Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C-Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences最新文献

In this article I critically evaluate the thesis that DNA is an ontologically distinctive developmental cause. I shall critically analyse different versions of the latter thesis by taking into consideration concrete developmental cases. I shall argue that DNA is neither a developmental determinant nor an ontologically distinctive developmental cause. Instead, I shall argue that mechanistic analysis shows that DNA's causal role in development depends on the higher robustness of the developmental processes in which it exerts its causal capacities. The focus on process and developmental system implies a metaphysical shift: rather than attributing to DNA molecules biochemically unique properties, I suggest that it might be better to think about DNA's causal role in development in terms of the causal capacities that DNA molecules manifest in a rich developmental milieu. I shall also suggest that my position is distinct both from the view advocating the instrumental primacy of DNA-centric biology and developmental constructionism. It is different from the former because it provides a substantial answer to the question of what makes DNA causally central in developmental processes. Finally, I argue that evolutionary considerations pose an important challenge to developmental constructionism.

In recent years there have been several attempts to examine Ethnobiology from an evolutionary perspective. I discuss several potential sources of confusion in applying Evolutionary concepts to Ethnobiology. Ethnobiological discussions of evolution have focused more on changes in human populations, or on human impacts upon plants used by humans for a variety of purposes, than on the processes typically emphasized in discussions by biologists studying evolution. There has been little acknowledgment of how the field of biological evolution is changing in the 21st Century. In this article I focus on recent developments in evolutionary thinking that could be effectively integrated into Ethnobiological concepts. These include: 1) The increased importance of individual organisms in understanding both population dynamics and microevolutionary change (i.e. natural selection). This change in focus creates the potential for incorporating understandings from Indigenous people who recognize a different set of dynamics that govern how both plant and animal populations are regulated, leading to new insights into how conservation practices should be enacted; 2) Niche Construction, which is a 21st century concept that argues that organisms shape their own environments and those of other species. This approach creates a new way of looking at how Natural Selection can act upon a wide range of organisms; and finally, 3) Reticulate Evolution, in which different species exchange genetic material as a result of behavioral or physiological interactions with major evolutionary consequences. These concepts relate strongly to fundamental Indigenous conceptions of ecosystem functioning, including the ideas that All Things are Connected and that All Life Forms are Related. I argue that Ethnobiology and Indigenous Knowledge are strongest in dealing with phenomena linked to behavior and ecology, which are fields being neglected by many contemporary molecular approaches to understanding evolution. Attempts to deal with Conservation in a world subject to climate change would be greatly improved by working closely with Indigenous peoples and incorporating concepts from these traditions into practices on a global scale.

This paper critically engages with Ian Hesketh's (2016) analysis of counterfactual histories of science. According to such analysis, extant counterfactual histories—especially of biology—have a rather conservative flavor, since due to the authors' concern for plausibility, they typically converge on actual science, in the sense that their endpoints coincide with (or are very similar to) those of the corresponding actual scientific developments. As a result, Hesketh argues, not only does the ambition—often proclaimed—to exhibit the centrality of contingency in history of science remain unfulfilled: counterfactual narratives in the history of biology also end up with valuing the past in view of its contribution to the establishment of present-day science. Contrary to this analysis, we contend that an unappreciated merit of counterfactual histories of science converging on actual science lies in the fact that they put present science in a different light, since by being approached from a counterfactual angle, differing from established history, present-day science appears in a new perspective.

Contingency-theorists have put forth differing accounts of evolutionary contingency. The bulk of these accounts abstractly refer to certain causal structures in which an evolutionarily contingent outcome is supposedly embedded. For example, an outcome is evolutionarily contingent if it is at the end of a ‘path-dependent’ or ‘causally dependent’ causal chain. However, this paper argues that many of these proposals fail to include a desideratum – the notion of biological evitability or that evolutionary outcomes could have been otherwise – that for good theoretical reasons ought to be part of an account of evolutionary contingency. Although an inclusion of this desideratum might seem obvious enough, under some existing accounts, an outcome can be contingent yet inevitable all the same. In my diagnosis of this issue, I develop the idea of trajectory propensity to highlight the fact that there are plausible biological scenarios in which causal structures, alone, fail to exhaustively determine the biological evitability of evolutionary forms. In the second half of the paper, I present two additional desiderata of an account of evolutionary contingency and, subsequently, proffer a novel account of evolutionary contingency as non-trivial objective probability, which overcomes the shortcomings of some previous proposals. According to this outcome-based account, contingency claims are probabilistic statements about an evolutionary outcome's objective probability of evolution within a specifically defined modal range: an outcome, O, is evolutionarily contingent in modal range, R, to the degree of objective probability, P (where P is in between 1 and 0).

This paper poses a problem for traditional phylogenetics: The identity of organisms that reproduce through fission can be understood in several different ways. This prompts questions about how to differentiate parent organisms from their offspring, making vertical gene transfer unclear. Differentiating between parents and offspring stems from what I call the identity problem. How the problem is resolved has implications for phylogenetic groupings. If the identity of a particular asexual organism persists through fission, the vertical lineage on a phylogenetic tree will split differently than if the identity of an organism does not survive the fission process.