Journal Article Mark Jay Steiner May 6, 1942 – April 6, 2020 Get access Yemima Ben-Menahem, Yemima Ben-Menahem The Hebrew University of Jerusalem E-mail: yemima.ben-menahem@mail.huji.ac.il. https://orcid.org/0009-0007-3632-3820 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Carl Posy Carl Posy The Hebrew University of Jerusalem E-mail: carl.posy@mail.huji.ac.il. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8047-8527 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Philosophia Mathematica, nkad015, https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkad015 Published: 16 September 2023
期刊文章Mark Jay Steiner 1942年5月6日- 2020年4月6日访问耶路撒冷希伯来大学Yemima Ben-Menahem, Yemima Ben-Menahem电子邮件:yemima.ben-menahem@mail.huji.ac.il。https://orcid.org/0009-0007-3632-3820搜索作者的其他作品:牛津学术谷歌学者卡尔·波西卡尔·波西耶路撒冷希伯来大学电子邮件:carl.posy@mail.huji.ac.il。https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8047-8527搜索作者的其他作品:牛津学术谷歌学者数学哲学，nkad015, https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkad015出版日期:2023年9月16日
{"title":"Mark Jay Steiner May 6, 1942 – April 6, 2020","authors":"Yemima Ben-Menahem, Carl Posy","doi":"10.1093/philmat/nkad015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkad015","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Mark Jay Steiner May 6, 1942 – April 6, 2020 Get access Yemima Ben-Menahem, Yemima Ben-Menahem The Hebrew University of Jerusalem E-mail: yemima.ben-menahem@mail.huji.ac.il. https://orcid.org/0009-0007-3632-3820 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Carl Posy Carl Posy The Hebrew University of Jerusalem E-mail: carl.posy@mail.huji.ac.il. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8047-8527 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Philosophia Mathematica, nkad015, https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkad015 Published: 16 September 2023","PeriodicalId":49004,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Mathematica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135306040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Bob Hale has defended a new conception of properties that is broadly Fregean in two key respects. First, like Frege, Hale insists that every property can be defined by an open formula. Second, like Frege, but unlike later definabilists, Hale seeks to justify full impredicative property comprehension. The most innovative part of his defense, we think, is a “definability constraint” that can serve as an implicit definition of the domain of properties. We make this constraint formally precise and prove that it fails to characterize the domain uniquely. Thus, we conclude, there is no easy road to impredicative definabilism.
Bob Hale为一种新的财产概念进行了辩护，这种概念在两个关键方面都是Fregean的。首先，像弗雷格一样，黑尔坚持认为每个性质都可以用一个开放公式来定义。第二，像弗雷格一样，但与后来的定义主义者不同，黑尔试图证明完全的不确定性理解是合理的。我们认为，他的辩护中最具创新性的部分是“可定义性约束”，它可以作为属性域的隐含定义。我们使这个约束形式上精确，并证明它不能唯一地刻画域。因此，我们得出的结论是，没有一条通往不可定义性的简单道路。
{"title":"No Easy Road to Impredicative Definabilism","authors":"Øystein Linnebo, Sam Roberts","doi":"10.1093/philmat/nkad013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkad013","url":null,"abstract":"Bob Hale has defended a new conception of properties that is broadly Fregean in two key respects. First, like Frege, Hale insists that every property can be defined by an open formula. Second, like Frege, but unlike later definabilists, Hale seeks to justify full impredicative property comprehension. The most innovative part of his defense, we think, is a “definability constraint” that can serve as an implicit definition of the domain of properties. We make this constraint formally precise and prove that it fails to characterize the domain uniquely. Thus, we conclude, there is no easy road to impredicative definabilism.","PeriodicalId":49004,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Mathematica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71435176","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I examine the classical idea of ‘algorithm’ as a sequential, step-by-step, deterministic procedure (i.e., the idea of ‘algorithm’ that was already in use by the 1930s), with respect to three themes, its relation to the notion of an ‘effective procedure’, its different roles and uses in logic, computer science, and mathematics (focused on numerical analysis), and its different formal definitions proposed by practitioners in these areas. I argue that ‘algorithm’ has been conceptualized and used in contrasting ways in the above areas, and discuss challenges and prospects for adopting a final foundational theory of (classical) ‘algorithms’.
{"title":"On Algorithms, Effective Procedures, and Their Definitions","authors":"Philippos Papayannopoulos","doi":"10.1093/philmat/nkad011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkad011","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I examine the classical idea of ‘algorithm’ as a sequential, step-by-step, deterministic procedure (i.e., the idea of ‘algorithm’ that was already in use by the 1930s), with respect to three themes, its relation to the notion of an ‘effective procedure’, its different roles and uses in logic, computer science, and mathematics (focused on numerical analysis), and its different formal definitions proposed by practitioners in these areas. I argue that ‘algorithm’ has been conceptualized and used in contrasting ways in the above areas, and discuss challenges and prospects for adopting a final foundational theory of (classical) ‘algorithms’.","PeriodicalId":49004,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Mathematica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49635820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Carl Posy and Yemima Ben-Menahem, eds. Mathematical Objects, Knowledge and Applications: Essays in Memory of Mark Steiner","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/philmat/nkad012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkad012","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49004,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Mathematica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43472816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Paola Cantù and Italo Testa, guest editors. Mathematical Practice and Social Ontology","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/philmat/nkad010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkad010","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49004,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Mathematica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47005865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using ideas proposed in Aboutness and developed in ‘If-thenism’, Stephen Yablo has tried to improve on classical if-thenism in mathematics, a view initially put forward by Bertrand Russell in his Principles of Mathematics. Yablo’s stated goal is to provide a reading of a sentence like ‘The number of planets is eight’ with a sort of content on which it fails to imply ‘Numbers exist’. After presenting Yablo’s framework, our paper raises a problem with his view that has gone virtually unnoticed in the literature. If we are right, then Yablo’s version of if-thenism cannot succeed.
{"title":"A Critique of Yablo’s If-thenism","authors":"Bradley Armour-Garb, F. Kroon","doi":"10.1093/philmat/nkad009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkad009","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Using ideas proposed in Aboutness and developed in ‘If-thenism’, Stephen Yablo has tried to improve on classical if-thenism in mathematics, a view initially put forward by Bertrand Russell in his Principles of Mathematics. Yablo’s stated goal is to provide a reading of a sentence like ‘The number of planets is eight’ with a sort of content on which it fails to imply ‘Numbers exist’. After presenting Yablo’s framework, our paper raises a problem with his view that has gone virtually unnoticed in the literature. If we are right, then Yablo’s version of if-thenism cannot succeed.","PeriodicalId":49004,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Mathematica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44222472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Who gets to contribute to knowledge production of an epistemic community? Scholarship has focussed on unjustified forms of exclusion. Here I study justified forms of exclusion by investigating the phenomenon of so-called ‘cranks’ in mathematics. I argue that workload-management concerns justify the exclusion of these outsiders from mathematical knowledge-making practices. My discussion reveals three insights. There are reasons other than incorrect mathematical argument that justify exclusions from mathematical practices. There are instances in which mathematicians are justified in rejecting even correct mathematical arguments. Finally, the way mathematicians spot mathematical crankery does not support the pejorative connotations of the ‘crank’ terminology.
{"title":"Justified Epistemic Exclusions in Mathematics","authors":"C. Rittberg","doi":"10.1093/philmat/nkad008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkad008","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Who gets to contribute to knowledge production of an epistemic community? Scholarship has focussed on unjustified forms of exclusion. Here I study justified forms of exclusion by investigating the phenomenon of so-called ‘cranks’ in mathematics. I argue that workload-management concerns justify the exclusion of these outsiders from mathematical knowledge-making practices. My discussion reveals three insights. There are reasons other than incorrect mathematical argument that justify exclusions from mathematical practices. There are instances in which mathematicians are justified in rejecting even correct mathematical arguments. Finally, the way mathematicians spot mathematical crankery does not support the pejorative connotations of the ‘crank’ terminology.","PeriodicalId":49004,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Mathematica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45722292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The Caesar problem arises for abstractionist views, which seek to secure reference for terms such as ‘the number of $X$s’ or $#X$ by stipulating the content of ‘unmixed’ identity contexts like ‘$#X = #Y$’. Frege objects that this stipulation says nothing about ‘mixed’ contexts such as ‘$# X = text{Julius Caesar}$’. This article defends a neglected response to the Caesar problem: the content of mixed contexts is just as open to stipulation as that of unmixed contexts.
凯撒问题出现在抽象主义的观点中，它试图通过规定“未混合”的身份上下文的内容，如“$#X = #Y$”，来确保对诸如“$X$s的数量”或“$#X$”等术语的引用。弗雷格反对说，这一规定没有提到“混合”上下文，如“$# X = text{Julius Caesar}$”。本文为对凯撒问题的一种被忽视的回应进行了辩护:混合上下文的内容与非混合上下文的内容一样可以规定。
{"title":"The Caesar Problem — A Piecemeal Solution","authors":"J P Studd","doi":"10.1093/philmat/nkad006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkad006","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The Caesar problem arises for abstractionist views, which seek to secure reference for terms such as ‘the number of $X$s’ or $#X$ by stipulating the content of ‘unmixed’ identity contexts like ‘$#X = #Y$’. Frege objects that this stipulation says nothing about ‘mixed’ contexts such as ‘$# X = text{Julius Caesar}$’. This article defends a neglected response to the Caesar problem: the content of mixed contexts is just as open to stipulation as that of unmixed contexts.","PeriodicalId":49004,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Mathematica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135290162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This note defends the reduction of ordinals to pure sets against an argument put forward by Beau Madison Mount. In the first part I will defend the claim that dependence simpliciter can be reduced to immediate dependence and define a notion of predecessor dependence. In the second part I will provide and defend a way to model the dependence profile of ordinals akin to Mount’s proposal in terms of immediate dependence and predecessor dependence. I furthermore show that my alternative dependence profile allows us to single out the reduction of ordinals to von Neumann ordinals as the only viable set-theoretic reduction.
{"title":"A Note on von Neumann Ordinals and Dependence","authors":"Jonas Werner","doi":"10.1093/philmat/nkad007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkad007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This note defends the reduction of ordinals to pure sets against an argument put forward by Beau Madison Mount. In the first part I will defend the claim that dependence simpliciter can be reduced to immediate dependence and define a notion of predecessor dependence. In the second part I will provide and defend a way to model the dependence profile of ordinals akin to Mount’s proposal in terms of immediate dependence and predecessor dependence. I furthermore show that my alternative dependence profile allows us to single out the reduction of ordinals to von Neumann ordinals as the only viable set-theoretic reduction.","PeriodicalId":49004,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Mathematica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46461402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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