Juan Carlos Triviño‐Salazar, Vicent Climent‐Ferrando
The deliberative democracy and governance literature indicates that the challenge of participatory mechanisms (e.g., participatory budgeting, citizen assemblies) is to be inclusive of all citizens, especially marginalized ones from the political system. Immigrants as a marginalized group are a target of inclusion. Asking the circumstances under which these mechanisms promote immigrants' effective inclusion is still a pending question. This article proposes a theoretical model centered on their inclusion in these mechanisms. We apply our model to the incorporation of immigrants into Barcelona's Neighborhood Council Meetings, revamped under the radical‐left Barcelona en Comú‐led government (2015–2023). Findings show that opening participatory mechanisms for immigrants did not build de facto inclusionary dynamics in Barcelona. We explained such findings on the mismatch between the political quest to deepen democracy and promote social justice through participatory mechanisms and the limitations to implement practices leading to a pluralist engagement with immigrants.
协商民主和治理文献表明，参与机制（如参与式预算编制、公民大会）面临的挑战是包容所有公民，特别是政治系统中的边缘化公民。移民作为一个边缘化群体，是包容的对象。这些机制在何种情况下能促进移民的有效融入，仍是一个悬而未决的问题。本文提出了一个以移民融入这些机制为中心的理论模型。我们将模型应用于移民融入巴塞罗那邻里委员会会议的情况，该会议在激进左翼的巴塞罗那委员会（Barcelona en Comú）领导的政府（2015-2023 年）下进行了改革。研究结果表明，为移民开放参与机制并没有在巴塞罗那形成事实上的包容性动力。我们将这些发现解释为通过参与机制深化民主和促进社会正义的政治追求与实施导致移民多元化参与的实践限制之间的不匹配。
{"title":"Including immigrant voices in local mechanisms of citizen participation? Insights from the crucial case of Barcelona","authors":"Juan Carlos Triviño‐Salazar, Vicent Climent‐Ferrando","doi":"10.1111/gove.12875","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12875","url":null,"abstract":"The deliberative democracy and governance literature indicates that the challenge of participatory mechanisms (e.g., participatory budgeting, citizen assemblies) is to be inclusive of all citizens, especially marginalized ones from the political system. Immigrants as a marginalized group are a target of inclusion. Asking the circumstances under which these mechanisms promote immigrants' effective inclusion is still a pending question. This article proposes a theoretical model centered on their inclusion in these mechanisms. We apply our model to the incorporation of immigrants into Barcelona's Neighborhood Council Meetings, revamped under the radical‐left <jats:italic>Barcelona en Comú</jats:italic>‐led government (2015–2023). Findings show that opening participatory mechanisms for immigrants did not build de facto inclusionary dynamics in Barcelona. We explained such findings on the mismatch between the political quest to deepen democracy and promote social justice through participatory mechanisms and the limitations to implement practices leading to a pluralist engagement with immigrants.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":"64 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141197954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Corruption in healthcare is widespread and consequential. Informal payments (IPs) are a common form of petty corruption, especially in low‐ and middle‐income countries. Using data from the Life in Transition Survey encompassing 33 countries across Europe and Central Asia, I analyze the prevalence and reasons behind IPs made to public health providers. In addition to individual‐ and system‐level factors often used in literature, I also introduce a latent measure of social norms related to high levels of corruption. These are associated with a significantly higher prevalence of paying informally. This paper also bridges a gap between the corruption literature and health‐related research by introducing a typology of IPs based on why they were made. I find that the association between health system characteristics and IPs prevalence differs based on the reason for payment. This difference is further exacerbated by the existence of corruption‐related social norms. The results of this analysis highlight the need to revisit existing anti‐corruption policies and align them to the underlying social norms.
{"title":"The effect of institutional characteristics and social norms on corruption in healthcare","authors":"Iva Parvanova","doi":"10.1111/gove.12868","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12868","url":null,"abstract":"Corruption in healthcare is widespread and consequential. Informal payments (IPs) are a common form of petty corruption, especially in low‐ and middle‐income countries. Using data from the Life in Transition Survey encompassing 33 countries across Europe and Central Asia, I analyze the prevalence and reasons behind IPs made to public health providers. In addition to individual‐ and system‐level factors often used in literature, I also introduce a latent measure of social norms related to high levels of corruption. These are associated with a significantly higher prevalence of paying informally. This paper also bridges a gap between the corruption literature and health‐related research by introducing a typology of IPs based on why they were made. I find that the association between health system characteristics and IPs prevalence differs based on the reason for payment. This difference is further exacerbated by the existence of corruption‐related social norms. The results of this analysis highlight the need to revisit existing anti‐corruption policies and align them to the underlying social norms.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":"25 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140671375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In 2023, a major earthquake struck Turkey, leaving thousands dead and exposing the country's corruption problems. The current Turkish president Erdoğan was sworn into power in 2003. Erdoğan's government has completely transformed the country with construction projects that have provided a huge economic boost. However, successive amnesties and non‐compliance with building regulations have uncovered cases of corruption. This paper analyses the evolution of corruption in Turkey during Erdoğan's rule. Several indicators are considered, such as the Corruption Perception Index, the Index on Impartial Administration or the V‐Dem Indicator on Political Corruption. The results indicate that two distinct stages can be distinguished during Erdoğan's term in office. The first stage was marked by a reduction in the perception of corruption, and the second stage was marked by an increase in the number of tenders for public works and corruption. Finally, several policy recommendations are proposed to reduce corruption in Turkey.
{"title":"Political corruption and earthquakes: Governance in Turkey under Erdogan's rule","authors":"Javier Cifuentes‐Faura","doi":"10.1111/gove.12869","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12869","url":null,"abstract":"In 2023, a major earthquake struck Turkey, leaving thousands dead and exposing the country's corruption problems. The current Turkish president Erdoğan was sworn into power in 2003. Erdoğan's government has completely transformed the country with construction projects that have provided a huge economic boost. However, successive amnesties and non‐compliance with building regulations have uncovered cases of corruption. This paper analyses the evolution of corruption in Turkey during Erdoğan's rule. Several indicators are considered, such as the Corruption Perception Index, the Index on Impartial Administration or the V‐Dem Indicator on Political Corruption. The results indicate that two distinct stages can be distinguished during Erdoğan's term in office. The first stage was marked by a reduction in the perception of corruption, and the second stage was marked by an increase in the number of tenders for public works and corruption. Finally, several policy recommendations are proposed to reduce corruption in Turkey.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":"210 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140625178","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The interactions between bureaucratic agencies and political actors shape governance outcomes, yet scholars disagree about how bureaucratic autonomy relates to government quality. Some claim that enhancing autonomy improves quality, whereas others maintain the opposite. An influential article by Fukuyama (2013) in Governance suggests a curvilinear relationship, moderated by capacity. This article evaluates the theory empirically, focusing on within‐country variation and two dimensions of autonomy: independence and discretion. Drawing on an original survey of over 3200 public sector workers in Brazil and administrative data on 325,000 public servants, we find evidence suggesting that the relationship between perceived autonomy and quality depends on the type of perceived autonomy and level of capacity. Public servants' perceptions of independence from political actors are associated with increased perceptions about governance quality in a linear fashion. For perceived discretion, we find initial evidence of a Goldilocks relationship: too little reduces perceptions of government quality but so does too much, especially in low‐capacity areas. Our findings offer initial evidence that may qualify claims that limiting bureaucratic discretion while increasing political oversight improves governance; instead, context may be crucial.
{"title":"Calibrating autonomy: How bureaucratic autonomy influences government quality in Brazil","authors":"Katherine Bersch, Francis Fukuyama","doi":"10.1111/gove.12865","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12865","url":null,"abstract":"The interactions between bureaucratic agencies and political actors shape governance outcomes, yet scholars disagree about how bureaucratic autonomy relates to government quality. Some claim that enhancing autonomy improves quality, whereas others maintain the opposite. An influential article by Fukuyama (2013) in <jats:italic>Governance</jats:italic> suggests a curvilinear relationship, moderated by capacity. This article evaluates the theory empirically, focusing on within‐country variation and two dimensions of autonomy: independence and discretion. Drawing on an original survey of over 3200 public sector workers in Brazil and administrative data on 325,000 public servants, we find evidence suggesting that the relationship between perceived autonomy and quality depends on the type of perceived autonomy and level of capacity. Public servants' perceptions of independence from political actors are associated with increased perceptions about governance quality in a linear fashion. For perceived discretion, we find initial evidence of a Goldilocks relationship: too little reduces perceptions of government quality but so does too much, especially in low‐capacity areas. Our findings offer initial evidence that may qualify claims that limiting bureaucratic discretion while increasing political oversight improves governance; instead, context may be crucial.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":"52 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140599942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using qualitative data from frontline police organizations in Punjab, Pakistan, this article investigates the role of street level management on creativity and improvisation in the frontline. Our findings show that the professional identities and attitudes of the street level managers play an important role in mediating creativity by the frontline workers, especially in the hierarchal organizational structure. If the managers adopted rule‐following attitude, frontline workers often faced hindrances in the use of creativity, leading to alienation. In contrast, if managers adopted a defiant attitude, frontline workers engaged in moderated creativity as they assumed the risk of rule breaking. This shows that creativity and innovation in organizations with no formal mandate to improvize is a messy and political process. Our study indicates the need to extend the research on policy innovation to hierarchal bureaucracies and organisational contexts where team work is not encouraged.
{"title":"Enablers or deterrent? Role of street level managers in use of creativity at the frontlines","authors":"Mohsin Bashir, Ayesha Masood","doi":"10.1111/gove.12866","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12866","url":null,"abstract":"Using qualitative data from frontline police organizations in Punjab, Pakistan, this article investigates the role of street level management on creativity and improvisation in the frontline. Our findings show that the professional identities and attitudes of the street level managers play an important role in mediating creativity by the frontline workers, especially in the hierarchal organizational structure. If the managers adopted rule‐following attitude, frontline workers often faced hindrances in the use of creativity, leading to alienation. In contrast, if managers adopted a defiant attitude, frontline workers engaged in moderated creativity as they assumed the risk of rule breaking. This shows that creativity and innovation in organizations with no formal mandate to improvize is a messy and political process. Our study indicates the need to extend the research on policy innovation to hierarchal bureaucracies and organisational contexts where team work is not encouraged.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":"57 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140599940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper adds to the literature on urban diplomacy by focusing on the role of smaller cities with an active international engagement in migration matters. What are the motives driving the involvement of these “ordinary” cities in international groupings? What role do these cities play in the circulation of policies related to migration integration? How does it translate into local policies? To do so, we rely on a quantitative analysis of 64 networks around the world and on the case study of Amadora (Portugal). It is argued that “ordinary” cities may gain visibility when participating in transnational networks of cities. However, the research also shows that the city involvement is driven by the search for financial capacities, thereby nurturing a form of dependency from international subsidies. In addition, Amadora's involvement in city networks is not necessarily connected with actual activism in favor of migrant integration. The research shows the tensions between political discourses at national and local levels, and the loopholes of the “transnationalization” of migration governance.
{"title":"City diplomacy of ordinary cities: Harnessing migrant inclusion policies for international engagement in Amadora, Portugal","authors":"Amandine Desille, Thomas Lacroix","doi":"10.1111/gove.12864","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12864","url":null,"abstract":"This paper adds to the literature on urban diplomacy by focusing on the role of smaller cities with an active international engagement in migration matters. What are the motives driving the involvement of these “ordinary” cities in international groupings? What role do these cities play in the circulation of policies related to migration integration? How does it translate into local policies? To do so, we rely on a quantitative analysis of 64 networks around the world and on the case study of Amadora (Portugal). It is argued that “ordinary” cities may gain visibility when participating in transnational networks of cities. However, the research also shows that the city involvement is driven by the search for financial capacities, thereby nurturing a form of dependency from international subsidies. In addition, Amadora's involvement in city networks is not necessarily connected with actual activism in favor of migrant integration. The research shows the tensions between political discourses at national and local levels, and the loopholes of the “transnationalization” of migration governance.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140599938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Existing literature suggests bureaucrats shirk when political oversight is limited or inefficient. When civil servants engage in multitasking, elected office holders have neither the capacity nor the incentives to monitor bureaucrat–citizen interactions. I argue that under such circumstances, public servants prioritize responding to local anomalies which are located in the immediate vicinity of politicians. Using a novel dataset on geolocated citizen problem reports from 40 urban municipalities in Hungary (N = 24,149), matched against addresses of mayors, I find that proximity to mayors' domiciles is associated with more prompt responses from authorities. Results suggest politicians' local roots generate positive externalities for their neighbors, as civil servants are incentivized to put those reports on the back burner which are the most invisible for their political principals. Further analyses suggest response speed is also positively associated with incumbent mayors' re‐election chances. The findings refine our understanding on political oversight of bureaucrats and voters' expectations about likely behavior of locally embedded civil servants.
{"title":"Neighbors with benefits: How politicians' local ties generate positive externalities when bureaucratic oversight is limited","authors":"Daniel Kovarek","doi":"10.1111/gove.12867","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12867","url":null,"abstract":"Existing literature suggests bureaucrats shirk when political oversight is limited or inefficient. When civil servants engage in multitasking, elected office holders have neither the capacity nor the incentives to monitor bureaucrat–citizen interactions. I argue that under such circumstances, public servants prioritize responding to local anomalies which are located in the immediate vicinity of politicians. Using a novel dataset on geolocated citizen problem reports from 40 urban municipalities in Hungary (N = 24,149), matched against addresses of mayors, I find that proximity to mayors' domiciles is associated with more prompt responses from authorities. Results suggest politicians' local roots generate positive externalities for their neighbors, as civil servants are incentivized to put those reports on the back burner which are the most invisible for their political principals. Further analyses suggest response speed is also positively associated with incumbent mayors' re‐election chances. The findings refine our understanding on political oversight of bureaucrats and voters' expectations about likely behavior of locally embedded civil servants.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":"75 20","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140376122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Can public agencies boost support for their mandate by being more transparent? We examine this important question in the context of foreign aid. Skepticism about foreign aid spending is common among citizens. This article argues that bilateral aid agencies can increase support for foreign aid by enhancing transparency. The article presents findings from three survey experiments involving a representative sample of 2058 British citizens, as well as observational data at the cross‐national level. The results suggest that transparency reforms are among the most effective institutional interventions for increasing public support. They also suggest that transparency is most effective at increasing public support amongst those who are initially more skeptical of aid and the civil service. Finally, they suggest that citizens do not have strong preferences about the type of information disclosed. They reward all types of transparency.
{"title":"Transparency and citizen support for public agencies: The case of foreign aid","authors":"Mirko Heinzel, Bernhard Reinsberg, Haley Swedlund","doi":"10.1111/gove.12863","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12863","url":null,"abstract":"Can public agencies boost support for their mandate by being more transparent? We examine this important question in the context of foreign aid. Skepticism about foreign aid spending is common among citizens. This article argues that bilateral aid agencies can increase support for foreign aid by enhancing transparency. The article presents findings from three survey experiments involving a representative sample of 2058 British citizens, as well as observational data at the cross‐national level. The results suggest that transparency reforms are among the most effective institutional interventions for increasing public support. They also suggest that transparency is most effective at increasing public support amongst those who are initially more skeptical of aid and the civil service. Finally, they suggest that citizens do not have strong preferences about the type of information disclosed. They reward all types of transparency.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140171827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Policy‐making is a complex business. While scholars have studied the politics of policy‐making for decades, we know surprisingly little about the role of individual ministries. We argue that and why individual ministries crucially shape policies' content, particularly their distributive profiles. We explain that it matters whether for example, a Ministry of Labor, of Finance, or of Home Affairs designs a policy. First, we systematically review existing literature on the factors that influence preferences of ministries and their power in policy‐making. Second, we develop a theory explaining that and why ministries have substantive policy impact and introducing a typology of three different ministerial ideal‐types: ministries follow a “social logic”, an “efficiency logic”, or a “law‐and‐order logic”. Third, we offer systematic empirical evidence: Using the least likely case of Germany, we introduce a novel content‐coded dataset on all social policies in the Bundestag since 1969, showing that ministries shape policies' distributive profiles, even when controlling for rival explanations, such as the partisan affiliation of ministers, the policy field, or cabinet type. We conclude by developing a research agenda on ministerial politics and highlight important implications for representation and responsiveness.
{"title":"Introducing ‘ministerial politics’: Analyzing the role and crucial redistributive impact of individual ministries in policy‐making","authors":"Julian L. Garritzmann, Katrijn Siderius","doi":"10.1111/gove.12859","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12859","url":null,"abstract":"Policy‐making is a complex business. While scholars have studied the politics of policy‐making for decades, we know surprisingly little about the role of <jats:italic>individual ministries</jats:italic>. We argue that and why individual ministries crucially shape policies' content, particularly their distributive profiles. We explain that it matters whether for example, a Ministry of Labor, of Finance, or of Home Affairs designs a policy. First, we systematically review existing literature on the factors that influence preferences of ministries and their power in policy‐making. Second, we develop a theory explaining that and why ministries have substantive policy impact and introducing a typology of three different ministerial ideal‐types: ministries follow a “social logic”, an “efficiency logic”, or a “law‐and‐order logic”. Third, we offer systematic empirical evidence: Using the least likely case of Germany, we introduce a novel content‐coded dataset on all social policies in the Bundestag since 1969, showing that ministries shape policies' distributive profiles, even when controlling for rival explanations, such as the partisan affiliation of ministers, the policy field, or cabinet type. We conclude by developing a research agenda on ministerial politics and highlight important implications for representation and responsiveness.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":"221 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140019547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As migration continues to shape urban societies, how cities deal with migration-based heterogeneity has become a salient issue. Much literature addressing immigrant policymaking has focused on current policy ideas and the different actors they involve; literature on urban governance has highlighted the role of collaboration between state and civil society actors. To date, however, limited research has taken a combined approach to see how municipalities forge collaboration with civil society in pursuit of (novel) policy ideas. The article draws on and combines immigrant policymaking, urban governance and urban regime literatures. It presents Mannheim as a heuristic case which shows how the city's immigrant policymaking reflects a combination of a shift towards 'diversity' as policy idea and discourse and long-term collaboration in policymaking. Positing the emergence of an “urban diversity regime” in Mannheim, the article reflects on the opportunities this heuristic notion presents for existing literature and for future research.
{"title":"Forging urban diversity regimes: A combined approach to immigrant policymaking and governance in Mannheim","authors":"Maria Schiller","doi":"10.1111/gove.12857","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12857","url":null,"abstract":"As migration continues to shape urban societies, how cities deal with migration-based heterogeneity has become a salient issue. Much literature addressing immigrant policymaking has focused on current policy ideas and the different actors they involve; literature on urban governance has highlighted the role of collaboration between state and civil society actors. To date, however, limited research has taken a combined approach to see how municipalities forge collaboration with civil society in pursuit of (novel) policy ideas. The article draws on and combines immigrant policymaking, urban governance and urban regime literatures. It presents Mannheim as a heuristic case which shows how the city's immigrant policymaking reflects a combination of a shift towards 'diversity' as policy idea and discourse and long-term collaboration in policymaking. Positing the emergence of an “urban diversity regime” in Mannheim, the article reflects on the opportunities this heuristic notion presents for existing literature and for future research.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139762359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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