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An assignment problem with interdependent valuations and externalities 具有相互依赖的价值和外部性的分配问题
IF 1.3 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2023-12-14 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01538-5
Tatiana Daddario, Richard P. McLean, Andrew Postlewaite

In this paper, we take a mechanism design approach to optimal assignment problems with asymmetrically informed buyers. In addition, the surplus generated by an assignment of a buyer to a seller may be adversely affected by externalities generated by other assignments. The problem is complicated by several factors. Buyers know their own valuations and externality costs but do not know this same information for other buyers. Buyers also receive private signals correlated with the state and, consequently, the implementation problem exhibits interdependent valuations. This precludes a naive application of the VCG mechanism and to overcome this interdependency problem, we construct a two-stage mechanism. In the first stage, we exploit correlation in the firms signals about the state to induce truthful reporting of observed signals. Given that buyers are honest in stage 1, we then use a VCG-like mechanism in stage 2 that induces honest reporting of valuation and externality functions.

本文采用一种机制设计方法来研究具有不对称信息购买者的最优分配问题。此外，将买方转让给卖方所产生的盈余可能会受到其他转让所产生的外部性的不利影响。这个问题因几个因素而复杂化。买家知道自己的估值和外部性成本，但不知道其他买家的信息。买家也接收到与国家相关的私人信号，因此，执行问题表现出相互依赖的估值。这排除了VCG机制的幼稚应用，为了克服这种相互依赖的问题，我们构建了一个两阶段的机制。在第一阶段，我们利用企业状态信号的相关性来诱导观察到的信号的真实报告。假设买方在第一阶段是诚实的，那么我们在第二阶段使用类似于vcg的机制，诱导诚实地报告估值和外部性函数。
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引用次数: 0
Environmental quality along the process of economic growth: a theoretical reappraisal 经济增长过程中的环境质量:一个理论再评价
IF 1.3 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2023-11-18 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01520-1
Maxime Menuet, Alexandru Minea, Patrick Villieu, Anastasios Xepapadeas

This paper studies the dual interaction between economic growth and environmental quality in an endogenous growth model. We exhibit multiple equilibria and complex local and global dynamics, resulting in potential indeterminacy, hysteresis effects, or long-lasting growth and environmental cycles. From a policy perspective, we reveal that changes in the environmental policy should be handled with care, as they may generate aggregate instability or condemn the economy to an environmental poverty trap associated with a possible irreversibility of environmental degradation. Lastly, our analysis provides a reassessment of pollution taxes, which are found to improve long-run economic growth when the model is well-determined, but reduce it in the presence of indeterminacy.

本文在内生增长模型中研究了经济增长与环境质量的双重相互作用。我们表现出多重平衡和复杂的局部和全局动态，导致潜在的不确定性、滞后效应或长期的生长和环境循环。从政策的角度来看，我们认为环境政策的变化应该谨慎处理，因为它们可能会产生总体不稳定，或使经济陷入与环境退化可能不可逆转相关的环境贫困陷阱。最后，我们的分析提供了对污染税的重新评估，发现当模型确定良好时，污染税可以改善长期经济增长，但在存在不确定性的情况下会降低经济增长。
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引用次数: 0
Achieving the maximum size for exchange problems with dichotomous preferences 实现具有二分类偏好的交换问题的最大规模
IF 1.3 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2023-11-17 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01536-7
Yan Long

We consider an exchange problem with dichotomous preferences, and agents endowed with acceptable (unacceptable) objects can exchange their endowments with other acceptable (unacceptable) objects in order to achieve the “maximum size” of the problem, that is, the maximum number of agents who obtain acceptable objects. We observe that the priority mechanisms appeared in the literature before are not fully incentive-compatible—agents may pretend that their endowments are acceptable to themselves to get better results. We construct a new class of mechanisms called “endowment-respecting priority mechanisms” to solve this problem. Our mechanisms are dominant strategy incentive-compatible, individually rational, and always achieve the maximum size.

我们考虑一个具有二分类偏好的交换问题，具有可接受(不可接受)对象的智能体可以与其他可接受(不可接受)对象交换其禀赋，以实现问题的“最大规模”，即获得可接受对象的智能体的最大数量。我们观察到，之前文献中出现的优先机制并不是完全激励兼容的——代理人可能会假装他们的禀赋是自己可以接受的，以获得更好的结果。为了解决这一问题，我们构建了一类新的机制，称为“尊重禀赋的优先机制”。我们的机制具有优势策略、激励相容、个体理性、总能达到最大规模的特点。
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引用次数: 0
The economic impact of lockdown and bounded treatment capability for an epidemic without vaccine 封锁和有限的治疗能力对无疫苗流行病的经济影响
3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2023-11-10 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01531-y
Konstantin Kogan, Fouad El Ouardighi, Avi Herbon
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引用次数: 0
Optimal allocations in growth models with private information 私有信息下增长模型的最优配置
3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2023-11-06 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01527-8
Tom Krebs, Martin Scheffel
Abstract This paper considers a class of growth models with idiosyncratic human capital risk and private information about individual effort choices (moral hazard). Households are infinitely-lived and have preferences that allow for a time-additive expected utility representation with a one-period utility function that is additive over consumption and effort as well as logarithmic over consumption. Human capital investment is risky due to idiosyncratic shocks that follow a Markov process with transition probabilities that depend on effort choices. The production process is represented by an aggregate production function that uses physical capital and human capital as input factors. We show that constrained optimal allocations are simple in the sense that individual effort levels and individual consumption growth rates are history-independent. Further, constrained optimal allocations are the solutions to a recursive social planner problem that is simple in the sense that exogenous shocks are the only state variables. We also show that constrained optimal allocations can be decentralized as competitive equilibrium allocations of a market economy with a simple tax- and transfer scheme. Finally, it is always optimal to subsidize human capital investment in the market economy.
摘要考虑一类具有特殊人力资本风险和个体努力选择(道德风险)私有信息的增长模型。家庭是无限大的，并且具有偏好，允许时间加性预期效用表示，具有一周期效用函数，该函数对消费和努力具有加性，对消费具有对数性。人力资本投资是有风险的，因为特殊冲击遵循马尔可夫过程，其转移概率取决于努力选择。生产过程用一个以物质资本和人力资本为投入要素的总生产函数来表示。我们表明，在个人努力水平和个人消费增长率与历史无关的意义上，约束最优配置是简单的。此外，约束最优分配是递归社会计划问题的解决方案，该问题很简单，因为外生冲击是唯一的状态变量。我们还证明了约束最优分配可以分散为具有简单税收和转移方案的市场经济的竞争均衡分配。最后，在市场经济条件下，对人力资本投资进行补贴总是最优的。
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引用次数: 0
Static and dynamic inefficiencies in an optimizing model of epidemics 流行病优化模型中的静态和动态低效率
3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2023-11-06 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01533-w
Pietro Garibaldi, Espen R. Moen, Christopher A. Pissarides
Abstract Several externalities arise when agents shield optimally to avoid infection during an epidemic. We classify externalities into static and dynamic and compare the decentralized and optimal solutions when agents derive utility from social interaction. For low infection costs agents shield too little; for high costs they shield too much because of a “rat race to shield”: they delay social action until other agents contract the disease and society reaches herd immunity. Other externalities drive more wedges between the private and social outcomes. The expectation of a fully effective vaccine that ends the disease faster changes results, reversing excessive shielding.
当病原体在流行病期间最佳地屏蔽以避免感染时，会产生一些外部性。我们将外部性分为静态外部性和动态外部性，并比较了代理从社会互动中获得效用时的分散解决方案和最优解决方案。为了降低感染成本，药物保护的太少;由于“激烈的保护竞争”，他们的保护成本过高:他们推迟了社会行动，直到其他代理人感染疾病，社会达到群体免疫。其他外部性在私人和社会结果之间造成了更多的分歧。人们期望一种完全有效的疫苗能更快地结束疾病，这改变了结果，扭转了过度屏蔽的局面。
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引用次数: 0
Entrepreneurship and misallocation in production network economies 生产网络经济中的企业家精神与错配
3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2023-11-04 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01535-8
Tiago Cavalcanti, Angelo Mendes, Pierluca Pannella
Abstract This paper investigates how sectoral linkages amplify or diminish misallocation at the intensive and extensive margins. Our analysis is based on a multisector general equilibrium model with input–output linkages, heterogeneous entrepreneurial abilities, and endogenous occupational choice. Distortions affect the intensive use of production inputs and they also impact the agents’ occupational decisions, misallocating the mass and type of entrepreneurs in different sectors of production. When the most distorted sectors are upstream (downstream), input–output linkages amplify (diminish) the loss from entreprenurial misallocation. We calibrate the model to the US and quantify the output losses from sectoral corporate taxes, decomposing the role of networks and the extensive margin decisions. We find that sectoral linkages quadruple the loss from the misallocation of entrepreneurs. We study an entry subsidy program, showing that it should target those sectors whose marginal entrepreneurs suffer larger profit losses, even if they are not necessarily the most distorted.
摘要本文研究了部门联系如何放大或减少集约化和粗放化边际的错配。我们的分析基于一个具有投入产出联系、异质性创业能力和内生职业选择的多部门一般均衡模型。扭曲影响了生产投入的集约使用，也影响了代理人的职业决策，在不同的生产部门错误地分配了企业家的数量和类型。当最扭曲的部门在上游(下游)时，投入产出联系放大(减少)了企业错配造成的损失。我们根据美国调整了模型，量化了行业企业税造成的产出损失，分解了网络的作用和广泛的利润率决策。我们发现，部门联系使企业家配置不当造成的损失增加了四倍。我们研究了一个进入补贴计划，表明它应该针对那些边际企业家遭受更大利润损失的行业，即使他们不一定是最扭曲的。
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引用次数: 0
Diversification and information in contests 竞赛中的多样化和信息化
3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2023-11-03 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01532-x
Jorge Lemus, Emil Temnyalov
Abstract We study contests with technological uncertainty, where contestants can invest in different technologies of uncertain value. The principal, who is also uncertain about the value of the technologies, can disclose an informative yet noisy public signal about the merit of each technology. The signal can focus contestants’ investments into more promising technologies or increase diversification. We characterize the principal’s optimal disclosure of information about the technologies, which depends on the value of diversification, the informativeness of available signals, and the ex-ante beliefs of the likelihood of success for each technology. We also find that under some conditions offering larger prizes or having more contestants decreases the extent of information disclosure.
摘要本文研究了具有技术不确定性的竞赛，参赛者可以投资不同的价值不确定的技术。委托人也不确定这些技术的价值，他可以披露关于每种技术优点的信息丰富但嘈杂的公共信号。这个信号可以让参赛者将投资集中在更有前途的技术上，或者增加投资的多样化。我们描述了委托人对技术信息的最优披露，这取决于多样化的价值、可用信号的信息量和对每种技术成功可能性的事前信念。我们还发现，在某些条件下，提供更大的奖品或更多的参赛者会降低信息披露的程度。
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引用次数: 0
Epictetusian rationality Epictetusian理性
3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2023-10-31 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01530-z
Gregory Ponthiere
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引用次数: 0
Allocation rules of indivisible prizes in team contests 团体赛中不可分奖品的分配规则
3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2023-10-30 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01534-9
Hideo Konishi, Nicolas Sahuguet, Benoît S. Y. Crutzen
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