Pub Date : 2023-11-04DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04386-x
Torben Braüner
Abstract In this paper various branching time semantics are compared with the aim of clarifying the role of true futures of counterfactual moments, that is, true futures of moments outside the true chronicle. First we give an account of Arthur Prior’s Ockhamistic semantics where truth of a formula is relative to a moment and a chronicle. We prove that this is equivalent to a version of a semantics put forward by Thomason and Gupta where truth is relative to a moment and what is called a chronicle function which assigns a chronicle to each moment. Later we discuss how a semantic theory considered by Belnap and Green may be formalised. It comes about by assuming a chronicle function to be given once and for all. However, this semantics invalidates an intuitively valid formula, so we present an alternative semantics where the formula in question is valid. Furthermore, we shall exhibit an intuitively invalid formula which is invalid in our alternative semantics, but which is valid in Prior’s Ockhamistic semantics. So we can conclude that Prior’s Ockhamistic validity does not imply validity in the alternative semantics. On the other hand, the converse implication does hold, as we shall prove. Summary of mathematical results: We have proved that Prior’s Ockhamistic semantics has the same valid formulas as Thomason and Gupta’s semantics, and we have proved that Prior’s Ockhamistic semantics has strictly more valid formulas than the alternative semantics.
{"title":"The true futures","authors":"Torben Braüner","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04386-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04386-x","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper various branching time semantics are compared with the aim of clarifying the role of true futures of counterfactual moments, that is, true futures of moments outside the true chronicle. First we give an account of Arthur Prior’s Ockhamistic semantics where truth of a formula is relative to a moment and a chronicle. We prove that this is equivalent to a version of a semantics put forward by Thomason and Gupta where truth is relative to a moment and what is called a chronicle function which assigns a chronicle to each moment. Later we discuss how a semantic theory considered by Belnap and Green may be formalised. It comes about by assuming a chronicle function to be given once and for all. However, this semantics invalidates an intuitively valid formula, so we present an alternative semantics where the formula in question is valid. Furthermore, we shall exhibit an intuitively invalid formula which is invalid in our alternative semantics, but which is valid in Prior’s Ockhamistic semantics. So we can conclude that Prior’s Ockhamistic validity does not imply validity in the alternative semantics. On the other hand, the converse implication does hold, as we shall prove. Summary of mathematical results: We have proved that Prior’s Ockhamistic semantics has the same valid formulas as Thomason and Gupta’s semantics, and we have proved that Prior’s Ockhamistic semantics has strictly more valid formulas than the alternative semantics.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"61 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135774748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-03DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04325-w
Ann C. Thresher
{"title":"Compact spaces and privileged times; what the video game asteroids can teach us about the present","authors":"Ann C. Thresher","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04325-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04325-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"68 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135869011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04355-4
Christian Kietzmann
Abstract In recent years several philosophers have proposed what has come to be called the Reasoning View of normative reasons, according to which normative reasons are premises of sound reasoning. The reasoning view has come under some criticism, which chiefly consists in counterexamples that purport to show that something can be a premise of sound reasoning without intuitively being a normative reason, or can be a normative reason without being a premise of sound reasoning. I here consider and reject three examples that were recently put forward. Discussing them will allow me to clarify the Reasoning View in important respects.
{"title":"Why reasons and reasoning don’t come apart","authors":"Christian Kietzmann","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04355-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04355-4","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In recent years several philosophers have proposed what has come to be called the Reasoning View of normative reasons, according to which normative reasons are premises of sound reasoning. The reasoning view has come under some criticism, which chiefly consists in counterexamples that purport to show that something can be a premise of sound reasoning without intuitively being a normative reason, or can be a normative reason without being a premise of sound reasoning. I here consider and reject three examples that were recently put forward. Discussing them will allow me to clarify the Reasoning View in important respects.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"8 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135933507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04376-z
Adrian Wüthrich
Abstract I present first results of my analysis of a collection of about 24,000 email messages from internal mailing lists of the ATLAS collaboration, at CERN, the particle physics laboratory, during the years 2010–2013. I represent the communication on these mailing lists as a network in which the members of the collaboration are connected if they reply to each other’s messages. Such a network allows me to characterize the collaboration from a bird’s eye view of its communication structure in epistemically relevant terms. I propose to interpret established measures such as the density of the network as indicators for the degree of “collaborativeness” of the collaboration and the presence of “communities” as a sign of cognitive division of labor. Similar methods have been used in philosophical and historical studies of collective knowledge generation but mostly at the level of information exchange, cooperation and competition between individual researchers or small groups. The present article aims to take initial steps towards a transfer of these methods and bring them to bear on the processes of collaboration inside a “collective author.”
{"title":"Characterizing a collaboration by its communication structure","authors":"Adrian Wüthrich","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04376-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04376-z","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I present first results of my analysis of a collection of about 24,000 email messages from internal mailing lists of the ATLAS collaboration, at CERN, the particle physics laboratory, during the years 2010–2013. I represent the communication on these mailing lists as a network in which the members of the collaboration are connected if they reply to each other’s messages. Such a network allows me to characterize the collaboration from a bird’s eye view of its communication structure in epistemically relevant terms. I propose to interpret established measures such as the density of the network as indicators for the degree of “collaborativeness” of the collaboration and the presence of “communities” as a sign of cognitive division of labor. Similar methods have been used in philosophical and historical studies of collective knowledge generation but mostly at the level of information exchange, cooperation and competition between individual researchers or small groups. The present article aims to take initial steps towards a transfer of these methods and bring them to bear on the processes of collaboration inside a “collective author.”","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"10 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135933767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04380-3
Tom Darling
Abstract I identify and then aim to resolve a tension between the psychological and existential conceptions of boredom. The dominant view in psychology is that boredom is an emotional state that is adaptive and self-regulatory. In contrast, in the philosophical phenomenological tradition, boredom is often considered as an existentially important mood. I leverage the predictive processing framework to offer an integrative account of boredom that allows us to resolve these tensions. This account explains the functional aspects of boredom-as-emotion in the psychological literature, offering a principled way of defining boredom’s function in terms of prediction-error-minimisation. However, mediated through predictive processing, we can also integrate the phenomenological view of boredom as a mood; in this light, boredom tracks our grip on the world – revealing a potentially fundamental (mis)attunement.
{"title":"Synthesising boredom: a predictive processing approach","authors":"Tom Darling","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04380-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04380-3","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I identify and then aim to resolve a tension between the psychological and existential conceptions of boredom. The dominant view in psychology is that boredom is an emotional state that is adaptive and self-regulatory. In contrast, in the philosophical phenomenological tradition, boredom is often considered as an existentially important mood. I leverage the predictive processing framework to offer an integrative account of boredom that allows us to resolve these tensions. This account explains the functional aspects of boredom-as-emotion in the psychological literature, offering a principled way of defining boredom’s function in terms of prediction-error-minimisation. However, mediated through predictive processing, we can also integrate the phenomenological view of boredom as a mood; in this light, boredom tracks our grip on the world – revealing a potentially fundamental (mis)attunement.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"80 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135934356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04392-z
Jaakko Hirvelä
Abstract Most of the literature surrounding virtue reliabilism revolves around issues pertaining to the analysis of knowledge. With the exception of the lottery paradox, virtue reliabilists have paid relatively little attention to classic epistemological paradoxes, such as Moore’s paradox. This is a significant omission given how central role such paradoxes have in epistemic theorizing. In this essay I take a step towards remedying this shortcoming by providing a solution to Moore’s paradox. The solution that I offer stems directly from the core of virtue reliabilism.
{"title":"A virtue reliabilist solution to moore’s paradox","authors":"Jaakko Hirvelä","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04392-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04392-z","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Most of the literature surrounding virtue reliabilism revolves around issues pertaining to the analysis of knowledge. With the exception of the lottery paradox, virtue reliabilists have paid relatively little attention to classic epistemological paradoxes, such as Moore’s paradox. This is a significant omission given how central role such paradoxes have in epistemic theorizing. In this essay I take a step towards remedying this shortcoming by providing a solution to Moore’s paradox. The solution that I offer stems directly from the core of virtue reliabilism.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"34 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135934708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04397-8
Guido Cassinandri, Marco Fasoli
Abstract Given the explanatory stalemate between ‘embedded’ (EMB) and ‘extended’ (EXT) cognition, various authors have proposed normative and moral arguments in favour of EXT. According to what we call the “extended cognition moral narrative” (EXT-MN) (Cassinadri, 2022), we should embrace EXT and dismiss EMB, because the former leads to morally preferable consequences with respect to the latter. In this article we argue that two arguments following the EXT moral narrative are flawed. In Sect. 2.1 and 2.2, we present respectively King (2016) and Vold’s (2018) ‘argument from assessment of capacities’ (AAC) and Clowes (2013), Farina and Lavazza’s (2022a) ‘cognitive diminishment argument’ (CDA). The AAC states that we should embrace EXT over EMB since the former is better at attributing cognitive credit to individuals with learning disabilities who use assistive tools to complete their learning tasks, thus avoiding their marginalisation. The CDA states that EMB implies a morally undesirable picture of the agent in terms of cognitive diminishment. In Sect. 3, we clarify and criticise the underlying assumptions of the AAC and CDA: the “cognitive credit assumption”, the “marginalisation assumption” and, more generally, an ableist conception of disabled agency. In Sect. 3.1, we discuss the role of moto-perceptual skills and metacognitive credit involved in complex cases of tool-use, to demonstrate that the EXT-MN is uninformative in addressing these cases. To conclude, in Sect. 4 we argue that AAC and CDA fail to present EXT as descriptively and normatively superior to EMB.
{"title":"Rejecting the extended cognition moral narrative: a critique of two normative arguments for extended cognition","authors":"Guido Cassinandri, Marco Fasoli","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04397-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04397-8","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Given the explanatory stalemate between ‘embedded’ (EMB) and ‘extended’ (EXT) cognition, various authors have proposed normative and moral arguments in favour of EXT. According to what we call the “extended cognition moral narrative” (EXT-MN) (Cassinadri, 2022), we should embrace EXT and dismiss EMB, because the former leads to morally preferable consequences with respect to the latter. In this article we argue that two arguments following the EXT moral narrative are flawed. In Sect. 2.1 and 2.2, we present respectively King (2016) and Vold’s (2018) ‘argument from assessment of capacities’ (AAC) and Clowes (2013), Farina and Lavazza’s (2022a) ‘cognitive diminishment argument’ (CDA). The AAC states that we should embrace EXT over EMB since the former is better at attributing cognitive credit to individuals with learning disabilities who use assistive tools to complete their learning tasks, thus avoiding their marginalisation. The CDA states that EMB implies a morally undesirable picture of the agent in terms of cognitive diminishment. In Sect. 3, we clarify and criticise the underlying assumptions of the AAC and CDA: the “cognitive credit assumption”, the “marginalisation assumption” and, more generally, an ableist conception of disabled agency. In Sect. 3.1, we discuss the role of moto-perceptual skills and metacognitive credit involved in complex cases of tool-use, to demonstrate that the EXT-MN is uninformative in addressing these cases. To conclude, in Sect. 4 we argue that AAC and CDA fail to present EXT as descriptively and normatively superior to EMB.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"42 11","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135935028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04345-6
Jacek Wawer
Abstract A novel fatalistic argument that combines elements of modal, temporal, and epistemic logic to prove that the fixed past is not compatible with the open future has recently been presented by Lampert (Analysis 82(3):426–434, 2022). By the construction of a countermodel, it is shown that his line of reasoning is defective. However, it is also explained how Lampert’s argument could be corrected if it were supported with an extra premise regarding the temporal status of a priori knowledge. This additional assumption—which was tacit in the original presentation—is shown to be the weakest link, and it is argued that, despite Lampert’s assurance, it can be plausibly rejected in a roughly Ockhamist framework. Thus, it is concluded that the fixed past poses no threat to the open future; however, a few different lessons about knowledge, necessity, and time are drawn from careful reflection on this novel argument.
{"title":"A problem with the fixed past fixed","authors":"Jacek Wawer","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04345-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04345-6","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A novel fatalistic argument that combines elements of modal, temporal, and epistemic logic to prove that the fixed past is not compatible with the open future has recently been presented by Lampert (Analysis 82(3):426–434, 2022). By the construction of a countermodel, it is shown that his line of reasoning is defective. However, it is also explained how Lampert’s argument could be corrected if it were supported with an extra premise regarding the temporal status of a priori knowledge. This additional assumption—which was tacit in the original presentation—is shown to be the weakest link, and it is argued that, despite Lampert’s assurance, it can be plausibly rejected in a roughly Ockhamist framework. Thus, it is concluded that the fixed past poses no threat to the open future; however, a few different lessons about knowledge, necessity, and time are drawn from careful reflection on this novel argument.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"12 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135935479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-01DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04311-2
Grace Helton, Christopher Register
{"title":"Hot-cold empathy gaps and the grounds of authenticity","authors":"Grace Helton, Christopher Register","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04311-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04311-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"29 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135325533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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