Canadian Journal of Economics-Revue Canadienne D Economique最新文献

Using the German census of the manufacturing industry, I analyze the impact of import competition on carbon emissions per unit of deflated sales (emission intensity). I combine precise information on firm-level CO$��{�\hspace{0.17em}�}_{�2�}�$ emissions with sector-level trade flows. Looking at the period 1995 until 2017, I focus on the impact of the rise of Eastern Europe and China while addressing the endogeneity of trade flows with an instrumental variable approach. The baseline results suggest that a 1 pp increase in the import penetration ratio caused a reduction of the average firm's emission intensity by approximately 0.3%. This result implies that the rise of the joint East between 1995 and 2017 kept the average firm's emission intensity 6% below the level it would have had in the absence of the East's rise. I do not find strong indication for reallocation of production towards more efficient firms. Finally, I supplement the analysis by examining the effect of export opportunities due to the East's rise. The results indicate that exporting to the East increased sales and emissions, with a small, if any, negative effect on emission intensities.

The existing empirical literature on impact of GATT/WTO membership on international trade is mixed. This paper contributes to solving the puzzle of “the missing GATT/WTO effects” by adhering closely to the theoretical foundations of the gravity model of trade. Capitalizing on the latest developments in the empirical trade literature and building a new and large data set covering 186 countries over the period 1980–2016, we estimate a theory-consistent gravity equation, which includes intra-national in addition to international trade flows. We find that joining GATT/WTO increased partial equilibrium trade between members by 140%. Our methods also deliver novel estimates of the impact of GATT/WTO on trade between members and non-member countries, indicating an increase of 72%.

Many experimental studies have assessed the relationship between the provision of information on relative income and redistribution preferences. However, the influence of information on perceived tax burden, which is considered a subjective cost of redistribution, has not been examined. This study investigates how individuals' relative income positions influence their income redistribution preferences and individual perceptions of the income tax burden. This study was conducted using a customized online survey. First, I asked respondents about their perceived income position in their country, redistribution preference and perceived tax burden. In the follow-up survey, I provided the treatment group with information on their true income positions based on the same questions as in the first survey. However, for the control group, I did not disclose their true income positions but asked them the same questions. The key findings suggest that, after learning their real income positions: (i) individuals who overestimated their income positions perceived their tax burden as higher, (ii) individuals' redistribution preferences had hardly changed and (iii) reciprocal individuals (who accounted for the largest proportion) perceived their tax burden as lower and were less likely to prefer redistribution.

The year 1960 is often presented as a break year in the economic history of Quebec and Canada. It is used to mark the beginning of the “Quiet Revolution” during which Canada's French-speaking province of Quebec underwent rapid socio-economic change in the form of rapid economic convergence with the rest of Canada and the emergence of a more expansive state (more so than in the rest of Canada). Using synthetic control methods, we analyze whether 1960 is associated with a departure from previous developments. With regards to GDP per capita, GDP per worker, household-size adjusted income, real wages and enrolment rates in primary and secondary schools, we find that 1960 was not an important date. For all macroeconomic indicators and enrolment rates, the counterfactual scenarios do not significantly differ from the actual data. For life expectancy at birth and completed schooling outcomes by schooling cohorts, we find that 1960 did mark a significant departure—albeit a modest one. We also find signs that size of government changed markedly after 1960. Shifting to other methods such as panel approach or time series strategy do not alter these results.

This study explores the industry-level effects of the FTAs that the United States signed with Chile, Australia and the Dominican Republic between 2004 and 2007. Employing a synthetic control approach, we uncover heterogeneity in post-FTA export growth across countries and industries. The study reveals that only a limited subset of industries in the US, which contributed to roughly one seventh of pre-FTA exports, experienced post-FTA export gains. No single industry consistently benefited from the FTAs with all three partners. This heterogeneity is present in countries where FTA-induced aggregate export growth is absent, as well as in those where only a few industries drive the aggregate export growth. Export increases were also concentrated in a limited range of products. Notably, only exports to Chile led to increased export intensity and diversification at both the aggregate and industry levels. These findings, robust to various specifications and estimation methods, highlight the substantial variation in FTA effects across industries and partner countries.

This paper finds that major 2006 Chinese environmental reforms creating mandatory emission reduction targets led firms to significantly reduce emissions, especially for firms in more polluting industries. A decomposition of the overall effect shows that firms relied primarily on technology upgrading (75.3%) rather than output cuts (24.7%) in meeting the regulatory changes. The driving forces for this “technique effect” are more water recycling and abatement device adoption. While polluting firms did not increase their green innovation, local equipment manufacturers—likely suppliers—did significantly increase green water patent applications, indicating an expanded environmental service market effect. Tests on firms' economic responses provide more evidence for an “internal” variant of the pollution haven hypothesis because firms' profit, capital, employment, market shares, and entry were all negatively affected by the more stringent regulation.

This study examines international spillover effects of technological shocks using a dynamic open economy model in which production tasks are automated by robots. A concentration of robot production in a few countries worldwide is essential to understanding automation advances and robot price declines in a globalized economy. Technological improvements in robot-producing countries decrease world robot prices and affect automation advances in other countries specializing in non-robot production; however, the reverse is not true. The welfare effects are also asymmetric and depend on the type of technological shocks. For example, by improving the productivity of investment in robots, the non-robot producing countries suffer from the deteriorated terms of trade and may become worse off depending on the global wealth distribution.

Border carbon taxes are considered as an important instrument to promote sustainable practices abroad and to level the playing field for domestic emission-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE) industries. We find that US emissions pricing plays a critical role in the effectiveness of border carbon taxes in protecting the international competitiveness of Canadian EITE producers. Border carbon taxes are more effective when the US follows the other OECD countries with stringent CO₂ emissions pricing than when the US abstains from emissions pricing. In the latter case, border carbon taxes reduce the competitiveness of Canadian EITE export supply to the US (Canada's most important export destination), weakening the initial protective effect of border carbon taxes on the Canadian domestic market.

We show that the presence of a welfare maximizing public firm in an oligopoly guarantees that no firm has an incentive to raise the costs of domestic private rivals. This represents another example of regulation by participation. There remains an incentive to raise the costs of the public firm and of foreign private rivals. We also explore which firms are most likely to have their costs raised and which firms are most likely to raise rivals' costs.