Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C-Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences最新文献

The concept of wild food does not play a significant role in contemporary nutritional science and it is seldom regarded as a salient feature within standard dietary guidelines. The knowledge systems of wild edible taxa are indeed at risk of disappearing. However, recent scholarship in ethnobotany, field biology, and philosophy demonstrated the crucial role of wild foods for food biodiversity and food security. The knowledge of how to use and consume wild foods is not only a means to deliver high-end culinary offerings, but also a way to foster alternative models of consumption. Our aim in this paper is to provide a conceptual framework for wild foods, which can account for diversified wild food ontologies. In the first section of the paper, we survey the main conception of wild foods provided in the literature, what we call the Nature View. We argue that this view falls short of capturing characteristics that are core to a sound account of wilderness in a culinary sense. In the second part of the paper, we provide the foundation for an improved model of wild food, which can countenance multiple dimensions and degrees connoting wilderness in the culinary world. In the third part of the paper we argue that thanks to a more nuanced ontological analysis, the gradient framework can serve ethnobiologists, philosophers, scientists, and policymakers to represent and negotiate theoretical conflicts on the nature of wild food.

In this contribution we seek to enrich the theoretical and methodological approaches of ethnobiology. The essay takes elements of Amerindian anthropology, classical ethnobiological studies and the freedoms provided by feminist philosophers to open up reflection. The central background of the essay is the method of “controlled equivocation” proposed by Viveiros de Castro (2004). We present a series of five ethnobiological equivocations ranging from the categorical equivocal, going through the subtle equivocal to the strictly ontological ones. The cases occurred in different territories of Argentina, including a case in an academic context. Through the fieldwork cases, we give an account of the origin of equivocations, the context for their emergence, which are the disciplinary nuances that cause them and even some academics’ preconceptions. To inhabit the equivocation allows opening the possibilities of coexistence among people –and their respective worlds–, especially if these people are in different power positions. We propose the method of controlled equivocation as a theoretical-discursive tool, which permits us to rethink the current concepts of ethnobiology. Thus, we want to broaden the current definition of ethnobiology understood as a dialogue from different scientific points of view.

Ethnobiology has emerged as an important transdisciplinary field that addresses the epistemic and political value of Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) through an integration of biological and social sciences. In North and Latin America, ethnobiology encompasses a diversity of approaches towards TEK but there is no consensus on how TEK relates to biological and anthropological research. The aim of this article is to develop an account that helps to map integration strategies in ethnobiological approaches in North and Latin America that jointly embrace biology, anthropology, and TEK. Borrowing the notion of ‘styles of reasoning’ and the framework of integrative pluralism from philosophy of science, we argue that ethnobiologists across the Americas have developed heterogeneous research programs. At the same time, we argue that these styles of reasoning tend to converge in prioritizing biological perspectives and are often limited in their understandings of cultural practices due to a lack of substantive ethnographic methods.

Approaching mental health on a global scale with particular reference to low- and mid-income countries raises issues concerning the disregard of the local context and values and the imposition of values characteristic of the Global North. Seeking a philosophical viewpoint to surmount these problems, the present paper argues for a value-laden framework for psychiatry with the specific incorporation of value pluralism, particularly in relation to the Global South context, while also emphasizing personal values such as the choice of treatment. In sketching out this framework, the paper aims to overcome the clash between universalism and relativism about psychiatric categories by focusing on how overlaps between cultures can contribute to ontology-building. A case study analyzing ethnopsychiatric research in the context of South India will illustrate the proposed view, while also pointing out avenues for further research on the causal efficacy of local shared beliefs about mental disorder. If approaches across different traditions and theoretical frames are shown to work in treating similar ailments, causal connections appear to cut across the different ontologies. Ethnopsychiatry would play a central role in such research, namely in disclosing the variables and mechanisms at work within the local approaches.

A central question for immunology is: what does the immune system recognize and according to which principles does this kind of recognition work? Immunology has been dominated by the idea of recognizing molecular structures and triggering an appropriate immune response when facing non-self or danger. Recently, characterizations in terms of function have turned out to be more conserved and explanatory in microbiota research than taxonomic composition for understanding microbiota-host interactions. Starting from a conceptual analysis of the notions of structure and function, I raise the title question whether it is possible for the immune system to recognize microbial functions. I argue that this is indeed the case, making the claim that some function-associated molecular patterns are not indicative of the presence of certain taxa (‘‘who is there’’) but of biochemical activities and effects (‘‘what is going on’’). In addition, I discuss case studies which show that there are immunological sensors that can directly detect microbial activities, irrespective of their specific structural manifestation. At the same time, the discussed account puts the causal role notions of function on a more realist and objective basis.

We introduce the virtual special issue on content in signalling systems. The issue explores the uses and limits of ideas from evolutionary game theory and information theory for explaining the content of biological signals. We explain the basic idea of the Lewis-Skyrms sender-receiver framework, and we highlight three key themes of the issue: (i) the challenge of accounting for deception, misinformation and false content, (ii) the relevance of partial or total common interest to the evolution of meaningful signals, and (iii) how the sender-receiver framework relates to teleosemantics.

In the late 19th century, physiologists such as David Ferrier, Eduard Hitzig, and Hermann Munk argued that cerebral brain functions are localized in discrete structures. By the early 20th century, this became the dominant position. However, another prominent physiologist, Friedrich Goltz, rejected theories of cerebral localization and argued against these physiologists until his death in 1902. I argue in this paper that previous historical accounts have failed to comprehend why Goltz rejected cerebral localization. I show that Goltz adhered to a falsificationist methodology, and I reconstruct how he designed his experiments and weighted different kinds of evidence. I then draw on the exploratory experimentation literature from recent philosophy of science to trace one root of the debate to differences in how the German localizers designed their experiments and reasoned about evidence. While Goltz designed his experiments to test hypotheses about the functions of predetermined cerebral structures, the localizers explored new functions and structures in the process of constructing new theories. I argue that the localizers relied on untested background conjectures to justify their inferences about functional organization. These background conjectures collapsed a distinction between phenomena they produced direct evidence for (localized symptoms) and what they reached conclusions about (localized functions). When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences.