Asymmetries in the formal obligations and rights afforded to sub-units are mainstays of many federations that have been extensively studied from many angles. However, we know relatively little about how these asymmetries shape views on federalism in the future. By leveraging data on differentiated integration in the European Union (EU), conceptually very similar to asymmetrical federalism, and survey data on attitudes toward the optimal future of it, I show that historical exposure to differentiated integration resulting from a bottom-up process of demands for sub-unit autonomy correlates to increased support for permanent differentiation in the future, especially among those critical of the EU. However, the opposite applies to differentiation imposed by the EU. A legacy of asymmetric federalism may thus breed opposition or support for unitary European federalism, depending on both the mode of past asymmetry that citizens have been exposed to and their views of the EU.
{"title":"Past Political Asymmetry and Present Public Opinion: How Has the Asymmetrical Federation of the EU Shaped Popular Opinion of Its Optimal Shape?","authors":"M. Moland","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjae001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjae001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Asymmetries in the formal obligations and rights afforded to sub-units are mainstays of many federations that have been extensively studied from many angles. However, we know relatively little about how these asymmetries shape views on federalism in the future. By leveraging data on differentiated integration in the European Union (EU), conceptually very similar to asymmetrical federalism, and survey data on attitudes toward the optimal future of it, I show that historical exposure to differentiated integration resulting from a bottom-up process of demands for sub-unit autonomy correlates to increased support for permanent differentiation in the future, especially among those critical of the EU. However, the opposite applies to differentiation imposed by the EU. A legacy of asymmetric federalism may thus breed opposition or support for unitary European federalism, depending on both the mode of past asymmetry that citizens have been exposed to and their views of the EU.","PeriodicalId":507126,"journal":{"name":"Publius: The Journal of Federalism","volume":"1 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139525165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article discusses a regionalization project, known as Minghetti’s bill, that was presented to the Italian parliament just after the creation of the country in 1861, debated at length, and finally rejected. The bill was the most advanced point reached on the decentralization front in Italy before the Second World War. Minghetti's bill is the first example of a regional process ever brought to parliamentary discussion. It was also a precursor of other regionalization schemes, such as the creation of French regions in 1972.
{"title":"A Regional System under Tight-Knit Elite Rule: The Last Attempt to Introduce Decentralization in Early Italy","authors":"Giorgio Brosio","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjad050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad050","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article discusses a regionalization project, known as Minghetti’s bill, that was presented to the Italian parliament just after the creation of the country in 1861, debated at length, and finally rejected. The bill was the most advanced point reached on the decentralization front in Italy before the Second World War. Minghetti's bill is the first example of a regional process ever brought to parliamentary discussion. It was also a precursor of other regionalization schemes, such as the creation of French regions in 1972.","PeriodicalId":507126,"journal":{"name":"Publius: The Journal of Federalism","volume":"34 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139530574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The effects of formal constitutional amendment rules are still contested, yielding mixed and inconsistent findings. The key issue lies in overlooking the broader institutional context in which amending clauses are situated. This article presents a novel theoretical argument centered on the “institutional embeddedness.” Empirically, we leverage a unique, most different systems design that compares Australia and Switzerland to assess the direct and indirect effects of formal amendment clauses. Both federations implement an identical “direct-democratic model of constitutional change,” despite differences in size, the underlying societal structure, the federalism model, and form of democratic governance. Our empirical results reveal similar direct effects on minority protection, but differing indirect effects on federal dynamics differ significantly. The formal amendment rule sustains Switzerland’s decentralized federal order, while contributing to pronounced centralizing trends in Australian federalism. These findings have vital implications for constitutional design, highlighting that the specific institutional context is decisive, not just the formal amendment rule.
{"title":"Assessing the Effects of Amendment Rules in Federal Systems: Australia and Switzerland Compared","authors":"Rahel Freiburghaus, A. Vatter","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjad044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad044","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The effects of formal constitutional amendment rules are still contested, yielding mixed and inconsistent findings. The key issue lies in overlooking the broader institutional context in which amending clauses are situated. This article presents a novel theoretical argument centered on the “institutional embeddedness.” Empirically, we leverage a unique, most different systems design that compares Australia and Switzerland to assess the direct and indirect effects of formal amendment clauses. Both federations implement an identical “direct-democratic model of constitutional change,” despite differences in size, the underlying societal structure, the federalism model, and form of democratic governance. Our empirical results reveal similar direct effects on minority protection, but differing indirect effects on federal dynamics differ significantly. The formal amendment rule sustains Switzerland’s decentralized federal order, while contributing to pronounced centralizing trends in Australian federalism. These findings have vital implications for constitutional design, highlighting that the specific institutional context is decisive, not just the formal amendment rule.","PeriodicalId":507126,"journal":{"name":"Publius: The Journal of Federalism","volume":"26 12","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139445943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Splitsville USA: A Democratic Argument for Breaking Up the United States, by Christopher F. Zurn","authors":"I. Somin","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjad045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad045","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":507126,"journal":{"name":"Publius: The Journal of Federalism","volume":"170 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139171429","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Note from the Editors","authors":"Paul Nolette, Philip Rocco","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjad039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad039","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":507126,"journal":{"name":"Publius: The Journal of Federalism","volume":"54 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139174052","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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