Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C-Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences最新文献

It is commonly claimed that the folk category of emotion does not constitute a natural kind, due to the significant compositional differences between its members, especially basic and complex emotions. Arguably, however, this conclusion stems from the dualistic philosophical anthropology underlying the discussion, which presupposes a metaphysical “split” between mind and body. This is the case irrespective of whether a traditional or biological (homology-based) approach to natural kinds is adopted. Since the origins of this increasingly disputed anthropology can ultimately be traced to Descartes' substance dualism, its adverse effects can likewise be addressed using a contemporary theory of emotion developed from Spinoza, one of Descartes' earliest critics on this issue. Furthermore, a Spinozistic view of emotion accords with the recent shift to a hierarchical approach to homology, which recognises that the evolutionary lineage of complex biological units should be traced via relational qualities rather than physical characteristics. Both the Spinozistic approach to emotion and the hierarchical approach to homology show that the compositional variation in the folk category of emotion does not necessarily preclude it from constituting a natural kind.

"Signals" are a conceptual apparatus in many scientific disciplines. Biologists inquire about the evolution of signals, economists talk about the signaling function of purchases and prices, and philosophers discuss the conditions under which signals acquire meaning. However, less attention has been paid to what is a signal. Most existing accounts are teleological in some way. This paper provides a definition of signals that avoids reference to form or purpose. Along the way we introduce novel notions of "information revealing" and "information concealing" moves in games. In the end, our account offers an alternative to teleological accounts of communication.

A wide variety of theories explain how social factors influence and shape knowledges. Other theories describe how materialism and social elements coalesce. Largely still missing, however, is an argument that substantially addresses both culture and materiality. Using examples from four ethnographic case studies of culturally-distinct practitioners (two groups of Indigenous harvesters, a group of contaminant ecologists and a group of fisheries biologists) creating knowledge about the same topic (clams), I develop an explanation of how and why (useful) knowledge pluralisms exist. Using a process-based ontology for theorizing about materialism, I explore how conceptual frameworks and knowledge-making practices become intertwined with materiality. I argue that this intertwining allows for the creation of knowledge while simultaneously resulting in potentially differing knowledges about the same subject.

Ethnobotanical research provides ample justification for comparing diverse biological nomenclatures and exploring ways that retain alternative naming practices. However, how (and whether) comparison of nomenclatures is possible remains a subject of discussion. The comparison of diverse nomenclatural practices introduces a suite of epistemic and ontological difficulties and considerations. Different nomenclatures may depend on whether the communities using them rely on formalized naming conventions; cultural or spiritual valuations; or worldviews. Because of this, some argue that the different naming practices may not be comparable if the ontological commitments employed differ. Comparisons between different nomenclatures cannot assume that either the naming practices or the object to which these names are intended to apply identifies some universally agreed upon object of interest. Investigating this suite of philosophical problems, I explore the role grey nomenclatures play in classification. ‘Grey nomenclatures’ are defined as those that employ names that are either intentionally or accidently non-Linnaean. The classification of the lichen thallus (a symbiont) has been classified outside the Linnaean system by botanists relying on the International Code of Nomenclature for algae, fungi, and plants (ICN). But, I argue, the use of grey names is not isolated and does not occur exclusively within institutionalized naming practices. I suggest, ‘grey names’ also aptly describe nomenclatures employed by indigenous communities such as the Samí of Northern Finmark, the Sherpa of Nepal, and the Okanagan First Nations. I pay particular attention to how naming practices are employed in these communities; what ontological commitments they hold; for what purposes are these names used; and what anchors the community's nomenclatural practices. Exploring the history of lichen naming and early ethnolichenological research, I then investigate the stakes that must be considered for any attempt to preserve, retain, integrate, or compare the knowledge contained in both academically formalized grey names and indigenous nomenclatures in a way that preserves their source-specific informational content.

Intercultural science education requires negotiations between knowledge systems and of tensions between them. Building on ethnographic fieldwork and educational interventions in two farming communities in the Northeast of Brazil, we explore the potential of science education to mediate between traditional and academic knowledge. While traditional knowledge shapes agricultural practices and interactions with the environment in the villages of Coração de Maria and Retiro, academic knowledge is emphasized in biology education. On the basis of philosophical debates about “partial overlaps” between epistemologies, ontologies and value systems, we analyze relations between traditional and academic ecological knowledge in these communities and argue that they can inform reflective practices in intercultural dialogue. By investigating biology education as a “trading zone” between knowledge systems, we analyze how partial overlaps become negotiated in educational practices in rural Brazil and provide the basis for educational interventions that foster intercultural dialogue.

Safety assessment of technologies and interventions is often underdetermined by evidence. For example, scientists have collected evidence concerning genetically modified plants for decades. This evidence was used to ground opposing safety protocols for “stacked genetically modified” plants, in which two or more genetically modified plants are combined. Evidence based policy would thus be rendered more effective by an approach that accounts for underdetermination. Douglas (2012) proposes an explanatory approach, based on the criteria of transparency, empirical competence, internal consistency of explanations, and predictive potency. However, sometimes multiple explanations can satisfy these criteria. We propose an additional criterion based on converse abduction, where explanations are selected on the basis of ontological background assumptions as well as by evidence. We then apply our proposed scheme to the case of the regulation of stacked genetically modified plants. We discuss the implications and suggest follow-up work concerning the generalizability of the approach.