Some mathematical proofs explain why the theorems they prove hold. This paper identifies several challenges for any counterfactual account of explanation in mathematics (that is, any account according to which an explanatory proof reveals how the explanandum would have been different, had facts in the explanans been different). The paper presumes that countermathematicals can be nontrivial. It argues that nevertheless, a counterfactual account portrays explanatory power as too easy to achieve, does not capture explanatory asymmetry, and fails to specify why certain proofs are explanatory and others are not. Greater informativeness about counterfactual dependence can even yield less explanatory power.
{"title":"Challenges Facing Counterfactual Accounts of Explanation in Mathematics","authors":"Lange M.","doi":"10.1093/philmat/nkab023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkab023","url":null,"abstract":"<span><div>ABSTRACT</div>Some mathematical proofs explain why the theorems they prove hold. This paper identifies several challenges for any counterfactual account of explanation in mathematics (that is, any account according to which an explanatory proof reveals how the explanandum would have been different, had facts in the explanans been different). The paper presumes that countermathematicals can be nontrivial. It argues that nevertheless, a counterfactual account portrays explanatory power as too easy to achieve, does not capture explanatory asymmetry, and fails to specify why certain proofs are explanatory and others are not. Greater informativeness about counterfactual dependence can even yield less explanatory power. </span>","PeriodicalId":49004,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Mathematica","volume":"54 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138534220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
FenstadJ.E.. Structures and Algorithms: Mathematics and the Nature of Knowledge. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning; 15. Springer, 2018. Pp. x + 134. ISBN 978-3-319-72973-2 (hbk); 978-3-030-10294-4 (pbk); 978-3-319-72974-9 (e-book). doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72974-9.
{"title":"J.E. Fenstad. Structures and Algorithms: Mathematics and the Nature of Knowledge","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/philmat/nkab021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkab021","url":null,"abstract":"<span>FenstadJ.E.. <strong><span style=\"font-style:italic;\">Structures and Algorithms: Mathematics and the Nature of Knowledge</span></strong>. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning; 15. Springer, 2018. Pp. x + 134. ISBN 978-3-319-72973-2 (hbk); 978-3-030-10294-4 (pbk); 978-3-319-72974-9 (e-book). doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72974-9.</span>","PeriodicalId":49004,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Mathematica","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138534222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper argues that, insofar as we doubt the bivalence of the Continuum Hypothesis or the truth of the Axiom of Choice, we should also doubt the consistency of third-order arithmetic, both the classical and intuitionistic versions. Underlying this argument is the following philosophical view. Mathematical belief springs from certain intuitions, each of which can be either accepted or doubted in its entirety, but not half-accepted. Therefore, our beliefs about reality, bivalence, choice and consistency should all be aligned.
{"title":"The Price of Mathematical Scepticism","authors":"P. Levy","doi":"10.1093/philmat/nkac011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkac011","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper argues that, insofar as we doubt the bivalence of the Continuum Hypothesis or the truth of the Axiom of Choice, we should also doubt the consistency of third-order arithmetic, both the classical and intuitionistic versions.\u0000 Underlying this argument is the following philosophical view. Mathematical belief springs from certain intuitions, each of which can be either accepted or doubted in its entirety, but not half-accepted. Therefore, our beliefs about reality, bivalence, choice and consistency should all be aligned.","PeriodicalId":49004,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Mathematica","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43980663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Four philosophical concerns about higher-order logic in general and the specific demands placed on it by the neo-logicist project are distinguished. The paper critically reviews recent responses to these concerns by, respectively, the late Bob Hale, Richard Kimberly Heck, and myself. It is argued that these score some successes. The main aim of the paper, however, is to argue that the most serious objection to the applications of higher-order logic required by the neo-logicist project has not been properly understood. The paper concludes by outlining a strategy, prefigured in recent work of Øystein Linnebo, for meeting this objection.
{"title":"Taking Stock: Hale, Heck, and Wright on Neo-Logicism and Higher-Order Logic","authors":"Crispin Wright","doi":"10.1093/philmat/nkab017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkab017","url":null,"abstract":"Four philosophical concerns about higher-order logic in general and the specific demands placed on it by the neo-logicist project are distinguished. The paper critically reviews recent responses to these concerns by, respectively, the late Bob Hale, Richard Kimberly Heck, and myself. It is argued that these score some successes. The main aim of the paper, however, is to argue that the most serious objection to the applications of higher-order logic required by the neo-logicist project has not been properly understood. The paper concludes by outlining a strategy, prefigured in recent work of Øystein Linnebo, for meeting this objection.","PeriodicalId":49004,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Mathematica","volume":"29 3","pages":"392-416"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70607957","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mojtaba Mojtahedi, Shahid Rahman, and Mohammad Saleh Zarepour, eds. Mathematics, Logic, and their Philosophies: Essays in Honour of Mohammad Ardeshir","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/philmat/nkab002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkab002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49004,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Mathematica","volume":"29 3","pages":"451-452"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70607965","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}