Pub Date : 2023-10-17DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00538-3
Marta C. Couto, Saptarshi Pal
{"title":"Correction: Introspection Dynamics in Asymmetric Multiplayer Games","authors":"Marta C. Couto, Saptarshi Pal","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00538-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00538-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"158 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135994842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-04DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00532-9
Charles F. Mason
{"title":"Do Small Players Undermine Cooperation in Asymmetric Games?","authors":"Charles F. Mason","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00532-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00532-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135590734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-27DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00528-5
Frederick van der Ploeg
Abstract Ngo Van Long’s classic paper on the risk of expropriation of natural resources published in a 1975 issue of the Journal of Economic Theory was an instant classic, which spawned a huge literature. Here I pay tribute to this wonderful brilliant yet modest scholar by briefly reviewing his contribution and then sketching how his insights can be used to analyse dynamic conflict over natural resources both as expropriation game and as a differential game on which Long has published extensively too. We discuss three results. First, if an incumbent faces a threat of a rival faction, extraction is more voracious if the factions do not share rents equally. Second, never-ending political conflict cycles are more inefficient if constitutional cohesiveness or rent sharing is strong and political instability is high. Third, resource wars are more intense if rent sharing is weak, reserves of resources are high, the wage is low, and elections occur less frequently.
Ngo Van Long在1975年出版的《经济理论杂志》(Journal of Economic Theory)上发表的关于自然资源被征用风险的经典论文立即成为经典，并催生了大量文献。在此，我向这位杰出而谦逊的学者致敬，简要回顾他的贡献，然后概述如何将他的见解用于分析自然资源的动态冲突，既可以作为征用博弈，也可以作为差异博弈，朗也就此发表了大量文章。我们讨论三个结果。首先，如果在位者面临竞争派系的威胁，如果派系不能平等地分享租金，那么抽取就会更加贪婪。其次，如果宪法凝聚力或租金分摊较强，政治不稳定程度较高，那么永无止境的政治冲突周期效率会更高。第三，如果租金共享弱、资源储备高、工资低、选举发生频率低，资源战争就会更激烈。
{"title":"Benefits of Rent Sharing in Dynamic Resource Games","authors":"Frederick van der Ploeg","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00528-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00528-5","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Ngo Van Long’s classic paper on the risk of expropriation of natural resources published in a 1975 issue of the Journal of Economic Theory was an instant classic, which spawned a huge literature. Here I pay tribute to this wonderful brilliant yet modest scholar by briefly reviewing his contribution and then sketching how his insights can be used to analyse dynamic conflict over natural resources both as expropriation game and as a differential game on which Long has published extensively too. We discuss three results. First, if an incumbent faces a threat of a rival faction, extraction is more voracious if the factions do not share rents equally. Second, never-ending political conflict cycles are more inefficient if constitutional cohesiveness or rent sharing is strong and political instability is high. Third, resource wars are more intense if rent sharing is weak, reserves of resources are high, the wage is low, and elections occur less frequently.","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135535991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-25DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00531-w
Vartika Singh, Veeraruna Kavitha
{"title":"Stochastic Vaccination Game Among Influencers, Leader and Public","authors":"Vartika Singh, Veeraruna Kavitha","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00531-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00531-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135814803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-25DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00517-8
Luca Colombo, Paola Labrecciosa
{"title":"Resource Mobility and Market Performance","authors":"Luca Colombo, Paola Labrecciosa","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00517-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00517-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135815108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-25DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00526-7
Didier Laussel
{"title":"Sequential Mergers and Delayed Monopolization in Triopoly","authors":"Didier Laussel","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00526-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00526-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"109 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135815282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-16DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00530-x
Vartika Singh, Veeraruna Kavitha
{"title":"Partial Information Games and Competitive Advertising","authors":"Vartika Singh, Veeraruna Kavitha","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00530-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00530-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135306072","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-16DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00527-6
Christos Koulovatianos
{"title":"Rational Noncooperative Strategic Exploitation of Species in a Predator–Prey Ecosystem with Random Disturbances","authors":"Christos Koulovatianos","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00527-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00527-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"2012 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135306543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-15DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00525-8
Marta C. Couto, Saptarshi Pal
Abstract Evolutionary game theory and models of learning provide powerful frameworks to describe strategic decision-making in social interactions. In the simplest case, these models describe games among two identical players. However, many interactions in everyday life are more complex. They involve more than two players who may differ in their available actions and in their incentives to choose each action. Such interactions can be captured by asymmetric multiplayer games. Recently, introspection dynamics has been introduced to explore such asymmetric games. According to this dynamics, at each time step players compare their current strategy to an alternative strategy. If the alternative strategy results in a payoff advantage, it is more likely adopted. This model provides a simple way to compute the players’ long-run probability of adopting each of their strategies. In this paper, we extend some of the previous results of introspection dynamics for 2-player asymmetric games to games with arbitrarily many players. First, we derive a formula that allows us to numerically compute the stationary distribution of introspection dynamics for any multiplayer asymmetric game. Second, we obtain explicit expressions of the stationary distribution for two special cases. These cases are additive games (where the payoff difference that a player gains by unilaterally switching to a different action is independent of the actions of their co-players), and symmetric multiplayer games with two strategies. To illustrate our results, we revisit several classical games such as the public goods game.
{"title":"Introspection Dynamics in Asymmetric Multiplayer Games","authors":"Marta C. Couto, Saptarshi Pal","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00525-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00525-8","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Evolutionary game theory and models of learning provide powerful frameworks to describe strategic decision-making in social interactions. In the simplest case, these models describe games among two identical players. However, many interactions in everyday life are more complex. They involve more than two players who may differ in their available actions and in their incentives to choose each action. Such interactions can be captured by asymmetric multiplayer games. Recently, introspection dynamics has been introduced to explore such asymmetric games. According to this dynamics, at each time step players compare their current strategy to an alternative strategy. If the alternative strategy results in a payoff advantage, it is more likely adopted. This model provides a simple way to compute the players’ long-run probability of adopting each of their strategies. In this paper, we extend some of the previous results of introspection dynamics for 2-player asymmetric games to games with arbitrarily many players. First, we derive a formula that allows us to numerically compute the stationary distribution of introspection dynamics for any multiplayer asymmetric game. Second, we obtain explicit expressions of the stationary distribution for two special cases. These cases are additive games (where the payoff difference that a player gains by unilaterally switching to a different action is independent of the actions of their co-players), and symmetric multiplayer games with two strategies. To illustrate our results, we revisit several classical games such as the public goods game.","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"239 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135395100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Strategic Licensing Model Choice with Network Effects in a Dynamic Duopoly","authors":"Fei Yan, Hong-Zhuan Chen, Sahin Telli, Zhi-Chao Zhang","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00516-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00516-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134910496","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：