Medical Law Review最新文献

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law on cross-border surrogacy establishes that a 'general and absolute impossibility' of obtaining recognition of the relationship, legally established in another country, between a surrogate-born child and their intended parents will violate the child's right to respect for private life. This approach requires States to accommodate familial bonds created through cross-border surrogacy and limits the margin of appreciation available to States to determine their national response. In recent case law, the ECtHR has adopted an interventionist approach in respect of national decision-making and has gone further than might be expected under the principle of subsidiarity. Examination of the emerging body of jurisprudence on cross-border surrogacy, however, reveals a preference for 'traditional' family formations, with the ECtHR tending to adopt a less interventionist and more deferential approach to national decision-making where the family at the centre of the case deviates from the structure of the family reflected in the seminal cross-border surrogacy case of Mennesson v France App no 65192/11 (ECtHR, 26 June 2014). This approach leads to inconsistency in the cross-border surrogacy case law as it creates something of a moving target for the vindication of children's rights in 'less traditional' family forms.

For the court to grant a parental order recognising intended parents as legal parents of a surrogate-born child, the gametes of at least one of the intended parents must have been used to create the embryo, under section 54(1)(b) and section 54A(1)(b) Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008. In the Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission's consultation paper, there was a provisional proposal to remove the genetic link requirement in cases of medical necessity. However, this proposal was not included in the Law Commissions' Final Report, instead recommending the retention of the requirement for a genetic link in almost all circumstances. This article contends that the Law Commissions' recommendation should be reconsidered in light of the child's right to identity. By reviewing how identity has been used by the courts when determining whether to grant a parental order, as well as a developing interpretation of Article 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and European Convention on Human Rights, it can be asserted that the identity of surrogate-born children necessitates recognition of the relationship between the child and intended parent(s), irrespective of a genetic link. On this basis, it is argued that there should be the possibility for intended parents to establish legal parenthood following surrogacy without the requirement for a genetic link.

Taking one's own life or attempting to do so has long been decriminalised in Australia. Aiding, counselling, or inciting another person to kill him or herself, however, remains a criminal offence. Yet, all six Australian States have now introduced laws allowing assistance in dying under certain circumstances. This article traces the recent history of Voluntary Assisted Dying (VAD) laws in Australia. It examines the introduction of the world's first assisted dying legislation in the Northern Territory in 1995 followed by the Federal Government's 1997 deprivation of the Territories' power to legislate on assisted dying invalidating said law. It further considers the fifty-seven failed Bills attempting to achieve law reform in this context in Australian jurisdictions between 1993 and 2017 with a view to identifying what factors may have contributed to the continuing lack of success. This article then outlines the rapid introduction of VAD laws in all six Australian States decriminalising VAD over the span of only 5 years. It ponders what may have changed to bring about this law reform. This article closes by contemplating potential future law reform in the Australian Territories, which have been reinstated with jurisdiction to legislate on VAD in December 2022.

Asylum-seekers, like any population, need healthcare services, yet national laws sometimes restrict access to such services. The European Social Charter (revised) protects the right to health and medical services. However, the Charter has a complex application, and its scope is limited concerning foreigners. This article analyses to what extent the provisions of the Charter on the right to health and medical assistance apply to adult asylum-seekers. It shows that the Charter may apply to various degrees to asylum-seekers depending on several circumstances, such as the national definition of residence or regular work, grounds for seeking asylum, citizenship or lack thereof. Depending on these factors, some asylum-seekers may receive full healthcare services, whereas others may have only limited rights. The article shows that the migrant statuses created by national and EU law do not fit in the system of statuses in the Charter, which might produce legal hindrances to accessing health-related rights for asylum-seekers. The article also discusses the possible ways for the European Committee of Social Rights to further expand the scope of the Charter's application.