{"title":"Should moral intuitionism go social?","authors":"Marvin Backes, Matti Eklund, E. Michaelson","doi":"10.1111/nous.12418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12418","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48442176","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper argues that all of the standard theories about the divisions of space and time can benefit from, and may need to rely on, parsimony considerations. More specifically, whether spacetime is discrete, gunky or pointy, there are wildly unparsimonious rivals to standard accounts that need to be resisted by proponents of those accounts, and only parsimony considerations offer a natural way of doing that resisting. Furthermore, quantitative parsimony considerations appear to be needed in many of these cases. When scientists evaluate scientific theories, they often have to rely on many criteria besides whether the relevant theories are consistent with the evidence so far. For one thing, it is harder than it looks to have evidence flatly contradict hypotheses, especially when we remember how easy it is to chalk recalcitrant results up to noise, or experimental error, or bias, or as-yet-undiscovered factors, and the fact that our theories often only have probabilistic connections to data. For another, it is relatively easy to come up with different theories that agree on any given body of data, though many will look like mere philosophers' tricks rather than serious scientific rivals. Finally, we need theories to help tell us about tricky cases that we have not observed so far: and when we are setting up experiments or observations we are not already sure about, we want to put extra effort into testing plausible theories of the new phenomena, rather than doing undirected data collection. But this suggests that we want criteria of plausibility that help choose between theories that have not already been ruled out by the evidence we already have. Scientists do seem to use criteria such as simplicity, coherence with theories in other areas, inductive considerations, valuing explanatory hypotheses, and so on. Call criteria of theory choice like these "theoretical virtues". 1
{"title":"Space, time and parsimony","authors":"Daniel Nolan","doi":"10.1111/nous.12420","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12420","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that all of the standard theories about the divisions of space and time can benefit from, and may need to rely on, parsimony considerations. More specifically, whether spacetime is discrete, gunky or pointy, there are wildly unparsimonious rivals to standard accounts that need to be resisted by proponents of those accounts, and only parsimony considerations offer a natural way of doing that resisting. Furthermore, quantitative parsimony considerations appear to be needed in many of these cases. When scientists evaluate scientific theories, they often have to rely on many criteria besides whether the relevant theories are consistent with the evidence so far. For one thing, it is harder than it looks to have evidence flatly contradict hypotheses, especially when we remember how easy it is to chalk recalcitrant results up to noise, or experimental error, or bias, or as-yet-undiscovered factors, and the fact that our theories often only have probabilistic connections to data. For another, it is relatively easy to come up with different theories that agree on any given body of data, though many will look like mere philosophers' tricks rather than serious scientific rivals. Finally, we need theories to help tell us about tricky cases that we have not observed so far: and when we are setting up experiments or observations we are not already sure about, we want to put extra effort into testing plausible theories of the new phenomena, rather than doing undirected data collection. But this suggests that we want criteria of plausibility that help choose between theories that have not already been ruled out by the evidence we already have. Scientists do seem to use criteria such as simplicity, coherence with theories in other areas, inductive considerations, valuing explanatory hypotheses, and so on. Call criteria of theory choice like these \"theoretical virtues\". 1","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63498995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reflection and Conditionalization: Comments on Michael Rescorla","authors":"Bas C. Van fraassen","doi":"10.1111/nous.12416","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12416","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47978842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper is about a tension between two theses. The first is Value of Evidence : roughly, the thesis that it is always rational for an agent to gather and use cost-free evidence for making decisions. The second is Rationality of Imprecision : the thesis that an agent can be rationally required to adopt doxastic states that are imprecise , i.e., not representable by a single credence function. While others have noticed this tension, I offer a new diagnosis of it. I show that it arises when an agent with an imprecise doxastic state engages in an unreflective inquiry , an inquiry where they revise their beliefs using an updating rule that doesn’t satisfy a weak reflection principle. In such an unreflective inquiry, certain synchronic norms of instrumental rationality can make it instrumentally irrational for an agent to gather and use cost-free evidence. I then go on to propose a diachronic norm of instrumental rationality that preserves Value of Evidence in unreflective inquiries. This, I suggest, may help us reconcile this thesis with Rationality of Imprecision . Consider this argument. The success of our actions depends on the way the world is. We can only find out how the world is by gathering more evidence and revising our beliefs in light of it. So, if a piece of evidence is available for gathering and use, it always makes sense to gather that evidence and use it for making decisions.
这篇论文是关于两篇论文之间的矛盾。第一个是证据的价值:粗略地说，这一论点认为，一个代理人收集和使用无成本的证据进行决策总是合理的。第二个是不精确的合理性(Rationality of inprecision):该理论认为，可以合理地要求智能体采用不精确的随机状态，即不能用单个可信度函数表示。虽然其他人已经注意到了这种紧张关系，但我提出了一种新的诊断。我表明，当一个具有不精确的不确定性状态的主体进行非反思性调查时，它就会出现，在这种调查中，他们使用不满足弱反射原则的更新规则来修改自己的信念。在这种非反思性的调查中，工具理性的某些共时性规范可以使代理人收集和使用无成本证据成为工具非理性。然后，我提出了一种工具理性的历时规范，它在非反思性调查中保留了证据的价值。我认为，这可能有助于我们调和这一论点与不精确的合理性。考虑一下这个论点。我们行动的成功取决于世界的现状。我们只有通过收集更多的证据，并根据证据修正我们的信念，才能发现这个世界是怎样的。所以，如果有证据可以收集和使用，那么收集证据并将其用于决策总是有意义的。
{"title":"Credal imprecision and the value of evidence","authors":"Nilanjan Das","doi":"10.1111/nous.12417","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12417","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is about a tension between two theses. The first is Value of Evidence : roughly, the thesis that it is always rational for an agent to gather and use cost-free evidence for making decisions. The second is Rationality of Imprecision : the thesis that an agent can be rationally required to adopt doxastic states that are imprecise , i.e., not representable by a single credence function. While others have noticed this tension, I offer a new diagnosis of it. I show that it arises when an agent with an imprecise doxastic state engages in an unreflective inquiry , an inquiry where they revise their beliefs using an updating rule that doesn’t satisfy a weak reflection principle. In such an unreflective inquiry, certain synchronic norms of instrumental rationality can make it instrumentally irrational for an agent to gather and use cost-free evidence. I then go on to propose a diachronic norm of instrumental rationality that preserves Value of Evidence in unreflective inquiries. This, I suggest, may help us reconcile this thesis with Rationality of Imprecision . Consider this argument. The success of our actions depends on the way the world is. We can only find out how the world is by gathering more evidence and revising our beliefs in light of it. So, if a piece of evidence is available for gathering and use, it always makes sense to gather that evidence and use it for making decisions.","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63498946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Criteria of identity without sortals","authors":"J. Mooney","doi":"10.1111/nous.12419","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12419","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63498960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Speakers offer testimony. They also hedge. This essay offers an account of how hedging makes a difference to testimony. Two components of testimony are considered: how testimony warrants a hearer’s attitude, and how testimony changes a speaker’s responsibilities. Starting with a norm-based approach to testimony where hearer’s beliefs are warranted because of social norms and speakers acquire responsibility from these same norms, I argue that hedging alters both components simultaneously. It changes which attitudes a hearer is prima facie warranted in forming in response to testimony, and reduces how much responsibility a speaker undertakes in testifying. A consequence of this account is that speakers who hedge for strategic purposes deprive their hearers of warrant for stronger doxastic attitudes.
{"title":"Hedged testimony","authors":"Peter Elswyk","doi":"10.1111/nous.12411","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12411","url":null,"abstract":"Speakers offer testimony. They also hedge. This essay offers an account of how hedging makes a difference to testimony. Two components of testimony are considered: how testimony warrants a hearer’s attitude, and how testimony changes a speaker’s responsibilities. Starting with a norm-based approach to testimony where hearer’s beliefs are warranted because of social norms and speakers acquire responsibility from these same norms, I argue that hedging alters both components simultaneously. It changes which attitudes a hearer is prima facie warranted in forming in response to testimony, and reduces how much responsibility a speaker undertakes in testifying. A consequence of this account is that speakers who hedge for strategic purposes deprive their hearers of warrant for stronger doxastic attitudes.","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63498902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The (moral) permissibility of an act is determined by the relative weights of reasons, or so I assume. But how many weights does a reason have? Weight Monism is the idea that reasons have a single weight value. There is just the weight of reasons. Weight Pluralism holds that reasons have at least two weight values and these values aren’t always equivalent. The simplest versions of Weight Monism hold that the weight of each reason is either equal to, weightier than, or less weighty than every other reason. We’ll see that this simple view leads to paradox. We must complicate the picture somehow.
{"title":"Parity, Moral Options, and the Weights of Reasons","authors":"C. Tucker","doi":"10.1111/nous.12410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12410","url":null,"abstract":"The (moral) permissibility of an act is determined by the relative weights of reasons, or so I assume. But how many weights does a reason have? Weight Monism is the idea that reasons have a single weight value. There is just the weight of reasons. Weight Pluralism holds that reasons have at least two weight values and these values aren’t always equivalent. The simplest versions of Weight Monism hold that the weight of each reason is either equal to, weightier than, or less weighty than every other reason. We’ll see that this simple view leads to paradox. We must complicate the picture somehow.","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63499356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Conditionalization governs how to reallocate credence in light of new evidence. One prominent argument in favor of Conditionalization holds that an agent who violates it is vulnerable to a diachronic Dutch book: a series of acceptable bets offered at multiple times that inflict a sure loss. van Fraassen argues that an agent who violates the Principle of Reflection is likewise vulnerable to a diachronic Dutch book. He concludes that agents should conform to both Conditionalization and Reflection. Some authors reply that Reflection is implausible and hence that there must be something wrong with diachronic Dutch book arguments. Other authors try to isolate a principled difference between the Dutch book argument for Conditionalization and the Dutch book argument for Reflection, such that the former argument may succeed even though the latter fails. I pursue a version of this strategy. I contend that, once we properly elucidate the notion of sure loss, non-reflectors are not vulnerable to a sure loss. An agent who violates Reflection is not thereby subject to a diachronic Dutch book. Appearances to the contrary result from an unmotivated focus upon an overly narrow set of gambling scenarios. §1. Conditionalization and Reflection
{"title":"REFLECTING ON DIACHRONIC DUTCH BOOKS","authors":"M. Rescorla","doi":"10.1111/nous.12409","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12409","url":null,"abstract":"Conditionalization governs how to reallocate credence in light of new evidence. One prominent argument in favor of Conditionalization holds that an agent who violates it is vulnerable to a diachronic Dutch book: a series of acceptable bets offered at multiple times that inflict a sure loss. van Fraassen argues that an agent who violates the Principle of Reflection is likewise vulnerable to a diachronic Dutch book. He concludes that agents should conform to both Conditionalization and Reflection. Some authors reply that Reflection is implausible and hence that there must be something wrong with diachronic Dutch book arguments. Other authors try to isolate a principled difference between the Dutch book argument for Conditionalization and the Dutch book argument for Reflection, such that the former argument may succeed even though the latter fails. I pursue a version of this strategy. I contend that, once we properly elucidate the notion of sure loss, non-reflectors are not vulnerable to a sure loss. An agent who violates Reflection is not thereby subject to a diachronic Dutch book. Appearances to the contrary result from an unmotivated focus upon an overly narrow set of gambling scenarios. §1. Conditionalization and Reflection","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48644525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We argue that all gradable expressions in natural language obey a principle that we call Comparability: if x and y are both F to some degree, then either x is at least as F as y or y is at least as F as x. This principle has been widely rejected among philosophers, especially by ethicists, and its falsity has been claimed to have important normative implications. We argue that Comparability is needed to explain the goodness of several patterns of inference that seem manifestly valid. We reply to some influential arguments against Comparability, raise and reject some new arguments, and draw out some surprising implications of Comparability for debates concerning preference and credence. 1 The thesis of comparability Our topic is the logic of comparative constructions: paradigmatically, the comparative forms of adjectives (‘F-er’ or ‘more F’) and the equative form (‘[at least] as F as’). ∗Thanks to Johann Frick, Jeremy Goodman, Ben Holguin, Ankit Kansal, Harvey Lederman, Ofra Magidor, Matt Mandelkern, Ralph Wedgwood, Alexis Wellwood, Timothy Williamson, Juhani YliVakkuri, and Snow Zhang.
我们认为，自然语言中所有可分类的表达都遵循一个我们称之为可比性的原则:如果x和y在某种程度上都是F，那么x至少和y一样F，或者y至少和x一样F。这一原则在哲学家中被广泛拒绝，尤其是伦理学家，它的虚假性被认为具有重要的规范性含义。我们认为需要可比性来解释几种似乎明显有效的推理模式的优点。我们回答了一些反对可比性的有影响力的论点，提出和拒绝了一些新的论点，并在关于偏好和可信度的辩论中得出了可比性的一些令人惊讶的含义。我们的主题是比较结构的逻辑:从范式上讲，形容词的比较形式(“F-er”或“more F”)和等号形式(“[at least] as F as”)。*感谢约翰·弗里克、杰里米·古德曼、本·奥尔金、安吉特·坎萨尔、哈维·莱德曼、奥弗拉·马吉多尔、马特·曼德尔克恩、拉尔夫·韦奇伍德、亚历克西斯·威尔伍德、蒂莫西·威廉森、尤哈尼·伊利瓦库里和张雪。
{"title":"The case for comparability","authors":"C. Dorr, Jacob M. Nebel, Jake Zuehl","doi":"10.1111/nous.12407","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12407","url":null,"abstract":"We argue that all gradable expressions in natural language obey a principle that we call Comparability: if x and y are both F to some degree, then either x is at least as F as y or y is at least as F as x. This principle has been widely rejected among philosophers, especially by ethicists, and its falsity has been claimed to have important normative implications. We argue that Comparability is needed to explain the goodness of several patterns of inference that seem manifestly valid. We reply to some influential arguments against Comparability, raise and reject some new arguments, and draw out some surprising implications of Comparability for debates concerning preference and credence. 1 The thesis of comparability Our topic is the logic of comparative constructions: paradigmatically, the comparative forms of adjectives (‘F-er’ or ‘more F’) and the equative form (‘[at least] as F as’). ∗Thanks to Johann Frick, Jeremy Goodman, Ben Holguin, Ankit Kansal, Harvey Lederman, Ofra Magidor, Matt Mandelkern, Ralph Wedgwood, Alexis Wellwood, Timothy Williamson, Juhani YliVakkuri, and Snow Zhang.","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63499301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Structure of Analog Representation","authors":"Andrew Y. Lee, Joshua Myers, G. Rabin","doi":"10.1111/nous.12404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12404","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63499247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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