Emanuele Colonnelli, Niels Joachim Gormsen, Tim Mcquade
Abstract We study how perceptions of corporate responsibility influence policy preferences and the effectiveness of corporate communication when agents have imperfect memory recall. Using a new large-scale survey of U.S. citizens on their support for corporate bailouts, we first establish that the public demands corporations to behave better within society, a sentiment we label “big business discontent.” Using random variation in the order of survey sections and in the exposure to animated videos, we then show that priming respondents to think about corporate responsibility lowers the support for bailouts. This finding suggests that big business discontent influences policy preferences. Furthermore, we find that messages which paint a positive picture of corporate responsibility can “backfire,” as doing so brings attention to an aspect on which the public has negative views. In contrast, reframing corporate bailouts in terms of economic tradeoffs increases support for the policy. We develop a memory-based model of decision-making and communication to rationalize these findings.
{"title":"Selfish Corporations","authors":"Emanuele Colonnelli, Niels Joachim Gormsen, Tim Mcquade","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad057","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We study how perceptions of corporate responsibility influence policy preferences and the effectiveness of corporate communication when agents have imperfect memory recall. Using a new large-scale survey of U.S. citizens on their support for corporate bailouts, we first establish that the public demands corporations to behave better within society, a sentiment we label “big business discontent.” Using random variation in the order of survey sections and in the exposure to animated videos, we then show that priming respondents to think about corporate responsibility lowers the support for bailouts. This finding suggests that big business discontent influences policy preferences. Furthermore, we find that messages which paint a positive picture of corporate responsibility can “backfire,” as doing so brings attention to an aspect on which the public has negative views. In contrast, reframing corporate bailouts in terms of economic tradeoffs increases support for the policy. We develop a memory-based model of decision-making and communication to rationalize these findings.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135997457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Emerging markets have experienced large human and economic costs from coronavirus disease 2019, and their tight fiscal space has limited the support extended to their citizens. We study the impact of an epidemic on economic and health outcomes by integrating epidemiological dynamics into a sovereign default model. The sovereign’s option to default tightens fiscal space and results in an epidemic with limited mitigation and depressed consumption. A quantitative analysis of our model accounts well for the dynamics of fatalities, social distancing, consumption, sovereign debt, and spreads in Latin America. We find that because of default risk, the welfare cost of the pandemic is about a third higher than it is in a version of the model with perfect financial markets. We study debt relief programs and find a compelling case for their implementation. These programs deliver large social gains, improving health and economic outcomes for the country at no cost to international lenders or financial institutions.
{"title":"Deadly Debt Crises: COVID-19 in Emerging Markets","authors":"Cristina Arellano, Yan Bai, Gabriel Mihalache","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad058","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Emerging markets have experienced large human and economic costs from coronavirus disease 2019, and their tight fiscal space has limited the support extended to their citizens. We study the impact of an epidemic on economic and health outcomes by integrating epidemiological dynamics into a sovereign default model. The sovereign’s option to default tightens fiscal space and results in an epidemic with limited mitigation and depressed consumption. A quantitative analysis of our model accounts well for the dynamics of fatalities, social distancing, consumption, sovereign debt, and spreads in Latin America. We find that because of default risk, the welfare cost of the pandemic is about a third higher than it is in a version of the model with perfect financial markets. We study debt relief programs and find a compelling case for their implementation. These programs deliver large social gains, improving health and economic outcomes for the country at no cost to international lenders or financial institutions.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134974638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Correction: regarding Article History dates for articles on journal Review of Economic Studies","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad056","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"61 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.8,"publicationDate":"2023-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78741750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract If sectoral trade flows obey structural gravity, countries’ bilateral trade imbalances are the result of macro trade imbalances, “triangular trade”, or pairwise asymmetric trade barriers. Using data for 40 major economies and the Rest of the World, we show that large and pervasive asymmetries in trade barriers are required to account for most of the observed variation in bilateral imbalances. A dynamic quantitative trade model suggests that eliminating these asymmetries would significantly reduce bilateral (but not macro) imbalances and have sizeable impacts on welfare. We provide evidence that the asymmetries we measure are in part related to the policy environment: trade inside the European Single Market appears to be subject to more bilaterally symmetric frictions. Extending the same symmetry to all parts of the global economy would give a large boost to the real incomes of several non-E.U. countries.
{"title":"Bilateral Trade Imbalances","authors":"Alejandro Cuñat, Robert Zymek","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad052","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract If sectoral trade flows obey structural gravity, countries’ bilateral trade imbalances are the result of macro trade imbalances, “triangular trade”, or pairwise asymmetric trade barriers. Using data for 40 major economies and the Rest of the World, we show that large and pervasive asymmetries in trade barriers are required to account for most of the observed variation in bilateral imbalances. A dynamic quantitative trade model suggests that eliminating these asymmetries would significantly reduce bilateral (but not macro) imbalances and have sizeable impacts on welfare. We provide evidence that the asymmetries we measure are in part related to the policy environment: trade inside the European Single Market appears to be subject to more bilaterally symmetric frictions. Extending the same symmetry to all parts of the global economy would give a large boost to the real incomes of several non-E.U. countries.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135960538","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We show that mortgage recourse systems, by discouraging default, magnify the impact of nominal rigidities. They cause deeper and more persistent recessions. This mechanism can account for up to 31% of the recovery gap during the Great Recession between the U.S., mostly a non-recourse economy, and Spain, a recourse economy. General equilibrium effects explain most of the differences between mortgage systems. With recourse, highly indebted homeowners dramatically cut consumption in a crisis, and account for a larger share of the aggregate consumption decline. However, without recourse, mortgages would be more expensive for riskier households, and homeownership rates would be lower.
{"title":"Mortgage Design and Slow Recoveries: The Role of Recourse and Default","authors":"Pedro Gete, Franco Zecchetto","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad055","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We show that mortgage recourse systems, by discouraging default, magnify the impact of nominal rigidities. They cause deeper and more persistent recessions. This mechanism can account for up to 31% of the recovery gap during the Great Recession between the U.S., mostly a non-recourse economy, and Spain, a recourse economy. General equilibrium effects explain most of the differences between mortgage systems. With recourse, highly indebted homeowners dramatically cut consumption in a crisis, and account for a larger share of the aggregate consumption decline. However, without recourse, mortgages would be more expensive for riskier households, and homeownership rates would be lower.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135286826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Many real-life settings of individual choice involve social interactions, causing targeted policies to have spillover effects. This article develops novel empirical tools for analysing demand and welfare effects of policy interventions in binary choice settings with social interactions. Examples include subsidies for health-product adoption and vouchers for attending a high-achieving school. We show that even with fully parametric specifications and unique equilibrium, choice data, that are sufficient for counterfactual demand prediction under interactions, are insufficient for welfare calculations. This is because distinct underlying mechanisms producing the same interaction coefficient can imply different welfare effects and deadweight-loss from a policy intervention. Standard index restrictions imply distribution-free bounds on welfare. We propose ways to identify and consistently estimate the structural parameters and welfare bounds allowing for unobserved group effects that are potentially correlated with observables and are possibly unbounded. We illustrate our results using experimental data on mosquito-net adoption in rural Kenya.
{"title":"Demand and Welfare Analysis in Discrete Choice Models with Social Interactions","authors":"Debopam Bhattacharya, Pascaline Dupas, Shin Kanaya","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad053","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Many real-life settings of individual choice involve social interactions, causing targeted policies to have spillover effects. This article develops novel empirical tools for analysing demand and welfare effects of policy interventions in binary choice settings with social interactions. Examples include subsidies for health-product adoption and vouchers for attending a high-achieving school. We show that even with fully parametric specifications and unique equilibrium, choice data, that are sufficient for counterfactual demand prediction under interactions, are insufficient for welfare calculations. This is because distinct underlying mechanisms producing the same interaction coefficient can imply different welfare effects and deadweight-loss from a policy intervention. Standard index restrictions imply distribution-free bounds on welfare. We propose ways to identify and consistently estimate the structural parameters and welfare bounds allowing for unobserved group effects that are potentially correlated with observables and are possibly unbounded. We illustrate our results using experimental data on mosquito-net adoption in rural Kenya.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135421547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Correction to: Uncertainty Shocks as Second-Moment News Shocks","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad050","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"67 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.8,"publicationDate":"2023-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74487780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Soheil Ghili, Ben Handel, Igal Hendel, Michael D. Whinston
Abstract Reclassification risk is a major concern in health insurance where contracts are typically 1 year in length but health shocks often persist for much longer. While most health systems with private insurers pair short-run contracts with substantial pricing regulations to reduce reclassification risk, long-term contracts with one-sided insurer commitment have significant potential to reduce reclassification risk without the negative side effects of price regulation, such as adverse selection. We theoretically characterize optimal long-term insurance contracts with one-sided commitment, extending the literature in directions necessary for studying health insurance markets. We leverage this characterization to provide a simple algorithm for computing optimal contracts from primitives. We estimate key market fundamentals using data on all under-65 privately insured consumers in Utah. We find that dynamic contracts are very effective at reducing reclassification risk for consumers who arrive at the market in good health, but they are ineffective for consumers who come to the market in bad health, demonstrating that there is a role for the government insurance of pre-market health risks. Individuals with steeply rising income profiles find front-loading costly, and thus relatively prefer ACA-type exchanges. Switching costs enhance, while myopia moderately compromises, the performance of dynamic contracts.
{"title":"Optimal Long-Term Health Insurance Contracts: Characterization, Computation, and Welfare Effects","authors":"Soheil Ghili, Ben Handel, Igal Hendel, Michael D. Whinston","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad054","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Reclassification risk is a major concern in health insurance where contracts are typically 1 year in length but health shocks often persist for much longer. While most health systems with private insurers pair short-run contracts with substantial pricing regulations to reduce reclassification risk, long-term contracts with one-sided insurer commitment have significant potential to reduce reclassification risk without the negative side effects of price regulation, such as adverse selection. We theoretically characterize optimal long-term insurance contracts with one-sided commitment, extending the literature in directions necessary for studying health insurance markets. We leverage this characterization to provide a simple algorithm for computing optimal contracts from primitives. We estimate key market fundamentals using data on all under-65 privately insured consumers in Utah. We find that dynamic contracts are very effective at reducing reclassification risk for consumers who arrive at the market in good health, but they are ineffective for consumers who come to the market in bad health, demonstrating that there is a role for the government insurance of pre-market health risks. Individuals with steeply rising income profiles find front-loading costly, and thus relatively prefer ACA-type exchanges. Switching costs enhance, while myopia moderately compromises, the performance of dynamic contracts.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135473939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Andreas Kettemann, Andreas I. Mueller, Josef Zweimüller
Abstract This article explores the relationship between the duration of a vacancy and the starting wage of a new job, using linked data on vacancies, the posting establishments, and the workers eventually filling the vacancies. The unique combination of large-scale, administrative worker, establishment, and vacancy data is critical for separating establishment- and job-level determinants of vacancy duration from worker-level heterogeneity. Conditional on observables, we find that vacancy duration is negatively correlated with the starting wage and its establishment component, with precisely estimated elasticities of −0.07 and −0.21, respectively. While the negative relationship is qualitatively consistent with search-theoretic models where firms use the wage as a recruiting device, these elasticities are small, suggesting that firms’ wage policies can account only for a small fraction of the variation in vacancy filling across establishments.
{"title":"Vacancy Durations and Entry Wages: Evidence from Linked Vacancy–Employer–Employee Data","authors":"Andreas Kettemann, Andreas I. Mueller, Josef Zweimüller","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad051","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article explores the relationship between the duration of a vacancy and the starting wage of a new job, using linked data on vacancies, the posting establishments, and the workers eventually filling the vacancies. The unique combination of large-scale, administrative worker, establishment, and vacancy data is critical for separating establishment- and job-level determinants of vacancy duration from worker-level heterogeneity. Conditional on observables, we find that vacancy duration is negatively correlated with the starting wage and its establishment component, with precisely estimated elasticities of −0.07 and −0.21, respectively. While the negative relationship is qualitatively consistent with search-theoretic models where firms use the wage as a recruiting device, these elasticities are small, suggesting that firms’ wage policies can account only for a small fraction of the variation in vacancy filling across establishments.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135711523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Correction: Hinterlands, City Formation and Growth: Evidence from the U.S. Westward Expansion","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad049","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135911880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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