Canadian Journal of Economics-Revue Canadienne D Economique最新文献

In a diverse society, heterogeneous returns to public goods (PG) and public bads (PB) are more often the rule rather than the exception, and often the returns from the public pool are such that individuals who are most affected no longer have incentives to free ride on others. We consider this set-up through a laboratory experiment and investigate how heterogeneity of marginal per capita returns (MPCRs) affect economic cooperation in both PG and PB games. We also examine whether information on heterogeneity—no information, information and information with a plea to help those who are most affected by the public pool—changes cooperation. Our results show that information regarding the heterogeneity does not change individual behaviour in both PG and PB games. However, a social plea to help individuals with MPCRs of 1.20 increases average group efficiency. Average individual contributions under the social plea treatment are either maintained or increased. Those with MPCRs of 1.20 are more cooperative than their counterparts but not as completely as theoretically predicted. The exact same individual is also more cooperative under a PG game than under a PB game; a result that remains unchanged whether MPCRs are homogeneous or heterogeneous.

Despite significant changes in gender norms over the 20th century and a substantial increase in women's labour force participation, women continue to provide the majority of unpaid child care. This poses a barrier to further improvements in women's labour force participation, especially when child care is limited, inaccessible or unaffordable. This paper explores the impact of substantial increases in child care accessibility and affordability on women's labour market outcomes by exploiting the rollout of free, full-day programming for four-year-old children in Nova Scotia from 2017/18 to 2020/21 using a staggered difference-in-differences approach. The program led to a 21 percentage-point increase in the labour force participation of mothers with four-year-old children in Nova Scotia, via increased employment. Unsurprisingly, these impacts are significantly larger for women whose youngest child is four years old.

We study the effects of international trade on the oligopsony power of firms in input markets. We build a theoretical model of international trade in which firms are oligopolists in the market for final goods and oligopsonists in the market for inputs. Consistent with evidence from the literature, firms' markups over unit costs rise with the level of oligopsony power and of oligopoly power. While trade liberalization decreases market power in one market, it has the opposite effect in the other. In particular, international competition between oligopolists in final goods markets causes oligopsony power to increase and oligopoly power to decline. In a simulation, we show that the increase in oligopsony power can more than offset the reduction in oligopoly power, resulting in a net increase in markups over unit costs.

We formulate an international oligopoly model in the presence of global common ownership. We theoretically investigate how common ownership affects the volume of international trade in an oligopoly market and global welfare. We find that welfare decreases (increases) with the degree of common ownership when the international transport costs are low (high), whereas common ownership reduces international trade. This conclusion remains valid in the presence of import tariffs and asymmetric common ownership share.

Micro evidence on wages suggests that there is heterogeneity across wage contract durations. While, on average, wages are sticky, a non-negligible proportion of wages are flexible. I generalize the Gertler and Trigari model to match this heterogeneity and show that the new model closely matches observed unemployment volatility. This finding deviates from the literature proposing an alternative calibration of the standard model and arguing that large unemployment fluctuations require a small surplus from an employment relationship. However, in the multi-sector model I present, unemployment volatility arises even with the standard calibration, where the surplus is relatively large.

Turnover (sales) is frequently used in developing countries as a presumptive income tax base to economize on the costs of tax administration and taxpayer compliance. We construct a simple model where a size threshold separates firms paying turnover tax from those paying regular income tax and where firms have the option of producing in the untaxed, informal sector. The optimal turnover tax rate trades off two policy concerns: reducing informality and avoiding strategic reductions in sales by firms seeking to remain below the threshold for the regular income tax. We provide analytical results and calibrate the model to compute the optimal policy using realistic parameter values. Introducing an optimally designed turnover tax induces about 12 percentage points of previously informal enterprises to register for the presumptive regime in the calibrated model.

We look at divestments by foreign firms—a topic that has received comparatively little attention in the literature—and investigate how changes in the regulatory environment in the host country may impact on such divestment decisions. We use the implementation of China's two control zones (TCZ) policy as a “quasi-natural experiment,” using detailed firm-level combined with city-level data for the empirical analysis. Our results show that the implementation of the TCZ policy has led to higher probabilities of divestments by foreign firms in cities and industries targeted by the TCZ policy. The mechanism behind this seems to be a TCZ-induced increase in discharge fees and efforts to reduce SO₂ emissions. Allowing for heterogeneity of effects, we find that the effect is particularly strong for firms from source countries with less stringent environmental regulation and those using less advanced technology. We also show that firms using intermediates from polluting industries also experience a higher probability of divestment.

This paper discusses how import tariffs interact with transport prices in episodes of trade liberalization. We develop a model of a transport industry that operates under imperfect competition and economies of scale. Double marginalization due to market power reduces the effects of trade liberalization, while a larger trade volume may support them due to economies of scale. We use a large data set of maritime transport data and combine them with tariff data to find that economies of scale beat market power: a decline in the tariff implies a decline in freight rates.

We study the behaviour of Canadian Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth over the past 60 years. We find that the observed stagnation during the last 20 years is accounted for entirely by the oil sector. Higher oil prices made capital-intensive sources of oil like the oil sands viable to extract on a commercial scale. However, the greater input required per barrel of oil slowed TFP growth. Comparing Canadian TFP growth with that of the United States and Norway reinforces these results. However, our result should not be interpreted to carry any welfare implications.

Artificial intelligence (AI) may be the next general purpose technology. General purpose technologies, such as the steam engine and computing, can have an outsized impact on productivity through a positive feedback loop between producing and application industries. Along with the discussion of AI's potential to improve productivity come a number of policy concerns related to AI's potential to automate jobs and to create existential risk for humanity. Because of these worries, in March 2023, a widely circulated petition called for a pause in AI research. That letter asked several questions about AI's potential impact on society. This paper examines those questions through an economic lens. It highlights reasons to be optimistic about the long-run impact of AI, while underscoring short-run risks. Economic models provide an understanding of where the ambiguity lies and where it does not. Our models suggest no ambiguity on whether there will be jobs and little ambiguity on long-term productivity growth if AI diffuses widely. In contrast, there is substantial ambiguity on the implications of AI's diffusion for inequality.