This paper studies the effects of immigration on crime and crime perceptions in Chile, where the foreign-born population tripled in less than ten years. We document null effects of immigration on crime but positive and significant effects on crime-related concerns and on preventive behavioral responses, such as investing in home security. We explore several channels and provide suggestive evidence related to low- versus high-education immigrants, ethnicity-related intergroup threats, and the role of local media. (JEL D83, D91, J15, K42, L82, O15, O17)
{"title":"Immigration, Crime, and Crime (Mis)Perceptions","authors":"Nicolás Ajzenman, Patricio Dominguez, Raimundo Undurraga","doi":"10.1257/app.20210156","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20210156","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the effects of immigration on crime and crime perceptions in Chile, where the foreign-born population tripled in less than ten years. We document null effects of immigration on crime but positive and significant effects on crime-related concerns and on preventive behavioral responses, such as investing in home security. We explore several channels and provide suggestive evidence related to low- versus high-education immigrants, ethnicity-related intergroup threats, and the role of local media. (JEL D83, D91, J15, K42, L82, O15, O17)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135367934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In many developing economies, urban workers earn substantially more than rural workers with the same level of education. Why don't more rural workers migrate to cities? I use two field experiments in Kenya to show that low migration is partly due to underestimation of urban incomes, which is sustained by income hiding by migrants. Parents at the origin underestimate their migrant children's incomes by nearly half, and underestimation is greater when a migrant's remittance obligations are high. Providing information about urban earnings increases migration to the capital city by about 40 percent over two years. (JEL C93, J31, J61, J82, O15, O18, R23)
{"title":"Hidden Income and the Perceived Returns to Migration","authors":"Travis Baseler","doi":"10.1257/app.20210571","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20210571","url":null,"abstract":"In many developing economies, urban workers earn substantially more than rural workers with the same level of education. Why don't more rural workers migrate to cities? I use two field experiments in Kenya to show that low migration is partly due to underestimation of urban incomes, which is sustained by income hiding by migrants. Parents at the origin underestimate their migrant children's incomes by nearly half, and underestimation is greater when a migrant's remittance obligations are high. Providing information about urban earnings increases migration to the capital city by about 40 percent over two years. (JEL C93, J31, J61, J82, O15, O18, R23)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136079719","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper shows that partisan cable news broadcasts have a causal effect on the size and composition of budgets in US localities. Using exogenous channel positioning as an instrument for viewership, we show that exposure to the conservative Fox News channel reduces revenues and expenditures. Multiple mechanisms drive these results: Fox News improves election chances for local Republicans, alters politician campaign agendas, and shifts voter policy preferences on fiscal issues. Consistent with the priorities of small-government conservatism, we find evidence that private provision compensates for the reduced public services. The “Fox News effect” extends beyond vote shares to rightward policy shifts. (JEL D72, H71, H72, H75, I20, L82)
{"title":"How Cable News Reshaped Local Government","authors":"Elliott Ash, Sergio Galletta","doi":"10.1257/app.20210501","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20210501","url":null,"abstract":"This paper shows that partisan cable news broadcasts have a causal effect on the size and composition of budgets in US localities. Using exogenous channel positioning as an instrument for viewership, we show that exposure to the conservative Fox News channel reduces revenues and expenditures. Multiple mechanisms drive these results: Fox News improves election chances for local Republicans, alters politician campaign agendas, and shifts voter policy preferences on fiscal issues. Consistent with the priorities of small-government conservatism, we find evidence that private provision compensates for the reduced public services. The “Fox News effect” extends beyond vote shares to rightward policy shifts. (JEL D72, H71, H72, H75, I20, L82)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135367477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Charles Bellemare, Marion Goussé, Guy Lacroix, Steeve Marchand
We sent fictitious applications to firms advertising job openings. We find that revealing a disability decreases callback rates by 25 percentage points. This result is not explained by accessibility constraints or lower productivity due to disability. We find that including a video résumé of a well-spoken applicant significantly increases callbacks by 10 percentage points for persons with and without disabilities, suggesting that discrimination is unaffected by quality signals in our context. Analysis of viewing activity suggests that employers seek less information when the applicant is disabled. Disclosing the disability later in the video increases employers' viewing time but leaves callback rates unchanged. (JEL C93, J14, J23, J24, J71, K31, M51)
{"title":"Physical Disability and Labor Market Discrimination: Evidence from a Video Résumé Field Experiment","authors":"Charles Bellemare, Marion Goussé, Guy Lacroix, Steeve Marchand","doi":"10.1257/app.20210633","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20210633","url":null,"abstract":"We sent fictitious applications to firms advertising job openings. We find that revealing a disability decreases callback rates by 25 percentage points. This result is not explained by accessibility constraints or lower productivity due to disability. We find that including a video résumé of a well-spoken applicant significantly increases callbacks by 10 percentage points for persons with and without disabilities, suggesting that discrimination is unaffected by quality signals in our context. Analysis of viewing activity suggests that employers seek less information when the applicant is disabled. Disclosing the disability later in the video increases employers' viewing time but leaves callback rates unchanged. (JEL C93, J14, J23, J24, J71, K31, M51)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135367936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze trends in cultural distances between groups in the United States defined by income, education, gender, race, and political ideology. We measure cultural distance as the ability to infer an individual's group based on media diet, consumer behavior, time use, social attitudes, or newborn's name. Gender difference in time-use decreased between 1965 and 1995 and has remained constant since. Differences in social attitudes by political ideology, and somewhat by income, have increased over the last four decades. Whites and non-Whites have diverged in consumer behavior. For all other demographic divisions and cultural dimensions, cultural distance has been broadly constant over time. (JEL D12, D91, J15, J16, L82, Z13)
{"title":"Coming Apart? Cultural Distances in the United States over Time","authors":"Marianne Bertrand, Emir Kamenica","doi":"10.1257/app.20210663","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20210663","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze trends in cultural distances between groups in the United States defined by income, education, gender, race, and political ideology. We measure cultural distance as the ability to infer an individual's group based on media diet, consumer behavior, time use, social attitudes, or newborn's name. Gender difference in time-use decreased between 1965 and 1995 and has remained constant since. Differences in social attitudes by political ideology, and somewhat by income, have increased over the last four decades. Whites and non-Whites have diverged in consumer behavior. For all other demographic divisions and cultural dimensions, cultural distance has been broadly constant over time. (JEL D12, D91, J15, J16, L82, Z13)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135367937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Matthew S Johnson, David I Levine, Michael W Toffel
We study how a regulator can best target inspections. Our case study is a US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) program that randomly allocated some inspections. On average, each inspection led to 2.4 (9 percent) fewer serious injuries over the next 5 years. Using new machine learning methods, we find that OSHA could have averted as much as twice as many injuries by targeting inspections to workplaces with the highest expected averted injuries and nearly as many by targeting the highest expected level of injuries. Either approach would have generated up to $850 million in social value over the decade we examine. (JEL C63, J28, J81, K32, L51)
{"title":"Improving Regulatory Effectiveness through Better Targeting: Evidence from OSHA","authors":"Matthew S Johnson, David I Levine, Michael W Toffel","doi":"10.1257/app.20200659","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20200659","url":null,"abstract":"We study how a regulator can best target inspections. Our case study is a US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) program that randomly allocated some inspections. On average, each inspection led to 2.4 (9 percent) fewer serious injuries over the next 5 years. Using new machine learning methods, we find that OSHA could have averted as much as twice as many injuries by targeting inspections to workplaces with the highest expected averted injuries and nearly as many by targeting the highest expected level of injuries. Either approach would have generated up to $850 million in social value over the decade we examine. (JEL C63, J28, J81, K32, L51)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136119736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study whether social media can amplify antiminority sentiment with a focus on Donald Trump’s political rise. Using an instrumental variable strategy based on Twitter’s early adopters at the South by Southwest festival in 2007, we find that higher Twitter use in a county is associated with a sizeable increase in anti-Muslim hate crimes after the 2016 presidential primaries. Trump’s tweets about Muslims predict increases in xenophobic tweets by his followers, cable news mentions of Muslims, and hate crimes on the following days. These results suggest that social media content can affect real-life out-comes. (JEL D72, J15, K42, L82, Z12)
{"title":"From Hashtag to Hate Crime: Twitter and Antiminority Sentiment","authors":"Karsten Müller, Carlo Schwarz","doi":"10.1257/app.20210211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20210211","url":null,"abstract":"We study whether social media can amplify antiminority sentiment with a focus on Donald Trump’s political rise. Using an instrumental variable strategy based on Twitter’s early adopters at the South by Southwest festival in 2007, we find that higher Twitter use in a county is associated with a sizeable increase in anti-Muslim hate crimes after the 2016 presidential primaries. Trump’s tweets about Muslims predict increases in xenophobic tweets by his followers, cable news mentions of Muslims, and hate crimes on the following days. These results suggest that social media content can affect real-life out-comes. (JEL D72, J15, K42, L82, Z12)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136185125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Reformers are calling for greater oversight of police behavior, in part through enhanced use of civilian complaints. However, others counter that greater oversight could chill effective policing. We assess police officer response to administrative determinations of misconduct. Using Chicago data, we find strong evidence that a sustained allegation reduces that officer’s future misconduct. We find no evidence that this effect is driven by incapacitation, such as assignment to desk duty, or by officer disengagement. We conclude that our findings are most consistent with improved officer conduct, in part from oversight and officer concerns over promotion, salary, and desirable assignments. (JEL H76, J45, K42, M54)
{"title":"Does Discipline Decrease Police Misconduct? Evidence from Chicago Civilian Allegations","authors":"Kyle Rozema, Max Schanzenbach","doi":"10.1257/app.20200568","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20200568","url":null,"abstract":"Reformers are calling for greater oversight of police behavior, in part through enhanced use of civilian complaints. However, others counter that greater oversight could chill effective policing. We assess police officer response to administrative determinations of misconduct. Using Chicago data, we find strong evidence that a sustained allegation reduces that officer’s future misconduct. We find no evidence that this effect is driven by incapacitation, such as assignment to desk duty, or by officer disengagement. We conclude that our findings are most consistent with improved officer conduct, in part from oversight and officer concerns over promotion, salary, and desirable assignments. (JEL H76, J45, K42, M54)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135265355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Electoral rules determine how voters’ preferences are aggregated and translated into political representation. Using a regression discontinuity design, I contrast single- and two-round elections in Brazil. In two-round elections, the eventual winner must obtain at least 50 percent of the vote. I show that two-round elections provide incentives for candidates to secure a broader base of support and provide public goods more broadly. Candidates represent a more geographically diverse group of voters, public schools have more resources, and there is less variation in resources across schools. Effects appear to be driven by strategic responses of candidates rather than differential entry into races. (JEL D72, H41, H75, I21, I28, O15, O17)
{"title":"When Do Politicians Appeal Broadly? The Economic Consequences of Electoral Rules in Brazil","authors":"Moya Chin","doi":"10.1257/app.20210529","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20210529","url":null,"abstract":"Electoral rules determine how voters’ preferences are aggregated and translated into political representation. Using a regression discontinuity design, I contrast single- and two-round elections in Brazil. In two-round elections, the eventual winner must obtain at least 50 percent of the vote. I show that two-round elections provide incentives for candidates to secure a broader base of support and provide public goods more broadly. Candidates represent a more geographically diverse group of voters, public schools have more resources, and there is less variation in resources across schools. Effects appear to be driven by strategic responses of candidates rather than differential entry into races. (JEL D72, H41, H75, I21, I28, O15, O17)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135265358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Exploiting the random assignment of Medicaid beneficiaries to managed care plans, we find substantial plan-specific spending effects despite plans having identical cost sharing. Enrollment in the lowest-spending plan reduces spending by at least 25%-primarily through quantity reductions-relative to enrollment in the highest-spending plan. Rather than reducing "wasteful" spending, lower-spending plans broadly reduce medical service provision-including the provision of low-cost, high-value care-and worsen beneficiary satisfaction and health. Consumer demand follows spending: a 10 percent increase in plan-specific spending is associated with a 40 percent increase in market share. These facts have implications for the government's contracting problem and program cost growth.
{"title":"What Difference Does a Health Plan Make? Evidence from Random Plan Assignment in Medicaid.","authors":"Michael Geruso, Timothy J Layton, Jacob Wallace","doi":"10.1257/app.20210843","DOIUrl":"10.1257/app.20210843","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Exploiting the random assignment of Medicaid beneficiaries to managed care plans, we find substantial plan-specific spending effects despite plans having <i>identical</i> cost sharing. Enrollment in the lowest-spending plan reduces spending by at least 25%-primarily through quantity reductions-relative to enrollment in the highest-spending plan. Rather than reducing \"wasteful\" spending, lower-spending plans broadly reduce medical service provision-including the provision of low-cost, high-value care-and worsen beneficiary satisfaction and health. Consumer demand follows spending: a 10 percent increase in plan-specific spending is associated with a 40 percent increase in market share. These facts have implications for the government's contracting problem and program cost growth.</p>","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"15 3","pages":"341-379"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10445793/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10101393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}