Abstract This article develops a new approach for theorizing about hermeneutical injustice. According to a dominant view, hermeneutical injustice results from a hermeneutical gap: one lacks the conceptual tools needed to make sense of, or to communicate, important social experiences, where this lack is a result of an injustice in the background social methods used to determine hermeneutical resources. I argue that this approach is incomplete. It fails to capture an important species of hermeneutical injustice which doesn't result from a lack of hermeneutical resources, but from the overabundance of distorting and oppressive concepts which function to crowd-out, defeat, or pre-empt the application of a more accurate hermeneutical resource. I propose a broader analysis that better respects the dynamic relationship between hermeneutical resources and the social and political contexts in which they are implemented.
{"title":"Hermeneutical Injustice: Distortion and Conceptual Aptness","authors":"Arianna Falbo","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2022.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2022.4","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article develops a new approach for theorizing about hermeneutical injustice. According to a dominant view, hermeneutical injustice results from a hermeneutical gap: one lacks the conceptual tools needed to make sense of, or to communicate, important social experiences, where this lack is a result of an injustice in the background social methods used to determine hermeneutical resources. I argue that this approach is incomplete. It fails to capture an important species of hermeneutical injustice which doesn't result from a lack of hermeneutical resources, but from the overabundance of distorting and oppressive concepts which function to crowd-out, defeat, or pre-empt the application of a more accurate hermeneutical resource. I propose a broader analysis that better respects the dynamic relationship between hermeneutical resources and the social and political contexts in which they are implemented.","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"343 - 363"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47209194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What started as a second edition of Theorizing Gender: An Introduction (co-authored by Annette Fitzsimons and Rosalind Minsky) instead became this self-conscious address on the metaphysics of sex and gender. The title of the book is telling. We are indeed doing gender theory in troubled times, and these troubled times are not separable from gender theory as it has developed over the decades. Just what is so very troubling? The authors observe, “there has been a resurgence of a very visible gender essentialism in everyday life” (6). It can be found in feminist communities that police the boundaries of the concept “Woman” (13), which has led to the so-called “TERF Wars” (see Pearce, Erikainen, and Vincent 2020). But Kathleen Lennon and Rachel Alsop also highlight that this metaphysical presumption underscores (among other ideological commitments) the rise of right-wing populism and new nationalisms—social orientations that typically endorse restricting the reproductive rights of those who gestate and reject the legitimacy of queer communities. Significantly, as the authors note, “in recent years these movements have launched attacks on gender theory itself” (6). With these contextual factors in place, it becomes clear that this book is an intervention in public discourse as much as an academic introduction to some of the most compelling developments of gender theory. The aim of this book is to argue against gender essentialism and to provide a convincing metaphysics that gives adequate emphasis to the body’s role in ego-formation—that is, to affirm that bodily differences make a difference to the subjects we become without conceding that bodily difference determines the kind of subject we are (20). Lennon and Alsop highlight that “those who adopt gender essentialist positions most commonly anchor them in biology” (22). Appropriately, this is the focus of chapter 1. There the authors focus on evolutionary psychiatry and differences of male and female brains, noting that evolutionary psychiatry has been roundly criticized for questionbegging, meanwhile research shows that “brains reflect the lives they have lived, not just the sex of their owners” (29). But what of the sex/gender distinction wherein gender refers to masculine and feminine styles of behavior and sex concerns the traits of the body: its hormones, genes, and morphology? The authors argue that sex itself is culturally constructed (31). There is no reason, beyond the social, that sex must be categorized into a dimorphic binary, for “several distinct biological markers of maleness and femaleness— visible morphology, hormones and chromosomes—are not always found together” (33).
{"title":"Gender Theory in Troubled Times Kathleen Lennon and Rachel Alsop, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2020 (ISBN: 978-0-745-68301-0)","authors":"Louise Richardson‑Self","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2022.23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2022.23","url":null,"abstract":"What started as a second edition of Theorizing Gender: An Introduction (co-authored by Annette Fitzsimons and Rosalind Minsky) instead became this self-conscious address on the metaphysics of sex and gender. The title of the book is telling. We are indeed doing gender theory in troubled times, and these troubled times are not separable from gender theory as it has developed over the decades. Just what is so very troubling? The authors observe, “there has been a resurgence of a very visible gender essentialism in everyday life” (6). It can be found in feminist communities that police the boundaries of the concept “Woman” (13), which has led to the so-called “TERF Wars” (see Pearce, Erikainen, and Vincent 2020). But Kathleen Lennon and Rachel Alsop also highlight that this metaphysical presumption underscores (among other ideological commitments) the rise of right-wing populism and new nationalisms—social orientations that typically endorse restricting the reproductive rights of those who gestate and reject the legitimacy of queer communities. Significantly, as the authors note, “in recent years these movements have launched attacks on gender theory itself” (6). With these contextual factors in place, it becomes clear that this book is an intervention in public discourse as much as an academic introduction to some of the most compelling developments of gender theory. The aim of this book is to argue against gender essentialism and to provide a convincing metaphysics that gives adequate emphasis to the body’s role in ego-formation—that is, to affirm that bodily differences make a difference to the subjects we become without conceding that bodily difference determines the kind of subject we are (20). Lennon and Alsop highlight that “those who adopt gender essentialist positions most commonly anchor them in biology” (22). Appropriately, this is the focus of chapter 1. There the authors focus on evolutionary psychiatry and differences of male and female brains, noting that evolutionary psychiatry has been roundly criticized for questionbegging, meanwhile research shows that “brains reflect the lives they have lived, not just the sex of their owners” (29). But what of the sex/gender distinction wherein gender refers to masculine and feminine styles of behavior and sex concerns the traits of the body: its hormones, genes, and morphology? The authors argue that sex itself is culturally constructed (31). There is no reason, beyond the social, that sex must be categorized into a dimorphic binary, for “several distinct biological markers of maleness and femaleness— visible morphology, hormones and chromosomes—are not always found together” (33).","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43124635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract People who have mental health diagnoses are often subject to sanist microaggressions in which pejorative terms to describe mental illness are used to represent that which is discreditable. Such microaggressions reflect and perpetrate stigma against severe mental illness, often held unconsciously as implicit bias. In this article, I examine the sanist attitudes that underlie sanist microaggressions, analyzing some of the cognitive biases that support mental illness stigma. Then I consider what responsibility we have with respect to microaggressions. I argue that all people share in a collective responsibility to engage in acts of epistemic resistance that challenge sanist attitudes so that it is easier for bystanders who witness microaggressions, and targets of microaggressions in particular, to identify microaggressions and to point out biased behavior. The act of pointing out bias is best understood as an act of epistemic resistance that is more effective and meaningful in the context of other acts of epistemic resistance. Ultimately, whether to point out bias is an individual decision that one must make after weighing the risks involved; engaging in a range of acts of epistemic resistance, on the other hand, is a moral responsibility everyone shares.
{"title":"Responding to Sanist Microaggressions with Acts of Epistemic Resistance","authors":"Abigail Gosselin","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2022.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2022.9","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract People who have mental health diagnoses are often subject to sanist microaggressions in which pejorative terms to describe mental illness are used to represent that which is discreditable. Such microaggressions reflect and perpetrate stigma against severe mental illness, often held unconsciously as implicit bias. In this article, I examine the sanist attitudes that underlie sanist microaggressions, analyzing some of the cognitive biases that support mental illness stigma. Then I consider what responsibility we have with respect to microaggressions. I argue that all people share in a collective responsibility to engage in acts of epistemic resistance that challenge sanist attitudes so that it is easier for bystanders who witness microaggressions, and targets of microaggressions in particular, to identify microaggressions and to point out biased behavior. The act of pointing out bias is best understood as an act of epistemic resistance that is more effective and meaningful in the context of other acts of epistemic resistance. Ultimately, whether to point out bias is an individual decision that one must make after weighing the risks involved; engaging in a range of acts of epistemic resistance, on the other hand, is a moral responsibility everyone shares.","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"293 - 314"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42217989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In Major Concepts in Spanish Feminist Theory, Roberta Johnson reconstructs Spanish feminist thought in an accessible and original way. This is not a conventional history of Spanish feminism, but rather a history of Spanish feminist theory that, while preserving chronological order, is articulated around six fundamental concepts addressed in six chapters along with an introduction and an epilogue. These concepts are solitude, personality, social class, work, difference, and equality. Masterfully, Johnson takes us from one chapter to another with a unity of meaning that traverses the book. The first chapter studies the concept of solitude in the work of authors from the end of the nineteenth century to the present. From the great feminists of the nineteenth century, such as Concepción Arenal or Emilia Pardo Bazán, to the sadly and recently deceased Carmen Alborch, Spanish feminism considers solitude as a necessary condition for women in order to form their own identity and fully realize themselves as independent individuals. On the one hand, the issue of solitude can be approached from a social or external perspective, where women desire to create their own physical place. On the other, the desire for solitude can be internal, where that physical space is linked to consciousness that enables personal development, being oneself, and building an independent personality. Neither of these perspectives nullifies the importance of the relationship with others. Intimately related to solitude is the concept of personality, to which Johnson dedicates the second chapter of the book. Most of the authors that Johnson studies understand personality as a set of complex interactions between the inner and outer self. According to Johnson, Rosa Chacel was the first Spanish writer to develop the idea, suggested by other earlier authors such as Arenal or Hildegart Rodríguez, of an interaction between these two dimensions. Neither in Chacel’s works nor in María Zambrano’s (also studied by Johnson) can we find a feminist use of the concept of personality; but, as Johnson points out, their thought is easily linked to a feminist meaning. In fact, Zambrano’s concept of persona is close to other authors’ idea of personality, referring to a set of specific characteristics that distinguish one individual from others. Carmen Martín Gaite departs from the dichotomy between the interior and exterior dimensions of the person, but like Chacel and Zambrano, she believed in the possibility of discovering the authentic internal self hidden behind external impositions. Although Martín Gaite’s use of the concept of personality is ambiguous, Spanish writers generally associate it with the formation of an identity that gives women independence and dignity. That brings to light the connection with the concept of solitude, since the
{"title":"Major Concepts in Spanish Feminist Theory Roberta Johnson, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2019 (ISBN 978-1-4384-7369-7)","authors":"Marta Madruga Bajo","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2022.22","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2022.22","url":null,"abstract":"In Major Concepts in Spanish Feminist Theory, Roberta Johnson reconstructs Spanish feminist thought in an accessible and original way. This is not a conventional history of Spanish feminism, but rather a history of Spanish feminist theory that, while preserving chronological order, is articulated around six fundamental concepts addressed in six chapters along with an introduction and an epilogue. These concepts are solitude, personality, social class, work, difference, and equality. Masterfully, Johnson takes us from one chapter to another with a unity of meaning that traverses the book. The first chapter studies the concept of solitude in the work of authors from the end of the nineteenth century to the present. From the great feminists of the nineteenth century, such as Concepción Arenal or Emilia Pardo Bazán, to the sadly and recently deceased Carmen Alborch, Spanish feminism considers solitude as a necessary condition for women in order to form their own identity and fully realize themselves as independent individuals. On the one hand, the issue of solitude can be approached from a social or external perspective, where women desire to create their own physical place. On the other, the desire for solitude can be internal, where that physical space is linked to consciousness that enables personal development, being oneself, and building an independent personality. Neither of these perspectives nullifies the importance of the relationship with others. Intimately related to solitude is the concept of personality, to which Johnson dedicates the second chapter of the book. Most of the authors that Johnson studies understand personality as a set of complex interactions between the inner and outer self. According to Johnson, Rosa Chacel was the first Spanish writer to develop the idea, suggested by other earlier authors such as Arenal or Hildegart Rodríguez, of an interaction between these two dimensions. Neither in Chacel’s works nor in María Zambrano’s (also studied by Johnson) can we find a feminist use of the concept of personality; but, as Johnson points out, their thought is easily linked to a feminist meaning. In fact, Zambrano’s concept of persona is close to other authors’ idea of personality, referring to a set of specific characteristics that distinguish one individual from others. Carmen Martín Gaite departs from the dichotomy between the interior and exterior dimensions of the person, but like Chacel and Zambrano, she believed in the possibility of discovering the authentic internal self hidden behind external impositions. Although Martín Gaite’s use of the concept of personality is ambiguous, Spanish writers generally associate it with the formation of an identity that gives women independence and dignity. That brings to light the connection with the concept of solitude, since the","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44479634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
in the twenty-first century is at a crossroads: one path is represented by the corporate, neoliberal feminism espoused by the likes of
21世纪正处于十字路口：一条道路是由企业、新自由主义女权主义所代表的，这些女权主义者支持
{"title":"Feminism for the 99%: A Manifesto Cinzia Arruzza, Tithi Bhattacharya, and Nancy Fraser Brooklyn, N.Y.: Verso, 2019 (ISBN 978-1-78873-442-4)","authors":"J. Otto","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2022.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2022.19","url":null,"abstract":"in the twenty-first century is at a crossroads: one path is represented by the corporate, neoliberal feminism espoused by the likes of","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44765199","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Climate Technology, Gender, and Justice: The Standpoint of the Vulnerable Tina Sikka, E-Book: Springer, 2019 (ISBN 978-3-030-01147-5)","authors":"Benjamin Goldberg","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2022.21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2022.21","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48972862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Anti-Electra: The Radical Totem of the Girl Elizabeth von Samsonow. Translated by Anita Fricek and Stephen Zepke, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2019 (ISBN: 978-15179-0713-6)","authors":"L. Daley","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2022.20","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2022.20","url":null,"abstract":", acts","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41794151","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article explores rage in the context of Korean feminist movements. Rage as a corporeal force can be combined with other emotional modalities to achieve consistency, durability, efficiency, and intensity. These modalities are interdependent, and rage, in relation to indignation, becomes a revolutionary affect that changes power dynamics. Women's indignant rage challenges the patriarchal value system and increases women's agency. Korean women deploy the politics of rage to “Escape the Corset” and free themselves from the oppressive devices—patriarchal family structures and traditional notions of femininity and beauty—that oppress women's bodies. The “Escape the Corset” movement, driven by indignant rage, materializes the possibility of resistance and creation that puts an end to the phallic economy of desire and meaning, and it elaborates a new modality of women's life cycle and relation to the world. Unlike indignant rage, a feminist revolutionary tool, rage combined with hatred is a conservative affect that annihilates the possibility of change and maintains the status quo. The politics of rage promotes a deconstruction of the patriarchal system, joining with a subversive and cathartic joy that contains hope for a more just future.
{"title":"Escaping the Corset: Rage as a Force of Resistance and Creation in the Korean Feminist Movement","authors":"J. Yun","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2022.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2022.15","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article explores rage in the context of Korean feminist movements. Rage as a corporeal force can be combined with other emotional modalities to achieve consistency, durability, efficiency, and intensity. These modalities are interdependent, and rage, in relation to indignation, becomes a revolutionary affect that changes power dynamics. Women's indignant rage challenges the patriarchal value system and increases women's agency. Korean women deploy the politics of rage to “Escape the Corset” and free themselves from the oppressive devices—patriarchal family structures and traditional notions of femininity and beauty—that oppress women's bodies. The “Escape the Corset” movement, driven by indignant rage, materializes the possibility of resistance and creation that puts an end to the phallic economy of desire and meaning, and it elaborates a new modality of women's life cycle and relation to the world. Unlike indignant rage, a feminist revolutionary tool, rage combined with hatred is a conservative affect that annihilates the possibility of change and maintains the status quo. The politics of rage promotes a deconstruction of the patriarchal system, joining with a subversive and cathartic joy that contains hope for a more just future.","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"257 - 275"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41734274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The dispute between the transgender-rights movement and “gender-critical” activists represents a stark division in British public discourse. Although the issues of contention are numerous and require their own philosophical treatment, a core metaphysical concern underlies them. Gender-critical activists, such as Kathleen Stock, tend to argue that recognizing trans women as women requires erasing the category of biological sex. This implies that all trans women are male, and thus recognizing them as women rips female biology from the root of the category “woman.” In this article, I argue that this view is mistaken. As exogenously produced sex characteristics should count toward a person's sex classification, all trans women are (or are becoming) female.
{"title":"Trans Women Are (or Are Becoming) Female: Disputing the Endogeneity Constraint","authors":"M. Carter","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2022.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2022.12","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The dispute between the transgender-rights movement and “gender-critical” activists represents a stark division in British public discourse. Although the issues of contention are numerous and require their own philosophical treatment, a core metaphysical concern underlies them. Gender-critical activists, such as Kathleen Stock, tend to argue that recognizing trans women as women requires erasing the category of biological sex. This implies that all trans women are male, and thus recognizing them as women rips female biology from the root of the category “woman.” In this article, I argue that this view is mistaken. As exogenously produced sex characteristics should count toward a person's sex classification, all trans women are (or are becoming) female.","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"384 - 401"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42340725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Among feminist philosophers, there are two lines of argument that sexist values are illegitimate in science, focusing on epistemic or ethical problems. This article supports a third framework, elucidating how value-laden science can enable epistemic oppression. My analysis demonstrates how purported knowledge laden with sexist values can compromise epistemic autonomy and contribute to paternalism and misogyny. I exemplify these epistemic wrongs with a case study of the morning-after pill (emergency contraception) during its 2006 switch to over-the-counter availability and its new drug label from the US Food and Drug Administration that it “may prevent implantation.” Antiabortion science advisers created this label to protect zygotes based on debated value judgments that were later concealed. This zygote-centric knowledge enabled them to shape potential users by instructing “good mothers” that they ought to protect zygotes and punishing “bad mothers” by refusing their requests for the drug. Therefore, I argue that the sexist values and gender norms of antiabortionists that prioritize zygotic health are illegitimate in this context because they cause epistemic injustices and perpetuate epistemic oppression. Furthermore, I advocate against blanket protections for the “right to conscience” and “religious freedom” of healthcare providers because they reinforce the epistemic oppression of women, especially those on the margins. Content Warning: This article discusses sexual assault and refusals to provide contraception to patients, including survivors.
{"title":"Imposing Values and Enforcing Gender through Knowledge: Epistemic Oppression with the Morning-after Pill's Drug Label","authors":"Christopher ChoGlueck","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2022.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2022.11","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Among feminist philosophers, there are two lines of argument that sexist values are illegitimate in science, focusing on epistemic or ethical problems. This article supports a third framework, elucidating how value-laden science can enable epistemic oppression. My analysis demonstrates how purported knowledge laden with sexist values can compromise epistemic autonomy and contribute to paternalism and misogyny. I exemplify these epistemic wrongs with a case study of the morning-after pill (emergency contraception) during its 2006 switch to over-the-counter availability and its new drug label from the US Food and Drug Administration that it “may prevent implantation.” Antiabortion science advisers created this label to protect zygotes based on debated value judgments that were later concealed. This zygote-centric knowledge enabled them to shape potential users by instructing “good mothers” that they ought to protect zygotes and punishing “bad mothers” by refusing their requests for the drug. Therefore, I argue that the sexist values and gender norms of antiabortionists that prioritize zygotic health are illegitimate in this context because they cause epistemic injustices and perpetuate epistemic oppression. Furthermore, I advocate against blanket protections for the “right to conscience” and “religious freedom” of healthcare providers because they reinforce the epistemic oppression of women, especially those on the margins. Content Warning: This article discusses sexual assault and refusals to provide contraception to patients, including survivors.","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"315 - 342"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45891844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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