Medical Law Review最新文献

This article adds to the still limited scholarship on the impact of abortion laws and policies on people with disabilities and those with diminished capacity who seek abortion. We argue that neither the legal nor policy framework currently operating in England and Wales adequately incorporates and protects the rights of people with disabilities or those experiencing mental ill-health. Rather, the law and policy framework jeopardizes their reproductive agency. We argue that greater attention to and incorporation of standards contained within the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (including the sources produced by its Committee) and implementation of guidelines produced by the World Health Organization would result in a rights-affirming framework that supports disabled women's reproductive agency, enhances their effective enjoyment of human rights, and supports them in accessing quality abortion care.

The emergence of FemTech technologies promises to revolutionize women's health and reproductive rights but conceals an insidious trap of surveillance and control in the hands of private and state actors. This article examines the extent to which FemTech technologies, under the guise of empowerment, enable private actors to play a leading role in managing reproductive rights, replacing largely inactive States in this crucial function. The analysis shows how private FemTech companies are becoming critical players in implementing and defending these rights, often in response to the inaction or inadequacies of States. The article approaches the FemTech phenomenon from several angles, including the promises of empowerment, concerns about surveillance and control, and the ambivalent roles of private actors as implementers and defenders of reproductive rights. This structure makes it possible to offer a critical analysis of the legal, societal, and ethical implications of FemTech, highlighting the tensions between the promises of empowerment and the risks of surveillance and control.

In Australia and the UK, commercialization and corporatization of assisted reproductive technologies have created a marketplace of clinics, products, and services. While this has arguably increased choice for patients, 'choice', shaped by commercial imperatives may not mean better-quality care. At present, regulation of clinics (including clinic-corporations) and clinicians focuses on the doctor-patient dyad and the clinic-consumer dyad. Scant attention has been paid to the conflicts between the clinic-corporation's duty to its shareholders and investors, the medical profession's duty to the corporations within which they practice, and the obligations of both clinicians and corporations to patients and to health systems. Frameworks of regulation based in corporate governance and business ethics, such as stakeholder models and 'corporate social responsibility', have well-recognized limits and may not translate well into healthcare settings. This means that existing governance frameworks may not meet the needs of patients or health systems. We argue for the development of novel regulatory approaches that more explicitly characterize the obligations that both corporations and clinicians in corporate environments have to patients and to society, and that promote fulfilment of these obligations. We consider mechanisms for application in the multi-jurisdictional setting of Australia, and the single jurisdictional settings of the UK.

In this article, using theories of procedural justice and 'slow violence', we consider potential reform of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. Our theoretical discussion is underpinned by findings from the ConnecteDNA project, exploring how people affected by donor conception experience direct-to-consumer genetic testing (DTCGT). The negative impacts of DTCGT, especially shock discoveries about the circumstances of someone's conception in adulthood, are linked to donor anonymity, and how its continued protection is experienced as a barrier to the rights and agency of donor-conceived people. We focus on two key issues relating to the donor information access process set out in section 31ZA of the 1990 Act. The first is that it excludes certain cohorts of donor-conceived people, creating inequalities of access to donor information. The second is the impact of the use of DTCGT to search for that information. We discuss what a procedurally just process of law reform would look like, concluding that, whatever (prospective) approach to donor anonymity is taken, the donor information access process should be the same for all donor-conceived people. We thus argue that, even were the status quo to be maintained, reform of the donor information access process with retrospective effect would be required.

Seeking an anticipatory declaration from the Court of Protection (CoP) to manage a risk of future loss of capacity in pregnant people during labour and delivery appears to be occurring more frequently. This article examines a growing case sample of recent CoP judgments in which anticipatory declarations have been sought and adopts a combined relational and spatial approach to question whether these types of anticipatory declarations empower patient autonomous choice, and to illuminate the complex web of relational, spatial, and temporal factors that hold influence over the way in which mental capacity law operates. Viewing such processes from both a patient and institutional perspective offers useful insights into the law's normative workings, boundaries, and constraints, and ultimately points to conclusions on the (in)effectiveness of anticipatory declarations as a legal mechanism for dealing with the risk of a patient losing capacity in the future. Moreover, however, taking a broader, spatial view signals the challenges posed by these cases to mental capacity legislation itself. The justifiability of the binary construct of capacity/incapacity has been challenged by some writers in this field, and this article offers further reflection on the integrity of this binary through its discussion of anticipatory orders for pregnant people.

Mental health and capacity laws applicable to children and young people in Northern Ireland (NI) lack clarity and coherence, with significant gaps in service provision and safeguarding. Drawing on an examination of such laws, we argue that law reform is needed. In the short term, we suggest there is merit in publishing statutory guidance, such as a Code of Practice, to address both the issue of evolving capacity in children and to facilitate best practice in policy and practice. This modest reform in the short term should be accompanied by a firm political commitment to ensuring that NI's innovative fusion mental capacity legislation is fully brought into force in the medium term. Meanwhile, law reform should form part of a holistic approach on the part of NI's policy-makers towards improving mental healthcare provision for children and young people in line with a human rights-based approach. This would include the following: increased allocation of funding and resources to facilitate more timely access to suitable treatment and related services; enhancing participation in policy, judicial, and clinical decision-making that impacts their lives; and employing a range of executive accountability mechanisms to drive improvements in such provision over time.

The Mental Capacity Act 2005 in England and Wales and Singapore's Mental Capacity Act 2008 (which substantially transplants provisions from the former statute) might appear to be twins on paper, but they have gone on to lead very different lives. In this article, we examine how two broadly identical laws have taken on divergent identities within their respective jurisdictions when implemented and interpreted in the courtroom. We reveal and analyse differences in parliamentary intent concerning at what stage a person's decision-making agency is putatively empowered; judicial development of central concepts; underlying socio-cultural commitments; and outline opportunities for bi-directional learning in mental capacity law across both jurisdictions.