Neuroethics最新文献

This short communication explores the idea of “stream of consciousness” and considers some of the ways in which scientific writing relies – even or perhaps especially insofar as it does not signal this fact – on the resources of literary language and literary thinking. Particular attention is given to notions of literal and figurative or metaphorical language, including “hydrological” and “ontic” metaphor. A crucial figure is simile (the “like”), discussed here in relation to the Thomas Nagel’s “What is it Like to Be a Bat?”, Todd Feinberg and Jon Mallatt’s Consciousness Demystified, and Anil Seth’s Being You: A New Science of Consciousness. Neuroethics cannot restrict itself to the domain of technology and the human. The deconstruction of anthropocentrism, already underway in literary modernism, calls for responsibility in relation to non-human as well as human life-forms. Virginia Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway provides rich and multifarious resources for exploring these issues. Woolf’s novel is considered as a kind of literary water music, in which sense and feeling is not limited to the human, and distinctions between consciousness and the environment are susceptible to dissolution. Woolf’s work is concerned with a conception of stream of consciousness as telepathic fluidity, as “merging minds” but without restitution of the individual or collective.

Despite its obvious advantages, the disruptive development of neurotechnology can pose risks to fundamental freedoms. In the context of such concerns, proposals have emerged in recent years either to design human rights de novo or to update the existing ones. These new rights in the age of neurotechnology are now widely referred to as “neurorights.” In parallel, there is a considerable amount of ongoing academic work related to updating the right to freedom of thought in order to include the protection of “freedom of thinking” (i.e., freedom of thought itself) and not only its social manifestations. Neurorights such as cognitive liberty, free will, mental freedom, and mental self-determination come into play here. Importantly, freedom of thought has often been considered a prerequisite for all the other fundamental freedoms and rights. In any case, just as other rights require additional legal instruments to guarantee their compliance, substantial neurorights will probably require specific complementary developments in procedural law. In relation to this, there is a long tradition of habeas corpus as an emergency remedy to enforce the rights of a citizen against illegal or arbitrary detention. More recently, the habeas data writ has been proposed and admitted in certain countries to guarantee a person’s ownership of their personal data. In this article, we propose to expand this procedural apparatus by incorporating a third habeas, which we call habeas cogitationem: a writ aimed primarily at enforcing the right to freedom of thinking (and, subsidiarily, the rest of neurorights) against direct, harmful interferences in a person’s thought process by both public and private perpetrators.

Chenwei Nie ([22]) argues against a Maherian one-factor approach to explaining delusion. We argue that his objections fail. They are largely based on a mistaken understanding of the approach (as committed to the claim that anomalous experience is sufficient for delusion). Where they are not so based, they instead rest on misinterpretation of recent defences of the position, and an underestimation of the resources available to the one-factor theory.

Abstract

Advances in neuroscience have enabled the transition of transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) from research and clinical settings to public use. For this primarily home-based context, tDCS has been popularized as a do-it-yourself (DIY) approach to improved cognition and wellness. The line between wellness and health is blurry, however, and little is known about how engagement with therapeutic tDCS impacts users’ interactions with other interventions such as clinical consultations, pharmacotherapy, complementary medicine, and even other neurotechnology. To close this gap, we collected data from the online content aggregator Reddit and analyzed posts pertaining to tDCS. Findings indicate that most users turn to Reddit to request information about tDCS as an adjunct, but not as a bypass, to ongoing or prior approaches. Posts suggest that mainstream medical care is viewed as necessary but not sufficient to address conditions such as depression and anxiety. Users discuss a mix of benefits and harms. This discourse provides valuable insights into the health practices, concerns and priorities of users, and new knowledge for informing applications of neurotechnology both inside and outside the therapeutic setting.

This study adopted an empirical method to investigate lay people’s attitudes toward the bioethical issues of human-animal chimeric brains. The results of online surveys showed that (1) people did not entirely reject chimeric brain research, but showed slightly more negative responses than ordinary animal testing; and that (2) their ethical concerns arose in connection with the perception that chimerism in the brain would humanize the animal. This means that people’s psychology was consistent with the ethical argument that crossing the human-animal boundary would bring moral confusion to our society. Meanwhile, it was not in line with another argument that moral status depended on having high capacities, and that chimerism would cause a problem if it enhanced animals’ capacities. Furthermore, this study analyzed additional psychological factors related to people’s moral judgment and the relationship among those factors. Several psychological factors, such as the perception that chimeric brain research is unnatural, were identified as mediating the relationship between perception of animal humanization and ethical concerns about creating and using chimeric brains. Introducing an empirical approach to the ethics of human-animal chimeric brains brought two findings: (1) this study informed us of socially shared intuition regarding this novel technology; and (2) it unveiled the psychological processes behind people’s ethical concerns in more detail than they spontaneously mentioned. These findings will help to build normative arguments and future policies that are understandable and acceptable to society.

In the historical context of a crisis in biological psychiatry, psychedelic drugs paired with psychotherapy are globally re-emerging in research clinics as a potential transdiagnostic therapy for treating mood disorders, addictions, and other forms of psychological distress. The treatments are poised to soon shift from clinical trials to widespread service delivery in places like Australia, North America, and Europe, which has prompted ethical questions by social scientists and bioethicists. Taking a broader view, we argue that the ethics of psychedelic therapy concerns not simply how psychotherapies are different when paired with psychedelic drugs, but how psychedelic therapies shape and are shaped by different values, norms, and metaphysical commitments. Drawing from the published literature and interviews with seven psychedelic therapists working in clinical trials in the United States, Germany, Switzerland, and Australia, this article opens the black box of the treatments to consider the values and informal debates currently animating the therapies. Considering questions of patient autonomy, mechanisms of therapeutic action, and which therapies are best suited to pair with psychedelic substances, we examine the ethics of psychedelic therapy as an emergent form of life. To bring this form of life out in fuller relief, we conclude by comparing and contrasting it with ayahuasca use in Amazonian shamanism.

Neural organoids are laboratory-generated entities that replicate certain structural and functional features of the human brain. Most neural organoids are disembodied—completely decoupled from sensory input and motor output. As such, questions about their potential capacity for consciousness are exceptionally difficult to answer. While not disputing the need for caution regarding certain neural organoid types, this paper appeals to two broad constraints on any adequate theory of consciousness—the first involving the dependence of consciousness on embodiment; the second involving the dependence of consciousness on representations—to argue that disembodied neural organoids are not plausible candidates for consciousness.

Environmental ethicists and experts in human health have raised concerns about the effects of hydraulic fracking to access natural oil and gas resources found deep in shale rock formations on surrounding ecosystems and communities. In this study, we analyzed the prevalence of discourse on brain and mental health, and ethics, in the peer-reviewed and grey literature in the five-year period between 2016 and 2022. A total of 84 articles met inclusion criteria for analysis. Seventy-six percent (76%) mentioned impacts on brain (e.g., neural tube defects, neurological symptoms), and mental health (e.g., negative psychological effects, stress, depression) briefly; 11 reports dedicated substantive discourse to either or both together. References to safety (77%) dominated the ethics context. Discussion of environmental injustices as fracking sites disproportionately affect vulnerable communities appeared in 38% of the papers. We examine the findings through the lens of environmental neuroethics that brings human-made changes to the environment, brain and mental health, and ethics together into three interwoven lines of inquiry.

A psychedelic renaissance is currently taking place in mental healthcare. The number of psychedelic-assisted therapy trials is growing steadily, and some countries already grant psychiatrists special permission to use psychedelics in non-research contexts under certain conditions. These clinical advances must be accompanied by ethical inquiry. One pressing ethical question involves whether patients can even give informed consent to psychedelic-assisted therapy: the treatment’s transformative nature seems to block its assessment, suggesting that patients are unable to understand what undergoing psychedelic-assisted therapy actually means for them and whether it aligns with their values. The present paper argues that patients often have sufficient knowledge to give informed consent because they know that they want to change their negative status quo and that psychedelic-assisted therapy offers an effective way to do so. Accordingly, patients can understand what the transformative nature of psychedelic-assisted therapy means for them and a make a value-aligned choice even if they are unable to anticipate the manifestation of a psychedelic experience.

Abstract

Mental health-related data generated by app users during the routine use of Consumer Mental Health Apps (CMHAs) are being increasingly leveraged for research and product improvement studies. However, it remains unclear which ethical safeguards and practices should be implemented by researchers and app developers to protect users during these studies, and concerns have been raised over their current implementation in CMHAs. To better understand which ethical safeguards and practices are implemented, why and how, 17 app developers and researchers were interviewed who had been involved in using CMHA data for studies. Interviewees discussed the impact on stakeholder interests, sufficiency thresholds and procedural alterations of informed consent, data protection, gathering app user perspectives and representing users in app design and study conduct, and ensuring adequate support. Although the reasoning behind how and why these ethical safeguards and practices should be implemented showed considerable variability and several gaps, interviewees converged on various general lines of reasoning. This allowed for the development of a coherent and nuanced account that could prove useful for future CMHA studies and which could stimulate further normative investigation of the role of ethical safeguards and practices in these studies.