Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2022.2038008
A. Kruglanski, Molly Ellenberg, Antonio Pierro
We appreciated our commentators ’ insights and the time they took in reflecting on our target article “ People who need people. ” Their remarks and analyses prompted us to re-think the issues at hand and re-consider the best way to understand the ample data that our model attempted to integrate. The “ heat ” of this discussion has engendered some welcome “ light, ” yielding an insight we are excited about. It produced a theoretical reframing in which our prior distinction between agency versus assistance is replaced by another central concept, the striving for personal significance (see Kruglanski et al., in press). In the present response to commentaries, we explain the rationale for this reframing and its fit to relevant empirical findings. Central to our discussion is people ’ s perception of their social worth, the conditions for its rise and fall, and its downstream consequences for people ’ s attitudes toward others.
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Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2022.2037992
A. Abele
Milyavsky, Kruglanski, Gelfand, Chernikova, and Ellenberg (this issue) propose a theoretical model on the compensatory relations between personal agency and social assistance. The paper is intriguing and thought provoking as it covers a large body of theorizing and empirical findings in psychology. It is an example for the often demanded-for attempt to integrate divergent theories and findings into a more general and overarching model. As an agency – communion researcher (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007, 2014, 2018; Abele, Ellemers, Fiske, Koch, & Yzerbyt, 2021) I will here concentrate on three of the many topics that are worth discussing: (1) constructs; (2) association of constructs; and (3) the association of agency and attitudes toward others.
{"title":"Agency, Social Assistance (Communion), And Goal Pursuit","authors":"A. Abele","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2037992","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2037992","url":null,"abstract":"Milyavsky, Kruglanski, Gelfand, Chernikova, and Ellenberg (this issue) propose a theoretical model on the compensatory relations between personal agency and social assistance. The paper is intriguing and thought provoking as it covers a large body of theorizing and empirical findings in psychology. It is an example for the often demanded-for attempt to integrate divergent theories and findings into a more general and overarching model. As an agency – communion researcher (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007, 2014, 2018; Abele, Ellemers, Fiske, Koch, & Yzerbyt, 2021) I will here concentrate on three of the many topics that are worth discussing: (1) constructs; (2) association of constructs; and (3) the association of agency and attitudes toward others.","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"33 1","pages":"23 - 25"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41736964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01Epub Date: 2023-02-07DOI: 10.1080/1047840x.2022.2149196
Adam Morris, Todd Braver
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Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2021.2004812
C. Sedikides
Abstract Self-protection and self-enhancement, once depicted as biases that impede accurate self-knowledge and hinder effective environmental control, have more recently been viewed as misbeliefs that can have fortuitous, adaptive consequences. I take the next step forward by construing identity protection and enhancement mechanisms as part of a routine, adaptive system. Whereas biological homeostasis regulates physiological processes, psychological homeostasis regulates the emotional states that threaten a desired identity. Ι elaborate on the nature of psychological homeostasis, the identity system that it modulates, and the immune system that safeguards it from harm. Ι discuss the construction of self-views and narratives in the ordinary stream of mental activity, as well as reparative responses to contemporaneous threats, similar to the immune system’s response to microbes that breach the body’s initial defenses. Using basic immunological principles, Ι distinguish between innate and adaptive psychological immunity, compare the spread of disease to that of threatening information among related self-views and narratives, and consider the “memories” of the biological and psychological immune systems to redress future threats. In addition, Ι offer a set of propositions that include predictions about various aspects of immunity, and end by considering the roles of awareness and self-deception in the immunity process.
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Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2021.2007702
Kristi A. Costabile, Abby S. Boytos
Sedikides’s immunity model of psychological homeostasis (this issue) presents a theoretical framework to understand a variety of self-protective social and cognitive psychological tendencies and biases, and in so doing encompasses a broad range of social-cognitive phenomena such as selfhandicapping (Jones & Berglas, 1978), social comparison (Festinger, 1954), and the fading affect bias (Ritchie et al., 2006). Here, we offer an examination and extension of the theoretical principles outlined by Sedikides as well as a discussion of future directions that follow from the ideas proposed in the target article. We focus our commentary on autobiographical narratives and how these narratives function to reflect, repair, and rewrite the self-concept. We will examine the dynamic relationship between autobiographical narratives and current self-views as well as the important role of social and cultural influences on narrative construction, perspectives that received less attention in the target article but which merit careful consideration when developing a greater understanding of the self-construction process.
Sedikides的心理稳态免疫模型(本期)提供了一个理论框架来理解各种自我保护的社会和认知心理倾向和偏见，这样做包含了广泛的社会认知现象，如自我设限(Jones & Berglas, 1978)、社会比较(Festinger, 1954)和逐渐减弱的影响偏见(Ritchie et al.， 2006)。在这里，我们提供了对Sedikides概述的理论原则的检查和扩展，以及对目标文章中提出的想法所遵循的未来方向的讨论。我们的评论重点是自传叙事，以及这些叙事如何反映、修复和重写自我概念。我们将研究自传体叙事与当前自我观点之间的动态关系，以及社会和文化影响对叙事构建的重要作用，这些观点在目标文章中受到的关注较少，但在对自我构建过程有更深入的了解时值得仔细考虑。
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Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2021.2007701
S. Koole
A Dutch teenager begins hormone treatment to more fully transition to the woman she feels she is. An American real estate mogul slaps his name on his casinos, hotels, and skyscrapers. A Tibetan monk retreats in the mountains to meditate in poverty and isolation. These three individuals could hardly be more different from another. Nevertheless, their behavior can be readily understood in terms of a selfenhancement motive, or the desire to forge a self-image that satisfies one’s personal, social and cultural values (Sedikides & Strube, 1997). Self-enhancement is implicated in a vast array of human activities, from reckless driving (Ben-Ari, Florian, & Mikulincer, 1999) to ideological extremism (McGregor & Marigold, 2003) and nostalgic reveries (Luo, Liu, Cai, Wildschut, & Sedikides, 2016). Self-enhancement further has close ties to psychological health and emotional wellbeing (Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2004). Consequently, is important to achieve a deeper scientific understanding of self-enhancement. Sedikides (this issue) furthers this aim by proposing a new theoretical model of self-enhancement. Central to the model is the notion that self-enhancement promotes psychological homeostasis, in the form of emotional wellbeing. More specifically, the homeostatic model draws an analogy between self-enhancement and the immune system. Just as the physical immune system protects the body from physical threats like germs or viruses, self-enhancement may form a psychological immune system that protects the person against psychological threats like loss or criticism. The homeostatic model thus connects self-enhancement to the dynamics of emotions and emotion regulation. Drawing from (social-) cognitive science, the adaptive functions of self-enhancement are assumed to be served through associative networks that contain identity themes, self-views, and autobiographical memories. The homeostatic model of self-enhancement (Sedikides, this issue) is a landmark achievement in the scientific study of the self. The model has both notable strengths and aspects that are in need of further development. In the remainder of this article, I take a closer look at the homeostatic model. First, I note some of the theoretical benefits of conceiving of self-enhancement as a biological adaptation. Second, I turn to the relation between physiological and psychological homeostasis. Third, I consider the analogy between self-enhancement and the immune system, and suggest that the digestive system may provide a useful alternative analogy. I end with some general conclusions and outlook on the self as a biological adaptation.
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Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2021.2004818
E. Jonas, Janine Stollberg
There is much to like about the target article by Sedikides as, among other things the author illuminates the important psychological construct of personal identity. He suggests that the construction and protection of a desired identity is an essential component of the human body’s harm protection system which serves to promote psychological homeostasis and supports the immune system of the body. Importantly, Sedikides sees psychological and biological immunity as two components in a coordinated and adaptive system that helps humans to adapt best to their environment. In doing so, he does not just use the immune system as a metaphor but emphasizes the actual influence of psychological states on biological processes. In addition, his article presents meaningful content with regard to the processes of identity construction, maintenance and protection. Although the field of social psychology is rich in research on defensive processes, Sedikides illustrates the creation and adaptation of narratives and thereby advances our understanding of how such narratives may increase homeostasis and thus support immunity. The idea that a psychological immune system is coordinated with the biological immune system to protect humans from harm is compelling. However, questions remain pertaining to how this coordination process works? For the author the idea of psychological homeostasis is fundamental and can be described as a regulatory process by which individuals strive to feel good and therefore try to modulate their affect within an acceptable range. Similar to the regulation of body temperature or blood sugar, the human body’s self-regulation can experience ups and downs and varies on a continuum from accurate to biased self-views. However, without these temporal biases or deviations, which manifest in self-protection and self-enhancement processes, the body would not be able to regain psychological homeostasis which is important for each individual to function well. Indeed, without homeostasis biological adaptation would be impeded and biological fitness would be reduced. Therefore, the body not only needs various well-functioning biological systems but also a psychological maintenance system. Identity processes which are connected with the human ability for conscious reflection, abstract representation and linguistic communication are an essential part of this psychological maintenance system. Humans build on their capacity for differentiation, continuity, and agency (which they share to a certain extent with animals) as well as on specific human capabilities for meta-beliefs (i.e., self-views as well as global and specific narratives about individual characteristic, attitudes, abilities, and beliefs). Especially conscious reflection, abstraction, and projection help people to protect themselves from harm, to adapt to their environment and to effectively control the environment. However, personal identity not only comes with benefits but also with costs in t
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Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2021.2004822
D. A. Stinson, Elysia Desgrosseilliers, Jessica J. Cameron
There is much to admire about Sedikides’ (this issue) homeostatic model of identity maintenance. In brief, Sedikides argues that people possess a psychological immune system that helps them to maintain psychological homeostasis; “a routine, adaptive, process by which people monitor their internal and external environments for threats to their selfviews or, more generally, to their theories about their characteristics, relationships, and circumstances” (p. 215). The scope and complexity of the model effectively incorporate theories and empirical findings from the sprawling literature about the self, and thus provides an overarching structure apt to organize the field. The model’s focus on mind-body connections is also a welcome return to a holistic self-psychology that seemed lost for a while, but whose resurgence in recent years raises new questions and offers new opportunities for interdisciplinary cross-pollination. Framing the mechanisms that uphold a coherent sense of self as an immune system further emphasizes the inherently intertwined biological and psychological components of human life. Yet despite all of these strengths and the importance of the model as a whole, if we are being totally honest—and that seems to be the goal here—we suspect that some people could feel alienated when reading this paper. We agree that most people must contend with daily feedback that refutes their generally-positive self-views, including negative feedback from an employer, poor performance on a task for which they believe they are highly skilled, and criticism by a friend—all examples that Sedikides uses to illustrate his model—and we agree that those kinds of experiences can be highly distressing. Yet, when some people read those examples, a tiny voice in their heads may whisper, “That must be nice!” It must be nice to live in a social world where identity-threats can be easily countered if one “construe[s] their experiences optimistically” or “recall[s] selectively favorable information” (Sedikides, this issue, p. 211). It must be nice to enjoy positive self-views that meet “... survival and reproductive needs, including physical and social attractiveness, intellectual prowess, self-regulatory proficiency, and social status” (Sedikides, this issue, p. 197). It must be nice to have a psychological system whose primary goal is to simply feel good. Unfortunately, for people who possess one or more intersecting identities that are subject to social devaluation, or stigma, this is not always their lived reality, and we think that this perspective is missing from Sedikides’ model. This oversight is epistemologically costly, because from a population demographic perspective, most people possess characteristics or belong to groups that are subjected to stigma, and most of them belong to multiple stigmatized groups (Pachankis et al., 2018; Reinka, Pan-Weisz, Lawner, & Quinn, 2020). The proportion of the population that is disabled, fat, queer, or who are Black, In
Sedikides（本期）的身份维持稳态模型有很多值得钦佩的地方。简而言之，Sedikides认为，人们拥有一个心理免疫系统，可以帮助他们维持心理稳态；“一个常规的、适应性的过程，人们通过这个过程来监控他们的内部和外部环境，以寻找对他们的自我观点的威胁，或者更广泛地说，对他们关于自己的特征、关系和环境的理论的威胁”（第215页）。该模型的范围和复杂性有效地结合了关于自我的大量文献中的理论和经验发现，从而提供了一个易于组织该领域的总体结构。该模型对身心联系的关注也是对整体自我心理学的一次可喜的回归，这种心理学似乎已经消失了一段时间，但近年来它的复兴提出了新的问题，并为跨学科交叉授粉提供了新的机会。构建维持自我作为免疫系统的连贯感的机制，进一步强调了人类生活中固有的相互交织的生物和心理组成部分。然而，尽管有所有这些优势和整个模型的重要性，如果我们完全诚实——这似乎是我们的目标——我们怀疑有些人在阅读这篇论文时可能会感到疏远。我们同意，大多数人必须面对反驳他们普遍积极的自我观点的日常反馈，包括雇主的负面反馈、他们认为自己非常擅长的任务表现不佳，以及朋友的批评——所有这些都是Sedikides用来说明他的模型的例子——我们也同意，这些经历可能会非常令人痛苦。然而，当一些人读到这些例子时，他们脑海中可能会有一个微弱的声音在窃窃私语，“那一定很好！”生活在一个社会世界里，如果一个人“乐观地解释自己的经历”或“选择性地回忆有利的信息”，那么身份威胁就很容易得到应对，这一定很好（Sedikides，本期，第211页）。享受满足“…生存和生殖需求，包括身体和社会吸引力、智力、自律能力和社会地位”的积极自我观一定很好（Sedikides，本期，第197页）。拥有一个以感觉良好为主要目标的心理系统一定很好。不幸的是，对于那些拥有一个或多个交叉身份、受到社会贬低或污名化的人来说，这并不总是他们的生活现实，我们认为Sedikides的模型中缺少这一观点。这种监督在认识论上代价高昂，因为从人口统计学的角度来看，大多数人都具有特征或属于遭受污名化的群体，而且他们中的大多数人属于多个污名化群体（Pachankis et al.，2018；Reinka、Pan-Weisz、Lawner和Quinn，2020）。生活在美国和加拿大等后殖民/定居者社会中的残疾人、肥胖者、酷儿、黑人、原住民或有色人种的比例——仅举几个可能的交叉和污名化身份——远远超过不属于这些群体的人口比例，即使在每个群体都是“少数群体”的社会中也是如此。事实上，助长污名化的霸权社会制度就是这样运作的：少数人支配多数人，这种支配的一部分包括忽视和排斥“非规范”的生活经历（例如，Bos、Pryor、Reeder和Stutterheim，2013）。因此，我们想借此机会，探索Sedikides（这个问题）令人印象深刻、彻底和令人信服的身份维护稳态模型是如何扩展的，以解释人们的经历，他们不仅必须在宁愿自己不存在的社会环境中挣扎求生，但也必须努力忍受这种创伤的心理后果并从中恢复过来。因此，在接下来的讨论中，我们探讨了如何扩展Sedikides的模型，以解释那些必须与社会污名共存的人的经历，并希望有一天能从社会污名中恢复过来。
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Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2021.2004813
Erin M. O’Mara Kunz, L. Gaertner
Sedikides (this issue) provides a comprehensive and compelling model detailing the adaptive nature of self-protection and self-enhancement as the drivers of psychological homeostasis. We consider through two examples that psychological homeostasis is adaptive, in part, because it promotes environmental control. The examples entail the role of specificity, which Sedikides incorporates in his Proposition 4 suggesting that broader (i.e., global) threats are harder to defend than specific (i.e., narrower) threats. We expand this proposition by considering specificity in regard to narratives, with the first exampling concerning what Sedikides refers to as a preemptive narrative and the second a reparative narrative.
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Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2021.2004817
Felipe De Brigard, Matthew L. Stanley
In 1998, Gilbert and Wilson et al. coined the term “psychological immune system” to refer to the set of cognitive mechanisms that help individuals fend off psychological discomfort and undesirable negative affect (Gilbert et al. 1998). Although, as they themselves acknowledged, this idea had been suggested previously in the literature (Freud, 1936; Vaillant, 1993), they utilized the term to explain and understand a number of different phenomena—including, of course, biases in affective forecasting (Gilbert, 2006). Gilbert, though, did not mean for the notion of a psychological immune system to be taken literally. A few years after the publication of that seminal paper, in an interview published by The New York Times, Gilbert explicitly stated that he and Wilson meant for the term to be interpreted metaphorically: “We’ve used the metaphor of the ‘psychological immune system’ –it’s just a metaphor, but not a bad one for that system of defenses that helps you feel better when bad things happen.” (Gertner, 2003). The claim that our mind is furnished with a psychological immune system was, therefore, offered as an attractive and useful strategy for explaining and understanding diverse psychological phenomena, and the interpretation of which was meant to be merely figurative. Gilbert’s ontological hesitation does not appeal to Sedikides, who has written an intriguing piece inviting us to think of the psychological immune system in a literal sense: as an actual, evolved set of cognitive mechanisms and operations whose adaptive purpose is to protect our sense of personal identity (Sedikides, this issue). The proposal builds heavily upon a series of connections drawn from features of our biological immune system and features of our putative psychological immune system. As a result, it comprises a large number of moving parts, some of which stand on shakier ground than others, and some of which leave us with more questions than they seem to answer. For instance, some of the evidence Sedikides adduces in support of his view comes from the fact that certain psychological tendencies and biases are conducive to beneficial behaviors for the organism. Since such individual benefits are taken to be adaptive, then the conclusion that the system that brought them about must have evolved for said purpose—i.e., psychological homeostasis—seems ineluctable. Unfortunately, the jump from “beneficial to me” to “selected for” or “having the function of” is often an unwarranted line of reasoning (Garson, 2016). One can easily engage in behaviors that are beneficial for oneself, but those behaviors can simultaneously be not-adaptive for organisms like us, in the sense of conferring evolutionary advantages. When psychologists use the term ‘adaptive’ they normally mean something like ‘non-detrimental for the organism’, which is not identical to the biologists’ sense of ‘adaptive’—meaning the organism’s propensity toward increased fitness in a local environment—which is the sen
我们主要关注我们个人身份的一个特定方面，即我们的道德身份。在过去的十年里
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