Medical Law Review最新文献

Where parents seek treatment for their young child that healthcare professionals cannot agree to, the High Court can determine what is in the child's best interests. Some activists and academics seek change to impose threshold criteria that would bolster the decision-making rights of parents and reduce deference to clinicians and the courts. We defend the best interests standard against arguments that a higher threshold of 'significant harm' should apply. We do so from ethical, legal, and clinical perspectives. The matter is of significant moral and practical importance, especially in light of the divergence of academic opinion, the burgeoning number of cases coming before the courts and recent case law and statutory attempts to effect change. We begin by disputing ethical claims that a significant harm threshold is preferable to the best interests standard, and then we set out jurisprudential and practical arguments that demonstrate the imprudence of a significant harm threshold and defend the established yardstick of best interests.

Heritable human genome editing (HHGE) to correct a nuclear gene sequence that would result in a serious genetic condition in a future child is presented as 'treatment' in various ethics and policy materials, and as morally preferable to the 'selection' practice of preimplantation genetic testing (PGT), which is subject to the disability critique. However, whether HHGE is 'treatment' for a future child, or another form of 'selection', or whether HHGE instead 'treats' prospective parents, are now central questions in the debate regarding its possible legalisation. This article argues that the idea of 'treatment' for a future child is largely a proxy for 'seriousness of purpose', intended to distinguish HHGE to avoid serious genetic conditions from less obviously justifiable uses; that HHGE is best understood, and morally justified, as a form of 'treatment' for prospective parents who strongly desire an unaffected genetically related child and who have no, or poor, options to achieve this; that HHGE would be morally permissible if consistent with that child's welfare; that legalisation is supportable with reference to the right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights; and that HHGE is morally distinguishable from PGT.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law on cross-border surrogacy establishes that a 'general and absolute impossibility' of obtaining recognition of the relationship, legally established in another country, between a surrogate-born child and their intended parents will violate the child's right to respect for private life. This approach requires States to accommodate familial bonds created through cross-border surrogacy and limits the margin of appreciation available to States to determine their national response. In recent case law, the ECtHR has adopted an interventionist approach in respect of national decision-making and has gone further than might be expected under the principle of subsidiarity. Examination of the emerging body of jurisprudence on cross-border surrogacy, however, reveals a preference for 'traditional' family formations, with the ECtHR tending to adopt a less interventionist and more deferential approach to national decision-making where the family at the centre of the case deviates from the structure of the family reflected in the seminal cross-border surrogacy case of Mennesson v France App no 65192/11 (ECtHR, 26 June 2014). This approach leads to inconsistency in the cross-border surrogacy case law as it creates something of a moving target for the vindication of children's rights in 'less traditional' family forms.

For the court to grant a parental order recognising intended parents as legal parents of a surrogate-born child, the gametes of at least one of the intended parents must have been used to create the embryo, under section 54(1)(b) and section 54A(1)(b) Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008. In the Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission's consultation paper, there was a provisional proposal to remove the genetic link requirement in cases of medical necessity. However, this proposal was not included in the Law Commissions' Final Report, instead recommending the retention of the requirement for a genetic link in almost all circumstances. This article contends that the Law Commissions' recommendation should be reconsidered in light of the child's right to identity. By reviewing how identity has been used by the courts when determining whether to grant a parental order, as well as a developing interpretation of Article 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and European Convention on Human Rights, it can be asserted that the identity of surrogate-born children necessitates recognition of the relationship between the child and intended parent(s), irrespective of a genetic link. On this basis, it is argued that there should be the possibility for intended parents to establish legal parenthood following surrogacy without the requirement for a genetic link.