Abstract In the canonical random on-the-job search model with continuous firm heterogeneity, I show that a mean-preserving spread of the firm-productivity distribution raises the returns to mobility, i.e., the inter-firm mobility of workers as measured by the number of outside contacts per employment spell. Both sorting and rent-share mechanisms play a role. In a further contribution, I distinguish frictional and structural impediments to mobility in order to establish a link between mobility and skills via the concept of versatility. Versatility enhances a person’s mobility since a mismatch between job requirements and the person’s skill set is less likely to occur. I provide some statistics in support of the discussed mechanisms. The findings are particularly intriguing in light of the concurrent rise in the productivity dispersion across firms and in the skill premium in many countries.
{"title":"Workplace Heterogeneity and the Returns to Versatility","authors":"Damir Stijepic","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2019-0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2019-0004","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the canonical random on-the-job search model with continuous firm heterogeneity, I show that a mean-preserving spread of the firm-productivity distribution raises the returns to mobility, i.e., the inter-firm mobility of workers as measured by the number of outside contacts per employment spell. Both sorting and rent-share mechanisms play a role. In a further contribution, I distinguish frictional and structural impediments to mobility in order to establish a link between mobility and skills via the concept of versatility. Versatility enhances a person’s mobility since a mismatch between job requirements and the person’s skill set is less likely to occur. I provide some statistics in support of the discussed mechanisms. The findings are particularly intriguing in light of the concurrent rise in the productivity dispersion across firms and in the skill premium in many countries.","PeriodicalId":501460,"journal":{"name":"The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"69 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138535117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We incorporate unawareness into the delegation problem between a financial expert and an investor, and study their pre-delegation communication. The expert has superior awareness of the possible states of the world, and decides whether to reveal some of them to the investor. We find that the expert reveals all the possible states to the investor if the investor is initially aware of a large set of possible states, but reveals partially or nothing otherwise. An investor with a higher degree of unawareness tends to delegate a larger set of projects to the expert, giving rise to a higher incentive for the expert to keep her unaware.
{"title":"Delegation and Information Disclosure with Unforeseen Contingencies","authors":"Haoran Lei,Xiaojian Zhao","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2018-0184","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2018-0184","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We incorporate unawareness into the delegation problem between a financial expert and an investor, and study their pre-delegation communication. The expert has superior awareness of the possible states of the world, and decides whether to reveal some of them to the investor. We find that the expert reveals all the possible states to the investor if the investor is initially aware of a large set of possible states, but reveals partially or nothing otherwise. An investor with a higher degree of unawareness tends to delegate a larger set of projects to the expert, giving rise to a higher incentive for the expert to keep her unaware.","PeriodicalId":501460,"journal":{"name":"The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138535716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this paper, I show the validity of and the relationship between two previously unrelated claims in monetary theory. The first claim, made by Earl Thompson, is that privately-issued bank notes pay a positive rate of return in a competitive equilibrium. The second claim, made by Fischer Black, is that it is possible to have a gold standard in which the gold reserves of the central bank are near zero. I show that both of these claims are correct under the assumption of complete markets and perfect commitment. The link between these claims is the Black-Scholes equation applied to convertible bank notes. In commodity-based monetary systems, bank notes are perpetual American options. I extend the model to consider the implications of a lack of commitment on the part of the bank and incomplete markets. I show that both arguments break down when banks lack commitment to redemption or markets are incomplete. I conclude with implications for macroeconomic theory.
{"title":"Competitively-Issued Convertible Bank Notes in a Theory of Finance: Earl Thompson Meets Fischer Black","authors":"Joshua R. Hendrickson","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2020-0021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2020-0021","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I show the validity of and the relationship between two previously unrelated claims in monetary theory. The first claim, made by Earl Thompson, is that privately-issued bank notes pay a positive rate of return in a competitive equilibrium. The second claim, made by Fischer Black, is that it is possible to have a gold standard in which the gold reserves of the central bank are near zero. I show that both of these claims are correct under the assumption of complete markets and perfect commitment. The link between these claims is the Black-Scholes equation applied to convertible bank notes. In commodity-based monetary systems, bank notes are perpetual American options. I extend the model to consider the implications of a lack of commitment on the part of the bank and incomplete markets. I show that both arguments break down when banks lack commitment to redemption or markets are incomplete. I conclude with implications for macroeconomic theory.","PeriodicalId":501460,"journal":{"name":"The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"19 1","pages":"311-328"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138535116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We examine free riding for entry deterrence in license auctions with heterogeneous incumbents. We establish the monotonicity of randomized preemptive bidding equilibria: an incumbent with a higher entry-loss rate has greater free-riding incentive, choosing a lower deterring probability. We then identify conditions for the existence of a series of fully or partially participating equilibria such that two or more incumbents with bounded heterogeneity in their entry-loss rates participate in randomized preemptive bidding. As an application, we examine a simple case of a bipartite group of participating incumbents consisting of one “leader” and many “followers”. We show that the policy of limiting the leader’s participation (set-asides for entrants, limiting participation of incumbents with excessive market shares, etc.) may or may not increase entry probability.
{"title":"Entry Deterrence and Free Riding in License Auctions: Incumbent Heterogeneity and Monotonicity","authors":"Biung-Ghi Ju,Seung Han Yoo","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2020-0143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2020-0143","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We examine free riding for entry deterrence in license auctions with heterogeneous incumbents. We establish the monotonicity of randomized preemptive bidding equilibria: an incumbent with a higher entry-loss rate has greater free-riding incentive, choosing a lower deterring probability. We then identify conditions for the existence of a series of fully or partially participating equilibria such that two or more incumbents with bounded heterogeneity in their entry-loss rates participate in randomized preemptive bidding. As an application, we examine a simple case of a bipartite group of participating incumbents consisting of one “leader” and many “followers”. We show that the policy of limiting the leader’s participation (set-asides for entrants, limiting participation of incumbents with excessive market shares, etc.) may or may not increase entry probability.","PeriodicalId":501460,"journal":{"name":"The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"161 1","pages":"199-231"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138534894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We critically assess the representative consumer with quadratic aggregate utility function which forms the foundation of a well-known class of linear oligopoly demand structures. It is argued that this approach is problematic and redundant. Regarding the latter, we show how the same demand system can be derived directly from a population of heterogeneous buyers for any number of products. Welfare analyses based on aggregate demand is shown to be sensitive to the underlying microfoundation.
{"title":"On the Microfoundation of Linear Oligopoly Demand","authors":"Iwan Bos,Dries Vermeulen","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2019-0114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2019-0114","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We critically assess the representative consumer with quadratic aggregate utility function which forms the foundation of a well-known class of linear oligopoly demand structures. It is argued that this approach is problematic and redundant. Regarding the latter, we show how the same demand system can be derived directly from a population of heterogeneous buyers for any number of products. Welfare analyses based on aggregate demand is shown to be sensitive to the underlying microfoundation.","PeriodicalId":501460,"journal":{"name":"The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"77 1","pages":"1-15"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138535113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
AbstractLegal assignment of liabilities for losses arising out of interactions involving negative externalities usually depend on which of the interacting parties are negligent and which are not. It has been established in the literature that, if negligence is defined as failure to take some cost-justified precaution then there is no liability rule which can always lead to an efficient outcome. The objective of this paper is to try and understand if it is still possible to make pairwise comparisons between rules on the basis of efficiency and to use such a method to explain/evaluate choices from a given set of rules. We focus on a set of five of the most widely analyzed rules (no liability, strict liability, negligence, negligence with the defense of contributory negligence and strict liability with the defense of contributory negligence), and use a binary relation according to which a rule in the set is considered to be at least as efficient as another if and only if the set of applications for which it is inefficient is a subset of the set of applications for which the other one is inefficient. We show that, with respect to the above mentioned relation, pairwise comparisons between rules in this set fail. The paper, thus, demonstrates that an efficiency based explanation for any choice from these five rules is not consistent with the notion of negligence defined as failure to take some cost-justified precaution.
{"title":"On the Choice of Liability Rules","authors":"Rajendra P. Kundu,Debabrata Pal","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2019-0160","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2019-0160","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractLegal assignment of liabilities for losses arising out of interactions involving negative externalities usually depend on which of the interacting parties are negligent and which are not. It has been established in the literature that, if negligence is defined as failure to take some cost-justified precaution then there is no liability rule which can always lead to an efficient outcome. The objective of this paper is to try and understand if it is still possible to make pairwise comparisons between rules on the basis of efficiency and to use such a method to explain/evaluate choices from a given set of rules. We focus on a set of five of the most widely analyzed rules (no liability, strict liability, negligence, negligence with the defense of contributory negligence and strict liability with the defense of contributory negligence), and use a binary relation according to which a rule in the set is considered to be at least as efficient as another if and only if the set of applications for which it is inefficient is a subset of the set of applications for which the other one is inefficient. We show that, with respect to the above mentioned relation, pairwise comparisons between rules in this set fail. The paper, thus, demonstrates that an efficiency based explanation for any choice from these five rules is not consistent with the notion of negligence defined as failure to take some cost-justified precaution.","PeriodicalId":501460,"journal":{"name":"The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"67 15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138535112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We develop a model of a prediction market with ambiguity and derive testable implications of the presence of Knightian uncertainty. Our model can explain two commonly observed empirical regularities in betting markets: the tendency for longshots to win less often than odds would indicate and the tendency for favorites to win more often. Using historical data from Intrade, we further present empirical evidence that is consistent with the predicted presence of Knightian uncertainty. Our evidence also suggests that, even with information acquisition, the Knightian uncertainty of the world may be not "learnable" to the traders in prediction markets.
{"title":"On the Observational Implications of Knightian Uncertainty","authors":"Kevin A. Hassett, Weifeng Zhong","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2019-0070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2019-0070","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a model of a prediction market with ambiguity and derive testable implications of the presence of Knightian uncertainty. Our model can explain two commonly observed empirical regularities in betting markets: the tendency for longshots to win less often than odds would indicate and the tendency for favorites to win more often. Using historical data from Intrade, we further present empirical evidence that is consistent with the predicted presence of Knightian uncertainty. Our evidence also suggests that, even with information acquisition, the Knightian uncertainty of the world may be not \"learnable\" to the traders in prediction markets.","PeriodicalId":501460,"journal":{"name":"The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"183 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138535110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
AbstractCapital outflows after financial integration can lead to simultaneous increases in the national savings rate and asset prices of an economy with substantial financing costs. Under autarky, firms invest in risky capital while facing a borrowing constraint that creates a need for precautionary savings. Financial integration provides firms with access to foreign risk-free assets and results in two effects: a substitution effect, whereby firms divert some investments to foreign assets and cause capital outflows; and a wealth effect, whereby they grow richer in equilibrium and thus demand more domestic capital. Savings gluts and asset price booms occur when the wealth effect dominates.
{"title":"Financial Integration, Savings Gluts, and Asset Price Booms","authors":"Felix Zhiyu Feng,Will Jianyu Lu,Caroline H. Zhu","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2018-0050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2018-0050","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractCapital outflows after financial integration can lead to simultaneous increases in the national savings rate and asset prices of an economy with substantial financing costs. Under autarky, firms invest in risky capital while facing a borrowing constraint that creates a need for precautionary savings. Financial integration provides firms with access to foreign risk-free assets and results in two effects: a substitution effect, whereby firms divert some investments to foreign assets and cause capital outflows; and a wealth effect, whereby they grow richer in equilibrium and thus demand more domestic capital. Savings gluts and asset price booms occur when the wealth effect dominates.","PeriodicalId":501460,"journal":{"name":"The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138542233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The ability of markets to aggregate information through prices is examined in a dynamic environment with unawareness. We find that if all traders are able to minimally update their awareness when they observe a price that is counterfactual to their private information, they will eventually reach an agreement, thus generalising the result of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [1982]. Moreover, if the traded security is separable, then agreement is on the correct price and there is information aggregation, thus gen- eralizing the result of Ostrovsky [2012] for non-strategic traders. We find that a trader increases her awareness if and only if she is able to become aware of something that other traders are already aware of and, under a mild condition, never becomes aware of anything more. In other words, agreement is more the result of understanding each other, rather than being unboundedly sophisticated.
{"title":"Updating Awareness and Information Aggregation","authors":"Spyros Galanis, Stelios Kotronis","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2018-0193","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2018-0193","url":null,"abstract":"The ability of markets to aggregate information through prices is examined in a dynamic environment with unawareness. We find that if all traders are able to minimally update their awareness when they observe a price that is counterfactual to their private information, they will eventually reach an agreement, thus generalising the result of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [1982]. Moreover, if the traded security is separable, then agreement is on the correct price and there is information aggregation, thus gen- eralizing the result of Ostrovsky [2012] for non-strategic traders. We find that a trader increases her awareness if and only if she is able to become aware of something that other traders are already aware of and, under a mild condition, never becomes aware of anything more. In other words, agreement is more the result of understanding each other, rather than being unboundedly sophisticated.","PeriodicalId":501460,"journal":{"name":"The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138535715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
AbstractWe study the rent-seeking behavior of political parties in a proportional representation system. In our model, the final policy choice of the parliament is a weighted average of parties’ policy positions, weights being their vote shares. An extreme party chooses a higher rent level than a moderate party in exchange for greater policy influence, except in some cases of unlikely distributions of parties. Moreover, political rents are not eliminated even with free entry, unless the entry cost is arbitrarily small.
{"title":"Extreme Parties and Political Rents","authors":"R. Emre Aytimur","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2018-0087","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2018-0087","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractWe study the rent-seeking behavior of political parties in a proportional representation system. In our model, the final policy choice of the parliament is a weighted average of parties’ policy positions, weights being their vote shares. An extreme party chooses a higher rent level than a moderate party in exchange for greater policy influence, except in some cases of unlikely distributions of parties. Moreover, political rents are not eliminated even with free entry, unless the entry cost is arbitrarily small.","PeriodicalId":501460,"journal":{"name":"The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138542200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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