Medical Law Review最新文献

The emergence of FemTech technologies promises to revolutionize women's health and reproductive rights but conceals an insidious trap of surveillance and control in the hands of private and state actors. This article examines the extent to which FemTech technologies, under the guise of empowerment, enable private actors to play a leading role in managing reproductive rights, replacing largely inactive States in this crucial function. The analysis shows how private FemTech companies are becoming critical players in implementing and defending these rights, often in response to the inaction or inadequacies of States. The article approaches the FemTech phenomenon from several angles, including the promises of empowerment, concerns about surveillance and control, and the ambivalent roles of private actors as implementers and defenders of reproductive rights. This structure makes it possible to offer a critical analysis of the legal, societal, and ethical implications of FemTech, highlighting the tensions between the promises of empowerment and the risks of surveillance and control.

The Mental Capacity Act 2005 in England and Wales and Singapore's Mental Capacity Act 2008 (which substantially transplants provisions from the former statute) might appear to be twins on paper, but they have gone on to lead very different lives. In this article, we examine how two broadly identical laws have taken on divergent identities within their respective jurisdictions when implemented and interpreted in the courtroom. We reveal and analyse differences in parliamentary intent concerning at what stage a person's decision-making agency is putatively empowered; judicial development of central concepts; underlying socio-cultural commitments; and outline opportunities for bi-directional learning in mental capacity law across both jurisdictions.

Seeking an anticipatory declaration from the Court of Protection (CoP) to manage a risk of future loss of capacity in pregnant people during labour and delivery appears to be occurring more frequently. This article examines a growing case sample of recent CoP judgments in which anticipatory declarations have been sought and adopts a combined relational and spatial approach to question whether these types of anticipatory declarations empower patient autonomous choice, and to illuminate the complex web of relational, spatial, and temporal factors that hold influence over the way in which mental capacity law operates. Viewing such processes from both a patient and institutional perspective offers useful insights into the law's normative workings, boundaries, and constraints, and ultimately points to conclusions on the (in)effectiveness of anticipatory declarations as a legal mechanism for dealing with the risk of a patient losing capacity in the future. Moreover, however, taking a broader, spatial view signals the challenges posed by these cases to mental capacity legislation itself. The justifiability of the binary construct of capacity/incapacity has been challenged by some writers in this field, and this article offers further reflection on the integrity of this binary through its discussion of anticipatory orders for pregnant people.

In recent years, concerns about the financial burdens of health care and growing recognition of the relevance of cost to decision making and patient experience have increasingly focused attention on financial 'transparency' and disclosure of costs to patients. In some jurisdictions, there have been calls not only for timely disclosure of costs information, but also for 'informed financial consent'. However, simply putting the 'financial' into 'informed consent' and invoking an informed consent standard for cost information encounters several ethical, legal, and practical difficulties. This article will examine the viability and desirability of 'informed financial consent', and whether it is possible to derive ideas from traditional informed consent that may improve decision making and the patient experience. We argue that, while there are important legal, ethical, and practical challenges to consider, some of the principles of informed consent to treatment can usefully guide financial communication. We also argue that, while medical practitioners (and their delegates) have an important role to play in bridging the gap between disclosure and enabling informed (financial) decision making, this must be part of a multi-faceted approach to financial communication that acknowledges the influence of non-clinical providers and other structural forces on discharging such obligations.

This article analyses the use of mediation to resolve mental capacity law disputes, including those that arise in the healthcare context. It draws on original empirical data, including interviews with lawyers and mediators, and analysis of a mediation scheme, to argue that mediation has the potential to be an effective method of resolution in mental capacity law. It highlights the relationship benefits of mediation while acknowledging the challenges of securing P's participation and best interests. The final section of the article considers how mediation can operate in one of the most challenging healthcare environments, the Intensive Care Unit. The article emphasizes that the challenges we see in mediation are not unique and exist across the spectrum of Court of Protection practice. Therefore, the article concludes that mediation may be used effectively but the jurisdiction would also benefit from a clearer regulatory framework in which it can operate.

As the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies in healthcare is expanding, patients in the European Union (EU) are increasingly subjected to automated medical decision-making. This development poses challenges to the protection of patients' rights. A specific patients' right not to be subject to automated medical decision-making is not considered part of the traditional portfolio of patients' rights. The EU AI Act also does not contain such a right. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) does, however, provide for the right 'not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing' in Article 22. At the same time, this provision has been severely critiqued in legal scholarship because of its lack of practical effectiveness. However, in December 2023, the Court of Justice of the EU first provided an interpretation of this right in C-634/21 (SCHUFA)-although in the context of credit scoring. Against this background, this article provides a critical analysis of the application of Article 22 GDPR to the medical context. The objective is to evaluate whether Article 22 GDPR may provide patients with the right to refuse automated medical decision-making. It proposes a health-conformant reading to strengthen patients' rights in the EU.