Compatibilists often understand control in terms of reasons‐responsiveness. This paper argues that there is another type of responsibility‐relevant control, persistence control, which is distinct from reasons‐responsiveness and cannot be assimilated into the latter. The paper provides an account of persistence control. The recognition of persistence control leads to the recognition of two kinds of lacking freedom, only one of which undermines the responsibility‐relevant control. This recognition has important implications for the puzzles surrounding the so‐called Luther‐style commitments and the asymmetry thesis concerning blameworthiness and praiseworthiness.
{"title":"Persistence control","authors":"Xiaofei Liu","doi":"10.1111/nous.70015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70015","url":null,"abstract":"Compatibilists often understand control in terms of reasons‐responsiveness. This paper argues that there is another type of responsibility‐relevant control, persistence control, which is distinct from reasons‐responsiveness and cannot be assimilated into the latter. The paper provides an account of persistence control. The recognition of persistence control leads to the recognition of two kinds of lacking freedom, only one of which undermines the responsibility‐relevant control. This recognition has important implications for the puzzles surrounding the so‐called Luther‐style commitments and the asymmetry thesis concerning blameworthiness and praiseworthiness.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"68 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145056694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sometimes we do what other people tell us to. A natural thought is that the motivation to act on an instruction comes about rationally as the result of interpreting an imperative and deciding to act on it; that is, by updating on information that gets mediated through belief‐desire reasoning. We defend an alternative “Spinozan” view about how instructions—specifically those performed with imperative sentences—might give rise to a motivation to act, namely, that when someone is told to do something, this activates motivations directly, without the person updating on information that gets mediated through belief‐desire reasoning. We will discuss two general strategies for thinking about how imperatives might supply motivation that are consistent with this view—one based on models of dissonance reduction and the other involving a more direct link between imperative utterances and motivational mental states. We will conclude with a discussion of how ecological considerations might favor a Spinozan process of motivation from imperatives.
{"title":"How to make people do things with words","authors":"Henry Schiller, Shaun Nichols","doi":"10.1111/nous.70005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70005","url":null,"abstract":"Sometimes we do what other people tell us to. A natural thought is that the motivation to act on an instruction comes about rationally as the result of interpreting an imperative and deciding to act on it; that is, by updating on information that gets mediated through belief‐desire reasoning. We defend an alternative “Spinozan” view about how instructions—specifically those performed with <jats:italic>imperative sentences</jats:italic>—might give rise to a motivation to act, namely, that when someone is told to do something, this activates motivations <jats:italic>directly</jats:italic>, without the person updating on information that gets mediated through belief‐desire reasoning. We will discuss two general strategies for thinking about how imperatives might supply motivation that are consistent with this view—one based on models of dissonance reduction and the other involving a more direct link between imperative utterances and motivational mental states. We will conclude with a discussion of how ecological considerations might favor a Spinozan process of motivation from imperatives.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144928210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Beneficence—the part of morality concerned with promoting people's well‐being—is widely thought to be both agent‐neutral and impartial: it prescribes a common aim to all, and does not favor some individuals over others. This paper explores a problem for agent‐neutral, impartial beneficence from the perspective of “individualistic ethics” in the tradition of Harsanyi. The problem reveals that if we want only what is best for each of infinitely many individuals, and we are rational, then we must care about some individuals more than others. I conclude that, on the individualistic approach, value must be fundamentally agent‐relative.
{"title":"Infinite ethics and the limits of impartiality","authors":"Jacob M. Nebel","doi":"10.1111/nous.70010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70010","url":null,"abstract":"Beneficence—the part of morality concerned with promoting people's well‐being—is widely thought to be both agent‐neutral and impartial: it prescribes a common aim to all, and does not favor some individuals over others. This paper explores a problem for agent‐neutral, impartial beneficence from the perspective of “individualistic ethics” in the tradition of Harsanyi. The problem reveals that if we want only what is best for each of infinitely many individuals, and we are rational, then we must care about some individuals more than others. I conclude that, on the individualistic approach, value must be fundamentally agent‐relative.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144905969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There are better and worse ways to acquire epistemic virtues and more generally to be disposed to change or maintain one's epistemic dispositions over time. This is a dimension along which one might be better or worse as an epistemic agent that, we argue, cannot be explained with reference to current normative categories in epistemology but requires recognition of a new norm or virtue—namely, “epistemic authenticity”—which is the central virtue in a novel class of virtues (or norms) of epistemic development. We sketch the contours of an account of personal authenticity and then consider the nature and value of a specifically epistemic form.
{"title":"Epistemic authenticity","authors":"Laura Frances Callahan, Michael C. Rea","doi":"10.1111/nous.70013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70013","url":null,"abstract":"There are better and worse ways to acquire epistemic virtues and more generally to be disposed to change or maintain one's epistemic dispositions over time. This is a dimension along which one might be better or worse as an epistemic agent that, we argue, cannot be explained with reference to current normative categories in epistemology but requires recognition of a new norm or virtue—namely, “epistemic authenticity”—which is the central virtue in a novel class of virtues (or norms) of epistemic development. We sketch the contours of an account of personal authenticity and then consider the nature and value of a specifically epistemic form.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"44 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144898967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Social movements are central to our contemporary understanding of social change. Accordingly, we should want to be able to say what it is that makes social movements special; that is, to say what it is that movements in their entirety have that random samples of people and organizations within the movement do not have. But I will argue that the prevailing analysis of social movements does not do this. The features enumerated by the social science literature on movementhood are at best necessary conditions, but they do not offer a jointly sufficient analysis because they allow that arbitrary proper constituents of movements will count as further movements. This particular challenge to sufficiency is what I call the Synecdoche Problem. I argue that an attractive, if also provocative, solution to the Synecdoche Problem is to posit that social movements are, as a matter of definitional necessity rather than mere contingent fact, part of an explanation of social change, where holist accounts of explanation will vindicate this as a property that a movement as a whole might have but not its proper constituents. This view has interesting implications for common movement‐related disputes.
{"title":"Social movements and the synecdoche problem","authors":"Megan Hyska","doi":"10.1111/nous.70012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70012","url":null,"abstract":"Social movements are central to our contemporary understanding of social change. Accordingly, we should want to be able to say what it is that makes social movements special; that is, to say what it is that movements in their entirety have that random samples of people and organizations within the movement do not have. But I will argue that the prevailing analysis of social movements does not do this. The features enumerated by the social science literature on movementhood are at best necessary conditions, but they do not offer a jointly sufficient analysis because they allow that arbitrary proper constituents of movements will count as further movements. This particular challenge to sufficiency is what I call the Synecdoche Problem. I argue that an attractive, if also provocative, solution to the Synecdoche Problem is to posit that social movements are, as a matter of definitional necessity rather than mere contingent fact, part of an explanation of social change, where holist accounts of explanation will vindicate this as a property that a movement as a whole might have but not its proper constituents. This view has interesting implications for common movement‐related disputes.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144901390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we explore the tension between the KK thesis and an attractive principle concerning the assertability of conditionals. We explore the prospects for defending the KK thesis against the problems posed, and conclude that they are dim. We therefore maintain that the pattern of assertability conditions for conditionals poses a powerful new argument against the KK thesis.
{"title":"Conditionals and KK","authors":"John Hawthorne, Yoaav Isaacs","doi":"10.1111/nous.70004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70004","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we explore the tension between the KK thesis and an attractive principle concerning the assertability of conditionals. We explore the prospects for defending the KK thesis against the problems posed, and conclude that they are dim. We therefore maintain that the pattern of assertability conditions for conditionals poses a powerful new argument against the KK thesis.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145088949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Higher-order metaphysics is in full swing. Its proponents argue that higher-order logic should replace set theory at the foundations of mathematics and metaphysics. But amid the enthusiasm, surprisingly little attention has been paid to some serious epistemological challenges facing the program—foremost among them a variant of the Benacerraf challenge, developed by Field and Clarke-Doane. Roughly put, the challenge is to explain the reliability of our higher-order logical beliefs. A similar problem is familiar from the philosophy of set theory, where it has led to a pluralist reconception of the foundations of mathematics. In this paper, I argue that regardless of whether higher-order logic is preferable to set theory on abductive grounds, they stand or fall together when faced with this epistemological challenge. They are companions in guilt (or innocence). I conclude that, absent other solutions, a promising path forward is to adopt a pluralist approach to higher-order logic. The consequences of such a shift are difficult to overstate.
{"title":"A Benacerraf problem for higher-order metaphysics","authors":"William McCarthy","doi":"10.1111/nous.70011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70011","url":null,"abstract":"Higher-order metaphysics is in full swing. Its proponents argue that higher-order logic should replace set theory at the foundations of mathematics and metaphysics. But amid the enthusiasm, surprisingly little attention has been paid to some serious epistemological challenges facing the program—foremost among them a variant of the Benacerraf challenge, developed by Field and Clarke-Doane. Roughly put, the challenge is to explain the reliability of our higher-order logical beliefs. A similar problem is familiar from the philosophy of set theory, where it has led to a pluralist reconception of the foundations of mathematics. In this paper, I argue that regardless of whether higher-order logic is preferable to set theory on abductive grounds, they stand or fall together when faced with this epistemological challenge. They are companions in guilt (or innocence). I conclude that, absent other solutions, a promising path forward is to adopt a pluralist approach to higher-order logic. The consequences of such a shift are difficult to overstate.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"55 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145089069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Caspar Hare presents a compelling argument for “taking the sugar” in cases of opaque sweetening: you have no reason to take the unsweetened option, and you have some reason to take the sweetened one. I argue that this argument fails—there is a perfectly good sense in which you do have a reason to take the unsweetened option. I suggest a way to amend Hare's argument to overcome this objection. I then argue that, although the improved version fares better, there is still room to resist Hare's argument—in a way that raises interesting questions about rational agency. In short, rationality is not about doing what one has the most reason to do; rather, it is about aiming to do what there is most reason to do.
{"title":"Reasons, rationality, and opaque sweetening: Hare's “No Reason” argument for taking the sugar","authors":"Ryan Doody","doi":"10.1111/nous.70007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70007","url":null,"abstract":"Caspar Hare presents a compelling argument for “taking the sugar” in cases of opaque sweetening: you have no reason to take the unsweetened option, and you have some reason to take the sweetened one. I argue that this argument fails—there is a perfectly good sense in which you <jats:italic>do</jats:italic> have a reason to take the unsweetened option. I suggest a way to amend Hare's argument to overcome this objection. I then argue that, although the improved version fares better, there is still room to resist Hare's argument—in a way that raises interesting questions about rational agency. In short, rationality <jats:italic>is not</jats:italic> about doing what one <jats:italic>has</jats:italic> the most reason to do; rather, it is about aiming to do what <jats:italic>there is</jats:italic> most reason to do.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144769880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The modal ontological argument for God's existence faces a symmetry problem: a seemingly equally plausible reverse modal ontological argument can be given for God's nonexistence. Here, we argue that there are significant asymmetries between the modal ontological argument and its reverse that render the latter more compelling than the former. Specifically, the latter requires a weaker logic than the former and, unlike the former, avoids the symmetry problem. We also explore to what extent these observations represent a new pathway to atheism.
{"title":"Symmetry lost: A modal ontological argument for atheism?","authors":"Peter Fritz, Tien‐Chun Lo, Joseph C. Schmid","doi":"10.1111/nous.70009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70009","url":null,"abstract":"The modal ontological argument for God's existence faces a symmetry problem: a seemingly equally plausible reverse modal ontological argument can be given for God's nonexistence. Here, we argue that there are significant asymmetries between the modal ontological argument and its reverse that render the latter more compelling than the former. Specifically, the latter requires a weaker logic than the former and, unlike the former, avoids the symmetry problem. We also explore to what extent these observations represent a new pathway to atheism.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"103 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144712246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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