Perceptions that others will contribute their fair share are fundamental to the legitimacy of the political system. To better understand how these perceptions take shape beyond the influence of political narratives and socializations, this paper investigates the role of the formative personal experiences of benefit recipiency and income changes in explaining views on welfare abuse as well as tax evasion. Theoretically, both increasing identification or ‘othering’ could occur when these experiences lead to new group adherence. To test this empirically, three‐wave Norwegian panel data (2014–2017) are analysed. Within‐ as well as between‐group analyses show that becoming dependent on benefits leads to lower perceptions of welfare abuse, while positive income changes prompt higher perceptions of tax evasion, albeit mostly among those with lower income levels. Overall, this article shows that formative personal experiences affect views that are fundamental to the perceived fairness, legitimacy and sustainability of the social and political system.
{"title":"Formative personal experiences: How benefit recipiency and income changes shape perceptions of system abuse","authors":"Arno Van Hootegem, Anna Helgøy, Miroslav Nemčok","doi":"10.1111/1475-6765.12685","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12685","url":null,"abstract":"Perceptions that others will contribute their fair share are fundamental to the legitimacy of the political system. To better understand how these perceptions take shape beyond the influence of political narratives and socializations, this paper investigates the role of the formative personal experiences of benefit recipiency and income changes in explaining views on welfare abuse as well as tax evasion. Theoretically, both increasing identification or ‘othering’ could occur when these experiences lead to new group adherence. To test this empirically, three‐wave Norwegian panel data (2014–2017) are analysed. Within‐ as well as between‐group analyses show that becoming dependent on benefits leads to lower perceptions of welfare abuse, while positive income changes prompt higher perceptions of tax evasion, albeit mostly among those with lower income levels. Overall, this article shows that formative personal experiences affect views that are fundamental to the perceived fairness, legitimacy and sustainability of the social and political system.","PeriodicalId":48273,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141001321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Men's numerical over‐representation in politics leads to complacency regarding their substantive representation. Yet the men in politics are not descriptively representative of most men and are drawn disproportionately from the most socially privileged groups. Building on theories of representation, intersectionality and masculinities, I argue that men have gendered representational needs that are not adequately met. Power structures among men leave many men marginalized and/or subordinated, and disincentivize the privileged men in power from defending disadvantaged men's interests. Masculinist cultures within politics inhibit discussion of male vulnerability and further undermine the substantive representation of men. I make the case for why we should study men's substantive representation and then show how we could do so. I propose a groundbreaking research agenda for identifying and measuring men's diverse representational needs, recognizing how these are shaped by gender and its intersection with other identities. Combining insights from objectivist, constructivist and intersectional approaches, I develop a framework for measuring the substantive representation of men that explores who represents men, which ideology informs their claims, which men are included and excluded and whether the goals of representation are to transform or uphold the status quo. I offer several illuminations of policies where different men have distinct gendered needs, and offer an extended example using educational outcomes in the United Kingdom to illustrate how privileged men are not effective representatives of disadvantaged men. This article builds the normative case and offers the theoretical tools for addressing an important gap in the study of representation.
{"title":"The substantive representation of men: Intersectionality, masculinities, and men's interests","authors":"Rainbow Murray","doi":"10.1111/1475-6765.12684","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12684","url":null,"abstract":"Men's numerical over‐representation in politics leads to complacency regarding their substantive representation. Yet the men in politics are not descriptively representative of most men and are drawn disproportionately from the most socially privileged groups. Building on theories of representation, intersectionality and masculinities, I argue that men have gendered representational needs that are not adequately met. Power structures among men leave many men marginalized and/or subordinated, and disincentivize the privileged men in power from defending disadvantaged men's interests. Masculinist cultures within politics inhibit discussion of male vulnerability and further undermine the substantive representation of men. I make the case for why we should study men's substantive representation and then show how we could do so. I propose a groundbreaking research agenda for identifying and measuring men's diverse representational needs, recognizing how these are shaped by gender and its intersection with other identities. Combining insights from objectivist, constructivist and intersectional approaches, I develop a framework for measuring the substantive representation of men that explores who represents men, which ideology informs their claims, which men are included and excluded and whether the goals of representation are to transform or uphold the status quo. I offer several illuminations of policies where different men have distinct gendered needs, and offer an extended example using educational outcomes in the United Kingdom to illustrate how privileged men are not effective representatives of disadvantaged men. This article builds the normative case and offers the theoretical tools for addressing an important gap in the study of representation.","PeriodicalId":48273,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140998238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
João Carvalho, Mariana CARMO DUARTE, Didier Ruedin
Immigration is a hot topic in Europe, but research on the media effects on public attention to immigration remains limited. We examine how media coverage affects the degree of importance attached to immigration in seven Western European Union member states. Data come from an extensive analysis of claims in printed newspapers, and the Eurobarometer (2002–2009). The continuous sample of news coverage is aggregated into a biannual panel, and we relate these data to citizens’ perceptions of the most important issues in their country 6 months later (lagged). The public consider immigration more important than other policy‐related issues when there is an increase in the volume of news and more political claims on the topic in the media. The media environment appears to be an exogenous actor that can have agenda‐setting effects on public concern about immigration. Our results highlight limitations of both the ‘policy‐gap’ thesis and thermostatic models of policy making.
{"title":"Follow the media? News environment and public concern about immigration","authors":"João Carvalho, Mariana CARMO DUARTE, Didier Ruedin","doi":"10.1111/1475-6765.12683","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12683","url":null,"abstract":"Immigration is a hot topic in Europe, but research on the media effects on public attention to immigration remains limited. We examine how media coverage affects the degree of importance attached to immigration in seven Western European Union member states. Data come from an extensive analysis of claims in printed newspapers, and the Eurobarometer (2002–2009). The continuous sample of news coverage is aggregated into a biannual panel, and we relate these data to citizens’ perceptions of the most important issues in their country 6 months later (lagged). The public consider immigration more important than other policy‐related issues when there is an increase in the volume of news and more political claims on the topic in the media. The media environment appears to be an exogenous actor that can have agenda‐setting effects on public concern about immigration. Our results highlight limitations of both the ‘policy‐gap’ thesis and thermostatic models of policy making.","PeriodicalId":48273,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141001422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Almost all anti‐corruption drives contain an awareness raising element. However, recent research reveals that anti‐corruption awareness raising messages can backfire by triggering a sense that corruption is too big of a problem to tackle, thus encouraging resignation rather than resistance. We advance this literature by exploring another potential unintended impact. Corruption scandals have played a prominent role in the rise of many populist leaders, who claim to challenge ‘the corrupt status quo’. We test whether anti‐corruption messages that call attention to the problem unintentionally help to foster populist attitudes through an original survey experiment in Albania. Breaking new ground by testing messages based on descriptive (how the world is) and injunctive (how people want it to be) norms, we find that while the latter has no effect, exposure to the former – which is more common in contemporary anti‐corruption campaigns – is associated with greater agreement with populist sentiments and beliefs.
{"title":"Opening the door to anti‐system leaders? Anti‐corruption campaigns and the global rise of populism","authors":"Nic Cheeseman, Caryn Peiffer","doi":"10.1111/1475-6765.12682","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12682","url":null,"abstract":"Almost all anti‐corruption drives contain an awareness raising element. However, recent research reveals that anti‐corruption awareness raising messages can backfire by triggering a sense that corruption is too big of a problem to tackle, thus encouraging resignation rather than resistance. We advance this literature by exploring another potential unintended impact. Corruption scandals have played a prominent role in the rise of many populist leaders, who claim to challenge ‘the corrupt status quo’. We test whether anti‐corruption messages that call attention to the problem unintentionally help to foster populist attitudes through an original survey experiment in Albania. Breaking new ground by testing messages based on descriptive (how the world is) and injunctive (how people want it to be) norms, we find that while the latter has no effect, exposure to the former – which is more common in contemporary anti‐corruption campaigns – is associated with greater agreement with populist sentiments and beliefs.","PeriodicalId":48273,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140664437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jana Belschner, Raimondas Ibenskas, Florian Weiler
Does candidate gender matter for vote choice? Whereas experimental research suggests an average preference for female candidates, observational studies tend to find null effects. In this note, we address the recent debate on how to measure voter preferences on the aggregate and the individual level. We argue that candidate gender preferences exist, but that whether and when they are revealed varies between and within voters. Drawing on an observational design and using data from over 500,000 individual ballots in Lithuanian elections, we employ multilevel regression and exponential random graph models to show how voters' candidate gender preferences are distributed across the electorate and how they vary in size and direction. We find that about half of all voters prefer either male or female candidates. Whereas preference for male candidates tends to be revealed in the first and second preference votes, preference for female candidates is first revealed in lower preference votes. Our results help explain contradictory findings in the literature and illustrate how observational data and methods can be used to assess voter preferences within electorates.
{"title":"When do voters reveal candidate gender preferences? Evidence from individual‐level ballot data","authors":"Jana Belschner, Raimondas Ibenskas, Florian Weiler","doi":"10.1111/1475-6765.12679","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12679","url":null,"abstract":"Does candidate gender matter for vote choice? Whereas experimental research suggests an average preference for female candidates, observational studies tend to find null effects. In this note, we address the recent debate on how to measure voter preferences on the aggregate and the individual level. We argue that candidate gender preferences exist, but that whether and when they are revealed varies between and within voters. Drawing on an observational design and using data from over 500,000 individual ballots in Lithuanian elections, we employ multilevel regression and exponential random graph models to show how voters' candidate gender preferences are distributed across the electorate and how they vary in size and direction. We find that about half of all voters prefer either male or female candidates. Whereas preference for male candidates tends to be revealed in the first and second preference votes, preference for female candidates is first revealed in lower preference votes. Our results help explain contradictory findings in the literature and illustrate how observational data and methods can be used to assess voter preferences within electorates.","PeriodicalId":48273,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140692269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Party competition sometimes resembles an auction, where parties seek to ‘buy’ elections through promises of economic largesse. In this article, I argue that whether parties engage in this practice will depend on political circumstances, such as the level of ideological competition. Incentives to promise more to voters will also vary depending on a party's electoral prospects: for parties that expect a significant level of government responsibility, promising too much is a risky strategy. I test these arguments by focusing on the spending commitments in party manifestos from 20 countries over the period 1945–2017. In line with expectations, parties tend to make more expansionary election pledges when ideological competition is more muted. In addition, left‐wing parties’ spending commitments are found to be influenced by their projected seat shares (based on opinion polls from before the start of the election campaign) relative to their competitors. Specifically, the stronger a left‐wing party's electoral prospects, the more fiscally conservative it tends to be, and vice versa.
{"title":"Auction politics: Party competition and expansionary election promises","authors":"Rory Costello","doi":"10.1111/1475-6765.12678","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12678","url":null,"abstract":"Party competition sometimes resembles an auction, where parties seek to ‘buy’ elections through promises of economic largesse. In this article, I argue that whether parties engage in this practice will depend on political circumstances, such as the level of ideological competition. Incentives to promise more to voters will also vary depending on a party's electoral prospects: for parties that expect a significant level of government responsibility, promising too much is a risky strategy. I test these arguments by focusing on the spending commitments in party manifestos from 20 countries over the period 1945–2017. In line with expectations, parties tend to make more expansionary election pledges when ideological competition is more muted. In addition, left‐wing parties’ spending commitments are found to be influenced by their projected seat shares (based on opinion polls from before the start of the election campaign) relative to their competitors. Specifically, the stronger a left‐wing party's electoral prospects, the more fiscally conservative it tends to be, and vice versa.","PeriodicalId":48273,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140708561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Coalition policymaking concerns not only who decides what in which jurisdiction but also when, how speedy and in what rhythm. Due to the limited time budget and shadow of future elections, parties in charge of respective ministerial portfolios have to strategically organize their policy agendas to trade off between policy and electoral incentives in the face of coalition partners who monitor and control ministerial autonomy. However, despite the burgeoning literature on coalition governance, the temporal dimension of ministerial agenda control is less well understood. I advance this research by proposing a model to directly account for the influence of time budgets on timing decisions of ministers in policy initiation. In this model, I distinguish between different timing strategies of policy initiation a ministerial party may possibly adopt and identify in equilibrium a conditional postponing strategy by which ministers facing high scrutiny of coalition partners will postpone bill initiation till the end of the term. The empirical examination lends support to my argument and further demonstrates that the timing strategy of ministers can also be influenced by coalition conflict and policy saliency of bills.
{"title":"Strategic postponement of coalition policymaking in European Parliamentary democracies","authors":"Xiao Lu","doi":"10.1111/1475-6765.12677","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12677","url":null,"abstract":"Coalition policymaking concerns not only who decides what in which jurisdiction but also when, how speedy and in what rhythm. Due to the limited time budget and shadow of future elections, parties in charge of respective ministerial portfolios have to strategically organize their policy agendas to trade off between policy and electoral incentives in the face of coalition partners who monitor and control ministerial autonomy. However, despite the burgeoning literature on coalition governance, the temporal dimension of ministerial agenda control is less well understood. I advance this research by proposing a model to directly account for the influence of time budgets on timing decisions of ministers in policy initiation. In this model, I distinguish between different timing strategies of policy initiation a ministerial party may possibly adopt and identify in equilibrium a conditional postponing strategy by which ministers facing high scrutiny of coalition partners will postpone bill initiation till the end of the term. The empirical examination lends support to my argument and further demonstrates that the timing strategy of ministers can also be influenced by coalition conflict and policy saliency of bills.","PeriodicalId":48273,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140712887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. Dingler, L. Hayek, Christian Schwaderer, Martin Senn, Andreas M. Kraxberger, Nada Ragheb
Threat language is an important, albeit ambivalent, element of political crisis communication. It raises public awareness and enhances compliance with emergency measures, but, if overused, it also carries the risk of making governments appear overwhelmed by a crisis. Research on political communication during the COVID‐19 pandemic has so far only produced very limited insights into the use of threat language by governments. To address this gap in the literature, our article analyses which factors influence the likelihood of threat language in the crisis communication of governments. We argue that individual‐level factors (politician vs. non‐politician and gender) shape the odds of including threat language and that contextual factors (time and subject area) determine the probability with which speakers employ this communication tool.Based on a unique dataset of 1108 press conferences with 433 speakers in 17 OECD countries and three US states, we demonstrate that men are slightly more prone to employ threat language than women. The most important determinant of its use, however, is the subject area that speakers are addressing. In particular, in the context of the health system and public management, speeches are likely to be associated with risks, dangers, and threats. Overall, our findings imply that crisis communication across countries is not as diverse as indicated by previous literature. Once countries are facing a comparable challenge, political actors largely communicate in a similar manner.
{"title":"Everyone will know someone who died of Corona: Government threat language during the COVID‐19 pandemic","authors":"S. Dingler, L. Hayek, Christian Schwaderer, Martin Senn, Andreas M. Kraxberger, Nada Ragheb","doi":"10.1111/1475-6765.12676","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12676","url":null,"abstract":"Threat language is an important, albeit ambivalent, element of political crisis communication. It raises public awareness and enhances compliance with emergency measures, but, if overused, it also carries the risk of making governments appear overwhelmed by a crisis. Research on political communication during the COVID‐19 pandemic has so far only produced very limited insights into the use of threat language by governments. To address this gap in the literature, our article analyses which factors influence the likelihood of threat language in the crisis communication of governments. We argue that individual‐level factors (politician vs. non‐politician and gender) shape the odds of including threat language and that contextual factors (time and subject area) determine the probability with which speakers employ this communication tool.Based on a unique dataset of 1108 press conferences with 433 speakers in 17 OECD countries and three US states, we demonstrate that men are slightly more prone to employ threat language than women. The most important determinant of its use, however, is the subject area that speakers are addressing. In particular, in the context of the health system and public management, speeches are likely to be associated with risks, dangers, and threats. Overall, our findings imply that crisis communication across countries is not as diverse as indicated by previous literature. Once countries are facing a comparable challenge, political actors largely communicate in a similar manner.","PeriodicalId":48273,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140717769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A. Driscoll, Jay N. Krehbiel, Michael J. Nelson, Sangyeon Kim
A growing body of research theorizes that partisanship can undermine democracy as citizens prioritize their political interests over abstract norms and values. We argue that crises might counteract intense partisanship by giving citizens clarity on the threats posed by rule of law violations. Examining the differential application of a law – a breach of democratic norms – we draw on an experiment embedded in representative surveys of Germany, the United States, Hungary and Poland to examine citizens’ sense of appropriate punishment for elites’ violation of a municipal mask‐wearing ordinance. We find evidence of partisan bias in citizens’ willingness to support punishment in all four countries. But, in the two consolidated democracies, we find that concern about the Covid‐19 crisis diminishes partisan biases in punishment preferences: citizens who are most concerned about the crisis also model the most consistency in their willingness to hold copartisans into account.
{"title":"The consistency principle: Crisis perceptions, partisanship and public support for democratic norms in comparative perspective","authors":"A. Driscoll, Jay N. Krehbiel, Michael J. Nelson, Sangyeon Kim","doi":"10.1111/1475-6765.12673","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12673","url":null,"abstract":"A growing body of research theorizes that partisanship can undermine democracy as citizens prioritize their political interests over abstract norms and values. We argue that crises might counteract intense partisanship by giving citizens clarity on the threats posed by rule of law violations. Examining the differential application of a law – a breach of democratic norms – we draw on an experiment embedded in representative surveys of Germany, the United States, Hungary and Poland to examine citizens’ sense of appropriate punishment for elites’ violation of a municipal mask‐wearing ordinance. We find evidence of partisan bias in citizens’ willingness to support punishment in all four countries. But, in the two consolidated democracies, we find that concern about the Covid‐19 crisis diminishes partisan biases in punishment preferences: citizens who are most concerned about the crisis also model the most consistency in their willingness to hold copartisans into account.","PeriodicalId":48273,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140729220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While cross‐sectional research has consistently shown graduates are less Eurosceptic than non‐graduates, little is known about the causal role of university study in determining these attitudes, as few longitudinal studies have explored this. This study does so, providing robust causal estimates of higher education's effect on Euroscepticism through applying individual‐ and sibling fixed‐effect modelling techniques to British Household Panel and Understanding Society data from 1999–2022. Both specifications provide consistent results; suggesting university study does little to decrease Euroscepticism in the short‐run but has substantial long‐run effects. This alludes to an ‘allocation’ effect, whereby it is largely not the experience of obtaining a degree itself, but the opportunities afforded by virtue of doing so that shape attitudes towards Europe. Our novel findings not only demonstrate that within‐sibling estimates of higher education's effect can be generalised to the wider British population but also advance our understanding of the mechanisms linking education with Euroscepticism.
{"title":"Exploring the linkage of higher education and attitudes towards European integration: The British case","authors":"Andrew McNEIL, Elizabeth Simon","doi":"10.1111/1475-6765.12675","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12675","url":null,"abstract":"While cross‐sectional research has consistently shown graduates are less Eurosceptic than non‐graduates, little is known about the causal role of university study in determining these attitudes, as few longitudinal studies have explored this. This study does so, providing robust causal estimates of higher education's effect on Euroscepticism through applying individual‐ and sibling fixed‐effect modelling techniques to British Household Panel and Understanding Society data from 1999–2022. Both specifications provide consistent results; suggesting university study does little to decrease Euroscepticism in the short‐run but has substantial long‐run effects. This alludes to an ‘allocation’ effect, whereby it is largely not the experience of obtaining a degree itself, but the opportunities afforded by virtue of doing so that shape attitudes towards Europe. Our novel findings not only demonstrate that within‐sibling estimates of higher education's effect can be generalised to the wider British population but also advance our understanding of the mechanisms linking education with Euroscepticism.","PeriodicalId":48273,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Political Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140737555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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