Pub Date : 2025-11-07DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00685-x
Merel Talbi, Roosmarijn van Woerden
Oftentimes, interdisciplinary research is heralded as an effective way to approach complex problems from a diverse range of disciplinary perspectives. However, many scholars of interdisciplinary research agree that doing interdisciplinary work is difficult and prone to failure. In this paper, we argue that this difficulty is better understood in light of a tension between the aim of interdisciplinary integration on the one hand, and the goal of normative epistemic pluralism on the other. This tension, which we believe takes place at the above-disciplines level of interdisciplinary research teams and projects, leads to difficulties in interdisciplinary research in practice. Additionally, we argue that the conflicts on the local, practical level where disciplinary researchers work together in multidisciplinary research teams - which we term the between-disciplines level - are caused by researchers insufficiently acknowledging the differences in (non-)fundamental epistemic goods that vary per academic discipline. In teams that do interdisciplinary research, it can occur that disciplines are brought together that have very different underlying epistemic presuppositions (or epistemic systems) that value different forms of research, methodologies and aims. We illustrate the difficulties of interdisciplinary research with the case study of the Mill Town Example, an interdisciplinary project that was deemed a failure by its participants, in order to sketch what epistemological conflicts look like in practice on the between-disciplines level. In order to address differences in how disciplinary researchers value (non-)fundamental epistemic goods, we suggest various forms of epistemic work that offer strategies to make epistemological conflicts manageable in interdisciplinary research.
{"title":"Reflections on interdisciplinary research in practice: Epistemological conflicts","authors":"Merel Talbi, Roosmarijn van Woerden","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00685-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00685-x","url":null,"abstract":"Oftentimes, interdisciplinary research is heralded as an effective way to approach complex problems from a diverse range of disciplinary perspectives. However, many scholars of interdisciplinary research agree that doing interdisciplinary work is difficult and prone to failure. In this paper, we argue that this difficulty is better understood in light of a tension between the aim of interdisciplinary integration on the one hand, and the goal of normative epistemic pluralism on the other. This tension, which we believe takes place at the above-disciplines level of interdisciplinary research teams and projects, leads to difficulties in interdisciplinary research in practice. Additionally, we argue that the conflicts on the local, practical level where disciplinary researchers work together in multidisciplinary research teams - which we term the between-disciplines level - are caused by researchers insufficiently acknowledging the differences in (non-)fundamental epistemic goods that vary per academic discipline. In teams that do interdisciplinary research, it can occur that disciplines are brought together that have very different underlying epistemic presuppositions (or epistemic systems) that value different forms of research, methodologies and aims. We illustrate the difficulties of interdisciplinary research with the case study of the Mill Town Example, an interdisciplinary project that was deemed a failure by its participants, in order to sketch what epistemological conflicts look like in practice on the between-disciplines level. In order to address differences in how disciplinary researchers value (non-)fundamental epistemic goods, we suggest various forms of epistemic work that offer strategies to make epistemological conflicts manageable in interdisciplinary research.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"103 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145473009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-07DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00687-9
Sarwar Ahmed
For various reasons, it has become common wisdom in science that there exists a principled epistemic distinction between direct and indirect observation. In this paper, I present a twofold argument. First, I argue against such a principled epistemic distinction. Second, I highlight a pervasive incongruence between the methodological and epistemological distinctions between direct and indirect observations. My arguments revolve around the idea that it is one thing to make a methodological distinction between observations and another to ascribe epistemic significance to them. I begin by unfolding the historical and philosophical foundations of the distinction, identifying three tenets that have served to sustain the distinction to the present day. I then provide a detailed analysis of two recent philosophical efforts to preserve the epistemic distinction in astrophysics and specific areas of astrophysics, ultimately suggesting that these approaches face significant challenges.
{"title":"The epistemological status of the direct and indirect observation distinction","authors":"Sarwar Ahmed","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00687-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00687-9","url":null,"abstract":"For various reasons, it has become common wisdom in science that there exists a principled epistemic distinction between direct and indirect observation. In this paper, I present a twofold argument. First, I argue against such a principled epistemic distinction. Second, I highlight a pervasive incongruence between the methodological and epistemological distinctions between direct and indirect observations. My arguments revolve around the idea that it is one thing to make a methodological distinction between observations and another to ascribe epistemic significance to them. I begin by unfolding the historical and philosophical foundations of the distinction, identifying three tenets that have served to sustain the distinction to the present day. I then provide a detailed analysis of two recent philosophical efforts to preserve the epistemic distinction in astrophysics and specific areas of astrophysics, ultimately suggesting that these approaches face significant challenges.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"54 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145472964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-07DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00700-1
Marco Tamborini
{"title":"Modeling practice and design principles in paleoinspired robotics: why deep time matters","authors":"Marco Tamborini","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00700-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00700-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145472989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-05DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00691-z
Nevia Dolcini, Bernard A. J. Jap, Chan Wa Kun, Stephen Politzer-Ahles
{"title":"The pursuitworthiness of experiments in neurolinguistics","authors":"Nevia Dolcini, Bernard A. J. Jap, Chan Wa Kun, Stephen Politzer-Ahles","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00691-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00691-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145441159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-03DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00694-w
Francesco Nappo, Nicolò Cangiotti
This paper defends an epistemology for terrestrial black hole simulations based on Hesse’s theory of material analogy in science. We outline the main verdicts and recommendations of this approach, arguing that they not only fit the experimental practice but are also more credible than those supported by competing proposals. Our analysis questions the role of so-called ‘universality results’ in establishing an evidential function for current experiments, while also escaping the conclusion that we learn nothing about black holes from simulating them.
{"title":"What’s so special about black hole simulations?","authors":"Francesco Nappo, Nicolò Cangiotti","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00694-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00694-w","url":null,"abstract":"This paper defends an epistemology for terrestrial black hole simulations based on Hesse’s theory of material analogy in science. We outline the main verdicts and recommendations of this approach, arguing that they not only fit the experimental practice but are also more credible than those supported by competing proposals. Our analysis questions the role of so-called ‘universality results’ in establishing an evidential function for current experiments, while also escaping the conclusion that we learn nothing about black holes from simulating them.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"156 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145427532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-03DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00690-0
Joel Katzav
Recent work on the epistemology of climate science includes arguments that are against probabilistic representations of uncertainty about climate and for possibilistic ones as well as some development and use of the latter. I reinstate these arguments, partly by rebutting Corey Dethier’s recent challenge to them and partly by arguing that they remain effective against recent improvements to probabilistic representations. Recognising, however, that the case for possibilistic representations can be undermined by problematic interpretations of epistemic possibilities, I set out criteria of adequacy for such interpretations in the climate context while arguing for a preferred interpretation. I criticise the appropriateness of standard interpretations, according to which a proposition is epistemically possible if and only if it is not recognised to be excluded by what is known, as well as some other prominent non-probabilistic interpretations. So too, I criticise interpretations of epistemic possibilities in terms of upper probabilities. I conclude that an interpretation of epistemic possibilities as possibilities that are consistent with knowledge that approximates the basic way things are is preferable to the other available interpretations.
{"title":"Arguing for and interpreting epistemic possibilities in climate science","authors":"Joel Katzav","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00690-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00690-0","url":null,"abstract":"Recent work on the epistemology of climate science includes arguments that are against probabilistic representations of uncertainty about climate and for possibilistic ones as well as some development and use of the latter. I reinstate these arguments, partly by rebutting Corey Dethier’s recent challenge to them and partly by arguing that they remain effective against recent improvements to probabilistic representations. Recognising, however, that the case for possibilistic representations can be undermined by problematic interpretations of epistemic possibilities, I set out criteria of adequacy for such interpretations in the climate context while arguing for a preferred interpretation. I criticise the appropriateness of standard interpretations, according to which a proposition is epistemically possible if and only if it is not recognised to be excluded by what is known, as well as some other prominent non-probabilistic interpretations. So too, I criticise interpretations of epistemic possibilities in terms of upper probabilities. I conclude that an interpretation of epistemic possibilities as possibilities that are consistent with knowledge that approximates the basic way things are is preferable to the other available interpretations.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145427604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-03DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00702-z
Selene Arfini, Matteo Costa
{"title":"Correction to: What kind of explanations can serendipity provide?","authors":"Selene Arfini, Matteo Costa","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00702-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00702-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"66 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145427738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-03DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00684-y
Sabina Leonelli, Rose Trappes
This paper examines the environments in which researchers operate in applied fields such as agricultural and phytosanitary science, where transdisciplinary interactions are the norm. In contrast to understandings of scientific research in terms of distinct traditions, methods and areas of research, we argue that transdisciplinary researchers operate in a highly dynamic, multi-sited and distributed research landscape, which we call multiplex research environment. As we illustrate with two case studies of crop-related research in Ghana and Italy, multiplex research environments are neither consistent nor easy to navigate, due to the presence of diverse, divergent, and dynamic commitments and demands. Individual researchers thus need to continuously negotiate tensions for knowledge to be successfully developed, while also fostering the ability to leverage unexpected exchanges or the absence of certain forms of collaborations towards fruitful forms of discovery.
{"title":"Research in the multiplex: navigating tensions and opportunities in transdisciplinary environments","authors":"Sabina Leonelli, Rose Trappes","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00684-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00684-y","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the environments in which researchers operate in applied fields such as agricultural and phytosanitary science, where transdisciplinary interactions are the norm. In contrast to understandings of scientific research in terms of distinct traditions, methods and areas of research, we argue that transdisciplinary researchers operate in a highly dynamic, multi-sited and distributed research landscape, which we call multiplex research environment. As we illustrate with two case studies of crop-related research in Ghana and Italy, multiplex research environments are neither consistent nor easy to navigate, due to the presence of diverse, divergent, and dynamic commitments and demands. Individual researchers thus need to continuously negotiate tensions for knowledge to be successfully developed, while also fostering the ability to leverage unexpected exchanges or the absence of certain forms of collaborations towards fruitful forms of discovery.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"127 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145427740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-03DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00699-5
Johannes Nyström
Colin Howson (2000) claims that the no miracles argument in favor of a realist interpretation of a scientific theory falls prey to the base rate fallacy and is therefore invalid on logical grounds. In response, Dawid and Hartmann (2018) claim that Howson only reconstructs a limited part of the argument. They argue that a more complete reconstruction of the no miracles argument takes into account the success frequency of a wider spectrum of scientific theory building, and therefore avoids the base rate fallacy. In a critical response to Dawid and Hartmann, Boge (2020) presents two challenges to their approach, both of which are designed to provide reasons for skepticism about treating observed success frequencies in science as connected to the relevant base rates. In this paper, I argue that Boge’s challenges are not effective.
{"title":"How to estimate the success chance of a scientific theory? On the no miracles argument and the base rate fallacy","authors":"Johannes Nyström","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00699-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00699-5","url":null,"abstract":"Colin Howson (2000) claims that the no miracles argument in favor of a realist interpretation of a scientific theory falls prey to the base rate fallacy and is therefore invalid on logical grounds. In response, Dawid and Hartmann (2018) claim that Howson only reconstructs a limited part of the argument. They argue that a more complete reconstruction of the no miracles argument takes into account the success frequency of a wider spectrum of scientific theory building, and therefore avoids the base rate fallacy. In a critical response to Dawid and Hartmann, Boge (2020) presents two challenges to their approach, both of which are designed to provide reasons for skepticism about treating observed success frequencies in science as connected to the relevant base rates. In this paper, I argue that Boge’s challenges are not effective.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"293 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145427537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-03DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00678-w
Simon Beyne
{"title":"The multiple determination strategy to solve the dark matter problem","authors":"Simon Beyne","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00678-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00678-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"152 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145427737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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