Pub Date : 2023-09-16DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00530-x
Vartika Singh, Veeraruna Kavitha
{"title":"Partial Information Games and Competitive Advertising","authors":"Vartika Singh, Veeraruna Kavitha","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00530-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00530-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135306072","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-16DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00527-6
Christos Koulovatianos
{"title":"Rational Noncooperative Strategic Exploitation of Species in a Predator–Prey Ecosystem with Random Disturbances","authors":"Christos Koulovatianos","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00527-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00527-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"2012 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135306543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-15DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00525-8
Marta C. Couto, Saptarshi Pal
Abstract Evolutionary game theory and models of learning provide powerful frameworks to describe strategic decision-making in social interactions. In the simplest case, these models describe games among two identical players. However, many interactions in everyday life are more complex. They involve more than two players who may differ in their available actions and in their incentives to choose each action. Such interactions can be captured by asymmetric multiplayer games. Recently, introspection dynamics has been introduced to explore such asymmetric games. According to this dynamics, at each time step players compare their current strategy to an alternative strategy. If the alternative strategy results in a payoff advantage, it is more likely adopted. This model provides a simple way to compute the players’ long-run probability of adopting each of their strategies. In this paper, we extend some of the previous results of introspection dynamics for 2-player asymmetric games to games with arbitrarily many players. First, we derive a formula that allows us to numerically compute the stationary distribution of introspection dynamics for any multiplayer asymmetric game. Second, we obtain explicit expressions of the stationary distribution for two special cases. These cases are additive games (where the payoff difference that a player gains by unilaterally switching to a different action is independent of the actions of their co-players), and symmetric multiplayer games with two strategies. To illustrate our results, we revisit several classical games such as the public goods game.
{"title":"Introspection Dynamics in Asymmetric Multiplayer Games","authors":"Marta C. Couto, Saptarshi Pal","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00525-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00525-8","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Evolutionary game theory and models of learning provide powerful frameworks to describe strategic decision-making in social interactions. In the simplest case, these models describe games among two identical players. However, many interactions in everyday life are more complex. They involve more than two players who may differ in their available actions and in their incentives to choose each action. Such interactions can be captured by asymmetric multiplayer games. Recently, introspection dynamics has been introduced to explore such asymmetric games. According to this dynamics, at each time step players compare their current strategy to an alternative strategy. If the alternative strategy results in a payoff advantage, it is more likely adopted. This model provides a simple way to compute the players’ long-run probability of adopting each of their strategies. In this paper, we extend some of the previous results of introspection dynamics for 2-player asymmetric games to games with arbitrarily many players. First, we derive a formula that allows us to numerically compute the stationary distribution of introspection dynamics for any multiplayer asymmetric game. Second, we obtain explicit expressions of the stationary distribution for two special cases. These cases are additive games (where the payoff difference that a player gains by unilaterally switching to a different action is independent of the actions of their co-players), and symmetric multiplayer games with two strategies. To illustrate our results, we revisit several classical games such as the public goods game.","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"239 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135395100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Strategic Licensing Model Choice with Network Effects in a Dynamic Duopoly","authors":"Fei Yan, Hong-Zhuan Chen, Sahin Telli, Zhi-Chao Zhang","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00516-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00516-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134910496","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-02DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00519-6
Aur'elien Delage, O. Buffet, J. Dibangoye, Abdallah Saffidine
{"title":"HSVI Can Solve Zero-Sum Partially Observable Stochastic Games","authors":"Aur'elien Delage, O. Buffet, J. Dibangoye, Abdallah Saffidine","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00519-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00519-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44793005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-31DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00520-z
Péter Bayer, Jeffrey West
{"title":"Games and the Treatment Convexity of Cancer","authors":"Péter Bayer, Jeffrey West","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00520-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00520-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135782837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-28DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00521-y
Ingela Alger, Laurent Lehmann
Abstract We model the evolution of preferences guiding behavior in pairwise interactions in group-structured populations. The model uses long-term evolution theory to examine different interaction scenarios, including conditional preference expression upon recognition of the partner’s type. We apply the model to the evolution of semi-Kantian preferences at the fitness level, which combine self-interest and a Kantian interest evaluating own behavior in terms of consequences for own fitness if the partner also adopted this behavior. We seek the convergence stable and uninvadable value of the Kantian coefficient, i.e., the weight attached to the Kantian interest, a quantitative trait varying between zero and one. We consider three scenarios: (a) incomplete information; (b) complete information and incomplete plasticity; and (c) complete information and complete plasticity, where individuals not only recognize the type of their interaction partner (complete information), but also conditionally express the Kantian coefficient upon it (complete plasticity). For (a), the Kantian coefficient generally evolves to equal the coefficient of neutral relatedness between interacting individuals; for (b), it evolves to a value that depends on demographic and interaction assumptions, while for (c) there are generally multiple uninvadable types, including the type whereby an individual is a pure Kantian when interacting with individuals of the same type and applies the Kantian coefficient that is uninvadable under complete information with zero relatedness when interacting with a different typed individual. Overall, our model connects several concepts for analysing the evolution of behavior rules for strategic interactions that have been emphasized in different and sometimes isolated studies.
{"title":"Evolution of Semi-Kantian Preferences in Two-Player Assortative Interactions with Complete and Incomplete Information and Plasticity","authors":"Ingela Alger, Laurent Lehmann","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00521-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00521-y","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We model the evolution of preferences guiding behavior in pairwise interactions in group-structured populations. The model uses long-term evolution theory to examine different interaction scenarios, including conditional preference expression upon recognition of the partner’s type. We apply the model to the evolution of semi-Kantian preferences at the fitness level, which combine self-interest and a Kantian interest evaluating own behavior in terms of consequences for own fitness if the partner also adopted this behavior. We seek the convergence stable and uninvadable value of the Kantian coefficient, i.e., the weight attached to the Kantian interest, a quantitative trait varying between zero and one. We consider three scenarios: (a) incomplete information; (b) complete information and incomplete plasticity; and (c) complete information and complete plasticity, where individuals not only recognize the type of their interaction partner (complete information), but also conditionally express the Kantian coefficient upon it (complete plasticity). For (a), the Kantian coefficient generally evolves to equal the coefficient of neutral relatedness between interacting individuals; for (b), it evolves to a value that depends on demographic and interaction assumptions, while for (c) there are generally multiple uninvadable types, including the type whereby an individual is a pure Kantian when interacting with individuals of the same type and applies the Kantian coefficient that is uninvadable under complete information with zero relatedness when interacting with a different typed individual. Overall, our model connects several concepts for analysing the evolution of behavior rules for strategic interactions that have been emphasized in different and sometimes isolated studies.","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136350138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-26DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00524-9
Jorge Peña, G. Nöldeke
{"title":"Cooperative Dilemmas with Binary Actions and Multiple Players","authors":"Jorge Peña, G. Nöldeke","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00524-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00524-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46205053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-12DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00522-x
Zhiru Wang, Shihua Fu, Jianjun Wang, Xiaoyu Zhao
{"title":"Strategy Consensus of Networked Evolutionary Games with Time Invariant Delays","authors":"Zhiru Wang, Shihua Fu, Jianjun Wang, Xiaoyu Zhao","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00522-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00522-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42070180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-11DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00523-w
Touffik Bouremani, Yacine Slimani
{"title":"Study of a Warfare Differential Game via Dynamic Programming Approach","authors":"Touffik Bouremani, Yacine Slimani","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00523-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00523-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44390868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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