European Journal of Political Research最新文献

Do representatives provide fair and proportional representation to each place in their district or, rather, do they favour some places, creating winners and losers of representation? While the impact of geography on representation has been extensively examined in majoritarian systems, we know little about the geographical losers of representation in proportional representation systems. We investigate the extent to which different places receive unequal levels of attention in parliament, relative to what we would expect based on their population size as a normative proportional ideal. Crucially, we conceptualize place-based representation at the micro-level by looking inside electoral districts, using Google Places and Named Entity Recognition. Findings indicate that there are significant deviations from the proportional ideal. We find that small localities and large cities are overrepresented in parliament, while the medium-sized cities and suburban peripheries of major metropolises are underrepresented. Places with a higher percentage of the population with university degrees are also overrepresented in parliament. These results carry important normative implications for forms of territorial-based representation.

Many contemporary researchers agree that group relative deprivation is a driver of political actions against outgroups. However, both relative deprivation and political actions are complex phenomena, making it important to further study this relationship in the context of other relevant variables. One such variable could be the specific outgroup. The purpose of our study was to evaluate differences in the contribution of group relative deprivation to the prediction of activist and radicalised intentions against two outgroups – Muslims and senior citizens. The multi-group structural equation modelling was applied separately on nationally representative samples of youth from Germany (N = 1,056), Norway (N = 376) and the United Kingdom (UK) (N = 1053). Group relative deprivation exhibited a robust relationship with activist intentions after controlling for general aggression, social desirability bias, age and gender, except in the UK, where the relationship between activist intentions and relative deprivation was stronger with Muslims as the target outgroup. The relationship between relative deprivation and radicalised intentions depended on the target outgroup across countries – it was related to radicalised intentions only against Muslims. The meaning and implications of these results are briefly discussed.

Issue ownership is an important determinant of the vote, and it is electorally beneficial for parties to build a strong reputation on their core issues. Even though issue ownership has already been studied extensively in the party literature, we know less about how citizens form ownership perceptions. We contribute to this literature by means of two studies on the connection between party behaviour and perceptions of issue ownership, with an empirical focus on issue competence reputations of parties. In Study 1, we combine party-level information about issue attention, positions and performance with data on competence perceptions from a wide range of national election studies. Study 2 is a pre-registered conjoint experiment designed to examine the causal link between party behaviour and perceived competence. Our results point to significant effects for all three hypothesised sources of competence reputations. Moving beyond previous work that has argued that competence reputations are mostly stable over time, after accounting for the variation due to parties' popularity, our results show that they fluctuate in the short term and that parties have some level of control over how they are perceived.

To what extent political parties engage in debates about the same issues and how they respond to each other is highly relevant to democratic processes. Existing research on issue engagement has uncovered several interesting patterns and factors, but has neglected one important feature of contemporary democracies: nowadays, political actors have a wide range of communication channels at their disposal with the use of ‘newer’ forms of political communication (e.g., social media) potentially transforming discursive power relations between political actors. However, it remains largely unclear whether the extent and nature of issue engagement varies between more ‘traditional’ and ‘newer’ forms of political communication. To fill this gap, I apply unsupervised topic modelling to press releases and tweets from political parties in Austria, Germany and Switzerland (January 2019–September 2021). The statistical analysis shows substantial differences in issue engagement between political parties in press releases and on Twitter, now X. First, I find a higher likelihood of issue engagement between parties in tweets. Second, Twitter appears to moderate the influence of party-level factors on issue engagement compared to press releases. The results show that for issue engagement in tweets, the importance of party size is smaller and the role of government parties is larger than in press releases, while the role of ideological distance does not seem to change. These findings add important insights to our understanding of the potential transformative effect of new communication technologies on party competition and political discourse.

Family-friendly practices in parliaments are central to the recruitment and retention of diverse representatives. Yet, instituting such reforms raises questions about public reactions, something little tested in current work. A conjoint experiment in the United Kingdom tests if the public punish MPs for taking time off their elected roles for a baby. And, importantly, asks who pays the price? Against expectations, MPs who take parental leave are not punished by the public. Voters prefer MPs who are parents, even when they take leave. Crucially, this preference is contingent upon MP sex. Women MPs who take parental leave are consistently the preferred choice over their male counterparts. When the ‘costs’ of parenthood are emphasised, women MPs receive a parenthood benefit, while men MPs do not. The findings align with the recent positive bias for women in electoral choice experiments and lend further support to implementing family-friendly policies in politics.

Does gender affect candidate selection and list placement under proportional representation (PR)? Existing research argues that PR systems have a positive effect on women's representation due to a more inclusive candidate selection process. However, analysing the actual process of candidate selection under PR before observing the final party list is challenging, and little is known about the preferences and strategies of party elites when selecting and ranking candidates. To address this lacuna, we conduct a novel two-stage conjoint experiment with party elites in Austria, which allows us to differentiate between two distinct mechanisms in candidate nomination under PR: selection and ranking. Our findings indicate that women generally have an advantage with respect to selection but find themselves subject to same-sex preferences when it comes to ranking on the list, for which they otherwise benefit from being low in supply. These findings have important implications for understanding patterns of female under-representation in PR systems.

The European Union (EU) has laboured hard to gain the right to make oral interventions in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in pursuit of a more active international role. At the same time, though, EU member-states continue to take the floor to make their own interventions, thus differentiating – but not necessarily distancing – their stance from the officially expressed EU position. In that respect, it is important to examine the drivers behind the differentiating activity of EU member-states and their engagement in UNGA deliberations. We identify structural, institutional, political and thematic drivers. They relate to resources, the EU system of external representation in the form of the EU rotating Council Presidency and the opportunities that it provides during each country's period in office, national political aspirations for greater influence, as well as issue-specific assertiveness. We operationalize and control for these drivers by looking at the size and economic resources of EU member-states, their individual statements while holding the EU rotating Council Presidency, their membership in the UN Security Council (UNSC) or candidacy for it, and the issue specificity of each UNGA Main Committee. Our analysis is based on a three-level longitudinal multilevel random intercept model and relies upon a new dataset that compiles the oral interventions made by representatives of EU member-states and by EU officials in UNGA through an automated content analysis of the verbatim records of the UNGA meetings from 1998 to 2017.

Online abuse is becoming an increasingly pressing issue for democratic societies. Citizens play an important role in curtailing abuse as they often moderate online content through counter speech and by reporting abusive messages. However, we know little about when citizens actually perceive negative comments directed at politicians as being abusive, and the factors shaping these perceptions are also understudied. In this study, we therefore investigate how citizens perceive criticism, insults, threats and sexist remarks directed at politicians on social media. Based on a survey experiment with 2,000 Danish citizens, we show that citizens’ assessments of the abusiveness of such remarks are not only affected by the content of the messages, but also by political ideology, political trust and gender. Surprisingly, partisanship does not seem to substantively affect perceptions of abuse. Our study provides novel insights into what exactly citizens consider to be abusive behaviour on social media.

Scholars increasingly raise concerns about the alleged detrimental impact of affective polarization on citizens’ democratic attitudes. Yet, prior studies on the relationship between affective polarization and democratic support have yielded mixed results: Whereas some scholars report evidence that affective polarization erodes citizens’ support for democracy, others report null findings. In this research note, we posit that one relevant explanation for these mixed results is that the relationship between affective polarization and democratic support is not linear, but rather negatively curvilinear (i.e., an inverted U-shape). Though extreme levels of affective polarization may harm citizens’ democratic commitments, a moderate amount of affective polarization can strengthen democratic support by heightening the political stakes and stimulating democratic involvement. Employing generalized additive modelling on data from the CNEP collected in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, we show strong and robust support for this negatively curvilinear pattern. These findings have important implications for our understanding of the dynamics between affective polarization and democratic support, as well as for the recommended estimation strategies of future studies that aim to explore this relationship.

This paper draws attention to a group of neighborhoods that are the object of heated elite discussions in many European countries. Using Sweden as our case, we demonstrate the feasibility of conducting high-quality surveys with residents in neighborhoods where large shares have an immigrant background and low socioeconomic status. Moreover, we develop a measurement that allows us to assess what residents in two of Sweden's politicized and vulnerable neighborhoods think is needed to improve the social order of their local areas. We find that residents believe that neighborhood problems are generally about a lack of social control between people and that residents are not preoccupied with culture clash issues. Overall, beliefs about what contributes to social order are structured, largely homogenous and independent of elite discourse. Based on a comparison with a nationally representative sample, we conclude that residents in vulnerable neighborhoods and residents in other neighborhoods share a similar worldview and approach to daily life, but that the need for local social order is more keenly felt in the vulnerable neighborhoods.