Pub Date : 2023-10-27DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00533-8
Chaitanya S. Gokhale, Marcus Frean, Paul B. Rainey
Abstract Mutualistic interactions among members of different species are common, seemingly stable, and thus apparently enduring. This is at odds with standard mathematical models based solely on between-species interactions, which show mutualisms to be inherently unstable. Models incorporating parameters for punishment and reward strategies demonstrate that the range of conditions over which stability is observed can be extended; however, the role of community-level dynamics impacted by within-species interactions remains relatively unexplored. Here we develop a general and readily applicable approach for analysing a broad range of mutualisms. By incorporating within-species interactions, we show that mutualisms can be stably maintained across diverse environmental conditions without introducing changes to between-species interaction parameters. Further, a balance of within- and between-species interactions is sufficient to allow the persistence of mutualisms encountering ecological perturbations. Our simple and robust framework resonates with emerging empirical data highlighting the role of community-level interactions and population dynamics in maintaining mutualisms.
{"title":"Eco-evolutionary Logic of Mutualisms","authors":"Chaitanya S. Gokhale, Marcus Frean, Paul B. Rainey","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00533-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00533-8","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Mutualistic interactions among members of different species are common, seemingly stable, and thus apparently enduring. This is at odds with standard mathematical models based solely on between-species interactions, which show mutualisms to be inherently unstable. Models incorporating parameters for punishment and reward strategies demonstrate that the range of conditions over which stability is observed can be extended; however, the role of community-level dynamics impacted by within-species interactions remains relatively unexplored. Here we develop a general and readily applicable approach for analysing a broad range of mutualisms. By incorporating within-species interactions, we show that mutualisms can be stably maintained across diverse environmental conditions without introducing changes to between-species interaction parameters. Further, a balance of within- and between-species interactions is sufficient to allow the persistence of mutualisms encountering ecological perturbations. Our simple and robust framework resonates with emerging empirical data highlighting the role of community-level interactions and population dynamics in maintaining mutualisms.","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"25 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136234005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-27DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00536-5
Stephen Salant, Joshua Keller
{"title":"How Much is a Nonearning Asset with No Current Capital Gains Worth?","authors":"Stephen Salant, Joshua Keller","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00536-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00536-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"164 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136235022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-21DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00534-7
Guiomar Martín-Herrán, Santiago J. Rubio
{"title":"Efficiency-Inducing Policy for Polluting Oligopolists","authors":"Guiomar Martín-Herrán, Santiago J. Rubio","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00534-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00534-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"9 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135512065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-21DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00529-4
Ashish R. Hota, Urmee Maitra, Ezzat Elokda, Saverio Bolognani
Abstract We present a dynamic population game model to capture the behavior of a large population of individuals in presence of an infectious disease or epidemic. Individuals can be in one of five possible infection states at any given time: susceptible, asymptomatic, symptomatic, recovered and unknowingly recovered, and choose whether to opt for vaccination, testing or social activity with a certain degree. We define the evolution of the proportion of agents in each epidemic state, and the notion of best response for agents that maximize long-run discounted expected reward as a function of the current state and policy. We further show the existence of a stationary Nash equilibrium and explore the transient evolution of the disease states and individual behavior under a class of evolutionary learning dynamics. Our results provide compelling insights into how individuals evaluate the trade-off among vaccination, testing and social activity under different parameter regimes, and the impact of different intervention strategies (such as restrictions on social activity) on vaccination and infection prevalence.
{"title":"Learning to Mitigate Epidemic Risks: A Dynamic Population Game Approach","authors":"Ashish R. Hota, Urmee Maitra, Ezzat Elokda, Saverio Bolognani","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00529-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00529-4","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We present a dynamic population game model to capture the behavior of a large population of individuals in presence of an infectious disease or epidemic. Individuals can be in one of five possible infection states at any given time: susceptible, asymptomatic, symptomatic, recovered and unknowingly recovered, and choose whether to opt for vaccination, testing or social activity with a certain degree. We define the evolution of the proportion of agents in each epidemic state, and the notion of best response for agents that maximize long-run discounted expected reward as a function of the current state and policy. We further show the existence of a stationary Nash equilibrium and explore the transient evolution of the disease states and individual behavior under a class of evolutionary learning dynamics. Our results provide compelling insights into how individuals evaluate the trade-off among vaccination, testing and social activity under different parameter regimes, and the impact of different intervention strategies (such as restrictions on social activity) on vaccination and infection prevalence.","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"35 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135510956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-17DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00538-3
Marta C. Couto, Saptarshi Pal
{"title":"Correction: Introspection Dynamics in Asymmetric Multiplayer Games","authors":"Marta C. Couto, Saptarshi Pal","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00538-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00538-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"158 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135994842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-04DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00532-9
Charles F. Mason
{"title":"Do Small Players Undermine Cooperation in Asymmetric Games?","authors":"Charles F. Mason","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00532-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00532-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135590734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-27DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00528-5
Frederick van der Ploeg
Abstract Ngo Van Long’s classic paper on the risk of expropriation of natural resources published in a 1975 issue of the Journal of Economic Theory was an instant classic, which spawned a huge literature. Here I pay tribute to this wonderful brilliant yet modest scholar by briefly reviewing his contribution and then sketching how his insights can be used to analyse dynamic conflict over natural resources both as expropriation game and as a differential game on which Long has published extensively too. We discuss three results. First, if an incumbent faces a threat of a rival faction, extraction is more voracious if the factions do not share rents equally. Second, never-ending political conflict cycles are more inefficient if constitutional cohesiveness or rent sharing is strong and political instability is high. Third, resource wars are more intense if rent sharing is weak, reserves of resources are high, the wage is low, and elections occur less frequently.
Ngo Van Long在1975年出版的《经济理论杂志》(Journal of Economic Theory)上发表的关于自然资源被征用风险的经典论文立即成为经典，并催生了大量文献。在此，我向这位杰出而谦逊的学者致敬，简要回顾他的贡献，然后概述如何将他的见解用于分析自然资源的动态冲突，既可以作为征用博弈，也可以作为差异博弈，朗也就此发表了大量文章。我们讨论三个结果。首先，如果在位者面临竞争派系的威胁，如果派系不能平等地分享租金，那么抽取就会更加贪婪。其次，如果宪法凝聚力或租金分摊较强，政治不稳定程度较高，那么永无止境的政治冲突周期效率会更高。第三，如果租金共享弱、资源储备高、工资低、选举发生频率低，资源战争就会更激烈。
{"title":"Benefits of Rent Sharing in Dynamic Resource Games","authors":"Frederick van der Ploeg","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00528-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00528-5","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Ngo Van Long’s classic paper on the risk of expropriation of natural resources published in a 1975 issue of the Journal of Economic Theory was an instant classic, which spawned a huge literature. Here I pay tribute to this wonderful brilliant yet modest scholar by briefly reviewing his contribution and then sketching how his insights can be used to analyse dynamic conflict over natural resources both as expropriation game and as a differential game on which Long has published extensively too. We discuss three results. First, if an incumbent faces a threat of a rival faction, extraction is more voracious if the factions do not share rents equally. Second, never-ending political conflict cycles are more inefficient if constitutional cohesiveness or rent sharing is strong and political instability is high. Third, resource wars are more intense if rent sharing is weak, reserves of resources are high, the wage is low, and elections occur less frequently.","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135535991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-25DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00531-w
Vartika Singh, Veeraruna Kavitha
{"title":"Stochastic Vaccination Game Among Influencers, Leader and Public","authors":"Vartika Singh, Veeraruna Kavitha","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00531-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00531-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135814803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-25DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00517-8
Luca Colombo, Paola Labrecciosa
{"title":"Resource Mobility and Market Performance","authors":"Luca Colombo, Paola Labrecciosa","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00517-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00517-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135815108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-25DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00526-7
Didier Laussel
{"title":"Sequential Mergers and Delayed Monopolization in Triopoly","authors":"Didier Laussel","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00526-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00526-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"109 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135815282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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