Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2023.2192647
Christine Reyna, Miguel Ángel Vázquez, Kaelan J. Vazquez, Kara Harris
left and right leaning Americans agree on a wide variety of specific policy details (e.g., aspects of the ACA, gun laws, police reform: see Bartekian & Reyna, 2022). In countries around the globe with parliamentary systems, rival parties often form coalitions to further common goals. Coalition building was a more widely used strategy than conflict (Mizrahi & Rosenthal, 2001), so finding ways to promote cooperative coalitions of ideological groups is a more lasting and time-tested solution. Bipartisanship produces stable policies that are less likely to change when COMMENTARIES 31
{"title":"Moving Beyond a W.E.I.R.D Psychology: A Multicultural Perspective on the Evolution of Ideology","authors":"Christine Reyna, Miguel Ángel Vázquez, Kaelan J. Vazquez, Kara Harris","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2023.2192647","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2023.2192647","url":null,"abstract":"left and right leaning Americans agree on a wide variety of specific policy details (e.g., aspects of the ACA, gun laws, police reform: see Bartekian & Reyna, 2022). In countries around the globe with parliamentary systems, rival parties often form coalitions to further common goals. Coalition building was a more widely used strategy than conflict (Mizrahi & Rosenthal, 2001), so finding ways to promote cooperative coalitions of ideological groups is a more lasting and time-tested solution. Bipartisanship produces stable policies that are less likely to change when COMMENTARIES 31","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"34 1","pages":"27 - 34"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45996588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2023.2192642
R. Baumeister, B. Bushman
Abstract Seeking to understand and reduce partisan hostility, we propose that humans evolved to benefit from cultural societies. Societies perform two crucial tasks, which have grown apart and are now championed by political opponents: (1) amassing resources, and (2) distributing resources. The political right focuses on amassing resources, whereas the political left focuses on redistributing resources. Both tasks are needed for society to flourish, but they foster contrary policies. This explains how left and right disagree on moral emphases, attitudes about time, rights versus responsibilities, manipulative strategies, and societal enemies—and why sharing or alternation in power benefits society. Market economies use incentives to create wealth, but these increase inequality. We hope our theory will help foster mutual respect among those on the left and right as both sides come to appreciate what the other side does to benefit society.
{"title":"Cultural Animal Theory of Political Partisan Conflict and Hostility","authors":"R. Baumeister, B. Bushman","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2023.2192642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2023.2192642","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Seeking to understand and reduce partisan hostility, we propose that humans evolved to benefit from cultural societies. Societies perform two crucial tasks, which have grown apart and are now championed by political opponents: (1) amassing resources, and (2) distributing resources. The political right focuses on amassing resources, whereas the political left focuses on redistributing resources. Both tasks are needed for society to flourish, but they foster contrary policies. This explains how left and right disagree on moral emphases, attitudes about time, rights versus responsibilities, manipulative strategies, and societal enemies—and why sharing or alternation in power benefits society. Market economies use incentives to create wealth, but these increase inequality. We hope our theory will help foster mutual respect among those on the left and right as both sides come to appreciate what the other side does to benefit society.","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"34 1","pages":"1 - 16"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49567381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2023.2192645
Jarret T. Crawford
In their target article, Baumeister and Bushman (BB; this issue) describe a “cultural animal” theory of political partisan conflict and hostility. There is little positive I can say about this article. My critique focuses on six primary problems: (1) ignoring relevant scientific evidence that challenges their thesis; (2) shoe-horning contradictory psychological evidence to fit their thesis; (3) lack of specificity in their predictive model; (4) ignoring or ignorance of political realities that challenge their thesis; (5) logical incoherence in examples provided to bolster their thesis; and (6) statements or claims that are politically tone deaf at best, and offensive at worst.
{"title":"Baumeister and Bushman’s Conflicted Theory of Political Conflict","authors":"Jarret T. Crawford","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2023.2192645","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2023.2192645","url":null,"abstract":"In their target article, Baumeister and Bushman (BB; this issue) describe a “cultural animal” theory of political partisan conflict and hostility. There is little positive I can say about this article. My critique focuses on six primary problems: (1) ignoring relevant scientific evidence that challenges their thesis; (2) shoe-horning contradictory psychological evidence to fit their thesis; (3) lack of specificity in their predictive model; (4) ignoring or ignorance of political realities that challenge their thesis; (5) logical incoherence in examples provided to bolster their thesis; and (6) statements or claims that are politically tone deaf at best, and offensive at worst.","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"34 1","pages":"23 - 26"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48357728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2023.2192654
R. Baumeister, B. Bushman
We thank all the commentators for their diligent and thoughtful efforts on our article. The detailed and scholarly work by several of them went far beyond the call of duty, which was most gratifying. In this brief response, we seek to articulate what can be learned from them and to resolve some misunderstandings. Our article was motivated by the recognition that partisan hostility has increased in recent years, particularly in the United States of America (USA). We thought social psychologists might be well positioned to seek ways of reducing the conflict, given the field’s accumulated expertise regarding human interactions and group processes. Judging by these commentaries, we were perhaps overly optimistic about social psychology’s potential for promoting social harmony in this fashion. Indeed, only the Aquino et al. (this issue) commentary took up the theme of how to reduce partisan conflict.
{"title":"Resources and Partisanship: Response to Commentaries","authors":"R. Baumeister, B. Bushman","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2023.2192654","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2023.2192654","url":null,"abstract":"We thank all the commentators for their diligent and thoughtful efforts on our article. The detailed and scholarly work by several of them went far beyond the call of duty, which was most gratifying. In this brief response, we seek to articulate what can be learned from them and to resolve some misunderstandings. Our article was motivated by the recognition that partisan hostility has increased in recent years, particularly in the United States of America (USA). We thought social psychologists might be well positioned to seek ways of reducing the conflict, given the field’s accumulated expertise regarding human interactions and group processes. Judging by these commentaries, we were perhaps overly optimistic about social psychology’s potential for promoting social harmony in this fashion. Indeed, only the Aquino et al. (this issue) commentary took up the theme of how to reduce partisan conflict.","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"34 1","pages":"47 - 51"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42472690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2023.2172277
I. Grossmann
s of the target articles, first determining common topics and subsequently calculating relative weight of twelve most frequently mentioned topics over time. Figure 1 shows themes which have dominated the discourse so far. Constant features are the topics of motivation (incl. needs and goals) and self-control, cognitive processes and their metacognitive regulation, mental health and well-being, individual differences and social cognition, as well as theoretical issues concerning research methods in psychology. Dominance of some themes reflects the Zeitgeist. The topic of meta-science—present in the journal since the first issue—become especially prominent in the last decade of Open Science movement. On the other hand, the topic of mental health and well-being was pronounced around the time of the discussions about well-being and the subsequent emergence of the Positive Psychology field in late 1990searly 2000s. In the new millennium, cultural diversity and related societal issues became salient, with the trend continuing to this day. Further, judgment and decision-making made a big entry in the last 15 years, possibly due the Nobel Prize in economics to Kahneman in 2002, and greater focus on behavioral economics thereafter. Toward Greater Equity and Diversity of Submissions The original idea behind Psychological Inquiry—a dialogue through open peer exchange about contentious ideas and theories—remains as important today as it was over three decades ago. Interdisciplinary research is on the rise (Van Noorden, 2015). Therefore, concepts and theories have an opportunity to be enriched by perspectives coming from different fields of studies. At the same time, intellectual silos and cultural echo-chambers remain—while more scholars today work in interdisciplinary teams of specialists than before (“Why Interdisciplinary Research Matters,” 2015), focus on specialization can also produce intellectual silos within one’s discipline. Such silos are often not conducive to the cumulative advancement of science. Scientific silos may be especially damaging for psychology (Cacioppo, 2007), where theoretical approaches touch on many neighboring disciplines, from anthropology and economics, to biology, linguistics, and neuroscience, to philosophy and education, to sociology and political science, to health studies, and so on (Boyack, Klavans, & B€orner, 2005). Scholars connecting closer to one of the neighboring fields may diverge in their grand theories, favor methodological paradigms others may find peculiar or simply be unfamiliar with, and develop their own jargon, all contributing to confusion about the concepts, methods, and evaluation of the results. How can we combat such disciplinary isolationism? An idea pursued by Psychological Inquiry since its inception has been to provide scholars with an opportunity for a civil discussion and debate of diverse ideas, and promoting a dialogue to clarify misunderstandings about theories, methods, or interpretation of c
{"title":"Transparency and Inclusion in Psychological Inquiry: Reflecting on the Past, Embracing the Present, and Building an Inclusive Future","authors":"I. Grossmann","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2023.2172277","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2023.2172277","url":null,"abstract":"s of the target articles, first determining common topics and subsequently calculating relative weight of twelve most frequently mentioned topics over time. Figure 1 shows themes which have dominated the discourse so far. Constant features are the topics of motivation (incl. needs and goals) and self-control, cognitive processes and their metacognitive regulation, mental health and well-being, individual differences and social cognition, as well as theoretical issues concerning research methods in psychology. Dominance of some themes reflects the Zeitgeist. The topic of meta-science—present in the journal since the first issue—become especially prominent in the last decade of Open Science movement. On the other hand, the topic of mental health and well-being was pronounced around the time of the discussions about well-being and the subsequent emergence of the Positive Psychology field in late 1990searly 2000s. In the new millennium, cultural diversity and related societal issues became salient, with the trend continuing to this day. Further, judgment and decision-making made a big entry in the last 15 years, possibly due the Nobel Prize in economics to Kahneman in 2002, and greater focus on behavioral economics thereafter. Toward Greater Equity and Diversity of Submissions The original idea behind Psychological Inquiry—a dialogue through open peer exchange about contentious ideas and theories—remains as important today as it was over three decades ago. Interdisciplinary research is on the rise (Van Noorden, 2015). Therefore, concepts and theories have an opportunity to be enriched by perspectives coming from different fields of studies. At the same time, intellectual silos and cultural echo-chambers remain—while more scholars today work in interdisciplinary teams of specialists than before (“Why Interdisciplinary Research Matters,” 2015), focus on specialization can also produce intellectual silos within one’s discipline. Such silos are often not conducive to the cumulative advancement of science. Scientific silos may be especially damaging for psychology (Cacioppo, 2007), where theoretical approaches touch on many neighboring disciplines, from anthropology and economics, to biology, linguistics, and neuroscience, to philosophy and education, to sociology and political science, to health studies, and so on (Boyack, Klavans, & B€orner, 2005). Scholars connecting closer to one of the neighboring fields may diverge in their grand theories, favor methodological paradigms others may find peculiar or simply be unfamiliar with, and develop their own jargon, all contributing to confusion about the concepts, methods, and evaluation of the results. How can we combat such disciplinary isolationism? An idea pursued by Psychological Inquiry since its inception has been to provide scholars with an opportunity for a civil discussion and debate of diverse ideas, and promoting a dialogue to clarify misunderstandings about theories, methods, or interpretation of c","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"33 1","pages":"233 - 238"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41524667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2022.2160595
Iftach Amir, Noga Aviad, Amit Bernstein
Abstract In response to the Attention to Thoughts (A2T) model, scholars reflected on and raised critical questions about the proposed complex dynamic systems theory, its computational formalization, and its implications for theory and study of internal attention and internally-directed cognition (IDC). We identify and reflect on three major themes that cut across these response papers related to, complexity, temporal dynamics, and internal states as a focus of scientific inquiry. (1) As Simple As Possible, But No Simpler: Necessary Complexity. We delineate the importance of developing formalized and dynamic systems theory to model behavioral complexity in IDC. Specifically, behavioral variations or processes which exhibit a range of trajectories and states of variable levels of temporal stability, that emerge from reciprocal and (often) non-linear interactions between attentional, mnemonic and affective processes, that unfold over time and context. (2) Complex Dynamical Systems Emerge in Time . We reflect on the observation that temporal trajectories, that self-organize into relatively stable patterns, across time-scales, emerge from moment-to-moment interactions within the system over micro time-scales; and that through circular causality that facilitates systemic self-regulation, emergent higher-level structures or macro time-scale trajectories function to constrain these moment-to-moment interactions within the system. In turn, we relate to future developments of A2T to model developmental, learning and plasticity processes in IDC that emerge over macro time-scales. (3) The Elephant in the Lab: Is Robust Scientific Theory and Study of Internal States Possible? We reflect on the conditions wherein external attention is, and is not, likely a meaningful proxy for internal attention, and the implications therein for the study of attention in mental health and related phenomena sub-served by IDC. Finally, we relate to future developments of A2T that could reflect theorized computational heterogeneity in objects competing for internal attentional selection.
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Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2022.2149183
E. Koster, Igor Marchetti, Ivan Grahek
Amir and Bernstein (this issue) propose a dynamical model of internally-directed cognition aimed at explaining the complex interactions between current goals, negative affect, and attentional selection in working memory. They connect the literature on internal attention, working memory, affect, rumination, and mind wandering to propose a formal mathematical model of internally-directed cognition. In this paper, they do not just provide a window on how people become stuck in loops of negative thinking, but they also provide a nice example of how clinical psychological science can move toward more formal theoretical models. In taking such an exciting step, we believe that this work also encounters some of the challenges faced by formal models of maladaptive cognition. Below we discuss some of these issues, not in order to criticize the current work, but to open a discussion, which we feel is paramount as the field of clinical psychology moves in the direction of developing formal theoretical models. In brief, the three main issues are: (1) the proposed model does not build on the existing cognitive models; (2) the model increases rather than decreases the complexity of the phenomenon; (3) there are no standard/alternative frameworks to compare the A2T model to, and it is not clear which kind of data or experiments could corroborate or falsify the model. New models should build on the existing formal models of cognitive processes. The reproducibility crisis in psychology (Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011) has led to significant changes in the way we conduct research, which include preregistration and better statistical methodology (Benjamin et al., 2018; Nosek, Ebersole, DeHaven, & Mellor, 2018). In the slipstream of this movement, a reinvigorated discussion has been opened on the role and current status of theory in psychology (e.g., Fried, 2020; Grahek, Schaller, & Tackett, 2021; Haslbeck, Ryan, Robinaugh, Waldorp, & Borsboom, 2021). Clearly, clinical psychological science has no shortage of rather vague, descriptive theories that are difficult to test and disprove. Many areas of psychology are moving in the direction of developing stronger theories, which could guide experimentation and increase the overall rigor of psychological science. In this context, clinical psychology is faced with the task of creating formal mathematical models of important phenomena, including the ones which the A2T model tackles. This effort, often referred to as computational psychiatry (Huys, Maia, & Frank, 2016; Montague, Dolan, Friston, & Dayan, 2012), is showing a lot of promise. The crucial part of this effort is to develop computational models that are relevant for understanding psychopathology, but also have direct links with the existing formal models from cognitive science. In this way, clinical psychology can build on the existing models, and extend them in order to better understand psychopathology. Such efforts are alread
{"title":"Focusing Inward: A Timely Yet Daunting Challenge for Clinical Psychological Science","authors":"E. Koster, Igor Marchetti, Ivan Grahek","doi":"10.1080/1047840X.2022.2149183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2022.2149183","url":null,"abstract":"Amir and Bernstein (this issue) propose a dynamical model of internally-directed cognition aimed at explaining the complex interactions between current goals, negative affect, and attentional selection in working memory. They connect the literature on internal attention, working memory, affect, rumination, and mind wandering to propose a formal mathematical model of internally-directed cognition. In this paper, they do not just provide a window on how people become stuck in loops of negative thinking, but they also provide a nice example of how clinical psychological science can move toward more formal theoretical models. In taking such an exciting step, we believe that this work also encounters some of the challenges faced by formal models of maladaptive cognition. Below we discuss some of these issues, not in order to criticize the current work, but to open a discussion, which we feel is paramount as the field of clinical psychology moves in the direction of developing formal theoretical models. In brief, the three main issues are: (1) the proposed model does not build on the existing cognitive models; (2) the model increases rather than decreases the complexity of the phenomenon; (3) there are no standard/alternative frameworks to compare the A2T model to, and it is not clear which kind of data or experiments could corroborate or falsify the model. New models should build on the existing formal models of cognitive processes. The reproducibility crisis in psychology (Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011) has led to significant changes in the way we conduct research, which include preregistration and better statistical methodology (Benjamin et al., 2018; Nosek, Ebersole, DeHaven, & Mellor, 2018). In the slipstream of this movement, a reinvigorated discussion has been opened on the role and current status of theory in psychology (e.g., Fried, 2020; Grahek, Schaller, & Tackett, 2021; Haslbeck, Ryan, Robinaugh, Waldorp, & Borsboom, 2021). Clearly, clinical psychological science has no shortage of rather vague, descriptive theories that are difficult to test and disprove. Many areas of psychology are moving in the direction of developing stronger theories, which could guide experimentation and increase the overall rigor of psychological science. In this context, clinical psychology is faced with the task of creating formal mathematical models of important phenomena, including the ones which the A2T model tackles. This effort, often referred to as computational psychiatry (Huys, Maia, & Frank, 2016; Montague, Dolan, Friston, & Dayan, 2012), is showing a lot of promise. The crucial part of this effort is to develop computational models that are relevant for understanding psychopathology, but also have direct links with the existing formal models from cognitive science. In this way, clinical psychology can build on the existing models, and extend them in order to better understand psychopathology. Such efforts are alread","PeriodicalId":48327,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Inquiry","volume":"33 1","pages":"273 - 275"},"PeriodicalIF":9.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43088307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2022.2141005
David R. Vago, N. Farb, R. N. Spreng
David R. Vago , Norman Farb , and R. Nathan Spreng Department of Psychology, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee; Contemplative Sciences Center, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia; Department of Psychology, University of Toronto Mississauga, Mississauga, Canada; Laboratory of Brain and Cognition, Montreal Neurological Institute, Department of Neurology and Neurosurgery, Faculty of Medicine, McGill University, Montreal, Canada; Departments of Psychiatry and Psychology, McGill University, Montreal, Canada; Douglas Mental Health University Institute, Verdun, Canada; McConnell Brain Imaging Centre, Montreal Neurological Institute, McGill University, Montreal, Canada
David R. Vago, Norman Farb和R. Nathan spring，田纳西州纳什维尔范德比尔特大学心理学系;维吉尼亚州夏洛茨维尔市维吉尼亚大学冥想科学中心;加拿大密西沙加多伦多大学心理学系;加拿大蒙特利尔麦吉尔大学医学院神经病学与神经外科蒙特利尔神经研究所脑与认知实验室;加拿大蒙特利尔麦吉尔大学精神病学与心理学系;加拿大凡尔登道格拉斯心理健康大学研究所;加拿大蒙特利尔麦吉尔大学蒙特利尔神经学研究所麦康奈尔脑成像中心
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Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2022.2149195
Marieke K. van Vugt, H. Jamalabadi
Abstract Iftach and Bernstein propose a dynamical system model of task-unrelated thought that is designed to explain how repetitive negative thinking (RNT) and maladaptive internally-directed cognition more generally arises from attentional biases, working memory, and negative affect. They show that specifically during a period of low task demands, it is easier for negative affect to grab resources and take over with RNT. They also postulate that for individuals with high cognitive reactivity, this tendency for RNT to take over is increased. We argue this paper is an important move forward toward understanding in what circumstances RNT takes over, but also that the model is not yet sufficiently “formalized.” Specifically, we notice excessive levels of flexibility and redundancy that could undermine the explainability of the model. Moreover, the likelihood of negative thinking, as implemented in the proposed model, relies heavily on working memory capacity. In response to this observation, we give suggestions for how the parametrization of this model could be done in a more principled manner. We think such an analysis paves the way for more principled computational modeling of RNT which can be applied to describing empirical data and eventually, to inform decision-making in clinical settings.
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Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2022.2106764
Kate A. Ratliff, C. Smith
Researchers interested in implicit bias agree that no one agrees what implicit bias is. Gawronski, Ledgerwood, and Eastwick (this issue) join a spate of scholars calling for better conceptual clarity around what it means for a construct or a measure to be implicit (Corneille & H€ utter, 2020; Fazio, Granados Samatoa, Boggs, & Ladanyi, 2022; Schmader, Dennehy, & Baron, 2022; Van Dessel et al., 2020). Some argue we should do away with the term entirely (Corneille & H€ utter, 2020), and others argue that authors simply need to do a better job defining how they are idiosyncratically using the term each time they use it (Greenwald & Lai, 2020). In their target article, Gawronski et al. argue for a fundamental redefinition of what it means for bias to be implicit. More specifically, they argue that implicit bias (IB) and bias on implicit measures (BIM) are conceptually and empirically distinct, and that BIM (defined as “effects of social category membership on behavioral responses captured by measurement instruments conventionally describe as implicit”) should not be treated as an instance of IB (defined as “behavioral responses influenced by social category cues when respondents are unaware of the effect of social category cues on their behavioral responses”). We agree that the time has come for our definition of implicit to be revamped in light of new findings. In fact, it is past time; we co-chaired a symposium titled “What is implicit about implicit attitudes?” at the Society for Personality and Social Psychology’s annual meeting in 2009, more than a decade ago. And we applaud the authors of the target article for taking a bold step toward making a change. Further, we agree with them that bias is best defined as a behavioral phenomenon rather than a latent mental construct. This is not a statement we make lightly; it has required some serious scholarly contemplation of the current state of the literature and some serious non-scholarly contemplation of our own egos to reach this conclusion. For some time now we, like most others, have described implicit bias as something that people have–e.g., participants have an implicit bias favoring one novel individual over another (Ratliff & Nosek, 2011), have an implicit preference favoring White over Black Americans (Chen & Ratliff, 2018), or have an implicit positive or negative attitude toward feminists (Redford, Howell, Meijs, & Ratliff, 2018). Many of us are quite invested in this way of thinking. And change is hard! But we recognize that we gain a lot by taking this more functional approach to bias. Most notably, a functional approach allows researchers to circumvent the perplexing situation of using the same name for construct and measure. Further, many of us working in this area are doing so because we hope to provide insights through which people can change their behavior in order to reduce inequality on real life issues that matter. Given that the problem of bias is a behavioral problem (De Houwer,
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