This paper explores possible biases in open peer-review using data from the English superior courts. Exploiting the random timing of on-the-job interaction between reviewers and reviewees, we find evidence that reviewers are reluctant to reverse the judgments of reviewees with whom they are about to interact, and that this effect is stronger when reviewer and reviewee share the same rank. The average bias is substantial: the proportion of reviewer affirmances is 30% points higher in the group where reviewers know they will soon work with their reviewee, relative to groups where such interaction is absent. Our results suggest reforms for the judicial listing process, and caution against recent trends in performance appraisal techniques and scientific publishing. (JEL A12, C21, K40, Z13)
{"title":"Bias in Open Peer-Review: Evidence from the English Superior Courts","authors":"Jordi Blanes i Vidal, C. Leaver","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWV004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWV004","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores possible biases in open peer-review using data from the English superior courts. Exploiting the random timing of on-the-job interaction between reviewers and reviewees, we find evidence that reviewers are reluctant to reverse the judgments of reviewees with whom they are about to interact, and that this effect is stronger when reviewer and reviewee share the same rank. The average bias is substantial: the proportion of reviewer affirmances is 30% points higher in the group where reviewers know they will soon work with their reviewee, relative to groups where such interaction is absent. Our results suggest reforms for the judicial listing process, and caution against recent trends in performance appraisal techniques and scientific publishing. (JEL A12, C21, K40, Z13)","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"39 1","pages":"431-471"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2015-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73509474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using a newly assembled dataset, we empirically investigate the effects of subcontracting on procurement auction prices in Italy. In this setting, the pre-qualifications required for firms aiming to bid on public contracts determine the firms’ different subcontracting formats. We find that fully qualified firms in a position to choose whether to subcontract generally offer lower prices than partially qualified firms, which must proceed with mandatory subcontracts. This result indicates that the firms’ voluntary arrangements tend to improve market performance, while imposed arrangements tend to worsen market performance, in the public procurement supply-chain. (JEL H57, L23, L24, D44)
{"title":"Firms’ Qualifications and Subcontracting in Public Procurement: An Empirical Investigation","authors":"L. Moretti, P. Valbonesi","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWV001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWV001","url":null,"abstract":"Using a newly assembled dataset, we empirically investigate the effects of subcontracting on procurement auction prices in Italy. In this setting, the pre-qualifications required for firms aiming to bid on public contracts determine the firms’ different subcontracting formats. We find that fully qualified firms in a position to choose whether to subcontract generally offer lower prices than partially qualified firms, which must proceed with mandatory subcontracts. This result indicates that the firms’ voluntary arrangements tend to improve market performance, while imposed arrangements tend to worsen market performance, in the public procurement supply-chain. (JEL H57, L23, L24, D44)","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"12 1","pages":"568-598"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2015-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78282162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Williamson’s 1976 study of natural-monopoly franchise bidding launched extensive debate concerning the degree to which transaction-cost problems afflict government franchising. We propose that municipalities vary in ability to discipline franchisees, and that this heterogeneous ability affects franchise renewal patterns and the quasi-rents that franchisees extract. We study provision of municipal water services in France, a setting characterized by both direct public provision and franchised private providers. We find that small municipalities pay a significant price premium for franchisee-provided water when compared with publicly provided water; in contrast, large municipalities do not pay a premium on average. Further, large municipalities are less likely to renew an incumbent franchisee that charges an "excessive" price, while small municipalities’ renewal patterns are not influenced by franchisees’ excessive pricing. We interpret the results as evidence that although large municipalities can discipline franchisees and thus prevent extraction of quasi-rents, small municipalities are less able to do so due to weaker outside options. (JEL: H0, H7, K00, L33)
{"title":"Water Under the Bridge: Determinants of Franchise Renewal in Water Provision","authors":"Eshien Chong, Stéphane Saussier, B. Silverman","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWV010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWV010","url":null,"abstract":"Williamson’s 1976 study of natural-monopoly franchise bidding launched extensive debate concerning the degree to which transaction-cost problems afflict government franchising. We propose that municipalities vary in ability to discipline franchisees, and that this heterogeneous ability affects franchise renewal patterns and the quasi-rents that franchisees extract. We study provision of municipal water services in France, a setting characterized by both direct public provision and franchised private providers. We find that small municipalities pay a significant price premium for franchisee-provided water when compared with publicly provided water; in contrast, large municipalities do not pay a premium on average. Further, large municipalities are less likely to renew an incumbent franchisee that charges an \"excessive\" price, while small municipalities’ renewal patterns are not influenced by franchisees’ excessive pricing. We interpret the results as evidence that although large municipalities can discipline franchisees and thus prevent extraction of quasi-rents, small municipalities are less able to do so due to weaker outside options. (JEL: H0, H7, K00, L33)","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"45 2 1","pages":"3-39"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2015-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83404476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We introduce a new method to measure the ideology of state Supreme Court justices using campaign finance records. In addition to recovering ideal point estimates for both incumbent and challenger candidates in judicial elections, the method’s unified estimation framework recovers judicial ideal points in a common ideological space with a diverse set of candidates for state and federal office, thus facilitating comparisons across states and institutions. After discussing the methodology and establishing measure validity, we present results for state supreme courts from the early 1990s onward. We find that the ideological preferences of justices play an important role in explaining state Supreme Court decision-making. We then demonstrate the greatly improved empirical tractability for testing separation-of-powers models of state judicial, legislative, and executive officials with an illustrative example from a recent political battle in Wisconsin that ensnared all three branches.
{"title":"A Common-Space Measure of State Supreme Court Ideology","authors":"Adam Bonica, Michael J. Woodruff","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWU016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWU016","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a new method to measure the ideology of state Supreme Court justices using campaign finance records. In addition to recovering ideal point estimates for both incumbent and challenger candidates in judicial elections, the method’s unified estimation framework recovers judicial ideal points in a common ideological space with a diverse set of candidates for state and federal office, thus facilitating comparisons across states and institutions. After discussing the methodology and establishing measure validity, we present results for state supreme courts from the early 1990s onward. We find that the ideological preferences of justices play an important role in explaining state Supreme Court decision-making. We then demonstrate the greatly improved empirical tractability for testing separation-of-powers models of state judicial, legislative, and executive officials with an illustrative example from a recent political battle in Wisconsin that ensnared all three branches.","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"11 1","pages":"472-498"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2015-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79961780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper combines Milgrom and Roberts’s influence-activity paradigm with the alienable control-rights approach of the Property Rights Theory to develop a unified theory of organizational practices and firm boundaries. Business relationships are optimally organized to curtail influence activities—costly activities aimed at persuading decision makers. Sometimes, rigid organizational practices that reduce ex post decision-making quality may be adopted if they reduce managers’ incentives to engage in influence activities. Unifying control (integration) may improve ex post decision making, but it intensifies disempowered managers’ returns to influence activities unless accompanied with rigid organizational practices. Interpreting influence costs under non-integration as "haggling costs" between firms and rigid organizational practices under integration as "bureaucracy". this model provides a unified account of the costs of both markets and hierarchies that accords with Williamson’s classic trade-off. Under this view, however, bureaucracy within firms is not a cost of integration, but rather an endogenous response to influence activities. (JEL D02, D23, D73, D83.)
{"title":"An Influence-Cost Model of Organizational Practices and Firm Boundaries","authors":"M. Powell","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWV005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWV005","url":null,"abstract":"This paper combines Milgrom and Roberts’s influence-activity paradigm with the alienable control-rights approach of the Property Rights Theory to develop a unified theory of organizational practices and firm boundaries. Business relationships are optimally organized to curtail influence activities—costly activities aimed at persuading decision makers. Sometimes, rigid organizational practices that reduce ex post decision-making quality may be adopted if they reduce managers’ incentives to engage in influence activities. Unifying control (integration) may improve ex post decision making, but it intensifies disempowered managers’ returns to influence activities unless accompanied with rigid organizational practices. Interpreting influence costs under non-integration as \"haggling costs\" between firms and rigid organizational practices under integration as \"bureaucracy\". this model provides a unified account of the costs of both markets and hierarchies that accords with Williamson’s classic trade-off. Under this view, however, bureaucracy within firms is not a cost of integration, but rather an endogenous response to influence activities. (JEL D02, D23, D73, D83.)","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"27 1","pages":"104-142"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2015-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78159775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) are new organizations created by the Affordable Care Act to encourage more efficient, integrated care delivery. To promote efficiency, ACOs sign contracts under which they keep a fraction of the savings from keeping costs below target provided they also maintain quality levels. To promote integration and facilitate measurement, ACOs are required to have at least 5000 enrollees and so must coordinate across many providers. We calibrate a model of optimal ACO incentives using proprietary performance measures from a large insurer. Our key finding is that free-riding is a severe problem and causes optimal incentive payments to exceed cost savings unless ACOs simultaneously achieve extremely large efficiency gains. This implies that successful ACOs will likely rely on motivational strategies that amplify the effects of under-powered incentives. These motivational strategies raise important questions about the limits of ACOs as a policy for promoting more efficient, integrated care (JEL D23, D86, I12, L14, L24, M52).
{"title":"Structuring Incentives within Accountable Care Organizations","authors":"B. Frandsen, James B. Rebitzer","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWU010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWU010","url":null,"abstract":"Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) are new organizations created by the Affordable Care Act to encourage more efficient, integrated care delivery. To promote efficiency, ACOs sign contracts under which they keep a fraction of the savings from keeping costs below target provided they also maintain quality levels. To promote integration and facilitate measurement, ACOs are required to have at least 5000 enrollees and so must coordinate across many providers. We calibrate a model of optimal ACO incentives using proprietary performance measures from a large insurer. Our key finding is that free-riding is a severe problem and causes optimal incentive payments to exceed cost savings unless ACOs simultaneously achieve extremely large efficiency gains. This implies that successful ACOs will likely rely on motivational strategies that amplify the effects of under-powered incentives. These motivational strategies raise important questions about the limits of ACOs as a policy for promoting more efficient, integrated care (JEL D23, D86, I12, L14, L24, M52).","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"3 1","pages":"77-103"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2015-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75131076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Corruption is usually depicted in one of two ways: as stemming from a lack of government accountability, or from a lack of capacity. Neither depiction predicts that the structure of institutions meant to control corruption should vary across autocratic regimes. If corruption results from moral hazard between politicians and citizens, then all unaccountable governments should eschew anticorruption bodies. If rent-seeking stems from moral hazard between politicians and bureaucrats, all governments should create anticorruption bodies. We offer an explanation for why unaccountable governments vary in their willingness to create anticorruption institutions. Autocrats create such bodies to deter ideologically disaffected members of the populace from entering the bureaucracy. Anticorruption institutions act as a commitment by the elite to restrict the monetary benefits from bureaucratic office, thus ensuring that only zealous supporters of the elite will pursue bureaucratic posts. We illustrate these arguments with case studies of South Korea and Rwanda. (JEL D73, P48)
{"title":"Corruption and Ideology in Autocracies","authors":"J. Hollyer, Léonard Wantchékon","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWU015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWU015","url":null,"abstract":"Corruption is usually depicted in one of two ways: as stemming from a lack of government accountability, or from a lack of capacity. Neither depiction predicts that the structure of institutions meant to control corruption should vary across autocratic regimes. If corruption results from moral hazard between politicians and citizens, then all unaccountable governments should eschew anticorruption bodies. If rent-seeking stems from moral hazard between politicians and bureaucrats, all governments should create anticorruption bodies. We offer an explanation for why unaccountable governments vary in their willingness to create anticorruption institutions. Autocrats create such bodies to deter ideologically disaffected members of the populace from entering the bureaucracy. Anticorruption institutions act as a commitment by the elite to restrict the monetary benefits from bureaucratic office, thus ensuring that only zealous supporters of the elite will pursue bureaucratic posts. We illustrate these arguments with case studies of South Korea and Rwanda. (JEL D73, P48)","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"102 4 1","pages":"499-533"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2015-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83883588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The archetype of the New Deal agency, exercising neutral, technocratic expertise, is no longer tenable. As Richard Stewart (1975. "Reformation of Administrative Law," 88 Harvard Law Review 1667–813) noted 35 years ago, administrative law "is undergoing a fundamental transformation." Following Stewart, the modern explanation in legal scholarship of the transformation is that federal judges came to the rescue of the administrative state, actively intervening in the regulatory process in order to preserve key values which had been threatened by an admixture of internal pathologies and external (read: "political") threats. We argue that the traditional explanation neglects a central aspect of the major transformations in American regulatory politics during the past half century—the critical role of Congress and the President in the reformation of both the American regulatory state and administrative law. The traditional explanation in legal scholarship, that courts implemented values and agendas separate from legislative aims, and hence separate from politics, is flawed because it neglects the larger transformations, beginning in the 1960s and continuing over the next two decades, in American national politics. During this period, a wide range of new constituencies arose, including the environmentalists, consumerists. The courts’ role in the reformation must be seen in this broader political transformation of the 1960s and 1970s rather than in a court-centric perspective in isolation from the rest of the political system. We illustrate our thesis with nuclear power regulation, which demonstrates the critical, joint roles of entrepreneurs in Congress and the courts.
“新政”(New Deal)机构行使中立、技术官僚专长的原型已不再站得住脚。饰演理查德·斯图尔特(1975)。35年前，《行政法的改革》(88 Harvard Law Review, 1667-813)指出，行政法“正在经历一场根本性的变革”。继斯图尔特之后，法律学界对这种转变的现代解释是，联邦法官拯救了行政国家，积极干预监管过程，以维护受到内部病态和外部(即“政治”)威胁的混合威胁的关键价值。我们认为，传统的解释忽视了过去半个世纪美国监管政治重大变革的一个核心方面——国会和总统在美国监管国家和行政法改革中的关键作用。法律学界的传统解释是，法院执行的价值观和议程与立法目标是分开的，因此与政治是分开的，这种解释是有缺陷的，因为它忽略了美国国家政治中始于20世纪60年代并持续了20年的更大变革。在此期间，出现了范围广泛的新支持者，包括环保主义者、消费主义者。法院在改革中的作用必须从20世纪60年代和70年代更广泛的政治转型中来看待，而不是从与政治体系其他部分隔离的以法院为中心的角度来看待。我们用核能监管来说明我们的论文，这证明了企业家在国会和法院中的关键、共同作用。
{"title":"The “Reformation of Administrative Law” Revisited","authors":"Daniel B. Rodriguez, Barry R. Weingast","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWV018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWV018","url":null,"abstract":"The archetype of the New Deal agency, exercising neutral, technocratic expertise, is no longer tenable. As Richard Stewart (1975. \"Reformation of Administrative Law,\" 88 Harvard Law Review 1667–813) noted 35 years ago, administrative law \"is undergoing a fundamental transformation.\" Following Stewart, the modern explanation in legal scholarship of the transformation is that federal judges came to the rescue of the administrative state, actively intervening in the regulatory process in order to preserve key values which had been threatened by an admixture of internal pathologies and external (read: \"political\") threats. We argue that the traditional explanation neglects a central aspect of the major transformations in American regulatory politics during the past half century—the critical role of Congress and the President in the reformation of both the American regulatory state and administrative law. The traditional explanation in legal scholarship, that courts implemented values and agendas separate from legislative aims, and hence separate from politics, is flawed because it neglects the larger transformations, beginning in the 1960s and continuing over the next two decades, in American national politics. During this period, a wide range of new constituencies arose, including the environmentalists, consumerists. The courts’ role in the reformation must be seen in this broader political transformation of the 1960s and 1970s rather than in a court-centric perspective in isolation from the rest of the political system. We illustrate our thesis with nuclear power regulation, which demonstrates the critical, joint roles of entrepreneurs in Congress and the courts.","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"39 1","pages":"782-807"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2015-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75090322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Traditional models of promotion have difficulty explaining why many firms do not favor internal employees for advancement. I develop a new model to explain this phenomenon. My model generates an equilibrium where some, but not all, ex ante identical firms recruit strictly internally. These firms employ higher quality entry-level workers, since they hire supervisors exclusively from their lower ranks. The scarcity of high-quality workers limits the use of this strategy. I derive several testable predictions on wage-tenure profile differences across firms with varying recruitment practices and confirm these predictions using matched employer–employee data from the United Kingdom. (JEL M50, J31)
{"title":"Internal Labor Markets in Equilibrium","authors":"Timothy N. Bond","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWW019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWW019","url":null,"abstract":"Traditional models of promotion have difficulty explaining why many firms do not favor internal employees for advancement. I develop a new model to explain this phenomenon. My model generates an equilibrium where some, but not all, ex ante identical firms recruit strictly internally. These firms employ higher quality entry-level workers, since they hire supervisors exclusively from their lower ranks. The scarcity of high-quality workers limits the use of this strategy. I derive several testable predictions on wage-tenure profile differences across firms with varying recruitment practices and confirm these predictions using matched employer–employee data from the United Kingdom. (JEL M50, J31)","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"18 1","pages":"28-67"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2015-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82188307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
To what extent do politicians reward voters who are members of their own ethnic or racial group? Using data from large cities in the United States, we study how black employment outcomes are affected by changes in the race of the cities’ mayors between 1973 and 2004. We find that relative to whites, black employment and labor force participation rise, and the black unemployment rate falls, during the tenure of black mayors. Black employment gains in municipal government jobs are particularly large, which suggests that our results capture causal effects of black mayors. Black mayors also lead to higher black incomes relative to white incomes. We show that our results continue to hold when we compare the treated cities to alternative control groups of cities, explicitly control for changing attitudes towards blacks or use regression discontinuity analysis to compare cities that elected black and white mayors in close elections. (JEL D7, H7, J7)
{"title":"Do Black Mayors Improve Black Relative to White Employment Outcomes? Evidence from Large US Cities","authors":"J. Nye, I. Rainer, Thomas Stratmann","doi":"10.1093/JLEO/EWU008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLEO/EWU008","url":null,"abstract":"To what extent do politicians reward voters who are members of their own ethnic or racial group? Using data from large cities in the United States, we study how black employment outcomes are affected by changes in the race of the cities’ mayors between 1973 and 2004. We find that relative to whites, black employment and labor force participation rise, and the black unemployment rate falls, during the tenure of black mayors. Black employment gains in municipal government jobs are particularly large, which suggests that our results capture causal effects of black mayors. Black mayors also lead to higher black incomes relative to white incomes. We show that our results continue to hold when we compare the treated cities to alternative control groups of cities, explicitly control for changing attitudes towards blacks or use regression discontinuity analysis to compare cities that elected black and white mayors in close elections. (JEL D7, H7, J7)","PeriodicalId":47987,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Economics & Organization","volume":"122 2 1","pages":"383-430"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2015-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88518382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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