Pub Date : 2023-12-01DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00545-4
Christian Hilbe, M. Kleshnina, Kateřina Staňková
{"title":"Evolutionary Games and Applications: Fifty Years of ‘The Logic of Animal Conflict’","authors":"Christian Hilbe, M. Kleshnina, Kateřina Staňková","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00545-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00545-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"22 9","pages":"1035 - 1048"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138624125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00539-2
Gensbittel Fabien, Pizarro Dana, Jérôme Renault
{"title":"Competition and Recall in Selection Problems","authors":"Gensbittel Fabien, Pizarro Dana, Jérôme Renault","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00539-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00539-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"53 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135933019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00541-8
Xiao-Bing Zhang
Abstract This paper uses a dynamic game to investigate the strategic interactions between carbon taxation by a coalition of resource consumers and (wellhead) energy pricing by a producers’ cartel under the possibility of innovation in a cheap carbon-free technology. The timing of innovation is uncertain, but can be affected by the amount spent on R &D. The results show that the expectation of possible innovation decreases both the initial carbon tax and producer price, resulting in higher initial resource extraction and carbon emissions. Though this ’green paradox’ effect triggered by possible innovation also will appear in the cooperative case (without strategic interactions), the presence of strategic interactions between resource producers and consumers can somewhat restrain such an effect. For both the resource consumers and a global planner, the optimal R &D to stimulate innovation is an increasing function of the initial CO2 concentration. However, the resource consumers can over-invest in R &D relative to the investment level that a global planner would choose.
{"title":"A Dynamic Game of Strategic Carbon Taxation and Energy Pricing with Green Technology Innovation","authors":"Xiao-Bing Zhang","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00541-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00541-8","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper uses a dynamic game to investigate the strategic interactions between carbon taxation by a coalition of resource consumers and (wellhead) energy pricing by a producers’ cartel under the possibility of innovation in a cheap carbon-free technology. The timing of innovation is uncertain, but can be affected by the amount spent on R &D. The results show that the expectation of possible innovation decreases both the initial carbon tax and producer price, resulting in higher initial resource extraction and carbon emissions. Though this ’green paradox’ effect triggered by possible innovation also will appear in the cooperative case (without strategic interactions), the presence of strategic interactions between resource producers and consumers can somewhat restrain such an effect. For both the resource consumers and a global planner, the optimal R &D to stimulate innovation is an increasing function of the initial CO2 concentration. However, the resource consumers can over-invest in R &D relative to the investment level that a global planner would choose.","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135934426","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-30DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00537-4
Manuel Staab
{"title":"Evolution of Risk-Taking Behaviour and Status Preferences in Anti-coordination Games","authors":"Manuel Staab","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00537-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00537-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"2 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136023055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-30DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00542-7
Hsiao-Chi Chen, Yunshyong Chow, Shi-Miin Liu
{"title":"Dynamics of Cournot and Bertrand Firms: Exploring Imitation and Replicator Processes","authors":"Hsiao-Chi Chen, Yunshyong Chow, Shi-Miin Liu","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00542-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00542-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"17 8","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136103997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-27DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00533-8
Chaitanya S. Gokhale, Marcus Frean, Paul B. Rainey
Abstract Mutualistic interactions among members of different species are common, seemingly stable, and thus apparently enduring. This is at odds with standard mathematical models based solely on between-species interactions, which show mutualisms to be inherently unstable. Models incorporating parameters for punishment and reward strategies demonstrate that the range of conditions over which stability is observed can be extended; however, the role of community-level dynamics impacted by within-species interactions remains relatively unexplored. Here we develop a general and readily applicable approach for analysing a broad range of mutualisms. By incorporating within-species interactions, we show that mutualisms can be stably maintained across diverse environmental conditions without introducing changes to between-species interaction parameters. Further, a balance of within- and between-species interactions is sufficient to allow the persistence of mutualisms encountering ecological perturbations. Our simple and robust framework resonates with emerging empirical data highlighting the role of community-level interactions and population dynamics in maintaining mutualisms.
{"title":"Eco-evolutionary Logic of Mutualisms","authors":"Chaitanya S. Gokhale, Marcus Frean, Paul B. Rainey","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00533-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00533-8","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Mutualistic interactions among members of different species are common, seemingly stable, and thus apparently enduring. This is at odds with standard mathematical models based solely on between-species interactions, which show mutualisms to be inherently unstable. Models incorporating parameters for punishment and reward strategies demonstrate that the range of conditions over which stability is observed can be extended; however, the role of community-level dynamics impacted by within-species interactions remains relatively unexplored. Here we develop a general and readily applicable approach for analysing a broad range of mutualisms. By incorporating within-species interactions, we show that mutualisms can be stably maintained across diverse environmental conditions without introducing changes to between-species interaction parameters. Further, a balance of within- and between-species interactions is sufficient to allow the persistence of mutualisms encountering ecological perturbations. Our simple and robust framework resonates with emerging empirical data highlighting the role of community-level interactions and population dynamics in maintaining mutualisms.","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"25 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136234005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-27DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00536-5
Stephen Salant, Joshua Keller
{"title":"How Much is a Nonearning Asset with No Current Capital Gains Worth?","authors":"Stephen Salant, Joshua Keller","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00536-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00536-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"164 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136235022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-21DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00534-7
Guiomar Martín-Herrán, Santiago J. Rubio
{"title":"Efficiency-Inducing Policy for Polluting Oligopolists","authors":"Guiomar Martín-Herrán, Santiago J. Rubio","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00534-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00534-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"9 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135512065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-21DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00529-4
Ashish R. Hota, Urmee Maitra, Ezzat Elokda, Saverio Bolognani
Abstract We present a dynamic population game model to capture the behavior of a large population of individuals in presence of an infectious disease or epidemic. Individuals can be in one of five possible infection states at any given time: susceptible, asymptomatic, symptomatic, recovered and unknowingly recovered, and choose whether to opt for vaccination, testing or social activity with a certain degree. We define the evolution of the proportion of agents in each epidemic state, and the notion of best response for agents that maximize long-run discounted expected reward as a function of the current state and policy. We further show the existence of a stationary Nash equilibrium and explore the transient evolution of the disease states and individual behavior under a class of evolutionary learning dynamics. Our results provide compelling insights into how individuals evaluate the trade-off among vaccination, testing and social activity under different parameter regimes, and the impact of different intervention strategies (such as restrictions on social activity) on vaccination and infection prevalence.
{"title":"Learning to Mitigate Epidemic Risks: A Dynamic Population Game Approach","authors":"Ashish R. Hota, Urmee Maitra, Ezzat Elokda, Saverio Bolognani","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00529-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00529-4","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We present a dynamic population game model to capture the behavior of a large population of individuals in presence of an infectious disease or epidemic. Individuals can be in one of five possible infection states at any given time: susceptible, asymptomatic, symptomatic, recovered and unknowingly recovered, and choose whether to opt for vaccination, testing or social activity with a certain degree. We define the evolution of the proportion of agents in each epidemic state, and the notion of best response for agents that maximize long-run discounted expected reward as a function of the current state and policy. We further show the existence of a stationary Nash equilibrium and explore the transient evolution of the disease states and individual behavior under a class of evolutionary learning dynamics. Our results provide compelling insights into how individuals evaluate the trade-off among vaccination, testing and social activity under different parameter regimes, and the impact of different intervention strategies (such as restrictions on social activity) on vaccination and infection prevalence.","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":"35 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135510956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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