractive, individualistic, and hence inclusive account of embodied gender identity. For political purposes, however, we also need to analyze concrete contexts of gender-related oppression.
摘要近年来，女性主义哲学中关于女性概念的争论以性别和社会性别的区分为前提，大多数建议都是在性别层面上进行的。在Simone de Beauvoir的基础上，Toril Moi提出了一种不依赖于性别和性别之间区别的“女人”描述(Moi 1999a)。她批评说，这种区别表明，一个人的身份在身体和社会层面之间的分离过于强烈。相反，她对“女人”的描述围绕着现象学的概念，即“作为情境的身体”或活着的身体(Leib)。这种对身体的理解强调一个人对自己身体的主观体验，而不是第三人称(例如医学)对人体的看法。莫伊的提议一方面是为了抵制生物决定论，另一方面是为了避免性别区分的二元论。在这篇文章中，我重新介绍了莫伊在最近的辩论中的立场，并研究了它是如何对待变性女性的“包容问题”(凯瑟琳·詹金斯)的。我认为，莫伊的描述为一种有吸引力的、个人主义的、因此也是包容性的性别认同描述提供了资源。然而，出于政治目的，我们也需要分析与性别有关的压迫的具体背景。
{"title":"Toril Moi's Phenomenological Account of “Woman” and Questions of Trans Inclusivity","authors":"Esther Neuhann","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2023.26","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2023.26","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The recent debate in feminist philosophy about an adequate concept of woman presupposes the distinction between sex and gender, and most proposals operate on the gender level. Building on Simone de Beauvoir, Toril Moi suggested an account of “woman” that does not rely on the distinction between sex and gender (Moi 1999a). She criticizes that this distinction suggests too strong a separation between the bodily and social dimensions of a person's identity. Instead, her account of “woman” centers around the phenomenological concept of the “body as situation” or the lived/living body (Leib). This understanding of the body emphasizes a person's subjective experience of their own body rather than a third-personal (for example, medical) perspective on humans’ bodies. With her proposal, Moi aims, on the one hand, to resist biological determinism, and, on the other, to avoid the dualism of the sex/gender distinction. In this article, I re-introduce Moi's position to the recent debate and examine how it fares regarding the “inclusion problem” (Katharine Jenkins) toward trans women. I suggest that Moi's account provides resources for an attractive, individualistic, and hence inclusive account of embodied gender identity. For political purposes, however, we also need to analyze concrete contexts of gender-related oppression.","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"251 - 274"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48260346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract I've been thinking quite a lot of late about how, as a settler, I can more fully and effectively support Indigenous peoples struggling for climate justice. In the process, I've found Andrea Sullivan-Clarke's recent insights about decolonizing allyship most helpful. After offering a brief summary of the necessary and sufficient conditions Sullivan-Clarke identifies for decolonizing allyship, I reflect on how I personally can strive to meet these conditions while remaining aware that—like my recovery from alcoholism—my work will never be complete.
{"title":"Decolonizing Allyship and Settler Support for Indigenous Climate Justice: A Note of Thanks to Andrea Sullivan-Clarke","authors":"A. F. Smith","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2023.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2023.18","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I've been thinking quite a lot of late about how, as a settler, I can more fully and effectively support Indigenous peoples struggling for climate justice. In the process, I've found Andrea Sullivan-Clarke's recent insights about decolonizing allyship most helpful. After offering a brief summary of the necessary and sufficient conditions Sullivan-Clarke identifies for decolonizing allyship, I reflect on how I personally can strive to meet these conditions while remaining aware that—like my recovery from alcoholism—my work will never be complete.","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"439 - 449"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44723013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this article I defend an account of beauty labor as a form of resistance that can enable individuals and communities to combat body oppression. Focusing on the “Fuck Flattering!” movement, a social-media-driven movement in which fat people purposefully wear unflattering clothing to resist antifat fashion and oppressive body standards, I first set three criteria necessary for an act of beauty labor to count as one of resistance. I argue that (1) the agent in question must be situated as a less ideal candidate for attributions of beauty, (2) the agent must have some level of knowledge or awareness of the norms (defined in light of dominant groups) and their harms, and (3) that knowledge or awareness of the harms of said norms must inform the agent's act of beauty labor. Based on this account of beauty labor as resistance, I argue that beauty labor can combat larger systems of oppression and incite meaningful change insofar as it enables individuals to claim and reclaim space (both digital and physical) from which fat people have been historically excluded, while affording an opportunity for education and unpacking of oppression and bias, and expanding the fashion industry.
{"title":"Beauty Labor as a Tool to Resist Antifatness","authors":"Cheryl Frazier","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2023.22","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2023.22","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this article I defend an account of beauty labor as a form of resistance that can enable individuals and communities to combat body oppression. Focusing on the “Fuck Flattering!” movement, a social-media-driven movement in which fat people purposefully wear unflattering clothing to resist antifat fashion and oppressive body standards, I first set three criteria necessary for an act of beauty labor to count as one of resistance. I argue that (1) the agent in question must be situated as a less ideal candidate for attributions of beauty, (2) the agent must have some level of knowledge or awareness of the norms (defined in light of dominant groups) and their harms, and (3) that knowledge or awareness of the harms of said norms must inform the agent's act of beauty labor. Based on this account of beauty labor as resistance, I argue that beauty labor can combat larger systems of oppression and incite meaningful change insofar as it enables individuals to claim and reclaim space (both digital and physical) from which fat people have been historically excluded, while affording an opportunity for education and unpacking of oppression and bias, and expanding the fashion industry.","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"231 - 250"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42922242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In the face of media attention that has recently spotlighted police brutality, racialized COVID-19 deaths, and the renewed visibility of white-supremacy groups, scholars, tech entrepreneurs, and media pundits are calling for an increase in empathy, claiming that it may move white and non-Black people of color beyond feelings of pity to dismantling anti-Black racism. However, in the context of anti-Blackness, is racial empathy possible? And what can we expect from it? Examining philosophical critiques of empathy's capabilities by philosophers and scholars engaged in feminist philosophy and Black studies, alongside Heidi Maibom's four-part definition of empathy, I focus on what empathy's limitations might tell us about the emotional and material structures that prevent empathy from achieving the results its advocates often hope for. I argue that the feelings of racial empathy, which may activate in empathy-inducing activities, may instead paradoxically point to the very anti-Black psychological structures that prevent empathetic action. I also contend that the feelings of racial empathy do not themselves undo the relations of anti-Blackness, but tracing the racism implicit in their activation may serve as a self-reflexive tool, an ongoing process, for understanding how anti-Blackness has shaped one's sense of self, embodied awareness, and lifeworld.
{"title":"Engaging with the Failures of Racial Empathy","authors":"Ashlie Sandoval","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2023.23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2023.23","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the face of media attention that has recently spotlighted police brutality, racialized COVID-19 deaths, and the renewed visibility of white-supremacy groups, scholars, tech entrepreneurs, and media pundits are calling for an increase in empathy, claiming that it may move white and non-Black people of color beyond feelings of pity to dismantling anti-Black racism. However, in the context of anti-Blackness, is racial empathy possible? And what can we expect from it? Examining philosophical critiques of empathy's capabilities by philosophers and scholars engaged in feminist philosophy and Black studies, alongside Heidi Maibom's four-part definition of empathy, I focus on what empathy's limitations might tell us about the emotional and material structures that prevent empathy from achieving the results its advocates often hope for. I argue that the feelings of racial empathy, which may activate in empathy-inducing activities, may instead paradoxically point to the very anti-Black psychological structures that prevent empathetic action. I also contend that the feelings of racial empathy do not themselves undo the relations of anti-Blackness, but tracing the racism implicit in their activation may serve as a self-reflexive tool, an ongoing process, for understanding how anti-Blackness has shaped one's sense of self, embodied awareness, and lifeworld.","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"316 - 329"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45706348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Hermeneutical injustice, as a species of epistemic injustice, is when members of marginalized groups are unable to make their experiences communicatively intelligible due to a deficiency in collective hermeneutical resources, where this deficiency is traditionally interpreted as a lack of concepts. Against this understanding, this article argues that even if adequate concepts that describe marginalized groups’ experiences are available within the collective hermeneutical resources, hermeneutical injustice can persist. This article offers an analysis of how this can happen by introducing the notion of hermeneutical excess: the introduction of additional concepts into collective hermeneutical resources that function to obscure agents’ understanding of the lived experiences of marginalized groups. The injustice of hermeneutical excesses happens not due to hermeneutical marginalization (the exclusion of members of marginalized groups from the construction of hermeneutical resources), but rather from hermeneutical domination: when members of dominant groups have been inappropriately included in the construction of hermeneutical resources. By taking as exemplary cases the concepts of “reverse racism” and “nonconsensual sex,” this article shows how such excesses are introduced as a kind of defensive strategy used by dominant ideologies precisely when progress with social justice is made.
{"title":"One Too Many: Hermeneutical Excess as Hermeneutical Injustice","authors":"Nicole Dular","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2023.20","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2023.20","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Hermeneutical injustice, as a species of epistemic injustice, is when members of marginalized groups are unable to make their experiences communicatively intelligible due to a deficiency in collective hermeneutical resources, where this deficiency is traditionally interpreted as a lack of concepts. Against this understanding, this article argues that even if adequate concepts that describe marginalized groups’ experiences are available within the collective hermeneutical resources, hermeneutical injustice can persist. This article offers an analysis of how this can happen by introducing the notion of hermeneutical excess: the introduction of additional concepts into collective hermeneutical resources that function to obscure agents’ understanding of the lived experiences of marginalized groups. The injustice of hermeneutical excesses happens not due to hermeneutical marginalization (the exclusion of members of marginalized groups from the construction of hermeneutical resources), but rather from hermeneutical domination: when members of dominant groups have been inappropriately included in the construction of hermeneutical resources. By taking as exemplary cases the concepts of “reverse racism” and “nonconsensual sex,” this article shows how such excesses are introduced as a kind of defensive strategy used by dominant ideologies precisely when progress with social justice is made.","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"423 - 438"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45331617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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