{"title":"Kant, moral overdemandingness and self‐scrutiny","authors":"Martin Sticker","doi":"10.1111/NOUS.12308","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/NOUS.12308","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/NOUS.12308","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63492943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sometimes we make a decision about an action we will undertake later and form an intention, but our judgment of what it is best to do undergoes a temporary shift when the time for action comes round. What makes it rational not to give in to temptation? Many contempo-rary solutions privilege diachronic rationality; in some “rational non-reconsideration” (RNR) accounts once the agent forms an intention, it is rational not to reconsider. This leads to other puzzles: how can someone be motivated to follow a plan that is contrary to their current judgment? How can it be rational to form a plan to resist if we can predict that our judgment will shift? I show how these puzzles can be solved in a framework where there are multiple units of agency, distinguishing between the judgments of the timeslice and those of the person over time, and allowing that the timeslice can “self identify”, taking the person over time as the resisting or succumbing to temptation can be instrumentally rational, depending on the unit of agency that is identified with. In order to show why we ought to resist temptation, we need to draw on a non-instrumental rationale. I sketch possible routes for doing this.
{"title":"Guard against temptation: Intrapersonal team reasoning and the role of intentions in exercising willpower","authors":"Natalie Gold","doi":"10.1111/NOUS.12369","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/NOUS.12369","url":null,"abstract":"Sometimes we make a decision about an action we will undertake later and form an intention, but our judgment of what it is best to do undergoes a temporary shift when the time for action comes round. What makes it rational not to give in to temptation? Many contempo-rary solutions privilege diachronic rationality; in some “rational non-reconsideration” (RNR) accounts once the agent forms an intention, it is rational not to reconsider. This leads to other puzzles: how can someone be motivated to follow a plan that is contrary to their current judgment? How can it be rational to form a plan to resist if we can predict that our judgment will shift? I show how these puzzles can be solved in a framework where there are multiple units of agency, distinguishing between the judgments of the timeslice and those of the person over time, and allowing that the timeslice can “self identify”, taking the person over time as the resisting or succumbing to temptation can be instrumentally rational, depending on the unit of agency that is identified with. In order to show why we ought to resist temptation, we need to draw on a non-instrumental rationale. I sketch possible routes for doing this.","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/NOUS.12369","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63497495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There has been considerable puzzlement over how to respond to higher-order evidence. The existing dilem-mas can be defused by adopting a ‘two-dimensional’ representation of doxastic attitudes which incorporates not only substantive uncertainty about which first-order state of affairs obtains but also the degree of conviction with which we hold the attitude. This makes it possible that in cases of higher-order evidence the evidence sometimes impacts primarily on our conviction, rather than our substantive uncertainty. I argue that such a two-dimensional representation is naturally developed by making use of imprecise probabilities.
{"title":"Higher‐order evidence and losing one's conviction","authors":"L. Henderson","doi":"10.1111/NOUS.12367","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/NOUS.12367","url":null,"abstract":"There has been considerable puzzlement over how to respond to higher-order evidence. The existing dilem-mas can be defused by adopting a ‘two-dimensional’ representation of doxastic attitudes which incorporates not only substantive uncertainty about which first-order state of affairs obtains but also the degree of conviction with which we hold the attitude. This makes it possible that in cases of higher-order evidence the evidence sometimes impacts primarily on our conviction, rather than our substantive uncertainty. I argue that such a two-dimensional representation is naturally developed by making use of imprecise probabilities.","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/NOUS.12367","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49467917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An explanatory idealist theory of grounding","authors":"D. Kovacs","doi":"10.1111/NOUS.12368","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/NOUS.12368","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/NOUS.12368","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63497440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the role of reason in Shepherd’s account of acquiring knowledge of the external world via first principles. Reason is important, but does not have a foundational role. Certain principles enable us to draw the required inferences for acquiring knowledge of the external world. These principles are basic, foundational and, more importantly, self-evident and thus justified in other ways than by demonstration. Justificatory demonstrations of these principles are neither required, nor possible. By drawing on textual and contextual evidence, I will show that Shepherd should have said that we know the first principles of any science, in general, and that “everything which begins to exist must have a cause”, in particular, via intuition, not via reason. Reasoning about such principles can help their self-evidence shine through in certain cases; their justification, and our being justified in believing them, does not come from this reasoning, however.
{"title":"Mary Shepherd on the role of proofs in our knowledge of first principles","authors":"M. Folescu","doi":"10.1111/NOUS.12365","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/NOUS.12365","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the role of reason in Shepherd’s account of acquiring knowledge of the external world via first principles. Reason is important, but does not have a foundational role. Certain principles enable us to draw the required inferences for acquiring knowledge of the external world. These principles are basic, foundational and, more importantly, self-evident and thus justified in other ways than by demonstration. Justificatory demonstrations of these principles are neither required, nor possible. By drawing on textual and contextual evidence, I will show that Shepherd should have said that we know the first principles of any science, in general, and that “everything which begins to exist must have a cause”, in particular, via intuition, not via reason. Reasoning about such principles can help their self-evidence shine through in certain cases; their justification, and our being justified in believing them, does not come from this reasoning, however.","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/NOUS.12365","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63497394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to the Nomological Argument, observed regularities in nature are best explained by an appeal to a supernatural being. A successful explanation must avoid two perils. Some explanations provide too little structure, predicting a universe without regularities. Others provide too much structure, thereby precluding an explanation of certain types of lawlike regularities featured in modern scientific theories. We argue that an explanation based in the creative, intentional action of a supernatural being avoids these two perils whereas leading competitors do not. Although our argument falls short of a full defense, it does suggest that the Nomological Argument is worthy of philosophical attention. 1 Sketch of the Nomological Argument According to the Nomological Argument, a supernatural being provides the best explanation of regularities in nature, such as that planets have elliptical orbits, that the speed of light is the same in all frames of reference, and that quantum systems evolve in accordance with the Schrödinger equation. Although we can’t provide a full defense in this paper, we will identify the leading competing hypotheses and argue that Divine Voluntarism—the hypothesis that regularities are explained by a supernatural being— beats them when it comes to two most-crucial explanatory virtues. This at least makes a strong prima facie case for preferring Divine Voluntarism to its leading competitors and clarifies how the Nomological Argument is to be defended. * This is the penultimate draft. The official version: http://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12364 1 Divine Voluntarism has received some recent attention (Foster 2004, Swinburne 2006, Collins 2009a, Orr 2019). However, these discussions have been limited in various respects—
{"title":"The nomological argument for the existence of God","authors":"Tyler Hildebrand, Thomas Metcalf","doi":"10.1111/NOUS.12364","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/NOUS.12364","url":null,"abstract":"According to the Nomological Argument, observed regularities in nature are best explained by an appeal to a supernatural being. A successful explanation must avoid two perils. Some explanations provide too little structure, predicting a universe without regularities. Others provide too much structure, thereby precluding an explanation of certain types of lawlike regularities featured in modern scientific theories. We argue that an explanation based in the creative, intentional action of a supernatural being avoids these two perils whereas leading competitors do not. Although our argument falls short of a full defense, it does suggest that the Nomological Argument is worthy of philosophical attention. 1 Sketch of the Nomological Argument According to the Nomological Argument, a supernatural being provides the best explanation of regularities in nature, such as that planets have elliptical orbits, that the speed of light is the same in all frames of reference, and that quantum systems evolve in accordance with the Schrödinger equation. Although we can’t provide a full defense in this paper, we will identify the leading competing hypotheses and argue that Divine Voluntarism—the hypothesis that regularities are explained by a supernatural being— beats them when it comes to two most-crucial explanatory virtues. This at least makes a strong prima facie case for preferring Divine Voluntarism to its leading competitors and clarifies how the Nomological Argument is to be defended. * This is the penultimate draft. The official version: http://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12364 1 Divine Voluntarism has received some recent attention (Foster 2004, Swinburne 2006, Collins 2009a, Orr 2019). However, these discussions have been limited in various respects—","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/NOUS.12364","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49545170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I argue that we can reason not only to new beliefs but to basically any change in attitude we can think of, including the abandonment of belief (contra John Broome), the acquisition of non-belief attitudes like relief and admiration, and the elimination of the same. To argue for this position, which I call generalism, I defend a sufficient condition on reasoning, roughly that we can reason to any change in attitude that is expressed by the conclusion of an argument we can be convinced by. I then produce examples of such arguments, and argue that they are indeed arguments. To produce such examples of the elimination of non-doxastic attitudes, I develop the idea of a state of attitudinal constraint acceptance, and show how it is useful for solving this problem, and useful in other parts of philosophy as well.
{"title":"Reasoning beyond belief acquisition","authors":"Daniel Drucker","doi":"10.1111/NOUS.12363","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/NOUS.12363","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that we can reason not only to new beliefs but to basically any change in attitude we can think of, including the abandonment of belief (contra John Broome), the acquisition of non-belief attitudes like relief and admiration, and the elimination of the same. To argue for this position, which I call generalism, I defend a sufficient condition on reasoning, roughly that we can reason to any change in attitude that is expressed by the conclusion of an argument we can be convinced by. I then produce examples of such arguments, and argue that they are indeed arguments. To produce such examples of the elimination of non-doxastic attitudes, I develop the idea of a state of attitudinal constraint acceptance, and show how it is useful for solving this problem, and useful in other parts of philosophy as well.","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/NOUS.12363","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63497847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
0. Introduction Ethical theory is steeped in two related metaphors: reasons have weight and reasons are weighed on a balance scale to determine an act’s deontic status (e.g., whether an act is permissible, impermissible, or required). Such metaphors are implicit in the ubiquitous talk of outweighing and the balance of reasons. The ubiquity of these metaphors gives them importance. If we are going to use or reject them, we should understand the best way of cashing them out. We may find, as I argue in this paper, that we can construct a promising model of how reasons interact to determine deontic status simply by cashing them out carefully. I assume that the metaphors of weight and weighing are apt for morality and practical rationality. So understood, substantive moral (rational) theories can make two kinds of mistake. First, a theory might incorrectly weight reasons. Perhaps, for example, it overestimates how much weight morality gives to self-interest. Second, a substantive theory might weigh reasons incorrectly. In principle, a theory might make one kind of mistake without making the other. This paper is after the fundamental model of weighing reasons to determine a deontic status, the model that determines what it is to weigh reasons correctly. Such a model can represent any normative theory that correctly weighs reasons, even if the theory incorrectly weights them. It can’t represent any theory that incorrectly weighs reasons. By identifying what it is to weigh reasons correctly, the fundamental model identifies structural constraints on any substantive moral or rational theory. The metaphor of weighing reasons brings to mind a single (double-pan balance) scale. The reasons for φ (Rφ) go in one pan and the reasons for ~φ (R~φ) go in the other. The relative weights, as indicated by the relative heights of the two sides of the scale, determine the deontic status of the act.
{"title":"The dual scale model of weighing reasons","authors":"C. Tucker","doi":"10.1111/NOUS.12361","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/NOUS.12361","url":null,"abstract":"0. Introduction Ethical theory is steeped in two related metaphors: reasons have weight and reasons are weighed on a balance scale to determine an act’s deontic status (e.g., whether an act is permissible, impermissible, or required). Such metaphors are implicit in the ubiquitous talk of outweighing and the balance of reasons. The ubiquity of these metaphors gives them importance. If we are going to use or reject them, we should understand the best way of cashing them out. We may find, as I argue in this paper, that we can construct a promising model of how reasons interact to determine deontic status simply by cashing them out carefully. I assume that the metaphors of weight and weighing are apt for morality and practical rationality. So understood, substantive moral (rational) theories can make two kinds of mistake. First, a theory might incorrectly weight reasons. Perhaps, for example, it overestimates how much weight morality gives to self-interest. Second, a substantive theory might weigh reasons incorrectly. In principle, a theory might make one kind of mistake without making the other. This paper is after the fundamental model of weighing reasons to determine a deontic status, the model that determines what it is to weigh reasons correctly. Such a model can represent any normative theory that correctly weighs reasons, even if the theory incorrectly weights them. It can’t represent any theory that incorrectly weighs reasons. By identifying what it is to weigh reasons correctly, the fundamental model identifies structural constraints on any substantive moral or rational theory. The metaphor of weighing reasons brings to mind a single (double-pan balance) scale. The reasons for φ (Rφ) go in one pan and the reasons for ~φ (R~φ) go in the other. The relative weights, as indicated by the relative heights of the two sides of the scale, determine the deontic status of the act.","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/NOUS.12361","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49479749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Making space for the normativity of coherence","authors":"Alex Worsnip","doi":"10.1111/NOUS.12362","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/NOUS.12362","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/NOUS.12362","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47570272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How to see invisible objects","authors":"Jessie Munton","doi":"10.1111/NOUS.12360","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/NOUS.12360","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/NOUS.12360","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63497799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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