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Issue Information - Request for Registered Reports 发行信息 - 申请注册报告
IF 4.4 2区 管理学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Journal of Accounting Research
Pub Date : 2024-02-02 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12525
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引用次数: 0
Issue Information - Request for Papers 议题信息 - 征求论文
IF 4.4 2区 管理学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Journal of Accounting Research
Pub Date : 2024-02-02 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12524
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引用次数: 0
Issue Information - Standing Call for Proposals for 发行信息--长期征集有关《世界文化多样性宣言》的提案
IF 4.4 2区 管理学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Journal of Accounting Research
Pub Date : 2024-02-02 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12526
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引用次数: 0
Fraud Power Laws 欺诈权力法
IF 4.4 2区 管理学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Journal of Accounting Research
Pub Date : 2023-12-30 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12520
EDWIGE CHEYNEL, DAVIDE CIANCIARUSO, FRANK S. ZHOU

Using misstatement data, we find that the distribution of detected fraud features a heavy tail. We propose a theoretical mechanism that explains such a relatively high frequency of extreme frauds. In our dynamic model, a manager manipulates earnings for personal gain. A monitor of uncertain quality can detect fraud and punish the manager. As the monitor fails to detect fraud, the manager's posterior belief about the monitor's effectiveness decreases. Over time, the manager's learning leads to a slippery slope, in which the size of frauds grows steeply, and to a power law for detected fraud. Empirical analyses corroborate the slippery slope and the learning channel. As a policy implication, we establish that a higher detection intensity can increase fraud by enabling the manager to identify an ineffective monitor more quickly. Further, nondetection of frauds below a materiality threshold, paired with a sufficiently steep punishment scheme, can prevent large frauds.

利用错报数据，我们发现被发现的欺诈行为的分布具有严重的尾部特征。我们提出了一种理论机制来解释如此高频率的极端欺诈行为。在我们的动态模型中，经理为了个人利益而操纵收益。质量不确定的监督者可以发现欺诈行为并对经理进行惩罚。由于监督者未能发现欺诈行为，经理对监督者有效性的后验信念就会下降。随着时间的推移，经理的学习会导致舞弊规模陡增的 "滑坡 "现象，并导致已发现舞弊的幂律。经验分析证实了滑坡和学习渠道。作为一种政策含义，我们认为，较高的检测强度可以使管理者更快地识别出无效的监控者，从而增加欺诈行为。此外，对低于实质性阈值的欺诈行为不予检测，再配以足够严厉的惩罚措施，可以防止大规模欺诈行为的发生。
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引用次数: 0
Occupational Licensing and Minority Participation in Professional Labor Markets 职业许可与少数族裔参与专业劳动力市场
IF 4.4 2区 管理学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Journal of Accounting Research
Pub Date : 2023-12-12 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12518
ANDREW G. SUTHERLAND, MATTHIAS UCKERT, FELIX W. VETTER

We examine the staggered adoption of additional educational requirements (“150-hour rule”) for Certified Public Accountants (“CPAs”) to understand the effects of occupational licensing on minority participation in professional labor markets. The 150-hour rule increased the educational requirement for CPAs from 120 to 150 credit hours, effectively adding a fifth year of study. We find a 13% greater entry decline following the requirement's enactment for minority than nonminority CPA candidates. Our analyses of parental income and financial aid availability point to a socioeconomic status channel explaining the differential entry declines. Studying exam passing patterns, professional misconduct, and job postings we find a deterioration, or at best, no change in CPA quality following enactment.

我们研究了注册专业会计师（"CPAs"）交错采用额外教育要求（"150 小时规则"）的情况，以了解职业许可对少数群体参与专业劳动力市场的影响。150 小时规则将注册会计师的教育要求从 120 个学分增加到 150 个学分，实际上增加了第五年的学习时间。我们发现，该规定颁布后，少数族裔注册会计师候选人的入学率比非少数族裔注册会计师候选人下降了 13%。我们对父母收入和财政援助可用性的分析表明，社会经济地位是造成入学率下降差异的原因之一。通过研究考试合格模式、职业不端行为和招聘职位，我们发现在颁布后，注册会计师的质量有所下降，或者充其量没有变化。本文受版权保护。
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引用次数: 0
The Impact of Credit Market Development on Auditor Choice: Evidence from Banking Deregulation 信贷市场发展对审计师选择的影响:来自银行业放松管制的证据
IF 4.4 2区 管理学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Journal of Accounting Research
Pub Date : 2023-12-06 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12519
GUS DE FRANCO, YUYAN GUAN, YIBIN ZHOU, XINDONG ZHU

We exploit the staggered state-level adoption of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) to examine how banking deregulation and the resulting increase in bank competition affect firms’ auditor choices. We find that an exogenous increase in the degree of interstate branch banking deregulation leads to a reduction in firms’ propensity to engage a Big N or industry expert auditor. This main result, when combined with our cross-sectional analyses, offers evidence suggesting that deregulation leads to less demand for higher quality auditors because (1) firms have increased access to credit, which reduces the benefits of higher audit quality; (2) entering banks’ lending expertise substitutes for higher quality financial statements; (3) incumbent banks with less lending expertise seek to protect their rents by preferring that borrowers provide lower quality financial statement information; and (4) external stakeholders delegate their monitoring to banks to a greater degree, resulting in less demand for higher quality financial statements. As such, our study sheds light on how the U.S. credit market's infrastructure shapes firms’ auditor choice decisions.

我们利用各州交错采用的Riegle-Neal州际银行和分支效率法案(IBBEA)来研究银行业放松管制和由此导致的银行竞争增加如何影响公司的审计师选择。我们发现，州际分行银行放松管制程度的外生增加导致公司聘请大N或行业专家审计师的倾向降低。这一主要结果与我们的横断面分析相结合，提供了证据表明，放松管制导致对高质量审计师的需求减少，因为:(a)公司获得信贷的机会增加了，这降低了高审计质量的好处;(b)利用银行的贷款专业知识替代高质量的财务报表;(c)缺乏贷款专业知识的现有银行通过倾向于借款人提供质量较低的财务报表信息来寻求保护其租金;(d)外部利益相关者更大程度上将其监督委托给银行，导致对高质量财务报表的需求减少。因此，我们的研究揭示了美国信贷市场的基础设施如何影响公司的审计选择决策。
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引用次数: 0
Cultural Origin and Minority Shareholder Expropriation: Historical Evidence 文化起源与小股东征用：历史证据
IF 4.4 2区 管理学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Journal of Accounting Research
Pub Date : 2023-10-25 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12517
ZHIHUI GU, WEI SUN, FRANK S. ZHOU

Can culture explain regional differences in minority shareholder expropriation? Examining regional variation in China, we document that the influence of historical Confucian values persists, despite decades of political movements clamping down on these values, and that these values reduce minority shareholder expropriation in local public firms. The effect on minority shareholder expropriation, in part, operates through the establishment of oversight mechanisms (i.e., greater financial reporting quality and dividend payouts) that constrain expropriation. The findings have important implications for understanding the origins of enduring regional differences in minority shareholder expropriation and capital market development.

文化能否解释小股东征用的地区差异？通过研究中国的地区差异，我们发现，尽管数十年来政治运动一直在压制儒家价值观，但这些价值观对历史上儒家价值观的影响依然存在，而且这些价值观减少了当地上市公司对小股东的征用。对小股东征用的影响在一定程度上是通过建立监督机制（即提高财务报告质量和股息支付）来实现的，这种机制限制了征用。这些发现对于理解小股东征用和资本市场发展方面长期存在的地区差异的根源具有重要意义。
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引用次数: 0
Transparency in Hierarchies 等级制度的透明度
IF 4.4 2区 管理学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Journal of Accounting Research
Pub Date : 2023-10-20 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12516
CHRISTIAN HOFMANN, RAFFI J. INDJEJIKIAN

We use an agency model to address the benefits and costs of transparency in a hierarchical organization in which the principal employs a manager entrusted with contracting authority and several workers, all under conditions of moral hazard. We define the principal's transparency choices as a decision to allow workers to observe their coworkers’ performances (observability) and as an investment in monitoring worker performance (precision). We find that whereas precision alleviates agency conflicts as expected, observability can exacerbate agency conflicts, especially if the manager's interests are misaligned sufficiently with those of the principal. Our results suggest several testable hypotheses including predictions that opaque performance measurement practices are well suited for small organizational units at lower hierarchical ranks, and in settings where the sensitivity-precision of the available measures is low, workers’ performances are correlated positively, and managerial productivity is modest.

我们使用一个代理模型来探讨在一个层级组织中透明度的收益和成本问题，在这个组织中，委托人雇用了一名受托拥有订约权的经理和若干名工人，所有这些人都处于道德风险的条件下。我们将委托人的透明度选择定义为允许工人观察同事表现的决定（可观察性）和监督工人表现的投资（精确性）。我们发现，精确性可以缓解代理冲突，而可观察性则会加剧代理冲突，尤其是当管理者的利益与委托人的利益严重不一致时。我们的研究结果提出了几个可检验的假设，其中包括不透明的绩效衡量方法非常适合等级较低的小型组织单位，以及在可用衡量标准的灵敏度-精确度较低、工人的绩效呈正相关、管理者的生产率不高的情况下。
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引用次数: 0
Issue Information - Request for Registered Reports 问题信息-注册报告请求
IF 4.4 2区 管理学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Journal of Accounting Research
Pub Date : 2023-10-19 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12511
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引用次数: 0
Issue Information - Standing Call for Proposals for 发布信息-长期征求建议书
IF 4.4 2区 管理学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Journal of Accounting Research
Pub Date : 2023-10-19 DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12512
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引用次数: 0
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