Pub Date : 2025-12-17DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00712-x
Patrick M. Duerr, Finnur Dellsén
{"title":"Correction to: Scientific progress and modern cosmology","authors":"Patrick M. Duerr, Finnur Dellsén","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00712-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00712-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145770645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-12DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00704-x
Kristina Rolin
I examine critically a received view of expert trustworthiness and the value-free ideal of science. According to this view, to be epistemically trustworthy in the eyes of citizens, scientific experts should aim to be as neutral as possible with respect to moral and social values when they provide research-based knowledge and advice to different publics. This view is thought to be feasible and desirable for both epistemic and moral/political reasons. I challenge this view by arguing against three recent attempts to defend the legacy of the value-free ideal of science. An analysis of epistemic trustworthiness helps philosophers understand why moral and social values should guide scientific experts’ knowledge-sharing activities. It also helps understand which moral and social values are needed to build and maintain expert trustworthiness. However, it does not amount to a full-service account of the proper roles of non-epistemic values in science. The analysis offers merely a partial approach to the value management question.
{"title":"Expert trustworthiness and the value-free ideal of science","authors":"Kristina Rolin","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00704-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00704-x","url":null,"abstract":"I examine critically a received view of expert trustworthiness and the value-free ideal of science. According to this view, to be epistemically trustworthy in the eyes of citizens, scientific experts should aim to be as neutral as possible with respect to moral and social values when they provide research-based knowledge and advice to different publics. This view is thought to be feasible and desirable for both epistemic and moral/political reasons. I challenge this view by arguing against three recent attempts to defend the legacy of the value-free ideal of science. An analysis of epistemic trustworthiness helps philosophers understand why moral and social values should guide scientific experts’ knowledge-sharing activities. It also helps understand which moral and social values are needed to build and maintain expert trustworthiness. However, it does not amount to a full-service account of the proper roles of non-epistemic values in science. The analysis offers merely a partial approach to the value management question.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"162 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145753233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-11DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00705-w
Philippe van Basshuysen
Performativity is the capacity of scientific representations (such as models, theories, predictions, or classifications) to alter the phenomena they are supposed to represent. Because one and the same representation may alter its target a lot, a little, or not at all, I argue that we should conceptualize performativity as a function of a representation and its performative power , which depends on its reach, acceptance, and its relevance to people. Using this framework, I then argue for a re-evaluation of performativity. Because performative effects can impair scientists’ ability to model, classify, explain, or predict (e.g. by steering outcomes away from those predicted) and they raise concerns about the legitimacy of science influencing the social world, performativity is often viewed as a threat to science. In contrast, I argue that we shouldn’t be worried about performativity as such, but rather, about concentrated performative power , that is, that the representations issued by individual scientists, or groups of scientists with uniform views, gain a power that is not in line with their epistemic credentials. To eradicate such power concentrations and to secure science’s proper role in a democratic society, we may sometimes hope for more, rather than fewer, performative effects.
{"title":"Performative power in science","authors":"Philippe van Basshuysen","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00705-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00705-w","url":null,"abstract":"Performativity is the capacity of scientific representations (such as models, theories, predictions, or classifications) to alter the phenomena they are supposed to represent. Because one and the same representation may alter its target a lot, a little, or not at all, I argue that we should conceptualize performativity as a function of a representation and its <jats:italic>performative power</jats:italic> , which depends on its reach, acceptance, and its relevance to people. Using this framework, I then argue for a re-evaluation of performativity. Because performative effects can impair scientists’ ability to model, classify, explain, or predict (e.g. by steering outcomes away from those predicted) and they raise concerns about the legitimacy of science influencing the social world, performativity is often viewed as a threat to science. In contrast, I argue that we shouldn’t be worried about performativity as such, but rather, about <jats:italic>concentrated performative power</jats:italic> , that is, that the representations issued by individual scientists, or groups of scientists with uniform views, gain a power that is not in line with their epistemic credentials. To eradicate such power concentrations and to secure science’s proper role in a democratic society, we may sometimes hope for more, rather than fewer, performative effects.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"144 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145718185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Justifying the epistemic authority of science in liberal democracy","authors":"Somogy Varga, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Klemens Kappel","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00703-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00703-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145703862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00695-9
Karl Heuer, José Antonio Pérez-Escobar, Deniz Sarikaya
This article presents a toy model and a case study on how a mathematical notion gains acceptance over competing alternatives. We argue that the main criteria is success, in the sense of: (a) the new notion fitting the “mathematical landscape” and (b) it empowering mathematicians to prove publishable results in the modern academic landscape. Both criteria go hand in hand. We identify one particular way that both things can be established, namely by creating counterparts of existing structures in another area of mathematics, i.e. by making sure that analogical results hold. Unlike in previous accounts of analogical reasoning, we hold that, sometimes, this process involves intentional creation of parallelisms between domains rather than mere discovery. We show this by discussing the case of Hamiltonicity results for infinite graphs. We argue that a prominent aim of this new notion is to shape the target domain so that knowledge can be transferred from the source domain. In our case study this notion enables knowledge transfer from finite combinatorics to infinite combinatorics in graph theory. We study how the first suggested notion for the counterpart of cycle, namely the notion of the double ray, was replaced by a topologically motivated approach to better fit the general mathematical landscape and thus aiding with knowledge transfer across fields.
{"title":"The making of a mathematical notion by analogy: the case of Hamiltonicity of (locally finite) infinite graphs","authors":"Karl Heuer, José Antonio Pérez-Escobar, Deniz Sarikaya","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00695-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00695-9","url":null,"abstract":"This article presents a toy model and a case study on how a mathematical notion gains acceptance over competing alternatives. We argue that the main criteria is success, in the sense of: (a) the new notion fitting the “mathematical landscape” and (b) it empowering mathematicians to prove publishable results in the modern academic landscape. Both criteria go hand in hand. We identify one particular way that both things can be established, namely by creating counterparts of existing structures in another area of mathematics, i.e. by making sure that analogical results hold. Unlike in previous accounts of analogical reasoning, we hold that, sometimes, this process involves intentional creation of parallelisms between domains rather than mere discovery. We show this by discussing the case of Hamiltonicity results for infinite graphs. We argue that a prominent aim of this new notion is to shape the target domain so that knowledge can be transferred from the source domain. In our case study this notion enables knowledge transfer from finite combinatorics to infinite combinatorics in graph theory. We study how the first suggested notion for the counterpart of cycle, namely the notion of the double ray, was replaced by a topologically motivated approach to better fit the general mathematical landscape and thus aiding with knowledge transfer across fields.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145651530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00698-6
Jamie Shaw
{"title":"Funding big science: managing diversity, social responsibility, and limited resources","authors":"Jamie Shaw","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00698-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00698-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145651555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-26DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00686-w
Patrick M. Duerr, Finnur Dellsén
The paper examines the nature of scientific progress through the lens of the history of modern cosmology (i.e. from Einstein’s, 1917 static universe to the present-day Standard (ΛCDM) model of cosmology). We distil three novel lessons, germane to the debate between the two main accounts of scientific progress (the noetic and the epistemic one, respectively). First, it’s difficult to sharply locate—to precisely pinpoint the locus of—the epistemic content of scientific knowledge. Cosmology displays stark epistemic holism: epistemic content and evidence are typically inextricably distributed over a wider “web of beliefs”. Secondly, cosmologists employ a variety of justificatory practices and modes of reasoning. More often than not, they fall short of the fastidious standards of traditional epistemology. Thirdly, cosmological claims typically defy easy and unambiguous characterisation in terms of truth. These three lessons are shown to pose grave challenges to the epistemic account of scientific progress (on which progress consists in the accumulation of knowledge). By contrast, the rivalling noetic account (which characterises progress in terms of improved understanding) can naturally accommodate those lessons.
{"title":"Full title: “Scientific progress and modern cosmology”","authors":"Patrick M. Duerr, Finnur Dellsén","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00686-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00686-w","url":null,"abstract":"The paper examines the nature of scientific progress through the lens of the history of modern cosmology (i.e. from Einstein’s, 1917 static universe to the present-day Standard (ΛCDM) model of cosmology). We distil three novel lessons, germane to the debate between the two main accounts of scientific progress (the noetic and the epistemic one, respectively). First, it’s difficult to sharply locate—to precisely pinpoint the locus of—the epistemic content of scientific knowledge. Cosmology displays stark epistemic holism: epistemic content and evidence are typically inextricably distributed over a wider “web of beliefs”. Secondly, cosmologists employ a variety of justificatory practices and modes of reasoning. More often than not, they fall short of the fastidious standards of traditional epistemology. Thirdly, cosmological claims typically defy easy and unambiguous characterisation in terms of truth. These three lessons are shown to pose grave challenges to the epistemic account of scientific progress (on which progress consists in the accumulation of knowledge). By contrast, the rivalling noetic account (which characterises progress in terms of improved understanding) can naturally accommodate those lessons.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145599250","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-25DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00701-0
Marina DiMarco
{"title":"Sex as a biological variable and the pursuitworthiness of exploratory inquiry","authors":"Marina DiMarco","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00701-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00701-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"189 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145593575","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-21DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00696-8
Michael Ridley
{"title":"Many retrocausal worlds: A foundation for quantum probability","authors":"Michael Ridley","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00696-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00696-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"187 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145575659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-08DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00681-1
Mohammad Maarefi
{"title":"Metaphysical grounding and mathematical explanation","authors":"Mohammad Maarefi","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00681-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00681-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145472977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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