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The transparency dilemma: How AI disclosure erodes trust 透明度困境:人工智能信息披露如何侵蚀信任
IF 3.4 2区 管理学 Q2 MANAGEMENT Pub Date : 2025-04-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2025.104405
Oliver Schilke , Martin Reimann
As generative artificial intelligence (AI) has found its way into various work tasks, questions about whether its usage should be disclosed and the consequences of such disclosure have taken center stage in public and academic discourse on digital transparency. This article addresses this debate by asking: Does disclosing the usage of AI compromise trust in the user? We examine the impact of AI disclosure on trust across diverse tasks—from communications via analytics to artistry—and across individual actors such as supervisors, subordinates, professors, analysts, and creatives, as well as across organizational actors such as investment funds. Thirteen experiments consistently demonstrate that actors who disclose their AI usage are trusted less than those who do not. Drawing on micro-institutional theory, we argue that this reduction in trust can be explained by reduced perceptions of legitimacy, as shown across various experimental designs (Studies 6–8). Moreover, we demonstrate that this negative effect holds across different disclosure framings, above and beyond algorithm aversion, regardless of whether AI involvement is known, and regardless of whether disclosure is voluntary or mandatory, though it is comparatively weaker than the effect of third-party exposure (Studies 9–13). A within-paper meta-analysis suggests this trust penalty is attenuated but not eliminated among evaluators with favorable technology attitudes and perceptions of high AI accuracy. This article contributes to research on trust, AI, transparency, and legitimacy by showing that AI disclosure can harm social perceptions, emphasizing that transparency is not straightforwardly beneficial, and highlighting legitimacy’s central role in trust formation.
随着生成式人工智能(AI)进入各种工作任务,关于它的使用是否应该公开以及这种披露的后果的问题已经成为有关数字透明度的公共和学术讨论的中心议题。本文通过以下问题来解决这一争论:披露人工智能的使用是否会损害用户的信任?我们研究了人工智能披露对不同任务中信任的影响——从通过分析进行的沟通到艺术创作——以及主管、下属、教授、分析师和创意人员等个人行为者,以及投资基金等组织行为者。13项实验一致表明,披露人工智能使用情况的演员比不披露的演员更不受信任。根据微观制度理论,我们认为信任的减少可以通过降低对合法性的认知来解释,正如各种实验设计所显示的那样(研究6-8)。此外,我们证明了这种负面影响在不同的披露框架中都存在,超越了算法厌恶,无论人工智能参与是否已知,也无论披露是自愿的还是强制性的,尽管它的影响相对弱于第三方披露(研究9-13)。论文内的荟萃分析表明,在对技术持积极态度和对高人工智能准确性的看法的评估者中,这种信任惩罚被减弱,但并未消除。本文对信任、人工智能、透明度和合法性的研究做出了贡献,表明人工智能披露会损害社会观念,强调透明度不是直接有益的,并强调合法性在信任形成中的核心作用。
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引用次数: 0
From low power to action: Reappraising powerlessness as an opportunity restores agency 从低权力到行动:重新评估无能为力作为一个机会恢复能动性
IF 3.4 2区 管理学 Q2 MANAGEMENT Pub Date : 2025-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2025.104404
Tianyu He , Michael Schaerer , Trevor A. Foulk , Elizabeth Baily Wolf , Winnie Y. Jiang
Agentic behaviors are a critical pathway to power in contemporary organizations. Paradoxically, employees who lack power are the least likely to think and act agentically—creating a self-perpetuating cycle of disadvantage. Existing research on facilitating employee agentic behaviors relies on structural solutions that are often out of reach for individual employees. Yet, anecdotal evidence suggests that this view may be incomplete, as some individuals seem to be able to overcome the challenges powerlessness poses without relying on external resources, control, or organizational change. Integrating research on powerlessness and cognitive reappraisal, the present research proposes that cognitively reappraising powerless situations as opportunities can help individuals cope with the negative effects low power has on agency. A negotiation simulation (Study 1) and two experience-sampling field experiments (Studies 2–3) support our predictions: cognitive reappraisal attenuates the negative effects of low-power experiences on approach-related orientation (i.e., the Behavioral Approach System), which subsequently facilitates several indicators of agentic behavior, including employees’ propensity to negotiate (Study 1) and their tendency to engage in voice and task proactivity at work (Studies 2–3). This research proposes a way to break the power-inaction link, suggesting that individuals may regulate their reactions to powerless experiences and offering an empowering and accessible strategy for sustaining agency.
在当代组织中,代理行为是获得权力的重要途径。矛盾的是,缺乏权力的员工最不可能以主观的方式思考和行动,从而形成一个自我延续的劣势循环。现有的关于促进员工代理行为的研究依赖于结构性解决方案,而这些解决方案对于员工个体来说往往遥不可及。然而,轶事证据表明,这种观点可能是不完整的,因为有些人似乎能够克服无力感带来的挑战,而不依赖外部资源、控制或组织变革。结合对无力感和认知重评价的研究,本研究提出将无力感情境作为机会进行认知重评价可以帮助个体应对低权力对代理的负面影响。一项谈判模拟(研究1)和两项经验抽样现场实验(研究2-3)支持了我们的预测:认知重评减弱了低权力经验对方法相关取向(即行为方法系统)的负面影响,这随后促进了代理行为的几个指标,包括员工的谈判倾向(研究1)和他们在工作中参与声音和任务主动性的倾向(研究2-3)。本研究提出了一种打破权力-不作为联系的方法,表明个体可以调节他们对无能为力经历的反应,并为维持代理提供了一种授权和可访问的策略。
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引用次数: 0
Paying off the intergenerational debt: How and why children of immigrants status-strive at work 偿还代际债务:移民子女如何以及为什么在工作中努力
IF 3.4 2区 管理学 Q2 MANAGEMENT Pub Date : 2025-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2025.104406
Herrison Chicas , Shimul Melwani
Children of immigrants, referred to as second-gens, are the fastest growing segment of the labor force in developed countries. Yet, their unique workplace experiences, behaviors, and outcomes remain conspicuously absent in management scholarship. In this paper, we explore why second-gens employees, despite their disadvantaged upbringings, consistently outperform children of native-born parents, referred to as third-gens. Drawing on psychological contract theory, we argue that this paradoxical phenomenon is explained by the immigrant bargain—a unique psychological contract whereby the sacrifices of the immigrant parents are expected to be redeemed and validated by the success of the second-gen child. Formed early in life, this bargain fosters a sense of indebtedness, motivating second-gens to strive for higher organizational status (i.e., pay raise, promotion) and higher societal status (i.e., income, occupational status) as means of repaying their parents. Across seven studies using American and European samples, we provide robust evidence supporting our theoretical model. This work advances research on immigrant generations in organizations and enhances our understanding of how psychological contracts outside of work spillover to affect behaviors inside the workplace.
移民子女被称为第二代,是发达国家劳动力中增长最快的部分。然而,他们独特的工作经历、行为和结果在管理学术中仍然明显缺失。在本文中,我们探讨了为什么第二代员工,尽管他们的成长环境不利,始终优于本地出生的父母的孩子,被称为第三代。根据心理契约理论,我们认为这种矛盾的现象可以用移民交易来解释,移民交易是一种独特的心理契约,移民父母的牺牲期望被第二代孩子的成功所补偿和验证。这种讨价还价形成于生命早期,培养了一种负债感,激励第二代人努力争取更高的组织地位(即加薪、晋升)和更高的社会地位(即收入、职业地位),作为报答父母的手段。通过使用美国和欧洲样本的七项研究,我们提供了强有力的证据来支持我们的理论模型。这项工作推进了对组织中移民世代的研究,并增强了我们对工作之外的心理契约如何影响工作场所内部行为的理解。
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引用次数: 0
Chronic monitoring for wrongdoing as a signal of immoral character 长期监视不法行为是不道德性格的标志
IF 3.4 2区 管理学 Q2 MANAGEMENT Pub Date : 2025-03-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2025.104402
Nathan A. Dhaliwal , Fan Xuan Chen , Jane O’Reilly , Karl Aquino
Punishing wrongdoing can sometimes have reputational benefits. But what do people think of those who regularly monitor their environment for signs of wrongdoing? Drawing on the concept of workplace vigilantism, we posit that acts of monitoring in workplace settings serve as negative cues of one’s moral character. In particular, we propose that chronically monitoring for signs of wrongdoing signals that an individual is driven by retributive and competitive leveling motives as well as a tendency to ascribe hostile motives to others. We examine this idea across six studies (and three supplementary studies). In Study 1, we find that employees have largely negative impressions of individuals who vigilantly monitor and reprimand wrongdoings at work. In Study 2, we find that punishers are seen as less moral when their acts of punishment are preceded by chronic monitoring for wrongdoing. In Study 3, we find that punishers who engage in chronic monitoring are seen as possessing heightened retributive and competitive leveling motives. In Study 4, we find that the reputational costs of chronic monitoring persist even when the violation is addressed in a courteous manner and that chronic monitoring signals that one ascribes hostile intentions to others. In Study 5, we identify an individual difference moderator, showing that negative judgments of workplace vigilantes are attenuated when observers share similar vigilante tendencies. Finally, in Study 6, we find that the reputational costs that result from chronic monitoring are observed across an array of workplace violations, including when the violation is of considerable organizational importance. Together, our results demonstrate that the perceived moral character of a punisher can hinge on whether monitoring for wrongdoing precedes such punitive acts.
惩罚不法行为有时会带来声誉上的好处。但是,人们如何看待那些经常监控周围环境以寻找不法行为迹象的人呢?根据工作场所警戒主义的概念,我们假设工作场所环境中的监控行为是一个人道德品质的负面暗示。特别是,我们建议长期监测不法行为的迹象表明,个人受到报复性和竞争性平衡动机的驱动,以及将敌对动机归咎于他人的倾向。我们通过六项研究(和三项补充研究)来检验这一观点。在研究1中,我们发现员工对那些在工作中警惕地监督和谴责错误行为的人有很大的负面印象。在研究2中,我们发现,如果惩罚者的惩罚行为之前有对不当行为的长期监控,那么他们就会被视为道德水平较低。在研究3中,我们发现参与长期监控的惩罚者被视为具有更高的报复性和竞争性平衡动机。在研究4中,我们发现,即使违规行为以礼貌的方式解决,长期监控的声誉成本仍然存在,并且长期监控标志着一个人将敌对意图归咎于他人。在研究5中,我们发现了个体差异调节因子,表明当观察者具有相似的义务警员倾向时,对工作场所义务警员的负面判断会减弱。最后,在研究6中,我们发现长期监控导致的声誉成本在一系列工作场所违规行为中被观察到,包括当违规行为具有相当大的组织重要性时。总之,我们的研究结果表明,惩罚者的道德品质可能取决于是否在这种惩罚行为之前对不法行为进行监控。
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引用次数: 0
The motivating power of streaks: Increasing persistence is as easy as 1, 2, 3 条纹的激励力量:增加持久性就像1、2、3一样简单
IF 3.4 2区 管理学 Q2 MANAGEMENT Pub Date : 2025-02-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2025.104391
Katie S. Mehr , Jackie Silverman , Marissa A. Sharif , Alixandra Barasch , Katherine L. Milkman
Organizations often use financial incentives to boost employees’ commitment to work-relevant goals in an effort to increase persistence and goal achievement (e.g., to improve organizational efficiency or sales). We introduce and test a novel incentive scheme designed to enhance persistence by increasing commitment to the goal of maximizing earnings. Specifically, we test “streak incentives,” or rewards that offer people increasing payouts for completing multiple consecutive work tasks. Across six pre-registered studies (total N = 4,504), we show that, contrary to standard economic models suggesting people will complete more piece-rate work for larger rewards, people actually complete more work when compensated with streak incentives than with larger, stable incentives. We theorize that this occurs because, by encouraging consecutive task completion, streak incentives increase commitment to a goal of maximizing earnings, which in turn increases persistence. We also show that this effect is not driven by providing increasing rewards; rather, people’s goal commitment and motivation are boosted by the requirement that they complete work tasks consecutively to earn escalating payments. Taken together, our results suggest that designing incentives to encourage streaks of work is a low-cost way to increase goal commitment and therefore persistence in organizations and other contexts.
组织经常使用经济激励来促进员工对工作相关目标的承诺,以增加持久性和目标的实现(例如,提高组织效率或销售)。我们引入并测试了一种新的激励方案,旨在通过增加对收益最大化目标的承诺来增强持久性。具体来说,我们测试了“连续奖励”,即为完成多个连续工作任务的人提供不断增加的奖励。通过六项预先注册的研究(总N = 4504),我们发现,与标准的经济模型(即人们会为获得更大的奖励而完成更多的计件工作)相反,人们实际上在获得连续奖励时完成的工作比获得更大、更稳定的奖励时完成的工作更多。我们的理论认为,这是因为,通过鼓励连续完成任务,连续激励增加了对收益最大化目标的承诺,这反过来又增加了持久性。我们还表明,这种效应不是由不断增加的奖励驱动的;相反,人们的目标承诺和动机是由他们连续完成工作任务以获得不断增加的报酬的要求所推动的。综上所述,我们的研究结果表明,设计激励机制来鼓励连续工作是一种低成本的方式,可以增加目标承诺,从而在组织和其他环境中坚持不懈。
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引用次数: 0
When do people claim to know the unknowable? The impact of informational context on overclaiming 人们什么时候声称知道不可知的事情?信息语境对夸大的影响
IF 3.4 2区 管理学 Q2 MANAGEMENT Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2025.104390
Stav Atir , Emily Rosenzweig , David Dunning
Managers and employees should not only identify what they know but also what they do not know. Yet, like other people, they often “overclaim” knowledge they cannot have, with myriad organizational consequences. Research has explored individual differences in such overclaiming. Herein, we propose that overclaiming is also contextually dependent on the informational environment. We find a robust assimilation effect of informational familiarity; people claim more knowledge of concepts that do not exist when they appear among familiar (versus unfamiliar) concepts (Studies 1–4). This effect is mediated by a self-inference process, whereby familiarity with real concepts leads people to infer they are knowledgeable on the topic, which in turn leads them to infer they also know nonexistent concepts ostensibly related to the topic (Studies 5–7). Our results suggest that informational context systematically affects the tendency to claim knowledge that one cannot have.
管理人员和员工不仅要明确自己知道什么,还要明确自己不知道什么。然而,与其他人一样,他们经常会 "过度要求 "自己不可能拥有的知识,从而给组织带来无数后果。有研究探讨了过度获取知识的个体差异。在此,我们提出,过度获取知识也与信息环境有关。我们发现,信息熟悉度会产生强大的同化效应;当不存在的概念出现在人们熟悉(相对于不熟悉)的概念中时,人们会对这些概念提出更多的知识要求(研究 1-4)。这种效应是由自我推断过程介导的,即对真实概念的熟悉会使人们推断自己对该主题有一定的了解,这反过来又会使他们推断自己也知道表面上与该主题相关的不存在的概念(研究 5-7)。我们的研究结果表明,信息语境会系统地影响人们声称自己拥有不可能拥有的知识的倾向。
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引用次数: 0
OBHDP’s adoption of Level 2 Transparency and Openness Promotion guidelines 波黑发展局通过了 2 级透明度和公开性促进准则
IF 3.4 2区 管理学 Q2 MANAGEMENT Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2025.104389
Michael D. Baer , Maryam Kouchaki
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引用次数: 0
The small-world illusion: Overestimating the frequency of in-person interactions with acquaintances 小世界错觉:高估与熟人面对面交流的频率
IF 3.4 2区 管理学 Q2 MANAGEMENT Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2024.104387
Nadav Klein
People generate substantial informational benefits from their social networks, and acquaintanceships—“weak ties”—are an important component of these benefits. However, acquaintances typically do not have deep knowledge of one another’s schedules and do not plan their interactions ahead of time. The uncertain nature of interactions with acquaintances raises the possibility that people might not realize how often they actually occur. The present experiments find that people overestimate the frequency of interacting with acquaintances (Experiments 1a-2b). This occurs partly because of an availability bias whereby instances of crossing paths with acquaintances are more top-of-mind and readily available than ways in which acquaintances might “miss” each other (Experiments 3a-5). One consequence of this is that people overestimate opportunities for receiving help from acquaintances and thus miss out on such opportunities (Experiment 5). Acquaintances do not interact as frequently as they think, and this misperception can reduce the benefits of social networks.
人们从他们的社会网络中获得了大量的信息利益,而熟人——“弱关系”——是这些利益的重要组成部分。然而,熟人通常不会对彼此的日程安排有深入的了解,也不会提前计划他们的互动。与熟人互动的不确定性增加了人们可能没有意识到这种互动实际上发生的频率的可能性。本实验发现,人们高估了与熟人互动的频率(实验1a-2b)。这在一定程度上是由于可得性偏差,即与熟人相遇的例子比熟人可能“错过”彼此的方式更容易被记住和获得(实验3a-5)。这样做的一个后果是,人们高估了从熟人那里得到帮助的机会,从而错过了这样的机会(实验5)。熟人之间的互动并不像他们想象的那么频繁,这种误解会降低社交网络的好处。
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引用次数: 0
“You knew what you were getting into”: Perspective differences in gauging informed consent "你知道你在做什么":衡量知情同意的视角差异
IF 3.4 2区 管理学 Q2 MANAGEMENT Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2024.104386
Rachel Schlund , Vanessa K. Bohns
We examine differences between perceived and experienced consent in organizational contexts—specifically, the aspect of consent that reflects how informed consenters feel. We theorize that people tasked with soliciting consent overestimate the extent to which consenters feel fully informed of what they are agreeing to and thus feel they have truly consented. We provide support for these predictions across six pre-registered studies (N = 2,993) and eight supplemental pre-registered studies (N = 4,406) that establish causal and mediation evidence, downstream organizational consequences, and real-world relevance. This research reveals that even when an agreement meets the legal criteria for consent, there may be misaligned perceptions of employees’ feelings of consent, with consequences for employees’ relationship with their organization. The current studies offer a significant step forward in understanding the markedly understudied role of consent in organizations.
我们研究了组织环境中感知到的同意和经验到的同意之间的差异——具体来说,是反映知情同意者感受的同意方面。我们的理论是,负责征求同意的人高估了同意者对他们所同意的内容的充分了解程度,从而认为他们已经真正同意了。我们通过6项预注册研究(N = 2993)和8项补充预注册研究(N = 4406)为这些预测提供了支持,这些研究建立了因果和中介证据、下游组织后果和现实世界相关性。这项研究表明,即使协议符合同意的法律标准,也可能会对员工的同意感受产生不一致的看法,从而影响员工与组织的关系。目前的研究提供了一个重要的一步,向前理解在组织中明显未被充分研究的同意的作用。
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引用次数: 0
Pitch imperfect: How investors respond to entrepreneur disclosure of personal flaws 推介不完美:投资者如何回应创业者披露个人缺点
IF 3.4 2区 管理学 Q2 MANAGEMENT Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2024.104388
Lauren C. Howe, Jochen I. Menges
When entrepreneurs pitch to investors, is it wise for them to disclose their flaws or should they rather not admit any weaknesses? Combining research in entrepreneurial finance with social comparison theory, we put forth a new conceptual model about when disclosing flaws elicits psychological closeness and results in investment. We distinguish between two types of flaws (agency-excess and agency-deficit) and consider the similarity between entrepreneurs and potential investors in these flaws. A field study and several experiments generally support our model. Disclosing agency-excess flaws does not generate closeness or elicit investment, even when investors possess the same flaw. Disclosing agency-deficit flaws can generate closeness and result in investment, but only among investors who possess the same flaw. Our research contributes to the entrepreneurial finance literature by showing nuanced effects concerning how flaw disclosures relate to investments; we also show that similarities between entrepreneurs and investors do not always pay off.
当创业者向投资者推销时,披露自己的缺点是明智之举,还是宁可不承认任何弱点?结合创业融资研究和社会比较理论,我们提出了一个新的概念模型,说明披露缺点何时会引起心理上的亲近感并导致投资。我们区分了两类缺陷(代理过剩和代理不足),并考虑了创业者和潜在投资者在这些缺陷上的相似性。一项实地研究和几项实验普遍支持我们的模型。即使投资者拥有相同的缺陷,披露代理过剩缺陷也不会产生亲近感或引起投资。披露代理缺陷可以产生亲近感并导致投资,但仅限于拥有相同缺陷的投资者之间。我们的研究显示了缺陷披露与投资之间的细微差别,为创业融资文献做出了贡献;我们还表明,创业者与投资者之间的相似性并不总是会带来回报。
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引用次数: 0
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Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
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