: Philosophers disagree about whether outcome luck can affect an agent’s “ moral responsibility .” Focusing on responsibility’s “negative side,” some maintain, and others deny, that an action ’s results bear constitutively on how “ blameworthy ” the actor is, and on how much blame or punishment they “deserve.” Crucially, both sides to the debate assume that an actor’s blameworthiness and negative desert are equally affected— or unaffected — by an action’s results. This article challenges that previously overlooked assumption, arguing that blameworthiness and desert are distinct moral notions that serve distinct normative functions: blameworthiness serves a liability function (removing a bar to otherwise impermissible treatments), whereas desert serves a favoring function (contributing new value to states of affairs, or providing new reasons for responsive treatments). Having distinguished (negative) desert from blameworthiness, the article proposes a novel resolution to the outcome-luck debate: that results do not affect an agent’s liability to blame, but do affect the amount and severity of blame to which the agent is justly liable, including by affecting the severity of blame that the agent deserves.
{"title":"Blameworthiness, desert, and luck","authors":"Mitchell N. Berman","doi":"10.1111/nous.12405","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12405","url":null,"abstract":": Philosophers disagree about whether outcome luck can affect an agent’s “ moral responsibility .” Focusing on responsibility’s “negative side,” some maintain, and others deny, that an action ’s results bear constitutively on how “ blameworthy ” the actor is, and on how much blame or punishment they “deserve.” Crucially, both sides to the debate assume that an actor’s blameworthiness and negative desert are equally affected— or unaffected — by an action’s results. This article challenges that previously overlooked assumption, arguing that blameworthiness and desert are distinct moral notions that serve distinct normative functions: blameworthiness serves a liability function (removing a bar to otherwise impermissible treatments), whereas desert serves a favoring function (contributing new value to states of affairs, or providing new reasons for responsive treatments). Having distinguished (negative) desert from blameworthiness, the article proposes a novel resolution to the outcome-luck debate: that results do not affect an agent’s liability to blame, but do affect the amount and severity of blame to which the agent is justly liable, including by affecting the severity of blame that the agent deserves.","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63499287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What explains the outcomes of chance processes? We claim that their setups do. Chances, we think, mediate these explanations of outcome by setup but do not feature in them. Facts about chances do feature in explanations of a different kind: higher-order explanations, which explain how and why setups explain their outcomes. In this paper, we elucidate this ’mediator view’ of chancy explanation and defend it from a series of objections. We then show how it changes the playing field in four metaphysical disputes concerning chance. First, it makes it more plausible that even low chances can have explanatory power. Second, it undercuts a circularity objection against reductionist theories of chance. Third, it redirects the debate about a prominent argu-ment against epistemic theories of chance. Finally, it sheds light on potential chancy explanations of the Uni-verse’s origin.
{"title":"How chance explains","authors":"M. Hicks, Alastair Wilson","doi":"10.1111/nous.12401","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12401","url":null,"abstract":"What explains the outcomes of chance processes? We claim that their setups do. Chances, we think, mediate these explanations of outcome by setup but do not feature in them. Facts about chances do feature in explanations of a different kind: higher-order explanations, which explain how and why setups explain their outcomes. In this paper, we elucidate this ’mediator view’ of chancy explanation and defend it from a series of objections. We then show how it changes the playing field in four metaphysical disputes concerning chance. First, it makes it more plausible that even low chances can have explanatory power. Second, it undercuts a circularity objection against reductionist theories of chance. Third, it redirects the debate about a prominent argu-ment against epistemic theories of chance. Finally, it sheds light on potential chancy explanations of the Uni-verse’s origin.","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47158427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The proper role of history in evolutionary explanations","authors":"T. Reydon","doi":"10.1111/nous.12402","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12402","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63499181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The measurement problem concerns an apparent conflict between the two fundamental principles of quantum mechanics, namely the Schr¨odinger equation and the measurement postulate. These principles describe inconsistent behavior for quantum systems in so-called “measurement con-texts.” Many theorists have thought that the measurement problem can only be resolved by proposing a mechanistic explanation of (genuine or apparent) wavefunction collapse that avoids explicit reference to “measure-ment.” However, I argue here that the measurement problem dissolves if we accept Humeanism about laws of nature. On a Humean metaphysics, there is no conflict between the two principles, nor is there any inherent problem with the concept of “measurement” figuring into the account of collapse.
{"title":"There is no measurement problem for Humeans","authors":"C. Dorst","doi":"10.1111/nous.12399","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12399","url":null,"abstract":"The measurement problem concerns an apparent conflict between the two fundamental principles of quantum mechanics, namely the Schr¨odinger equation and the measurement postulate. These principles describe inconsistent behavior for quantum systems in so-called “measurement con-texts.” Many theorists have thought that the measurement problem can only be resolved by proposing a mechanistic explanation of (genuine or apparent) wavefunction collapse that avoids explicit reference to “measure-ment.” However, I argue here that the measurement problem dissolves if we accept Humeanism about laws of nature. On a Humean metaphysics, there is no conflict between the two principles, nor is there any inherent problem with the concept of “measurement” figuring into the account of collapse.","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63499129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"No fact of the middle","authors":"Justin Khoo","doi":"10.1111/nous.12389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12389","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/nous.12389","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48026612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many philosophers assume that, when making moral decisions under uncertainty, we should choose the option that has the greatest expected moral value, regardless of how risky it is. But their arguments for maximizing expected moral value do not support it over rival, risk-averse approaches. In this paper, I present a novel argument for maximizing expected value: when we think about larger series of decisions that each decision is a part of, all but the most risk-averse agents would prefer that we consistently choose the option with the highest expected value. To the extent that what we choose on a given occasion should be guided by the entire series of choices we prefer, then on each occasion, we should choose the option with the highest expected moral value.
{"title":"Ignore risk; Maximize expected moral value","authors":"Michael Zhao","doi":"10.1111/nous.12398","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12398","url":null,"abstract":"Many philosophers assume that, when making moral decisions under uncertainty, we should choose the option that has the greatest expected moral value, regardless of how risky it is. But their arguments for maximizing expected moral value do not support it over rival, risk-averse approaches. In this paper, I present a novel argument for maximizing expected value: when we think about larger series of decisions that each decision is a part of, all but the most risk-averse agents would prefer that we consistently choose the option with the highest expected value. To the extent that what we choose on a given occasion should be guided by the entire series of choices we prefer, then on each occasion, we should choose the option with the highest expected moral value.","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/nous.12398","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63499064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper explores the significance of intelligent social behavior among non-human animals for philosophical theories of communication. Using the alarm call system of vervet monkeys as a case study, I argue that interpersonal communication (or what I call “minded communication”) can and does take place in the absence of the production and recognition of communicative intentions. More generally, I argue that evolutionary theory provides good reasons for maintaining that minded communication is both temporally and explanatorily prior to the use of communicative intentions. After develop-ing these negative points about the place of communicative intentions in detail, I provide a novel alternative account according to which minded communication is characterized in terms of patterns of action and response that function to coordinate the representational mental states of agents. I show that an account which centers on patterns of representational coordination of this sort is well suited to capture the theoretical roles associated with minded communication and that it does so in a way that provides a good fit with comparative facts about the presence of minded communication among non-human animals.
{"title":"Communication before communicative intentions","authors":"J. Armstrong","doi":"10.1111/nous.12396","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12396","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the significance of intelligent social behavior among non-human animals for philosophical theories of communication. Using the alarm call system of vervet monkeys as a case study, I argue that interpersonal communication (or what I call “minded communication”) can and does take place in the absence of the production and recognition of communicative intentions. More generally, I argue that evolutionary theory provides good reasons for maintaining that minded communication is both temporally and explanatorily prior to the use of communicative intentions. After develop-ing these negative points about the place of communicative intentions in detail, I provide a novel alternative account according to which minded communication is characterized in terms of patterns of action and response that function to coordinate the representational mental states of agents. I show that an account which centers on patterns of representational coordination of this sort is well suited to capture the theoretical roles associated with minded communication and that it does so in a way that provides a good fit with comparative facts about the presence of minded communication among non-human animals.","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/nous.12396","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63498987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Problems for factive accounts of assertion","authors":"Sven Rosenkranz","doi":"10.1111/nous.12395","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12395","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/nous.12395","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63499164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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