Pub Date : 2023-10-07DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04339-4
Henry Taylor
Abstract This paper develops and defends a compound powerful qualities view of properties. According to this view, properties are essentially composed of distinct powerful and qualitative elements. First, I outline an argument for the compound powerful qualities view, based on the claim that it has the explanatory power of other views, without incurring their costs. Second, I argue that the view has the resources to explain how properties are individuated, by claiming that properties are partially individuated by their qualitative elements, and partially by their powerful elements. Third, I distinguish two versions of the view, one of which says that the qualitative and powerful are parts of properties, the other of which says that they are aspects of properties. I argue that the parthood view is the more parsimonious because it can avoid postulating a novel metaphysical relation. Fourth, I argue that the relation between the powerful and qualitative elements of a property is necessary, and lay out various viable options concerning what the relation might be, including grounding and primitivism.
{"title":"Compound powerful qualities: properties as compounds of distinct powers and qualities","authors":"Henry Taylor","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04339-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04339-4","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper develops and defends a compound powerful qualities view of properties. According to this view, properties are essentially composed of distinct powerful and qualitative elements. First, I outline an argument for the compound powerful qualities view, based on the claim that it has the explanatory power of other views, without incurring their costs. Second, I argue that the view has the resources to explain how properties are individuated, by claiming that properties are partially individuated by their qualitative elements, and partially by their powerful elements. Third, I distinguish two versions of the view, one of which says that the qualitative and powerful are parts of properties, the other of which says that they are aspects of properties. I argue that the parthood view is the more parsimonious because it can avoid postulating a novel metaphysical relation. Fourth, I argue that the relation between the powerful and qualitative elements of a property is necessary, and lay out various viable options concerning what the relation might be, including grounding and primitivism.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"201 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135254982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-05DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04340-x
Ric Sims
{"title":"Boundary objects, trading zones, and stigmergy: the social and the cognitive in science","authors":"Ric Sims","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04340-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04340-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"100 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134975186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-03DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04262-8
Shuhei Shimamura, Tuomo Tiisala
Abstract This paper presents a new argument to defend the normativity of meaning, specifically the thesis that there are no meanings without norms. The argument starts from the observation inferentialists have emphasized that incompatibility relations between sentences are a necessary part of meaning as it is understood. We motivate this approach by showing that the standard normativist strategy in the literature, which is developed in terms of veridical reference that may swing free from the speaker’s understanding, violates the ought-implies-can principle, but ours does not. In addition, our approach is superior because, unlike the dominant approach, it can be extended from declarative sentences to non-representational uses of language. In this paper, however, we only formulate the argument for the base case that involves incompatibility relations between declarative sentences. The goal is not to derive norms from something that is not normative, but to explicate the distinctive type of normativity that is built into meaning as it is understood by language-users. The explication proceeds in two steps. (1) For any sentence s a speaker understands, there is another sentence s’ that is (and is understood by the speaker as) incompatible with s . (2) In virtue of understanding this incompatibility of meanings, she ought not to be committed to both s and s’ . This prohibition is not derived from instrumental practical reason, nor is it based on representational correctness, but its source is the incompatibility of meanings.
{"title":"Normativity of meaning: An inferentialist argument","authors":"Shuhei Shimamura, Tuomo Tiisala","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04262-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04262-8","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper presents a new argument to defend the normativity of meaning, specifically the thesis that there are no meanings without norms. The argument starts from the observation inferentialists have emphasized that incompatibility relations between sentences are a necessary part of meaning as it is understood. We motivate this approach by showing that the standard normativist strategy in the literature, which is developed in terms of veridical reference that may swing free from the speaker’s understanding, violates the ought-implies-can principle, but ours does not. In addition, our approach is superior because, unlike the dominant approach, it can be extended from declarative sentences to non-representational uses of language. In this paper, however, we only formulate the argument for the base case that involves incompatibility relations between declarative sentences. The goal is not to derive norms from something that is not normative, but to explicate the distinctive type of normativity that is built into meaning as it is understood by language-users. The explication proceeds in two steps. (1) For any sentence s a speaker understands, there is another sentence s’ that is (and is understood by the speaker as) incompatible with s . (2) In virtue of understanding this incompatibility of meanings, she ought not to be committed to both s and s’ . This prohibition is not derived from instrumental practical reason, nor is it based on representational correctness, but its source is the incompatibility of meanings.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135689543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Purpose: This study aimed to report 12 years of experience in the development of a quality assurance system in radiation oncology in a university hospital.
Material and methods: We developed the Quality Assurance Program in Radiation Oncology (QUAPRO) in 2008 to detect treatment deviation in the radiotherapy (RT) process with three steps of near-miss detection: simulation and prescription (primary check, PC), treatment planning (secondary check, SC), and treatment delivery process (tertiary check, TC). We transferred our paper-based medical records to electronic-based radiotherapy information systems (RTISs) in 2013. QUAPRO was completely integrated into RTIS in 2017. Since then, electronic-based incident reporting has been conducted. The program is called the Radiation Incident Learning System (RILS). The near-miss rates were compared during the three time periods: 2008-2012, 2013-2017, and 2017-2020.
Results: Five years of paper-based QUAPRO for 2008-2012 demonstrated a fluctuation in the checking ratio, with a gradually increasing rate of near misses of 3.5-19.7%. After electronic-based medical records were developed in 2013, the results revealed a dramatic increase from a rate of 2.7 to 4.2 in the number of checks per patient and achieved an increased rate of near misses of 24.7% for PC, SC, and TC. The rate of near misses gradually decreased to 5.3% after 2017 because of RT workflow improvement.
Conclusion: The analysis of 12 years in near-miss data reflected the effectiveness of our quality assurance program. The QUAPRO system can detect near-miss incidents in the whole RT workflow and illustrate the detection improvement when integrated into electronic-based medical records. Regular feedback and exploration of near-miss reporting are recommended for proper RT workflow improvement.
{"title":"Development of a quality assurance system in radiation oncology: A 12-year experience in a University Hospital.","authors":"Wannapha Nobnop, Vicharn Lorvidhaya, Somsak Wanwilairat, Anirut Watcharawipha, Ekkasit Tharavichitkul, Wimrak Onchan, Somvilai Chakrabandhu, Pitchayaponne Klunklin, Bongkot Jia-Mahasap, Pooriwat Muangwong, Imjai Chitapanarux","doi":"10.4103/jcrt.jcrt_39_22","DOIUrl":"10.4103/jcrt.jcrt_39_22","url":null,"abstract":"<p><strong>Purpose: </strong>This study aimed to report 12 years of experience in the development of a quality assurance system in radiation oncology in a university hospital.</p><p><strong>Material and methods: </strong>We developed the Quality Assurance Program in Radiation Oncology (QUAPRO) in 2008 to detect treatment deviation in the radiotherapy (RT) process with three steps of near-miss detection: simulation and prescription (primary check, PC), treatment planning (secondary check, SC), and treatment delivery process (tertiary check, TC). We transferred our paper-based medical records to electronic-based radiotherapy information systems (RTISs) in 2013. QUAPRO was completely integrated into RTIS in 2017. Since then, electronic-based incident reporting has been conducted. The program is called the Radiation Incident Learning System (RILS). The near-miss rates were compared during the three time periods: 2008-2012, 2013-2017, and 2017-2020.</p><p><strong>Results: </strong>Five years of paper-based QUAPRO for 2008-2012 demonstrated a fluctuation in the checking ratio, with a gradually increasing rate of near misses of 3.5-19.7%. After electronic-based medical records were developed in 2013, the results revealed a dramatic increase from a rate of 2.7 to 4.2 in the number of checks per patient and achieved an increased rate of near misses of 24.7% for PC, SC, and TC. The rate of near misses gradually decreased to 5.3% after 2017 because of RT workflow improvement.</p><p><strong>Conclusion: </strong>The analysis of 12 years in near-miss data reflected the effectiveness of our quality assurance program. The QUAPRO system can detect near-miss incidents in the whole RT workflow and illustrate the detection improvement when integrated into electronic-based medical records. Regular feedback and exploration of near-miss reporting are recommended for proper RT workflow improvement.</p>","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"186 1","pages":"1975-1981"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74175307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-29DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04316-x
Bartosz Maćkiewicz, Katarzyna Kuś, Witold M. Hensel
Abstract According to the expertise defense, practitioners of the method of cases need not worry about findings that ordinary people’s philosophical intuitions depend on epistemically irrelevant factors. This is because, honed by years of training, the intuitions of professional philosophers likely surpass those of the folk. To investigate this, we conducted a controlled longitudinal study of a broad range of intuitions in undergraduate students of philosophy (n = 226), whose case judgments we sampled after each semester throughout their studies. Under the assumption, made by proponents of the expertise defense, that formal training in philosophy gives rise to the kind of expertise that accounts for changes in the students’ responses to philosophically puzzling cases, our data suggest that the acquired cognitive skills only affect single case judgments at a time. There does not seem to exist either a general expertise that informs case judgments in all areas of philosophy, or an expertise specific to particular subfields. In fact, we argue that available evidence, including the results of cross-sectional research, is best explained in terms of differences in adopted beliefs about specific cases, rather than acquired cognitive skills. We also investigated whether individuals who choose to study philosophy have atypical intuitions compared to the general population and whether students whose intuitions are at odds with textbook consensus are more likely than others to drop out of the philosophy program.
{"title":"The influence of philosophical training on the evaluation of philosophical cases: a controlled longitudinal study","authors":"Bartosz Maćkiewicz, Katarzyna Kuś, Witold M. Hensel","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04316-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04316-x","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to the expertise defense, practitioners of the method of cases need not worry about findings that ordinary people’s philosophical intuitions depend on epistemically irrelevant factors. This is because, honed by years of training, the intuitions of professional philosophers likely surpass those of the folk. To investigate this, we conducted a controlled longitudinal study of a broad range of intuitions in undergraduate students of philosophy (n = 226), whose case judgments we sampled after each semester throughout their studies. Under the assumption, made by proponents of the expertise defense, that formal training in philosophy gives rise to the kind of expertise that accounts for changes in the students’ responses to philosophically puzzling cases, our data suggest that the acquired cognitive skills only affect single case judgments at a time. There does not seem to exist either a general expertise that informs case judgments in all areas of philosophy, or an expertise specific to particular subfields. In fact, we argue that available evidence, including the results of cross-sectional research, is best explained in terms of differences in adopted beliefs about specific cases, rather than acquired cognitive skills. We also investigated whether individuals who choose to study philosophy have atypical intuitions compared to the general population and whether students whose intuitions are at odds with textbook consensus are more likely than others to drop out of the philosophy program.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135198964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-29DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04329-6
Daniel Kostić, Willem Halffman
Abstract The philosophical literature on scientific explanation in neuroscience has been dominated by the idea of mechanisms. The mechanist philosophers often claim that neuroscience is in the business of finding mechanisms. This view has been challenged in numerous ways by showing that there are other successful and widespread explanatory strategies in neuroscience. However, the empirical evidence for all these claims was hitherto lacking. Empirical evidence about the pervasiveness and uses of various explanatory strategies in neuroscience is particularly needed because examples and case studies that are used to illustrate philosophical claims so far tend to be hand-picked. The risk of confirmation bias is therefore considerable: when looking for white swans, all one finds is that swans are white. The more systematic quantitative and qualitative bibliometric study of a large body of relevant literature that we present in this paper can put such claims into perspective. Using text mining tools, we identify the typical linguistic patterns used in the alleged mechanistic, dynamical, and topological explanations in the literature, their preponderance and how they change over time. Our findings show abundant use of mechanistic language, but also the presence of a significant neuroscience literature using topological and dynamical explanatory language, which grows over time and increasingly differentiates from each other and from mechanistic explanations.
{"title":"Mapping explanatory language in neuroscience","authors":"Daniel Kostić, Willem Halffman","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04329-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04329-6","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The philosophical literature on scientific explanation in neuroscience has been dominated by the idea of mechanisms. The mechanist philosophers often claim that neuroscience is in the business of finding mechanisms. This view has been challenged in numerous ways by showing that there are other successful and widespread explanatory strategies in neuroscience. However, the empirical evidence for all these claims was hitherto lacking. Empirical evidence about the pervasiveness and uses of various explanatory strategies in neuroscience is particularly needed because examples and case studies that are used to illustrate philosophical claims so far tend to be hand-picked. The risk of confirmation bias is therefore considerable: when looking for white swans, all one finds is that swans are white. The more systematic quantitative and qualitative bibliometric study of a large body of relevant literature that we present in this paper can put such claims into perspective. Using text mining tools, we identify the typical linguistic patterns used in the alleged mechanistic, dynamical, and topological explanations in the literature, their preponderance and how they change over time. Our findings show abundant use of mechanistic language, but also the presence of a significant neuroscience literature using topological and dynamical explanatory language, which grows over time and increasingly differentiates from each other and from mechanistic explanations.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135198965","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-28DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04337-6
Sophia Dandelet
Abstract This essay is about a special kind of transformative choice that plays a key role in debates about permissivism, the view that some bodies of evidence permit more than one rational response. A prominent objection to this view contends that its defender cannot vindicate our aversion to arbitrarily switching between belief states in the absence of any new evidence. A prominent response to that objection tries to provide the desired vindication by appealing to the idea that arbitrary switching would involve a special kind of transformative choice: the choice to change one’s epistemic standards, i.e., one’s commitments regarding the relative importance of achieving true belief and avoiding false belief. My first aims here are to argue that this response is unsuccessful and propose an alternative. My secondary aim is to consider how this discussion might bear on more general debates about transformative choice.
{"title":"Arbitrary switching and concern for truth","authors":"Sophia Dandelet","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04337-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04337-6","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This essay is about a special kind of transformative choice that plays a key role in debates about permissivism, the view that some bodies of evidence permit more than one rational response. A prominent objection to this view contends that its defender cannot vindicate our aversion to arbitrarily switching between belief states in the absence of any new evidence. A prominent response to that objection tries to provide the desired vindication by appealing to the idea that arbitrary switching would involve a special kind of transformative choice: the choice to change one’s epistemic standards, i.e., one’s commitments regarding the relative importance of achieving true belief and avoiding false belief. My first aims here are to argue that this response is unsuccessful and propose an alternative. My secondary aim is to consider how this discussion might bear on more general debates about transformative choice.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135386938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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