This paper explains a function of the legal boundaries of various organizations (such as corporations, security interests and trusts): they define internal capital markets within which capital may be redeployed over time by fiat and over which it may be moved only at greater cost and with greater difficulty. The option to switch capital allocations among available projects is valuable and its value can be enhanced when management of the option is delegated to an informed and loyal agent. However, if the switching option has low value, agents have little private information or agency costs are severe, the principal should constrain the ability of her agent to reallocate capital. She may accomplish this by shrinking the legal boundaries of the relevant internal capital markets: that is, by segregating projects into separate legal organizations. For example, a number of corporate, securities, tax and debtor-creditor law rules make switching between affiliate corporations significantly more costly than within a firm. Security interests and trusts also constrain capital budgeting flexibility. Indeed, the law provides a menu of instruments that, to varying degrees, remove from agents the discretion to adjust capital allocations among projects over time. The paper also examines the charitable sector: the prevailing information conditions and tax rules differ in important respects from those in the commercial sector and they raise interesting internal capital market issues. Capital budgeting flexibility in charities is constrained by charitable trust law principles. In both commercial and charitable sectors, intermediaries offer an attractive alternative solution to the agency tradeoff.
{"title":"Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries of Firms, Collateral and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises","authors":"George G. Triantis","doi":"10.2307/4093365","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/4093365","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explains a function of the legal boundaries of various organizations (such as corporations, security interests and trusts): they define internal capital markets within which capital may be redeployed over time by fiat and over which it may be moved only at greater cost and with greater difficulty. The option to switch capital allocations among available projects is valuable and its value can be enhanced when management of the option is delegated to an informed and loyal agent. However, if the switching option has low value, agents have little private information or agency costs are severe, the principal should constrain the ability of her agent to reallocate capital. She may accomplish this by shrinking the legal boundaries of the relevant internal capital markets: that is, by segregating projects into separate legal organizations. For example, a number of corporate, securities, tax and debtor-creditor law rules make switching between affiliate corporations significantly more costly than within a firm. Security interests and trusts also constrain capital budgeting flexibility. Indeed, the law provides a menu of instruments that, to varying degrees, remove from agents the discretion to adjust capital allocations among projects over time. The paper also examines the charitable sector: the prevailing information conditions and tax rules differ in important respects from those in the commercial sector and they raise interesting internal capital market issues. Capital budgeting flexibility in charities is constrained by charitable trust law principles. In both commercial and charitable sectors, intermediaries offer an attractive alternative solution to the agency tradeoff.","PeriodicalId":48320,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Law Review","volume":"117 1","pages":"1102"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2004-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/4093365","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68731729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds","authors":"C. Sabel, William H. Simon","doi":"10.2307/4093364","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/4093364","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48320,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Law Review","volume":"117 1","pages":"1015"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2004-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/4093364","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68731697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Second Amendment, so Far","authors":"Stuart Banner, D. Williams","doi":"10.2307/4093463","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/4093463","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48320,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Law Review","volume":"117 1","pages":"898"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/4093463","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68732722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Theorists of transitional justice study the transition measures used, or eschewed, by new democracies that succeed communist or authoritarian regimes - measures including trials, purges, lustration, reparations, and truth commissions. The theorists tend to oppose transitional measures, portraying them as illiberal and as a distraction from the task of consolidating new democracies. In this Article we argue against that view. The critics of transitional justice have gone wrong by overlooking that transitional measures are common in consolidated legal systems, which themselves constantly undergo political and economic shocks resulting in transitions of greater or lesser degree. Ordinary justice has developed a range of pragmatic tools for managing transitions. Consolidated democracies use trials, purges and reparations to accomplish valuable forward-looking goals without allowing illiberal repression; new democracies can and should use those tools also. Because transitional justice is continuous with ordinary justice, there is no reason to treat transitional-justice measures as presumptively suspect, on either moral or institutional grounds.
{"title":"Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice","authors":"E. Posner, Adrian Vermeule","doi":"10.2307/4093461","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/4093461","url":null,"abstract":"Theorists of transitional justice study the transition measures used, or eschewed, by new democracies that succeed communist or authoritarian regimes - measures including trials, purges, lustration, reparations, and truth commissions. The theorists tend to oppose transitional measures, portraying them as illiberal and as a distraction from the task of consolidating new democracies. In this Article we argue against that view. The critics of transitional justice have gone wrong by overlooking that transitional measures are common in consolidated legal systems, which themselves constantly undergo political and economic shocks resulting in transitions of greater or lesser degree. Ordinary justice has developed a range of pragmatic tools for managing transitions. Consolidated democracies use trials, purges and reparations to accomplish valuable forward-looking goals without allowing illiberal repression; new democracies can and should use those tools also. Because transitional justice is continuous with ordinary justice, there is no reason to treat transitional-justice measures as presumptively suspect, on either moral or institutional grounds.","PeriodicalId":48320,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Law Review","volume":"117 1","pages":"762"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/4093461","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68732490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Note, Underenfranchisement: Black Voters and the Presidential Nomination Process","authors":"J. Driver","doi":"10.2307/4093339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/4093339","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48320,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Law Review","volume":"117 1","pages":"2318"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/4093339","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68731521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Not Your Daddy's Fundamentalism: Intelligent Design in the Classroom","authors":"F. Beckwith","doi":"10.2307/4093466","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/4093466","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48320,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Law Review","volume":"117 1","pages":"964"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/4093466","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68732804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I. CONTEXT AND CHRONOLOGY ...... 835 A. The Political Culture and Legal Landscape of Early-Nineteenth-Century Kentucky... 836 I. "Steady to the principles of pure republicanism" 836 2. "The laws of Virginia for the appropriation of lands were the greatest curse that ever befell Kentucky" 839 B. The Crisis Unfolds 844 . The Triggering D ecision 845 2. Removal and Reorganization 849 3. Response and Retrenchment 852 II. POWER, LEGITIMACY, AND CONSTITUTIONALISM .... 855 A. Competing Structural Theories of Sovereignty 857 i. Questions of Representation ........ 857 2. "[I]n ... a multiplicity of checks the freedom of the whole will be safe" 862 3. "Aristocrats" and "Farmers" 865 B. The Locus and Methodology of Constitutional Interpretation 869 i. The New Court's Populist View of Constitutionalism . 870 (a) Judicial Illegitimacy and Incompetency in Constitutional Interpretation 870 (b) "That little book": Implications of Writtenness for Popular Constitutional Theory 871 2. The Old-Court Party's Moderate Judicial Constitutionalism 874 III. RAMIFICATIONS ACROSS GEOGRAPHY, TIME, AND THEORY 877 A. Insights Regarding Marbury's Influence and the Opinions of National Leaders ......... 879 I. "Marberry and Madison ... [an] unhappy citation[]" . 879 2. The Views of National Leaders 881 B. Influences on Judicial Behavior and Andrew Jackson's Constitutionalism 884 I. Judicial Behavior 884 2. Jackson's Constitutionalism 886 C. Broader Historical and Theoretical Lessons 888 i. Recent Scholarship Assessing Conceptions of Judicial Review in the Early Republic 888 2. A n U ncertain C onsensus 892 3. The Public's Constitutional Moment 894 4. Taming the Judges 896
{"title":"\"A Question Which Convulses a Nation\": The Early Republic's Greatest Debate About the Judicial Review Power","authors":"Theodore W. Ruger","doi":"10.2307/4093462","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/4093462","url":null,"abstract":"I. CONTEXT AND CHRONOLOGY ...... 835 A. The Political Culture and Legal Landscape of Early-Nineteenth-Century Kentucky... 836 I. \"Steady to the principles of pure republicanism\" 836 2. \"The laws of Virginia for the appropriation of lands were the greatest curse that ever befell Kentucky\" 839 B. The Crisis Unfolds 844 . The Triggering D ecision 845 2. Removal and Reorganization 849 3. Response and Retrenchment 852 II. POWER, LEGITIMACY, AND CONSTITUTIONALISM .... 855 A. Competing Structural Theories of Sovereignty 857 i. Questions of Representation ........ 857 2. \"[I]n ... a multiplicity of checks the freedom of the whole will be safe\" 862 3. \"Aristocrats\" and \"Farmers\" 865 B. The Locus and Methodology of Constitutional Interpretation 869 i. The New Court's Populist View of Constitutionalism . 870 (a) Judicial Illegitimacy and Incompetency in Constitutional Interpretation 870 (b) \"That little book\": Implications of Writtenness for Popular Constitutional Theory 871 2. The Old-Court Party's Moderate Judicial Constitutionalism 874 III. RAMIFICATIONS ACROSS GEOGRAPHY, TIME, AND THEORY 877 A. Insights Regarding Marbury's Influence and the Opinions of National Leaders ......... 879 I. \"Marberry and Madison ... [an] unhappy citation[]\" . 879 2. The Views of National Leaders 881 B. Influences on Judicial Behavior and Andrew Jackson's Constitutionalism 884 I. Judicial Behavior 884 2. Jackson's Constitutionalism 886 C. Broader Historical and Theoretical Lessons 888 i. Recent Scholarship Assessing Conceptions of Judicial Review in the Early Republic 888 2. A n U ncertain C onsensus 892 3. The Public's Constitutional Moment 894 4. Taming the Judges 896","PeriodicalId":48320,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Law Review","volume":"117 1","pages":"826"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/4093462","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68732640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Prior inquiries into the relationship between equal protection and disparate impact have focused on whether equal protection entails a disparate impact standard and whether laws prohibiting disparate impacts can qualify as legislation enforcing equal protection. In this Article, Professor Primus focuses on a third question: whether equal protection affirmatively forbids the use of statutory disparate impact standards. Like affirmative action, a statute restricting racially disparate impacts is a race-conscious mechanism designed to reallocate opportunities from some racial groups to others. Accordingly, the same individualist view of equal protection that has constrained the operation of affirmative action might also raise questions about disparate impact laws. Those questions can be satisfactorily answered: the disparate impact standards of statutes such as Title VII are not now unconstitutional. But by exploring the tensions between those standards and the now-prevailing view of equal protection, the Article illuminates many indeterminacies in both of those legal concepts. It also argues against interpreting disparate impact standards in ways that most easily align with the values of individualist equal protection. Such interpretations offer easier defenses against constitutional attack, but they also threaten to cleanse antidiscrimination law of its rematning concern with inherited racial hierarchy.
{"title":"Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three","authors":"Richard A. Primus","doi":"10.2307/3651947","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3651947","url":null,"abstract":"Prior inquiries into the relationship between equal protection and disparate impact have focused on whether equal protection entails a disparate impact standard and whether laws prohibiting disparate impacts can qualify as legislation enforcing equal protection. In this Article, Professor Primus focuses on a third question: whether equal protection affirmatively forbids the use of statutory disparate impact standards. Like affirmative action, a statute restricting racially disparate impacts is a race-conscious mechanism designed to reallocate opportunities from some racial groups to others. Accordingly, the same individualist view of equal protection that has constrained the operation of affirmative action might also raise questions about disparate impact laws. Those questions can be satisfactorily answered: the disparate impact standards of statutes such as Title VII are not now unconstitutional. But by exploring the tensions between those standards and the now-prevailing view of equal protection, the Article illuminates many indeterminacies in both of those legal concepts. It also argues against interpreting disparate impact standards in ways that most easily align with the values of individualist equal protection. Such interpretations offer easier defenses against constitutional attack, but they also threaten to cleanse antidiscrimination law of its rematning concern with inherited racial hierarchy.","PeriodicalId":48320,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Law Review","volume":"117 1","pages":"493"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2003-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/3651947","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68847718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Murder, He Wrote","authors":"Cynthia Lee","doi":"10.2307/3651951","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3651951","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48320,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Law Review","volume":"117 1","pages":"711"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2003-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/3651951","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68847417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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