Moods, orthodoxy holds, exist outside the space of reasons. A depressed subject may change their thoughts and behaviors as a result of their depression. But, according to this view, their mood gives them no genuine reason to do so. Instead, moods are mere causal influences on cognition. The issue is that moods, with their diffuse phenomenology, appear to lack intentionality (Directionlessness). But intentionality appears to be a necessary condition on rationality (The Content Constraint). Together, these principles conflict with the idea that moods are rational states of mind (Mood Rationality). The inconsistency of these three principles is the Puzzle of Mood Rationality. Now to many, this puzzle is hardly vexing: we should reject Mood Rationality. But, I argue, Mood Rationality is true despite its unpopularity. Thus, we need another way of resolving the puzzle. To do so, I distinguish intentionality as a first‐personal, phenomenological notion from representation as a third‐personal, cognitive scientific notion. I then argue that moods satisfy a revised version of the Content Constraint and sketch an account of moods as representational but non‐intentional mental states, drawing on the Valuationist paradigm in affective neuroscience. I end by showing how this account enables us to explain moods’ rationality.
{"title":"The puzzle of mood rationality","authors":"Adam Bradley","doi":"10.1111/nous.12517","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12517","url":null,"abstract":"Moods, orthodoxy holds, exist outside the space of reasons. A depressed subject may change their thoughts and behaviors as a result of their depression. But, according to this view, their mood gives them no genuine reason to do so. Instead, moods are mere causal influences on cognition. The issue is that moods, with their diffuse phenomenology, appear to lack intentionality (<jats:italic>Directionlessness</jats:italic>). But intentionality appears to be a necessary condition on rationality (<jats:italic>The Content Constraint</jats:italic>). Together, these principles conflict with the idea that moods are rational states of mind (<jats:italic>Mood Rationality</jats:italic>). The inconsistency of these three principles is <jats:italic>the Puzzle of Mood Rationality</jats:italic>. Now to many, this puzzle is hardly vexing: we should reject Mood Rationality. But, I argue, Mood Rationality is true despite its unpopularity. Thus, we need another way of resolving the puzzle. To do so, I distinguish intentionality as a first‐personal, phenomenological notion from representation as a third‐personal, cognitive scientific notion. I then argue that moods satisfy a revised version of the Content Constraint and sketch an account of moods as representational but non‐intentional mental states, drawing on the Valuationist paradigm in affective neuroscience. I end by showing how this account enables us to explain moods’ rationality.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141495781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to the modal account of luck it is a matter of luck that p if p is true at the actual world, but false in a wide‐range of nearby worlds. According to the modal account of risk, it is risky that p if p is true at some close world. I argue that the modal accounts of luck and risk do not mesh well together. The views entail that p can be both maximally risky and maximally lucky, but there is nothing which is both maximally lucky and maximally risky. I offer a novel theory of risk that fits together with the modal account of luck and demonstrate that it is both extensionally and formally superior to extant proposals.
根据 "运气 "的模态解释，如果 p 在实际世界中为真，而在附近的一系列世界中为假，那么 p 就是一个运气问题。根据风险的模态解释，如果p在某个近似世界中为真，那么p就是有风险的。我认为，关于运气和风险的模态解释并不能很好地融合在一起。这两种观点都会导致p既可能是风险最大的，也可能是运气最大的，但没有什么东西既是运气最大的，也是风险最大的。我提出了一种新的风险理论，它与运气的模态论述相吻合，并证明它在外延和形式上都优于现有的建议。
{"title":"Metaphysics of risk and luck","authors":"Jaakko Hirvelä","doi":"10.1111/nous.12516","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12516","url":null,"abstract":"According to the modal account of luck it is a matter of luck that <jats:italic>p</jats:italic> if <jats:italic>p</jats:italic> is true at the actual world, but false in a wide‐range of nearby worlds. According to the modal account of risk, it is risky that <jats:italic>p</jats:italic> if <jats:italic>p</jats:italic> is true at some close world. I argue that the modal accounts of luck and risk do not mesh well together. The views entail that <jats:italic>p</jats:italic> can be both maximally risky and maximally lucky, but there is nothing which is both maximally lucky and maximally risky. I offer a novel theory of risk that fits together with the modal account of luck and demonstrate that it is both extensionally and formally superior to extant proposals.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141461952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to the principle of indifference, when a set of possibilities is evidentially symmetric for you – when your evidence no more supports any one of the possibilities over any other – you're required to distribute your credences uniformly among them. Despite its intuitive appeal, the principle of indifference is often thought to be unsustainable due to the problem of multiple partitions: Depending on how a set of possibilities is divided, it seems that sometimes, applying indifference reasoning can require you to assign incompatible credences to equivalent possibilities. This paper defends the principle of indifference from the problem of multiple partitions by offering two guides for how to respond. The first is for permissivists about rationality, and is modeled on permissivists' arguments for the claim that a body of evidence sometimes does not uniquely determine a fully rational credence function. The second is for impermissivists about rationality, and is modeled on impermissivists' arguments for the claim that a body of evidence does always uniquely determine a fully rational credence function. What appears to be a decisive objection against the principle of indifference is in fact an instance of a general challenge taking different forms familiar to both permissivists and impermissivists.
{"title":"How to be indifferent","authors":"Sebastian Liu","doi":"10.1111/nous.12512","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12512","url":null,"abstract":"According to the principle of indifference, when a set of possibilities is evidentially symmetric for you – when your evidence no more supports any one of the possibilities over any other – you're required to distribute your credences uniformly among them. Despite its intuitive appeal, the principle of indifference is often thought to be unsustainable due to the problem of multiple partitions: Depending on how a set of possibilities is divided, it seems that sometimes, applying indifference reasoning can require you to assign incompatible credences to equivalent possibilities. This paper defends the principle of indifference from the problem of multiple partitions by offering two guides for how to respond. The first is for permissivists about rationality, and is modeled on permissivists' arguments for the claim that a body of evidence sometimes does not uniquely determine a fully rational credence function. The second is for impermissivists about rationality, and is modeled on impermissivists' arguments for the claim that a body of evidence does always uniquely determine a fully rational credence function. What appears to be a decisive objection against the principle of indifference is in fact an instance of a general challenge taking different forms familiar to both permissivists and impermissivists.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"85 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141453078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The question whether the notion of rigidity can be extended in a fruitful way beyond singular terms has received a standard answer in the literature, according to which non‐singular terms designate kinds, properties or other abstract singular objects, and generalized rigidity is the same thing as singular term rigidity, but for terms designating such objects. I offer some new criticisms of this view and go on to defend an alternative view, on which non‐singular terms designate extensions in general, and generalized rigidity is identity of extension across possible worlds. I develop some fundamental positive considerations that make this view virtually inevitable as a view of generalized rigidity, emphasizing its exclusive ability to offer a purely logical justification of the necessity of several kinds of statements that go beyond true identity statements between rigid singular terms.
{"title":"Rigidity and necessary application","authors":"Mario Gómez‐Torrente","doi":"10.1111/nous.12511","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12511","url":null,"abstract":"The question whether the notion of rigidity can be extended in a fruitful way beyond singular terms has received a standard answer in the literature, according to which non‐singular terms designate kinds, properties or other abstract singular objects, and generalized rigidity is the same thing as singular term rigidity, but for terms designating such objects. I offer some new criticisms of this view and go on to defend an alternative view, on which non‐singular terms designate extensions in general, and generalized rigidity is identity of extension across possible worlds. I develop some fundamental positive considerations that make this view virtually inevitable as a view of generalized rigidity, emphasizing its exclusive ability to offer a purely logical justification of the necessity of several kinds of statements that go beyond true identity statements between rigid singular terms.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"62 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141448399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper presents the epistemic practices account, a theory about the nature of epistemic normativity. The account aims to explain how the pursuit of epistemic values such as truth and knowledge can give rise to epistemic norms. On this account, epistemic norms are the internal rules of epistemic social practices. The account explains four crucial features of epistemic normativity while dissolving some apparent tensions between them. The account also provides a unified theory of epistemic and zetetic normativity.
{"title":"Epistemic practices: A unified account of epistemic and zetetic normativity","authors":"Will Fleisher","doi":"10.1111/nous.12514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12514","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents the epistemic practices account, a theory about the nature of epistemic normativity. The account aims to explain how the pursuit of epistemic values such as truth and knowledge can give rise to epistemic norms. On this account, epistemic norms are the internal rules of epistemic social practices. The account explains four crucial features of epistemic normativity while dissolving some apparent tensions between them. The account also provides a unified theory of epistemic and zetetic normativity.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141448353","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the nature of the specific grasp involved in moral understanding. After discussing Hills's ability account of that central component of moral understanding in light of problematic cases, I argue that moral grasp is best conceived of as a type of knowledge that is grounded in a subject's moral appreciation. I then show how and why the relevant notion of moral appreciation is connected to moral virtues and to one's affective and motivational engagement with moral reasons. Finally, I discuss the connection between moral appreciation and a subject's ability to offer moral explanations in relation to the debate between pessimists and optimists about moral understanding's testimonial transmission.
{"title":"Moral understanding: From virtue to knowledge","authors":"Miloud Belkoniene","doi":"10.1111/nous.12508","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12508","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the nature of the specific grasp involved in moral understanding. After discussing Hills's ability account of that central component of moral understanding in light of problematic cases, I argue that moral grasp is best conceived of as a type of knowledge that is grounded in a subject's moral appreciation. I then show how and why the relevant notion of moral appreciation is connected to moral virtues and to one's affective and motivational engagement with moral reasons. Finally, I discuss the connection between moral appreciation and a subject's ability to offer moral explanations in relation to the debate between pessimists and optimists about moral understanding's testimonial transmission.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141187685","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A notable feature of our moral and legal practices is the recognition of privileges, powers, and entitlements belonging to a select group of individuals in virtue of their status as victims of wrongful conduct. A philosophical literature on relational normativity purports to account for this status in terms of such notions as interests, rights, and attitudes of disregard. This paper argues that such individualistic notions cannot account for prevailing and intuitive ways of demarcating the class of victims. The paper is focused on the wrongful infliction of harm, and centers on the mediating role played by impersonal “danger‐making properties” in the determination of the class of victims. The paper begins with an analysis of one of the most well‐ known discussions of negligently‐inflicted harm — from the most famous case of the American common law tradition, Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. — and the analysis is then extended to the morality of harm‐doing more broadly, negligent and intentional alike. The paper's chief targets are interest theories of rights — including contractualist theories of moral claim‐rights of the kind defended by R. Jay Wallace — and neo‐Strawsonian Quality of Will theories of “moral injury”.
我们的道德和法律实践的一个显著特点是承认特定群体因其不法行为受害者的身份而享有特权、权力和权利。关于关系规范性的哲学文献试图从利益、权利和漠视态度等概念的角度来解释这种地位。本文认为，这种个人主义的概念无法解释划分受害者类别的普遍和直观的方式。本文以不法侵害为研究对象，重点探讨非个人的 "危险制造属性 "在确定受害者类别时所发挥的中介作用。本文首先分析了美国普通法传统中最著名的帕尔斯格拉夫诉长岛铁路公司案中最广为人知的关于过失致人损害的论述，然后将分析扩展到更广义的伤害行为的道德问题，无论是过失还是故意。本文的主要研究对象是权利的利益理论--包括杰伊-华莱士（R. Jay Wallace）所捍卫的那种道德请求权的契约主义理论--以及新斯特劳森意志品质（neo-Strawsonian Quality of Will）的 "道德伤害 "理论。
{"title":"‘I didn't know it was you’: The impersonal grounds of relational normativity","authors":"Jed Lewinsohn","doi":"10.1111/nous.12498","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12498","url":null,"abstract":"A notable feature of our moral and legal practices is the recognition of privileges, powers, and entitlements belonging to a select group of individuals in virtue of their status as victims of wrongful conduct. A philosophical literature on relational normativity purports to account for this status in terms of such notions as interests, rights, and attitudes of disregard. This paper argues that such individualistic notions cannot account for prevailing and intuitive ways of demarcating the class of victims. The paper is focused on the wrongful infliction of harm, and centers on the mediating role played by impersonal “danger‐making properties” in the determination of the class of victims. The paper begins with an analysis of one of the most well‐ known discussions of negligently‐inflicted harm — from the most famous case of the American common law tradition, <jats:italic>Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co</jats:italic>. — and the analysis is then extended to the morality of harm‐doing more broadly, negligent and intentional alike. The paper's chief targets are interest theories of rights — including contractualist theories of moral claim‐rights of the kind defended by R. Jay Wallace — and neo‐Strawsonian Quality of Will theories of “moral injury”.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"213 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141091847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Much has been written on whether practical knowledge (knowledge‐how) reduces to propositional knowledge (knowledge‐that). Less attention has been paid to what we call deliberative knowledge (knowledge‐to), i.e., knowledge ascriptions embedding other infinitival questions, like where to meet, when to leave, and what to bring. We offer an analysis of knowledge‐to and argue on its basis that, regardless of whether knowledge‐how reduces to knowledge‐that, no such reduction of knowledge‐to is forthcoming. Knowledge‐to, unlike knowledge‐that and knowledge‐how, requires the agent to have formed certain conditional intentions. We discuss the philosophical implications for knowledge‐how, deliberative questions, and virtue.
{"title":"Knowing what to do","authors":"Ethan Jerzak, Alexander W. Kocurek","doi":"10.1111/nous.12503","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12503","url":null,"abstract":"Much has been written on whether practical knowledge (knowledge‐how) reduces to propositional knowledge (knowledge‐that). Less attention has been paid to what we call deliberative knowledge (knowledge‐to), i.e., knowledge ascriptions embedding other infinitival questions, like <jats:italic>where to meet</jats:italic>, <jats:italic>when to leave</jats:italic>, and <jats:italic>what to bring</jats:italic>. We offer an analysis of knowledge‐to and argue on its basis that, regardless of whether knowledge‐how reduces to knowledge‐that, no such reduction of knowledge‐to is forthcoming. Knowledge‐to, unlike knowledge‐that and knowledge‐how, requires the agent to have formed certain conditional intentions. We discuss the philosophical implications for knowledge‐how, deliberative questions, and virtue.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140895737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Doxastic involuntarism—the thesis that we lack direct voluntary control (in response to non‐evidential reasons) over our belief states—is often touted as philosophical orthodoxy. I here offer a novel defense of doxastic voluntarism, centered around three key moves. First, I point out that belief has two central functional roles, but that discussions of voluntarism have largely ignored questions of control over belief's guidance function. Second, I propose that we can learn much about doxastic control by looking to cognitive scientific research on control over other relevantly similar mental states. I draw on a mechanistic account of control of the guidance function for “emotion‐type states,” and argue that these same cognitive control mechanisms can used to block doxastic guidance. This gives us an account of “back‐end” doxastic control which can be deployed for reasons which are not the right kinds of reasons to support “front‐end” belief formation—i.e., non‐evidential reasons. Third, I argue that comprehensive, self‐directed exercises of this kind of control can amount to an underappreciated kind of voluntarism. This form of voluntarism is available to any account of belief that takes guidance‐instantiation to be at least partly constitutive of believing. Finally, I discuss objections to, and upshots of, the view.
{"title":"A defense of back‐end doxastic voluntarism","authors":"Laura K. Soter","doi":"10.1111/nous.12501","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12501","url":null,"abstract":"Doxastic involuntarism—the thesis that we lack direct voluntary control (in response to non‐evidential reasons) over our belief states—is often touted as philosophical orthodoxy. I here offer a novel defense of doxastic voluntarism, centered around three key moves. First, I point out that belief has two central functional roles, but that discussions of voluntarism have largely ignored questions of control over belief's guidance function. Second, I propose that we can learn much about doxastic control by looking to cognitive scientific research on control over other relevantly similar mental states. I draw on a mechanistic account of control of the guidance function for “emotion‐type states,” and argue that these same cognitive control mechanisms can used to block doxastic guidance. This gives us an account of “back‐end” doxastic control which can be deployed for reasons which are not the right kinds of reasons to support “front‐end” belief formation—i.e., non‐evidential reasons. Third, I argue that comprehensive, self‐directed exercises of this kind of control can amount to an underappreciated kind of voluntarism. This form of voluntarism is available to any account of belief that takes guidance‐instantiation to be at least partly constitutive of believing. Finally, I discuss objections to, and upshots of, the view.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140820011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Our universe seems to be miraculously fine‐tuned for life. Multiverse theories have been proposed as an explanation for this on the basis of probabilistic arguments, but various authors have objected that we should consider our total evidence that this universe in particular has life in our inference, which would block the argument. The debate thus crucially hinges on how Bayesian background and evidence are distinguished and on how indexical or demonstrative terms are analysed. The aim of this article is to take a step back and examine these various aspects of Bayesian reasoning and how they affect the arguments. The upshot is that there are reasons to resist the fine‐tuning argument for the multiverse, but the “this‐universe‐objection” is not one of them.
{"title":"Indexicality, Bayesian background and self‐location in fine‐tuning arguments for the multiverse","authors":"Quentin Ruyant","doi":"10.1111/nous.12502","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12502","url":null,"abstract":"Our universe seems to be miraculously fine‐tuned for life. Multiverse theories have been proposed as an explanation for this on the basis of probabilistic arguments, but various authors have objected that we should consider our total evidence that this universe in particular has life in our inference, which would block the argument. The debate thus crucially hinges on how Bayesian background and evidence are distinguished and on how indexical or demonstrative terms are analysed. The aim of this article is to take a step back and examine these various aspects of Bayesian reasoning and how they affect the arguments. The upshot is that there are reasons to resist the fine‐tuning argument for the multiverse, but the “this‐universe‐objection” is not one of them.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140820047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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