{"title":"Correction to: Inference for Ranks with Applications to Mobility across Neighbourhoods and Academic Achievement across Countries","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad074","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.8,"publicationDate":"2023-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74133016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Correction to: Vintage-Specific Driving Restrictions","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad076","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.8,"publicationDate":"2023-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74257342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Do firms adjust wages in response to changes in their own demand level, or to changes in competitive pressure from rival employers? We study how exporters adjust wages in response to unexpected product demand shocks during the 2008–2009 Great Recession. Using rich data on Portuguese firms’ pre-recession export shipments, we measure firm-level shocks to export demand during the Recession. We show that shocks constructed at the firm level are not necessarily firm-specific and can be decomposed into a common component affecting all producers in a product market and an idiosyncratic component affecting individual firms within markets based on the locations of their pre-Recession customers. We demonstrate that while both components impact firms’ output and their workers’ wages, the common component spills over from firms to their labor market rivals, whereas the idiosyncratic component does not. We find that 10-15% of firms’ idiosyncratic demand passes through to their employees’ wage growth with no effect on retention rates, implying significant dependence of wages on noncompetitive quasi-rents. Moreover, we find that wages respond primarily to shifts in internal labor demand when labor markets are thin, but they respond more to competition from other employers when labor markets are fluid. These results indicate that employers’ ability to set wages hinges on the underlying competitiveness of the labor market.
{"title":"How Responsive are Wages to Firm-Specific Changes in Labor Demand? Evidence from Idiosyncratic Export Demand Shocks","authors":"A. Garin, Filipe Silvério","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad069","url":null,"abstract":"Do firms adjust wages in response to changes in their own demand level, or to changes in competitive pressure from rival employers? We study how exporters adjust wages in response to unexpected product demand shocks during the 2008–2009 Great Recession. Using rich data on Portuguese firms’ pre-recession export shipments, we measure firm-level shocks to export demand during the Recession. We show that shocks constructed at the firm level are not necessarily firm-specific and can be decomposed into a common component affecting all producers in a product market and an idiosyncratic component affecting individual firms within markets based on the locations of their pre-Recession customers. We demonstrate that while both components impact firms’ output and their workers’ wages, the common component spills over from firms to their labor market rivals, whereas the idiosyncratic component does not. We find that 10-15% of firms’ idiosyncratic demand passes through to their employees’ wage growth with no effect on retention rates, implying significant dependence of wages on noncompetitive quasi-rents. Moreover, we find that wages respond primarily to shifts in internal labor demand when labor markets are thin, but they respond more to competition from other employers when labor markets are fluid. These results indicate that employers’ ability to set wages hinges on the underlying competitiveness of the labor market.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.8,"publicationDate":"2023-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83374077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. Cerreia-Vioglio, Roberto Corrao, Giacomo Lanzani
This paper proposes a model of non-Bayesian social learning in networks that accounts for heuristics and biases in opinion aggregation. The updating rules are represented by nonlinear opinion aggregators from which we extract two extreme networks capturing strong and weak links. We provide graph-theoretic conditions for these networks that characterize opinions.convergence, consensus formation, and efficient or biased information aggregation. Under these updating rules, agents may ignore some of their neighbors.opinions, reducing the number of effective connections and inducing long-run disagreement for .nite populations. For the wisdom of the crowd in large populations, we highlight a trade-off between how connected the society is and the nonlinearity of the opinion aggregator. Our framework bridges several models and phenomena in the non-Bayesian social learning literature, thereby providing a unifying approach to the field.
{"title":"Dynamic Opinion Aggregation: Long-Run Stability and Disagreement","authors":"S. Cerreia-Vioglio, Roberto Corrao, Giacomo Lanzani","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad072","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper proposes a model of non-Bayesian social learning in networks that accounts for heuristics and biases in opinion aggregation. The updating rules are represented by nonlinear opinion aggregators from which we extract two extreme networks capturing strong and weak links. We provide graph-theoretic conditions for these networks that characterize opinions.convergence, consensus formation, and efficient or biased information aggregation. Under these updating rules, agents may ignore some of their neighbors.opinions, reducing the number of effective connections and inducing long-run disagreement for .nite populations. For the wisdom of the crowd in large populations, we highlight a trade-off between how connected the society is and the nonlinearity of the opinion aggregator. Our framework bridges several models and phenomena in the non-Bayesian social learning literature, thereby providing a unifying approach to the field.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.8,"publicationDate":"2023-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89820074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Industrialization experiences differ substantially across countries. We use a benchmark model of structural change to shed light on the sources of this heterogeneity and, in particular, the phenomenon of premature deindustrialization. Our analysis leads to three key findings. First, benchmark models of structural change robustly generate hump-shaped patterns for the evolution of the industrial sector. Second, heterogeneous patterns of catch-up in sectoral productivities across countries can generate variation in industrialization experiences similar to those found in the data, including premature deindustrialization. Third, differences in the rate of agricultural productivity growth across economies can account for the majority of the variation in peak industrial employment shares.
{"title":"Heterogeneous Paths of Industrialization","authors":"Federico Huneeus, Richard Rogerson","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad066","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Industrialization experiences differ substantially across countries. We use a benchmark model of structural change to shed light on the sources of this heterogeneity and, in particular, the phenomenon of premature deindustrialization. Our analysis leads to three key findings. First, benchmark models of structural change robustly generate hump-shaped patterns for the evolution of the industrial sector. Second, heterogeneous patterns of catch-up in sectoral productivities across countries can generate variation in industrialization experiences similar to those found in the data, including premature deindustrialization. Third, differences in the rate of agricultural productivity growth across economies can account for the majority of the variation in peak industrial employment shares.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134999196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abhijit Banerjee, Emily Breza, Arun G Chandrasekhar, Esther Duflo, Matthew O Jackson, Cynthia kinnan
Abstract We show that the entry of formal financial institutions can have far-reaching and long-lasting impacts on informal lending and social networks more generally. We first study the introduction of microfinance in 75 villages in Karnataka, India, 43 of which were exposed to microfinance. Using difference-in-differences, we show that networks shrank more in exposed villages. Moreover, links between households that were both unlikely to borrow from microfinance were at least as likely to disappear as links involving likely borrowers. We replicate these surprising findings in the context of a randomised controlled trial (RCT) in Hyderabad, where a microfinance institution randomly selected 52 of 104 neighbourhoods to enter first. Four years after all neighbourhoods were treated, households in early-entry neighbourhoods had credit access longer and had larger loans. We again find fewer social relationships between households in these neighbourhoods, even among those ex-ante unlikely to borrow. Because the results suggest global spillovers, atypical in usual models of network formation, we develop a new dynamic model of network formation that emphasizes chance meetings, where efforts to socialize generate a global network-level externality. Finally, we analyse informal borrowing and the sensitivity of consumption to income fluctuations. Households unlikely to take up microcredit suffer the greatest loss of informal borrowing and risk sharing, underscoring the global nature of the externality.
{"title":"Changes in Social Network Structure in Response to Exposure to Formal Credit Markets","authors":"Abhijit Banerjee, Emily Breza, Arun G Chandrasekhar, Esther Duflo, Matthew O Jackson, Cynthia kinnan","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad065","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We show that the entry of formal financial institutions can have far-reaching and long-lasting impacts on informal lending and social networks more generally. We first study the introduction of microfinance in 75 villages in Karnataka, India, 43 of which were exposed to microfinance. Using difference-in-differences, we show that networks shrank more in exposed villages. Moreover, links between households that were both unlikely to borrow from microfinance were at least as likely to disappear as links involving likely borrowers. We replicate these surprising findings in the context of a randomised controlled trial (RCT) in Hyderabad, where a microfinance institution randomly selected 52 of 104 neighbourhoods to enter first. Four years after all neighbourhoods were treated, households in early-entry neighbourhoods had credit access longer and had larger loans. We again find fewer social relationships between households in these neighbourhoods, even among those ex-ante unlikely to borrow. Because the results suggest global spillovers, atypical in usual models of network formation, we develop a new dynamic model of network formation that emphasizes chance meetings, where efforts to socialize generate a global network-level externality. Finally, we analyse informal borrowing and the sensitivity of consumption to income fluctuations. Households unlikely to take up microcredit suffer the greatest loss of informal borrowing and risk sharing, underscoring the global nature of the externality.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135399699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In many environments, including credit and online markets, records about participants are collected, published, and erased after some time. We study the effects of erasing past records in a dynamic market where the quality of sellers follows a Markov process, and buyers leave feedback about sellers to an information intermediary. When the average quality of sellers is low, unlimited records lead to a market breakdown in the long run. We consider the information design problem and characterize information policies that can sustain trade and that maximize social welfare. These policies hide some information from the market in order to foster socially desirable experimentation. We show that these outcomes can be implemented by appropriately deleting past records. Crucially, positive and negative records play opposite roles with different intensities and must have different lengths: negative records must be deleted sufficiently late, and positive ones sufficiently early.
{"title":"Memory and Markets","authors":"Sergey Kovbasyuk, Giancarlo Spagnolo","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad067","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In many environments, including credit and online markets, records about participants are collected, published, and erased after some time. We study the effects of erasing past records in a dynamic market where the quality of sellers follows a Markov process, and buyers leave feedback about sellers to an information intermediary. When the average quality of sellers is low, unlimited records lead to a market breakdown in the long run. We consider the information design problem and characterize information policies that can sustain trade and that maximize social welfare. These policies hide some information from the market in order to foster socially desirable experimentation. We show that these outcomes can be implemented by appropriately deleting past records. Crucially, positive and negative records play opposite roles with different intensities and must have different lengths: negative records must be deleted sufficiently late, and positive ones sufficiently early.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"147 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135399698","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study policy experimentation in organizations with endogenous membership. An organization decides when to stop a policy experiment based on its results. As information arrives, agents update their beliefs, and enter or leave the organization based on their expected flow payoffs. Unsuccessful experiments make all agents more pessimistic, but also drive out conservative members. We identify sufficient conditions under which the latter effect dominates, leading to excessive experimentation. In fact, the organization may experiment forever in the face of mounting negative evidence. Ex post heterogeneous payoffs exacerbate the problem, as optimists can join forces with guaranteed winners. Control by shareholders who own all future payoffs, however, can have a corrective effect. Our results contrast with models of collective experimentation with fixed membership, in which underexperimentation is the typical outcome.
{"title":"Experimentation in Endogenous Organizations","authors":"Germán Gieczewski, Svetlana Kosterina","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad064","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We study policy experimentation in organizations with endogenous membership. An organization decides when to stop a policy experiment based on its results. As information arrives, agents update their beliefs, and enter or leave the organization based on their expected flow payoffs. Unsuccessful experiments make all agents more pessimistic, but also drive out conservative members. We identify sufficient conditions under which the latter effect dominates, leading to excessive experimentation. In fact, the organization may experiment forever in the face of mounting negative evidence. Ex post heterogeneous payoffs exacerbate the problem, as optimists can join forces with guaranteed winners. Control by shareholders who own all future payoffs, however, can have a corrective effect. Our results contrast with models of collective experimentation with fixed membership, in which underexperimentation is the typical outcome.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"356 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.8,"publicationDate":"2023-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77154525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract How does an increase in market size, say due to globalization, affect welfare? We study this question using a model with monopolistic competition, heterogeneous markups, and fixed costs. We characterize changes in welfare and decompose changes in allocative efficiency into three different effects: (1) reallocations across firms with heterogeneous price elasticities due to intensifying competition, (2) reallocations due to the exit of marginally profitable firms, and (3) reallocations due to changes in firms’ markups. Whereas the second and third effects have ambiguous implications for welfare, the first effect, which we call the Darwinian effect, always increases welfare regardless of the shape of demand curves. We nonparametrically calibrate demand curves with data from Belgian manufacturing firms and quantify our results. We find that mild increasing returns at the microlevel can catalyze large increasing returns at the macrolevel. Between 70 and 90% of increasing returns to scale come from improvements in how a larger market allocates resources. The lion’s share of these gains are due to the Darwinian effect, which increases the aggregate markup and concentrates sales and employment in high-markup firms. This has implications for policy: an entry subsidy, which harnesses Darwinian reallocations, can improve welfare even when there is more entry than in the first best.
{"title":"The Darwinian Returns to Scale","authors":"D. R. Baqaee, Emmanuel Farhi","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad061","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract How does an increase in market size, say due to globalization, affect welfare? We study this question using a model with monopolistic competition, heterogeneous markups, and fixed costs. We characterize changes in welfare and decompose changes in allocative efficiency into three different effects: (1) reallocations across firms with heterogeneous price elasticities due to intensifying competition, (2) reallocations due to the exit of marginally profitable firms, and (3) reallocations due to changes in firms’ markups. Whereas the second and third effects have ambiguous implications for welfare, the first effect, which we call the Darwinian effect, always increases welfare regardless of the shape of demand curves. We nonparametrically calibrate demand curves with data from Belgian manufacturing firms and quantify our results. We find that mild increasing returns at the microlevel can catalyze large increasing returns at the macrolevel. Between 70 and 90% of increasing returns to scale come from improvements in how a larger market allocates resources. The lion’s share of these gains are due to the Darwinian effect, which increases the aggregate markup and concentrates sales and employment in high-markup firms. This has implications for policy: an entry subsidy, which harnesses Darwinian reallocations, can improve welfare even when there is more entry than in the first best.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135050879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We use novel, large-scale data on 17.5 million Americans to study how a policy-driven increase in economic resources affects children's long-term outcomes. Using the 2000 Census and 2001–13 American Community Survey linked to the Social Security Administration's NUMIDENT, we leverage the county-level rollout of the Food Stamps program between 1961 and 1975. We find that children with access to greater economic resources before age five have better outcomes as adults. The treatment-on-the-treated effects show a 6% of a standard deviation improvement in human capital, 3% of a standard deviation increase in economic self-sufficiency, 8% of a standard deviation increase in the quality of neighbourhood of residence, a 1.2-year increase in life expectancy, and a 0.5 percentage-point decrease in likelihood of being incarcerated. These estimates suggest that Food Stamps’ transfer of resources to families is a highly cost-effective investment in young children, yielding a marginal value of public funds of approximately sixty-two.
{"title":"Is the Social Safety Net a Long-Term Investment? Large-Scale Evidence From the Food Stamps Program","authors":"Martha J Bailey, Hilary Hoynes, Maya Rossin-Slater, Reed Walker","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad063","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We use novel, large-scale data on 17.5 million Americans to study how a policy-driven increase in economic resources affects children's long-term outcomes. Using the 2000 Census and 2001–13 American Community Survey linked to the Social Security Administration's NUMIDENT, we leverage the county-level rollout of the Food Stamps program between 1961 and 1975. We find that children with access to greater economic resources before age five have better outcomes as adults. The treatment-on-the-treated effects show a 6% of a standard deviation improvement in human capital, 3% of a standard deviation increase in economic self-sufficiency, 8% of a standard deviation increase in the quality of neighbourhood of residence, a 1.2-year increase in life expectancy, and a 0.5 percentage-point decrease in likelihood of being incarcerated. These estimates suggest that Food Stamps’ transfer of resources to families is a highly cost-effective investment in young children, yielding a marginal value of public funds of approximately sixty-two.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135215424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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