Biosemiotics最新文献

Our article debates the issues at stake in the Heideggerian examination of the Umwelt theory in his Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. This discussion sheds light on the links and differences between the lifeworld that is constituted as a set of meanings and interactions, and the world that opens up to Being, by providing a definition of the world as what is experienced through “the accessibility of beings” (Heidegger, 1983/1995, p. 196, § 47), i.e. the lived relationship to the subjective world itself. As Heidegger (1983/1995, p. 192, § 46) theorizes the idea of the animal “poor in world” (based on the Uexküllian (1934/2010, p. 51) concept of “poverty”), he implies that both humans and animals perceive the fundamental nature of the world, albeit in different ways.

Therefore, the article contends that the distinct treatment of human beings helps avoid confusion between the ontology of beings and their ontic biological structure. As Uexküll also makes the human being the exception in the harmonics of nature, we demonstrate that Uexküll’s statement of the human imperfection in fact prevents a biological reductionism. This article thus highlights the challenge, for biosemiotics, to provide a clear distinction between the ontology of living beings and their biological disposition.

A somewhat prominent view in the literature is that language provides opportunity to program the brain with ‘cognitive gadgets’, or ‘virtual machines’. Here, I explore the possibility that thinking itself – internal symbolic responses to stimuli that are either intrinsic or extrinsic, and computational procedures that operate on these internal symbolic representations – is such a software product rather than just an emergent phenomenon of the brain’s hardware being ‘complex enough’, or the brain processing information in a manner that is ‘integrated enough’. I also present a testable hypothesis that would indicate the presence of such a thought-gadget, and briefly overview some evolutionary pre-requisites for its existence. Further, I explore some consequences the existence of such a gadget would entail for our understanding of consciousness. The nature of the gadget is left unspecified as the article is not a blueprint for the thinking gadget, but an argument in favor of its existence.

In the corpus of phenomenological philosophy (as far as it is influenced by the works of Jacob von Uexküll and the debate of phenomenologists with philosophical anthropologists such as E. Cassirer, F. J. J. Buytendijk, and A. Portmann), we find the allegation that one of the fundamental differences between human and non-human animals is that while the non-human animal has a species-specific umwelt, humans have access to (a certain idea of) welt. In this sense, Heidegger speaks of the animal as a being “poor-in-world” in contrast to man as a “world-making” being. Similarly, Merleau-Ponty states that language helps a human person step out of her umwelt into the idea of welt. In the present study, I proceed from the critical reflection of this umwelt–welt distinction, emphasizing the question of the status of this “world.” For a better understanding of this problem, I illustrate it by the example of sign language acquisition by congenitally deafblind people, using phenomenological analysis of intercorporeality and associated phenomena in combination with “dialogical epistemology” as an interpretive framework. Claude Romano’s thesis of “evential hermeneutics” can illuminate this situation, as it explains the vital role various events play in establishing the world through our experience. From this point of view, the “world” plays a role not as a sum of objects in a play of objective causes, but rather it is a transcendental field from which events arise.

The aim of this paper is to compare the theory of Gestalt qualities, introduced by the Austrian philosopher Christian von Ehrenfels (1859–1932), with the concept of Umwelt, proposed by Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944). The primary basis for the comparison will be the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961), who extensively discusses the two concepts in his work. In the Uexküll–Ehrenfelsian context, we focus on analysing the similarities and differences of their argumentation and model approaches to understanding the living and non-living natural entities, their mutual communication, development, and ontological grounding. We also consider the role of individual experience with the environment: in that context, the metaphysical frameworks within which the two thinkers operate in their efforts to explain natural phenomena are central to our comparative reflections.

The visible human body is composed of flesh and bones for the most part, yet an invisible orchestra of sensations and perceptions creates a virtual or phantom body that behaves like a shadow following every movement and gesture of its anatomical complement. This shadow becomes only “visible” to the individual when bodily integrity is affected, anatomically or cognitively. Phantom limbs have been known for a long time. They refer to the felt presence of a missing hand, leg, or other body part as if it was still in place. Reciprocally and of a supposedly cognitive origin, phantom extremities are reported by some patients that feel the virtual presence of a supernumerary limb – signifying anatomical “overcompleteness.” However, other patients feel as one of their limbs does not belong to their body – signifying “foreignness”. Various shades of the so-called body integrity identity disorder exemplify the assumed complex signification processes within the human body. The Peircean theory of signs and the Uexküllian concept of endosemiosis are combined to approach the still poorly understood phantom phenomena in light of representation and embodiment.

Based on Kolchinsky and Wolpert’s work on the semantics of autonomous agents, I propose an application of Mathematical Logic and Probability to model cognitive processes. In this work, I will follow Bateson’s insights on the hierarchy of learning in complex organisms and formalize his idea of applying Russell’s Type Theory. Following Weaver’s three levels for the communication problem, I link the Kolchinsky–Wolpert model to Bateson’s insights, and I reach a semantic and conceptual hierarchy in living systems as an explicative model of some adaptive constraints. Due to the generality of Kolchinsky and Wolpert’s hypotheses, I highlight some fundamental gaps between the results in current Artificial Intelligence and the semantic structures in human beings. In light of the consequences of my model, I conclude the paper by proposing a general definition of knowledge in probabilistic terms, overturning de Finetti’s Subjectivist Definition of Probability.

The present paper will summarise the methodology, the scientific outcomes, and the potential for generalisation of the model of a project that studied cohabitation between human inhabitants and liminal species (in the present case, corvids) in Tartu, Estonia, from October 2021 to July 2023, with a comparative field study in Paris, France. It will present the context and goals of using a semiotic model to map interspecific cohabitation, expose what kind of data can be used to feed the model in a relevant way and how it was done in the case of this project. This paper will present how the model diagnosed issues in cohabitation, both from material nuisances and cultural aspects, insisting on the concept of “hostile minority” that emerged from the study. It will discuss the importance of problem-solving in interspecific cohabitation, what the model suggested regarding this aspect, how this tool can be generalised to a large variety of cases and why it should be used this way.

This article reviews the edited volume “Evolvability: A Unifying Concept in Evolutionary Biology?” through biological and philosophical lenses. The book provides diverse angles on evolvability, which is affected by various hierarchical levels, timescales, and types of variation, thus moving beyond a purely genomics perspective. Evolvability is important to biosemiotics because understanding the dynamics of topological genotype spaces could help one better comprehend the phenotypic spaces of meaning, as developmental codes and interrelations can influence the emergence of biological novelty over time. This book is successful in provoking thought on evolvability's role as both a product and a driver of evolutionary innovations and explores the philosophical implications of how evolution has the capacity to generate novel forms of meaning.

In our target article, “Learning and the evolution of conscious agents” we outlined an evolutionary approach to consciousness, arguing that the evolution of a form of open-ended, representational, and generative learning (unlimited associative learning, UAL) drove the evolution of consciousness. Our view highlights the dynamics and functions of consciousness, delineates its taxonomic distribution and suggests a framework for exploring its developmental and evolutionary modifications. The approach we offer resonates with biosemioticians’ views, but as the responses to our target article show, our proposal also faces challenges and has led to suggestions that extend, develop and qualify it. Our response to the 14 varied and rich commentaries starts with the recurring and deep question raised by many of them – the relation between life and sentience. We explore this question by introducing and expanding on “vivaciousness”, a term we coined to describe the turbulent, flexible exploration-stabilization processes inherent in the living condition, as well as addressing the related concepts of Umwelt and selfhood. We then consider the question of the adequacy of unlimited associative learning (UAL) as an evolutionary transition marker (ETM) of minimal consciousness (rather than as a marker of a complex form of sentience), and the possible precursors of sentience. The engagement with these broad themes is entangled with a discussion of evolutionary transitions, constitutive emergence and the function/s of consciousness. The suggestions of our commentators, urging us to explore new concepts and new avenues of research within the framework of a richer view of evolution are then discussed. We end by briefly considering what we regard as a conceptual lacuna, which is leading to the indiscriminate use of the term “sentience” and which awaits further investigation.