Rize Jing, Xi Gong, Jia Tang, Xiaozhen Lai, Hufeng Wang
Family physician contract service (FPCS) was introduced by the Chinese government in 2016, which entailed the registration of individual patients with a designated family physician in primary healthcare facilities. To assess the yet-to-be realized impacts of incentives for family physicians on the performance of the FPCS policy in China, a qualitative semistructured interview was conducted in 2019 with 36 participants, including directors of local health commissions, leaders of primary healthcare facilities, family physicians, and nurses in eight community health centers in four cities deemed to have advanced and effectively implemented FPCS policies. The data analysis was guided by the framework method, which indicated the necessity of implementing a patient-based capitation system for FPCS and augmenting its financial allocation. The analysis further reveals a divergence in how incentives are perceived based on professional seniority: nonsenior physicians view financial incentives as a matter of livelihood and fairness, while senior physicians approach them strategically, weighing them against other professional activities. The independent distribution method was found to have the potential to enhance the motivation of family physicians in their work. A financing model that relies on health insurance payments may give rise to adverse selection concerns, as it could encourage the selection of healthier patients when making contracts. This issue can be effectively addressed through an innovative modification of the distribution method, whereby higher contract fees are assigned to individuals with more serious medical conditions. The implementation of nonfinancial incentives, including increased authority delegation, closer work relationships, and sufficient self-identification, has the potential to enhance the performance of the FPCS program. Consequently, it remains important to augment family physicians’ income and enhance their sense of self-fulfillment in the implementation of the FPCS policy in China.
{"title":"How Do the Incentives for Family Physicians Affect the Implementation of Family Physician Contract Service Policy in China? A Qualitative Study","authors":"Rize Jing, Xi Gong, Jia Tang, Xiaozhen Lai, Hufeng Wang","doi":"10.1155/hsc/9250733","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1155/hsc/9250733","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Family physician contract service (FPCS) was introduced by the Chinese government in 2016, which entailed the registration of individual patients with a designated family physician in primary healthcare facilities. To assess the yet-to-be realized impacts of incentives for family physicians on the performance of the FPCS policy in China, a qualitative semistructured interview was conducted in 2019 with 36 participants, including directors of local health commissions, leaders of primary healthcare facilities, family physicians, and nurses in eight community health centers in four cities deemed to have advanced and effectively implemented FPCS policies. The data analysis was guided by the framework method, which indicated the necessity of implementing a patient-based capitation system for FPCS and augmenting its financial allocation. The analysis further reveals a divergence in how incentives are perceived based on professional seniority: nonsenior physicians view financial incentives as a matter of livelihood and fairness, while senior physicians approach them strategically, weighing them against other professional activities. The independent distribution method was found to have the potential to enhance the motivation of family physicians in their work. A financing model that relies on health insurance payments may give rise to adverse selection concerns, as it could encourage the selection of healthier patients when making contracts. This issue can be effectively addressed through an innovative modification of the distribution method, whereby higher contract fees are assigned to individuals with more serious medical conditions. The implementation of nonfinancial incentives, including increased authority delegation, closer work relationships, and sufficient self-identification, has the potential to enhance the performance of the FPCS program. Consequently, it remains important to augment family physicians’ income and enhance their sense of self-fulfillment in the implementation of the FPCS policy in China.</p>","PeriodicalId":48195,"journal":{"name":"Health & Social Care in the Community","volume":"2025 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1155/hsc/9250733","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145366966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}