Pub Date : 2024-07-01DOI: 10.1080/20403313.2024.2323346
George Letsas
In Law as a Moral Practice, Scott Hershovitz defends the pluralist view that there are many sets of legal norms which we can validly employ for different purposes, none of which qualifies as unique...
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Pub Date : 2024-07-01DOI: 10.1080/20403313.2024.2323348
Nicolaos Stavropoulos
The main thesis of Scott Hershovitz's recent book is in its title: Law is a Moral Practice. By this, Hershovitz means that legal practices aim to adjust people's moral relationships (and generally ...
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Pub Date : 2024-07-01DOI: 10.1080/20403313.2024.2323340
Scott Hershovitz
Published in Jurisprudence: An International Journal of Legal and Political Thought (Vol. 15, No. 2, 2024)
发表于《法理学》：国际法律和政治思想杂志》（第 15 卷，第 2 期，2024 年）
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Pub Date : 2024-07-01DOI: 10.1080/20403313.2024.2323342
Angelo Ryu
Here I distinguish two things jurisprudence might take itself to explain. A theory of law can be either concept-first or practice-first. Concept-first theories investigate the concept we implicitly...
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Pub Date : 2024-06-13DOI: 10.1080/20403313.2024.2355054
M. Reiff
{"title":"The liberal conception of free speech and its limits","authors":"M. Reiff","doi":"10.1080/20403313.2024.2355054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20403313.2024.2355054","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":501391,"journal":{"name":"Jurisprudence","volume":"28 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141347918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-10DOI: 10.1080/20403313.2024.2342194
Alan Brudner
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Pub Date : 2024-05-10DOI: 10.1080/20403313.2024.2342192
Alexander Sarch
For any putative excuse, why not recast it as a justification rendering one’s wrongful conduct ultimately permissible? This paper confronts the worry that many, perhaps all, excuses might collapse ...
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Pub Date : 2024-04-12DOI: 10.1080/20403313.2023.2297580
Ezequiel Monti
In a recent paper, Daniel Whiting has argued that there are no exclusionary reasons (i.e., second-order reasons not to act for a reason). The premise of the argument is what he calls the motivation...
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Pub Date : 2024-04-12DOI: 10.1080/20403313.2023.2297583
Jonathan Dancy
This is a response to Paakkunainen’s ‘The Normative-Explanatory Nexus and the Nature of Reasons’.
这是对帕库奈宁的 "规范-解释性联系与理由的本质 "的回应。
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Pub Date : 2024-04-12DOI: 10.1080/20403313.2023.2297579
Felix Koch
What exactly do we need to do in order to make a promise, or to exercise some other normative power? On a view relied on by many philosophers writing on promising, consent, and related phenomena, t...
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