Pub Date : 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1080/1047840x.2023.2248857
Zoe A. Purcell, Jean-François Bonnefon
"Research on Artificial Intelligence is Reshaping Our Definition of Morality." Psychological Inquiry, 34(2), pp. 100–101 Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationFundingThe authors are supported by grant ANR-19-PI3A-0004, grant ANR-17-EURE-0010, and the Research Foundation TSE-Partnership.
{"title":"Research on Artificial Intelligence is Reshaping Our Definition of Morality","authors":"Zoe A. Purcell, Jean-François Bonnefon","doi":"10.1080/1047840x.2023.2248857","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840x.2023.2248857","url":null,"abstract":"\"Research on Artificial Intelligence is Reshaping Our Definition of Morality.\" Psychological Inquiry, 34(2), pp. 100–101 Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationFundingThe authors are supported by grant ANR-19-PI3A-0004, grant ANR-17-EURE-0010, and the Research Foundation TSE-Partnership.","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"222 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135717876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1080/1047840x.2023.2248859
Emma E. Buchtel
Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.Additional informationFundingThis work described in this paper was partially supported by grants from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (HKIEd ECS 859813 and EdUHK 18605921).
{"title":"Morality as Fish: Defining Morality as a Prototype Concept","authors":"Emma E. Buchtel","doi":"10.1080/1047840x.2023.2248859","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840x.2023.2248859","url":null,"abstract":"Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.Additional informationFundingThis work described in this paper was partially supported by grants from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (HKIEd ECS 859813 and EdUHK 18605921).","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135717872","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1080/1047840x.2023.2248852
Luke D. Smillie, Isabel Thielmann
Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s)
点击放大图片点击缩小图片披露声明作者未发现潜在的利益冲突
{"title":"Defining and Describing Morality: The View from Personality Psychology","authors":"Luke D. Smillie, Isabel Thielmann","doi":"10.1080/1047840x.2023.2248852","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840x.2023.2248852","url":null,"abstract":"Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s)","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135717877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1080/1047840x.2023.2248863
Linda J. Skitka
{"title":"Do We Need a Definition of Morality? A Comment on the Distinctions between Definition and Theory and the Problem of Porn","authors":"Linda J. Skitka","doi":"10.1080/1047840x.2023.2248863","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840x.2023.2248863","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135717878","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1080/1047840x.2023.2248853
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
点击放大图片点击缩小图片披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。
{"title":"Dahl’s Definition of Morality","authors":"Walter Sinnott-Armstrong","doi":"10.1080/1047840x.2023.2248853","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840x.2023.2248853","url":null,"abstract":"Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135717879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1080/1047840x.2023.2248855
Mariola Paruzel-Czachura
Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the authorAdditional informationFundingThe NAWA Bekker Program supported me with a grant “Moral thinking and unethical behavior” [number PN/BEK/2020/1/00058/DEC/1].
{"title":"What is Morality? Narrow and Broad Definition","authors":"Mariola Paruzel-Czachura","doi":"10.1080/1047840x.2023.2248855","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840x.2023.2248855","url":null,"abstract":"Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the authorAdditional informationFundingThe NAWA Bekker Program supported me with a grant “Moral thinking and unethical behavior” [number PN/BEK/2020/1/00058/DEC/1].","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136329348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1080/1047840x.2023.2248860
Roberto Posada, Gustavo A. Peña
Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
点击放大图片点击缩小图片披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。
{"title":"Defining Morality for Psychology: The Risk of Integrating Paradigms","authors":"Roberto Posada, Gustavo A. Peña","doi":"10.1080/1047840x.2023.2248860","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840x.2023.2248860","url":null,"abstract":"Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135717873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2023.2192649
J. Sheehy‐Skeffington, Lotte Thomsen
All group-living animals must coordinate securing and distributing territory, resources, rights, and care. Human society presents a ubiquitous and unsurpassed level of cooperation extending deep into our psychology, which evolved to enable and exploit the transmission of generations of accumulated cultural knowledge in part in service of securing the resources necessary for groups to survive and thrive in varied habitats (Richerson & Boyd, 2005). These processes present a series of critical questions about how reciprocal cooperation beyond immediate kin may be sustained within cultural groups so as to not be undermined by defectors (see e.g., Trivers, 1971; Van Veelen, Garc ıa, Rand, & Nowak, 2012; Sugden, 1986; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004, 2005; Boyd & Mathew, 2021; Richerson & Boyd, 2005), pointing to the importance of enforcing shared moral norms for what is a fair manner of cooperating in the production and distribution of adaptive benefits (cf. Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004; Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Boyd & Mathew, 2021; see also Rai & Fiske, 2011, Fiske & Rai, 2014). Alongside the role of history and cultural context in setting what is seen as fair, the complexity of the social world gives people considerable moral wiggle room for applying and reasoning about general justice norms in motivated, selective, opportunistic ways that best further their own particular interests (cf. Batson, 2008; Dana, Weber, & Kuang, 2007; Eftedal et al., 2022; Eftedal & Thomsen, 2021; Kahan, 2016; Kunda, 1990; Larson & Capra, 2009; Regner & Matthey, 2005; Slothuus & De Vreese, 2010), likely often without even realizing that they are doing so (cf. Eftedal & Thomsen, 2021). The result is a situation in which different parties and coalitions may be in stark ideological conflict while everybody is nevertheless convinced that universal morals and justice support their particular partisan point of view. With the goal of understanding the shared rationality and morality underlying both sides of the political spectrum, Baumeister and Bushman (this issue) connect psychological insights to those from the study of evolution, culture, history, and politics. They argue that human’s evolved readiness for culture yields two abilities and related sets of preferences concerning the generation of resources on the one hand, and their distribution, on the other. It is suggested that these opposed orientations are differentially triggered by working in jobs that are linked with resource generation versus redistribution, yielding ideological groups primarily concerned with one societal function over another, while societal flourishing in fact demands a healthy dose of both. Here, we bracket the question of the factors that lead to social and economic flourishing (whether in historical or contemporary context), one deep within the domains of history, sociology, anthropology, macroeconomics, and political science. We instead focus on efforts toward an evolutionarily att
{"title":"Ideology as a Moral-Relational Language","authors":"J. Sheehy‐Skeffington, Lotte Thomsen","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2023.2192649","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2023.2192649","url":null,"abstract":"All group-living animals must coordinate securing and distributing territory, resources, rights, and care. Human society presents a ubiquitous and unsurpassed level of cooperation extending deep into our psychology, which evolved to enable and exploit the transmission of generations of accumulated cultural knowledge in part in service of securing the resources necessary for groups to survive and thrive in varied habitats (Richerson & Boyd, 2005). These processes present a series of critical questions about how reciprocal cooperation beyond immediate kin may be sustained within cultural groups so as to not be undermined by defectors (see e.g., Trivers, 1971; Van Veelen, Garc ıa, Rand, & Nowak, 2012; Sugden, 1986; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004, 2005; Boyd & Mathew, 2021; Richerson & Boyd, 2005), pointing to the importance of enforcing shared moral norms for what is a fair manner of cooperating in the production and distribution of adaptive benefits (cf. Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004; Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Boyd & Mathew, 2021; see also Rai & Fiske, 2011, Fiske & Rai, 2014). Alongside the role of history and cultural context in setting what is seen as fair, the complexity of the social world gives people considerable moral wiggle room for applying and reasoning about general justice norms in motivated, selective, opportunistic ways that best further their own particular interests (cf. Batson, 2008; Dana, Weber, & Kuang, 2007; Eftedal et al., 2022; Eftedal & Thomsen, 2021; Kahan, 2016; Kunda, 1990; Larson & Capra, 2009; Regner & Matthey, 2005; Slothuus & De Vreese, 2010), likely often without even realizing that they are doing so (cf. Eftedal & Thomsen, 2021). The result is a situation in which different parties and coalitions may be in stark ideological conflict while everybody is nevertheless convinced that universal morals and justice support their particular partisan point of view. With the goal of understanding the shared rationality and morality underlying both sides of the political spectrum, Baumeister and Bushman (this issue) connect psychological insights to those from the study of evolution, culture, history, and politics. They argue that human’s evolved readiness for culture yields two abilities and related sets of preferences concerning the generation of resources on the one hand, and their distribution, on the other. It is suggested that these opposed orientations are differentially triggered by working in jobs that are linked with resource generation versus redistribution, yielding ideological groups primarily concerned with one societal function over another, while societal flourishing in fact demands a healthy dose of both. Here, we bracket the question of the factors that lead to social and economic flourishing (whether in historical or contemporary context), one deep within the domains of history, sociology, anthropology, macroeconomics, and political science. We instead focus on efforts toward an evolutionarily att","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"34 1","pages":"35 - 42"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42978722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2023.2192652
Kevin B. Smith
Baumeister and Bushman (this issue) offer a cultural animal theory of partisan hostility (hereafter CAT) with the specific aim of explaining the root drivers of political conflict. CAT posits that competition for power revolves around oppositional worldviews reflecting preferences attached to the two primary objectives of all successful societies: amassing and distributing resources. Based on this premise CAT seeks not only to help explain the persistence of the themes motivating political conflict, but also to shed light on the underlying causes of growing levels affective polarization widely documented in the United States and other liberal democracies. CAT takes on a large and complicated slice of the social world; its stated scope is to cover nothing less than the majority of political conflict. That is an ambitious goal for any theoretical project, and the sheer variety and complexity of the analytical target means explanatory gaps and exceptions are inevitable. To their credit, Baumeister and Bushman recognize this, and explicitly acknowledge that CAT makes no claims to be a universal explanatory framework, but is a formulation aimed at being, “correct far more often than not.” Within the limits hinted at, CAT is, in my judgment, quite successful. It is certainly a framework that can be readily employed to generate testable hypotheses, and may point to de-escalation opportunities. While I find much to praise in this framework, in what follows I focus on what I see as two key, and not fully acknowledged, limitations of CAT. I argue that CAT is essentially an economic theory of political conflict which, if correct, has two important implications: (1) A broad swath of the explanatory horsepower CAT is designed to provide is readily available from existing frameworks, and, (2) like other economic theories CAT’s explanatory power decreases considerably when the focus shifts from self-interested resource distribution to the conflicts anchored in social values, and it is the latter that is core to understanding hostile partisan disagreements.
{"title":"Economic Values, Social Values and Cultural Animal Theory","authors":"Kevin B. Smith","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2023.2192652","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2023.2192652","url":null,"abstract":"Baumeister and Bushman (this issue) offer a cultural animal theory of partisan hostility (hereafter CAT) with the specific aim of explaining the root drivers of political conflict. CAT posits that competition for power revolves around oppositional worldviews reflecting preferences attached to the two primary objectives of all successful societies: amassing and distributing resources. Based on this premise CAT seeks not only to help explain the persistence of the themes motivating political conflict, but also to shed light on the underlying causes of growing levels affective polarization widely documented in the United States and other liberal democracies. CAT takes on a large and complicated slice of the social world; its stated scope is to cover nothing less than the majority of political conflict. That is an ambitious goal for any theoretical project, and the sheer variety and complexity of the analytical target means explanatory gaps and exceptions are inevitable. To their credit, Baumeister and Bushman recognize this, and explicitly acknowledge that CAT makes no claims to be a universal explanatory framework, but is a formulation aimed at being, “correct far more often than not.” Within the limits hinted at, CAT is, in my judgment, quite successful. It is certainly a framework that can be readily employed to generate testable hypotheses, and may point to de-escalation opportunities. While I find much to praise in this framework, in what follows I focus on what I see as two key, and not fully acknowledged, limitations of CAT. I argue that CAT is essentially an economic theory of political conflict which, if correct, has two important implications: (1) A broad swath of the explanatory horsepower CAT is designed to provide is readily available from existing frameworks, and, (2) like other economic theories CAT’s explanatory power decreases considerably when the focus shifts from self-interested resource distribution to the conflicts anchored in social values, and it is the latter that is core to understanding hostile partisan disagreements.","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"34 1","pages":"43 - 46"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42861639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2023.2192643
Karl Aquino, Maja Graso, Stefan Thau
Baumeister and Bushman (this issue) present a parsimonious explanation for why the conflict between the left and right is inevitable, sometimes hostile, and prone to escalation. They propose that one way to reduce the intensity of the political polarization is for people on the political right and left to accept a turn-taking arrangement. Central to their argument for why alternations in power can be effective for reducing intergroup conflict is that both parties endorse values that are functional for society, even if their aims are not always reflected in their policies. The core assumption of their cultural animal theory is that the right prioritizes amassing resources, while the left prioritizes sharing or redistributing resources. If each side is given a chance to lead and translate their priorities into policy, the excesses of one regime can be counterbalanced by the excesses of the next, and society will improve as a result. We offer a few observations about their analysis and suggest some plausible amendments to their theory. The model Baumeister and Bushman introduce as being most advantageous for promoting group survival, flourishing, and social stability in a democracy is dialectical. In this regard, they occupy the same territory as thinkers like Hegel (1807/2019) and Marx (1867/2004), who also believed that historical progress toward a superior end-state results from conflict between competing groups. We can imagine how a political dialectic could produce healthier, more prosperous collectives. For instance, people might wish to indulge their desire for voting-based social experimentation, allowing them to learn from the positive and negative outcomes of translating one party’s values into action. We also find merit in the authors’ argument that exchanges in power between political opponents are generally preferable to a prolonged single party rule (like the authors, we acknowledge that there are historical exceptions where such a rule can produce stable and prosperous societies). That said, we suggest an alternative to the process of political turn-taking that Baumeister and Bushman did not sufficiently explore, but that could also reduce political animosity: moderation. Moderation can be defined as “the deliberate effort not to seek the greatest emotion or the fullest accomplishment” (Fukuyama, 2022, p. 154). We maintain that regardless of which party is in power, it is less disruptive to society if neither one attempts to steer it in a direction too far from what most people can reasonably endure without becoming existentially threatened, morally confused, and cynically disengaged from political life. Through political debate and other institutionally mediated processes, a workable society is one that can integrate competing views to create mutually beneficial solutions that are not at the extremes (Carrese, 2016). Importantly, an alternation in power is not essential for a course of moderation to be followed.
{"title":"Not by Bread Alone: Immoderate Politics and the Roots of Suffering","authors":"Karl Aquino, Maja Graso, Stefan Thau","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2023.2192643","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2023.2192643","url":null,"abstract":"Baumeister and Bushman (this issue) present a parsimonious explanation for why the conflict between the left and right is inevitable, sometimes hostile, and prone to escalation. They propose that one way to reduce the intensity of the political polarization is for people on the political right and left to accept a turn-taking arrangement. Central to their argument for why alternations in power can be effective for reducing intergroup conflict is that both parties endorse values that are functional for society, even if their aims are not always reflected in their policies. The core assumption of their cultural animal theory is that the right prioritizes amassing resources, while the left prioritizes sharing or redistributing resources. If each side is given a chance to lead and translate their priorities into policy, the excesses of one regime can be counterbalanced by the excesses of the next, and society will improve as a result. We offer a few observations about their analysis and suggest some plausible amendments to their theory. The model Baumeister and Bushman introduce as being most advantageous for promoting group survival, flourishing, and social stability in a democracy is dialectical. In this regard, they occupy the same territory as thinkers like Hegel (1807/2019) and Marx (1867/2004), who also believed that historical progress toward a superior end-state results from conflict between competing groups. We can imagine how a political dialectic could produce healthier, more prosperous collectives. For instance, people might wish to indulge their desire for voting-based social experimentation, allowing them to learn from the positive and negative outcomes of translating one party’s values into action. We also find merit in the authors’ argument that exchanges in power between political opponents are generally preferable to a prolonged single party rule (like the authors, we acknowledge that there are historical exceptions where such a rule can produce stable and prosperous societies). That said, we suggest an alternative to the process of political turn-taking that Baumeister and Bushman did not sufficiently explore, but that could also reduce political animosity: moderation. Moderation can be defined as “the deliberate effort not to seek the greatest emotion or the fullest accomplishment” (Fukuyama, 2022, p. 154). We maintain that regardless of which party is in power, it is less disruptive to society if neither one attempts to steer it in a direction too far from what most people can reasonably endure without becoming existentially threatened, morally confused, and cynically disengaged from political life. Through political debate and other institutionally mediated processes, a workable society is one that can integrate competing views to create mutually beneficial solutions that are not at the extremes (Carrese, 2016). Importantly, an alternation in power is not essential for a course of moderation to be followed.","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"34 1","pages":"17 - 22"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48561578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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