Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5129/001041522x16304417658794
Steven D. Schaaf
Under what conditions will authoritarian courts issue decisions that constrain state actors? This study breaks new ground in authoritarianism research by explaining when authoritarian states are—and are not—held accountable to legal norms. I leverage evidence from interviews with Jordanian and Palestinian legal actors, original data on judicial decisions, and two years of fieldwork shadowing judges as they conducted business in the courthouse. I find that courts in Jordan and Palestine are hardly regime pawns, as judges routinely prioritize their own interests above those of regime elites. My results also demonstrate that lawsuits revealing instances of intra-state disunity are particularly good vehicles for expanding judicial authority over state activity and, further, that appellate courts are uniquely less capable of constraining state actors.
{"title":"When Do Courts Constrain the Authoritarian State? Judicial Decision-Making in Jordan and Palestine","authors":"Steven D. Schaaf","doi":"10.5129/001041522x16304417658794","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041522x16304417658794","url":null,"abstract":"Under what conditions will authoritarian courts issue decisions that constrain state actors? This study breaks new ground in authoritarianism research by explaining when authoritarian states are—and are not—held accountable to legal norms. I leverage evidence from interviews with Jordanian and Palestinian legal actors, original data on judicial decisions, and two years of fieldwork shadowing judges as they conducted business in the courthouse. I find that courts in Jordan and Palestine are hardly regime pawns, as judges routinely prioritize their own interests above those of regime elites. My results also demonstrate that lawsuits revealing instances of intra-state disunity are particularly good vehicles for expanding judicial authority over state activity and, further, that appellate courts are uniquely less capable of constraining state actors.","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70698406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5129/001041522x16337326788795
Emily Meierding
Do oil busts destabilize petrostates? This article asserts that existing political resource curse theories overpredict the likelihood of instability during oil busts because they overlook petrostates’ agency. It argues that, by employing the “petrostates’ toolkit”—a collection of strategies for mitigating the negative consequences of low oil prices—most oil producers can survive even prolonged oil busts. Through within-case comparisons of thirty petrostates’ political stability before and after the 2014 oil price collapse, it finds that most petrostates were more or equally stable during the bust than before it. The article also presents a case study showing how Saudi Arabia used the petrostates’ toolkit to remain politically stable after the 2014 collapse. The article concludes that petrostates are not “over a barrel” during oil busts.
{"title":"Over a Barrel? Oil Busts and Petrostate Stability","authors":"Emily Meierding","doi":"10.5129/001041522x16337326788795","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041522x16337326788795","url":null,"abstract":"Do oil busts destabilize petrostates? This article asserts that existing political resource curse theories overpredict the likelihood of instability during oil busts because they overlook petrostates’ agency. It argues that, by employing the “petrostates’ toolkit”—a collection of strategies for mitigating the negative consequences of low oil prices—most oil producers can survive even prolonged oil busts. Through within-case comparisons of thirty petrostates’ political stability before and after the 2014 oil price collapse, it finds that most petrostates were more or equally stable during the bust than before it. The article also presents a case study showing how Saudi Arabia used the petrostates’ toolkit to remain politically stable after the 2014 collapse. The article concludes that petrostates are not “over a barrel” during oil busts.","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70698478","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5129/001041522x16346476699950
We know little about repression’s effects on opposition party mobilization under electoral authoritarianism. I argue that targeted repression of opposition leaders has both direct negative effects on mobilization and indirect effects on activist and voter support. However, party organizations and ideological leadership can adapt to mitigate targeted repression’s effects. In Germany, from 1878–1890 the social democratic party was banned and its leaders were expelled from their home districts. I estimate difference-in-differences models that leverage variation in expulsion timing and frequency to estimate their effects on electoral outcomes. Expulsions caused declines in social democrats’ electoral support. However, their effects diminished with each additional expulsion and after the first election post-expulsions, as local party organizations adapted to maintain mobilization in electoral districts despite targeted repression.
{"title":"Authoritarian Repression and Electoral Opposition: Mobilization under Germany’s Antisocialist Law","authors":"","doi":"10.5129/001041522x16346476699950","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041522x16346476699950","url":null,"abstract":"We know little about repression’s effects on opposition party mobilization under electoral authoritarianism. I argue that targeted repression of opposition leaders has both direct negative effects on mobilization and indirect effects on activist and voter support. However, party organizations and ideological leadership can adapt to mitigate targeted repression’s effects. In Germany, from 1878–1890 the social democratic party was banned and its leaders were expelled from their home districts. I estimate difference-in-differences models that leverage variation in expulsion timing and frequency to estimate their effects on electoral outcomes. Expulsions caused declines in social democrats’ electoral support. However, their effects diminished with each additional expulsion and after the first election post-expulsions, as local party organizations adapted to maintain mobilization in electoral districts despite targeted repression.","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70698524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5129/001041521X16115808641104
Lindsay Mayka
Governments throughout the world invoke human rights ideas to motivate policy reforms. What impact do rights-based frames have on the policy process? I argue that rights-based frames can generate new resources and institutional opportunities that restructure battles over public policy. These resources and opportunities can both initially legitimate state interventions that violate rights, while also creating openings to hold governments accountable for abuses committed by the state in the name of human rights. I develop this argument by analyzing a militarized security intervention in Bogotá, Colombia, which the local government framed as necessary to stop the commercial sexual exploitation of children—yet yielded new rights violations. This article reveals the material consequences of human rights discourses in battles over policing and urban planning.
{"title":"The Power of Human Rights Frames in Urban Security: Lessons from Bogotá","authors":"Lindsay Mayka","doi":"10.5129/001041521X16115808641104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041521X16115808641104","url":null,"abstract":"Governments throughout the world invoke human rights ideas to motivate policy reforms. What impact do rights-based frames have on the policy process? I argue that rights-based frames can generate new resources and institutional opportunities that restructure battles over public policy. These resources and opportunities can both initially legitimate state interventions that violate rights, while also creating openings to hold governments accountable for abuses committed by the state in the name of human rights. I develop this argument by analyzing a militarized security intervention in Bogotá, Colombia, which the local government framed as necessary to stop the commercial sexual exploitation of children—yet yielded new rights violations. This article reveals the material consequences of human rights discourses in battles over policing and urban planning.","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70697159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5129/001041522X16195268352999
D. Pion-Berlin, Igor Acácio
Social protests are a feature of democracy in Latin America. When the police cannot handle them, governments, facing threats to their tenure, are tempted to order the armed forces to step in. The military, when ordered to deploy in counter-protest operations, exhibits behaviors ranging from defiance to conditional and full compliance. The article investigates the sources of variation in military responses to mass protests, leveraging a small-n comparative analysis and a diverse case selection strategy. It draws on qualitative evidence from Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador, democracies with a history of protests. It finds that a combination of the judicial risks soldiers assume if they repress, professional mission preferences, and social identity between the military and the protesters are the most compelling explanations for military responses.
{"title":"Explaining Military Responses to Protests in Latin American Democracies","authors":"D. Pion-Berlin, Igor Acácio","doi":"10.5129/001041522X16195268352999","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041522X16195268352999","url":null,"abstract":"Social protests are a feature of democracy in Latin America. When the police cannot handle them, governments, facing threats to their tenure, are tempted to order the armed forces to step in. The military, when ordered to deploy in counter-protest operations, exhibits behaviors ranging from defiance to conditional and full compliance. The article investigates the sources of variation in military responses to mass protests, leveraging a small-n comparative analysis and a diverse case selection strategy. It draws on qualitative evidence from Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador, democracies with a history of protests. It finds that a combination of the judicial risks soldiers assume if they repress, professional mission preferences, and social identity between the military and the protesters are the most compelling explanations for military responses.","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70697592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5129/001041522x16281740895086
Eric Mosinger, Kai M. Thaler, Diana Paz García, Charlotte Fowler
Are long-standing, widespread grievances a necessary condition for civil resistance campaigns? We argue historical framing can enable sudden mass uprisings even where long-standing anti-regime grievances are absent. Protest cascades can develop to challenge relatively stable, popular governments through four interdependent historical framing mechanisms. First, protesters and bystanders may draw analogies to historical contentious episodes. Second, individuals or groups may imagine themselves occupying paradigmatic roles from past popular struggles, offering prescriptions for action. Third, protesters can adopt symbolic and tactical repertoires from previous contentious episodes. Finally, protesters may concentrate protests within symbolic space. We develop our theory with evidence from Nicaragua’s 2018 mass uprising, which nearly toppled previously-popular President Daniel Ortega, after violence against protesters activated powerful frames resonating with Nicaragua’s history of dictatorship and revolution.
{"title":"Civil Resistance in the Shadow of the Revolution: Historical Framing in Nicaragua’s Sudden Uprising","authors":"Eric Mosinger, Kai M. Thaler, Diana Paz García, Charlotte Fowler","doi":"10.5129/001041522x16281740895086","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041522x16281740895086","url":null,"abstract":"Are long-standing, widespread grievances a necessary condition for civil resistance campaigns? We argue historical framing can enable sudden mass uprisings even where long-standing anti-regime grievances are absent. Protest cascades can develop to challenge relatively stable, popular governments through four interdependent historical framing mechanisms. First, protesters and bystanders may draw analogies to historical contentious episodes. Second, individuals or groups may imagine themselves occupying paradigmatic roles from past popular struggles, offering prescriptions for action. Third, protesters can adopt symbolic and tactical repertoires from previous contentious episodes. Finally, protesters may concentrate protests within symbolic space. We develop our theory with evidence from Nicaragua’s 2018 mass uprising, which nearly toppled previously-popular President Daniel Ortega, after violence against protesters activated powerful frames resonating with Nicaragua’s history of dictatorship and revolution.","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70697821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5129/001041522x16240414667941
Dina Bishara, Sharan Grewal
Under what conditions do trade unions participate in elections during democratic transitions? Conventional explanations focus on unions’ economic interests, organizational power, and militancy in the lead-up to democratization. The behavior of the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), however, challenges these expectations. Despite its organizational strength and prominent role in the country’s transition, as well as the presence of economic incentives for participation, the UGTT has eschewed formal electoral participation. This article leverages this case to theorize an additional factor shaping electoral behavior: internal cohesion. Drawing on in-depth interviews with union leaders and original survey data of union members, we show how the threat of internal fragmentation acts as a powerful internal constraint, even in situations where unions are otherwise well-positioned to engage in elections.
{"title":"Political, Not Partisan: The Tunisian General Labor Union under Democracy","authors":"Dina Bishara, Sharan Grewal","doi":"10.5129/001041522x16240414667941","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041522x16240414667941","url":null,"abstract":"Under what conditions do trade unions participate in elections during democratic transitions? Conventional explanations focus on unions’ economic interests, organizational power, and militancy in the lead-up to democratization. The behavior of the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), however, challenges these expectations. Despite its organizational strength and prominent role in the country’s transition, as well as the presence of economic incentives for participation, the UGTT has eschewed formal electoral participation. This article leverages this case to theorize an additional factor shaping electoral behavior: internal cohesion. Drawing on in-depth interviews with union leaders and original survey data of union members, we show how the threat of internal fragmentation acts as a powerful internal constraint, even in situations where unions are otherwise well-positioned to engage in elections.","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70697899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5129/001041522x16382201562711
Thomas R. Vargas
What explains why some governments advanced decentralized education in the 1990s while others shied away from such efforts? Some arguments suggest that decentralization was pursued to improve the coverage and quality of education. Others point to partisanship, ideology, or diffusion. Drawing on case studies of El Salvador and Paraguay, I argue instead that governments pursued education decentralization in part because it could be deployed as a political weapon to weaken teachers’ unions affiliated with the opposition, thus depressing mobilization and votes for their rivals. These findings contribute to the literature on decentralization by highlighting a new political motivation fueling decentralization efforts across the developing world—the demobilization of the opposition.
{"title":"Decentralization as a Political Weapon: Education Politics in El Salvador and Paraguay","authors":"Thomas R. Vargas","doi":"10.5129/001041522x16382201562711","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041522x16382201562711","url":null,"abstract":"What explains why some governments advanced decentralized education in the 1990s while others shied away from such efforts? Some arguments suggest that decentralization was pursued to improve the coverage and quality of education. Others point to partisanship, ideology, or diffusion. Drawing on case studies of El Salvador and Paraguay, I argue instead that governments pursued education decentralization in part because it could be deployed as a political weapon to weaken teachers’ unions affiliated with the opposition, thus depressing mobilization and votes for their rivals. These findings contribute to the literature on decentralization by highlighting a new political motivation fueling decentralization efforts across the developing world—the demobilization of the opposition.","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70699053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5129/001041521x16003831042567
Harris Doshay
When facing state-backed repression, why do groups sometimes band together in solidarity and sometimes fail to do so? This study contributes to the literature on repression by studying how and why repressed groups react to repression, focusing on how registered civil society groups affect solidarity. Specifically, I trace the impact of the Chinese Communist Party's Cross Demolition Campaign on patterns of solidarity and victim blaming among Christian Churches. I further demonstrate conditions under which repressed group members become more fragmented and scattered rather than more unified. Based on evidence from sixty-four elite and mass interviews, I find that registered groups' legibility constrains their members, thus enabling dynamics of victim-blaming that hinder solidarity and further empowering the autocrat to divide and conquer potential opposition.
{"title":"Solidarity or Distancing? How Official Status Influences Chinese Protestant Reactions to Repression","authors":"Harris Doshay","doi":"10.5129/001041521x16003831042567","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041521x16003831042567","url":null,"abstract":"When facing state-backed repression, why do groups sometimes band together in solidarity and sometimes fail to do so? This study contributes to the literature on repression by studying how and why repressed groups react to repression, focusing on how registered civil society groups affect solidarity. Specifically, I trace the impact of the Chinese Communist Party's Cross Demolition Campaign on patterns of solidarity and victim blaming among Christian Churches. I further demonstrate conditions under which repressed group members become more fragmented and scattered rather than more unified. Based on evidence from sixty-four elite and mass interviews, I find that registered groups' legibility constrains their members, thus enabling dynamics of victim-blaming that hinder solidarity and further empowering the autocrat to divide and conquer potential opposition.","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70696915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5129/001041522X16167712348135
P. Andersson
Recent research claims that the link between partisanship and policy is weak and that left-wing governments tax the poor surprisingly heavily. In this article, I argue that left-wing taxation depends on the institutional context, not constraints from unions or overall spending. Using novel data, I demonstrate that the left tax more regressively in countries using proportional electoral systems, and more progressively in majoritarian countries. The political mechanism is evaluated in a comparison of Swedish and British tax policy after WWII. Uncertainty over future influence made the left in Britain wary of consumption tax, while the left in Sweden combined consumption tax with expanded social programs. Political risk shaped the strategies of key actors and helps explain the divergence in tax policy during this period.
{"title":"Taxation and Left-wing Redistribution: The Politics of Consumption Tax in Britain and Sweden","authors":"P. Andersson","doi":"10.5129/001041522X16167712348135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5129/001041522X16167712348135","url":null,"abstract":"Recent research claims that the link between partisanship and policy is weak and that left-wing governments tax the poor surprisingly heavily. In this article, I argue that left-wing taxation depends on the institutional context, not constraints from unions or overall spending. Using novel data, I demonstrate that the left tax more regressively in countries using proportional electoral systems, and more progressively in majoritarian countries. The political mechanism is evaluated in a comparison of Swedish and British tax policy after WWII. Uncertainty over future influence made the left in Britain wary of consumption tax, while the left in Sweden combined consumption tax with expanded social programs. Political risk shaped the strategies of key actors and helps explain the divergence in tax policy during this period.","PeriodicalId":47960,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70697272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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