Contemporary American federalism, while characterized by nationalized policy battles in the states, is also increasingly defined by the centralization of power in the federal judiciary. In this introductory piece of the 2023–2024 Annual Review issue, we unpack the judicialization of federalism politics. This process, we argue, has been facilitated by national political gridlock, defined by increasing dysfunction in Congress, and the growth of the administrative presidency. In policy conflicts on subjects ranging from education and the environment to abortion and other individual rights, courts have played an increasingly significant role as the arbiter of the federal–state balance of power. As the articles in this Annual Review illustrate, with a few exceptions, judicialization of federalism has often resulted in the devolution of authority to the states, with significant implications for public policy and democratic institutions.
{"title":"The State of American Federalism 2023–2024: Judicialization of Gridlocked Politics","authors":"Rebecca Bromley-Trujillo, M. Dichio","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjae022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjae022","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Contemporary American federalism, while characterized by nationalized policy battles in the states, is also increasingly defined by the centralization of power in the federal judiciary. In this introductory piece of the 2023–2024 Annual Review issue, we unpack the judicialization of federalism politics. This process, we argue, has been facilitated by national political gridlock, defined by increasing dysfunction in Congress, and the growth of the administrative presidency. In policy conflicts on subjects ranging from education and the environment to abortion and other individual rights, courts have played an increasingly significant role as the arbiter of the federal–state balance of power. As the articles in this Annual Review illustrate, with a few exceptions, judicialization of federalism has often resulted in the devolution of authority to the states, with significant implications for public policy and democratic institutions.","PeriodicalId":507126,"journal":{"name":"Publius: The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141684067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article argues that fragmented and varied regulatory, cultural, and electoral responses to guns and gun rights in the contemporary United States are a result of two long-standing features of American political life––its tradition of armed federalism and its unique, domestically oriented market for small firearms. As a result of the intersection of these two phenomena, the past 150 years have seen the growth of a fragmentary regulatory response to firearms on the part of local, state, and federal jurisdictions; the emergence of an organized national gun-rights movement; and, most significantly, the ascendance of a legal strategy by supporters of gun-rights constitutionalism. Only by examining the historical contingencies of American political institutions and markets does the contested transformation of a “right to bear arms” into gun rights make sense.
{"title":"Armed Federalism, Gun Markets, and the Right to Bear Arms in the United States","authors":"Jonathan Obert","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjae020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjae020","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article argues that fragmented and varied regulatory, cultural, and electoral responses to guns and gun rights in the contemporary United States are a result of two long-standing features of American political life––its tradition of armed federalism and its unique, domestically oriented market for small firearms. As a result of the intersection of these two phenomena, the past 150 years have seen the growth of a fragmentary regulatory response to firearms on the part of local, state, and federal jurisdictions; the emergence of an organized national gun-rights movement; and, most significantly, the ascendance of a legal strategy by supporters of gun-rights constitutionalism. Only by examining the historical contingencies of American political institutions and markets does the contested transformation of a “right to bear arms” into gun rights make sense.","PeriodicalId":507126,"journal":{"name":"Publius: The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141359117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
With ever-increasing gridlock and polarization at the national level, many new policy changes in the United States have come at the state level. This includes legislation that restricts the right to vote, limits free speech and expression, and gerrymanders state legislative and congressional districts. A growing body of literature describes these changes, when taken together, as evidence of subnational democratic backsliding. Yet this literature largely ignores the effects of federalism on the structure of institutions within the states, particularly on judicial independence. In this article, I examine the relationship between measures of democracy and introduction of court-curbing legislation in the states. Focusing on instances of court packing, changing the methods of selection and retention, and impeachment, I show that heightened attacks on judicial independence are associated with other types of democratic backsliding.
{"title":"Democratic Backsliding in the American States: The Case of Judicial Independence","authors":"Meghan E. Leonard","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjae009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjae009","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 With ever-increasing gridlock and polarization at the national level, many new policy changes in the United States have come at the state level. This includes legislation that restricts the right to vote, limits free speech and expression, and gerrymanders state legislative and congressional districts. A growing body of literature describes these changes, when taken together, as evidence of subnational democratic backsliding. Yet this literature largely ignores the effects of federalism on the structure of institutions within the states, particularly on judicial independence. In this article, I examine the relationship between measures of democracy and introduction of court-curbing legislation in the states. Focusing on instances of court packing, changing the methods of selection and retention, and impeachment, I show that heightened attacks on judicial independence are associated with other types of democratic backsliding.","PeriodicalId":507126,"journal":{"name":"Publius: The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140729356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Consociationalism promises to resolve tensions among groups in deeply divided societies by constructing shared identity that transcends ethnic divisions. Yet there is no guarantee that this will happen, and empirical studies testing this claim yield inconsistent results. We examine the extent to which political parties appeal to shared identities within a consociation, focusing on the Brussels Capital Region (BCR) in Belgium. The BCR constitutes a regional consociation aimed at addressing divisions between Dutch and French speakers. Based on a quantitative analysis of party programs, and a qualitative analysis of thirty interviews with Brussels MPs, our findings indicate that parties do indeed appeal to a common sense of belonging, often on issues that have a low ethnolinguistic salience. When addressing contentious community matters, however, we observe that Dutch-speaking parties (especially ethnic outbidders) prioritize their own linguistic group identity more than Francophone parties.
{"title":"Out of Many, One? Exploring Ethnolinguistic Identity Appeals in the Brussels Capital Region","authors":"Benjamin Blanckaert, Didier Caluwaerts","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjae010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjae010","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Consociationalism promises to resolve tensions among groups in deeply divided societies by constructing shared identity that transcends ethnic divisions. Yet there is no guarantee that this will happen, and empirical studies testing this claim yield inconsistent results. We examine the extent to which political parties appeal to shared identities within a consociation, focusing on the Brussels Capital Region (BCR) in Belgium. The BCR constitutes a regional consociation aimed at addressing divisions between Dutch and French speakers. Based on a quantitative analysis of party programs, and a qualitative analysis of thirty interviews with Brussels MPs, our findings indicate that parties do indeed appeal to a common sense of belonging, often on issues that have a low ethnolinguistic salience. When addressing contentious community matters, however, we observe that Dutch-speaking parties (especially ethnic outbidders) prioritize their own linguistic group identity more than Francophone parties.","PeriodicalId":507126,"journal":{"name":"Publius: The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140738678","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
State preemption in the form of tax and expenditure limits significantly limits local revenue-raising capacity. To gain insights into how local governments respond to fiscal preemption through direct democracy, this study focuses on tax referenda that override the levy limit set by Proposition 2½ in Massachusetts. Analyzing a sample of 320 municipalities from 2010 to 2021, we investigate the influence of fiscal slack resources and tax burden on the levy limit overrides and exclusions. Our analysis breaks down the tax referendum process into two stages, highlighting the involvement of different decision-makers: local officials proposing the referendum and individual voters approving it. We find that municipalities are motivated to seek tax referenda due to diminishing fiscal slack resources, yet the tax burden on residents can discourage such pursuits.
{"title":"Local Fiscal Response to State Preemption: A Case Study of Massachusetts’ Proposition 2½ Tax Referendum","authors":"Shu Wang, Yonghong Wu","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjae007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjae007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 State preemption in the form of tax and expenditure limits significantly limits local revenue-raising capacity. To gain insights into how local governments respond to fiscal preemption through direct democracy, this study focuses on tax referenda that override the levy limit set by Proposition 2½ in Massachusetts. Analyzing a sample of 320 municipalities from 2010 to 2021, we investigate the influence of fiscal slack resources and tax burden on the levy limit overrides and exclusions. Our analysis breaks down the tax referendum process into two stages, highlighting the involvement of different decision-makers: local officials proposing the referendum and individual voters approving it. We find that municipalities are motivated to seek tax referenda due to diminishing fiscal slack resources, yet the tax burden on residents can discourage such pursuits.","PeriodicalId":507126,"journal":{"name":"Publius: The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140238213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic pushed the European Union (EU) to centralize several public health functions. With the European Health Union (EHU) initiative, four reforms have been adopted to strengthen the EU’s health security framework: the extension of the European Medicines Agency and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control’s mandates, the creation of the Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority, and the upgrading of the Decision on serious cross-border threats to health. This article analyses the reconfiguration of authority patterns resulting from these reforms. It argues that the EHU exemplifies a distinct mode of integration (expansive unification) in which national sovereignty is not transferred to the center but is jointly exercised at the center. This mode of integration is suitable for capacity building in core state domains when functional needs confront reluctance from constituent units to surrender control.
{"title":"Integration through Expansive Unification: The Birth of the European Health Union","authors":"Maurizio Ferrera, Anna Kyriazi, Joan Miró","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjae006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjae006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic pushed the European Union (EU) to centralize several public health functions. With the European Health Union (EHU) initiative, four reforms have been adopted to strengthen the EU’s health security framework: the extension of the European Medicines Agency and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control’s mandates, the creation of the Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority, and the upgrading of the Decision on serious cross-border threats to health. This article analyses the reconfiguration of authority patterns resulting from these reforms. It argues that the EHU exemplifies a distinct mode of integration (expansive unification) in which national sovereignty is not transferred to the center but is jointly exercised at the center. This mode of integration is suitable for capacity building in core state domains when functional needs confront reluctance from constituent units to surrender control.","PeriodicalId":507126,"journal":{"name":"Publius: The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140258594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We evaluate whether feelings of state pride in the USA are linked to the quality of democracy in one’s state. Using two original surveys, we find no relationship between an objective measure of the quality of state democracy and feelings of state pride. In contrast, we find a consistent positive relationship between subjective evaluations and state pride such that citizens with more positive evaluations of the quality of democracy in their state report higher levels of state pride. Interestingly, feelings of state pride are not linked to the objective measure of democracy even when citizens are informed of where their state ranks in a survey experiment. However, subsample analyses reveal that there is a relationship between the objective measure and state pride among Democrats and political “losers” (citizens living in states where the government is controlled by the opposite party). We conclude by discussing implications for citizenship and state pride in an era of democratic erosion.
{"title":"State Pride and the Quality of Democracy in the American States","authors":"Patrick Flavin, Gregory Shufeldt","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjae002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjae002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We evaluate whether feelings of state pride in the USA are linked to the quality of democracy in one’s state. Using two original surveys, we find no relationship between an objective measure of the quality of state democracy and feelings of state pride. In contrast, we find a consistent positive relationship between subjective evaluations and state pride such that citizens with more positive evaluations of the quality of democracy in their state report higher levels of state pride. Interestingly, feelings of state pride are not linked to the objective measure of democracy even when citizens are informed of where their state ranks in a survey experiment. However, subsample analyses reveal that there is a relationship between the objective measure and state pride among Democrats and political “losers” (citizens living in states where the government is controlled by the opposite party). We conclude by discussing implications for citizenship and state pride in an era of democratic erosion.","PeriodicalId":507126,"journal":{"name":"Publius: The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139962163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rethinking Decentralization: Mapping the Meaning of Subsidiarity in Federal Political Culture, by Jacob Deem","authors":"Bianca Jamal, Loleen Berdahl","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjae004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjae004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":507126,"journal":{"name":"Publius: The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139963547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There is a lingering myth in the international compliance literature that domestic multilevel structures have a negative impact on the fulfilment of international commitments. This article argues that this literature has failed to understand multilevel structures as a multi-layered concept. Instead of viewing multilevel governance as a one-dimensional concept or a mere system of veto-players, I propose to study the effects of the individual components, i.e., federalism, decentral governance, and joint decision-making. I test the plausibility of this approach by analyzing the implementation of the Ramsar Wetlands Convention. My findings debunk the myth about the negative effects of multilevel structures on the implementation of international agreements. I show that states in which subnational decision-makers can act autonomously from the central level are better placed to produce implementation measures in the area of environmental conservation.
{"title":"Federalism, Decentral Governance, and Joint Decision-Making: Bad News for the Implementation of International Environmental Agreements?","authors":"Johannes Müller Gómez","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjae003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjae003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 There is a lingering myth in the international compliance literature that domestic multilevel structures have a negative impact on the fulfilment of international commitments. This article argues that this literature has failed to understand multilevel structures as a multi-layered concept. Instead of viewing multilevel governance as a one-dimensional concept or a mere system of veto-players, I propose to study the effects of the individual components, i.e., federalism, decentral governance, and joint decision-making. I test the plausibility of this approach by analyzing the implementation of the Ramsar Wetlands Convention. My findings debunk the myth about the negative effects of multilevel structures on the implementation of international agreements. I show that states in which subnational decision-makers can act autonomously from the central level are better placed to produce implementation measures in the area of environmental conservation.","PeriodicalId":507126,"journal":{"name":"Publius: The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139842020","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There is a lingering myth in the international compliance literature that domestic multilevel structures have a negative impact on the fulfilment of international commitments. This article argues that this literature has failed to understand multilevel structures as a multi-layered concept. Instead of viewing multilevel governance as a one-dimensional concept or a mere system of veto-players, I propose to study the effects of the individual components, i.e., federalism, decentral governance, and joint decision-making. I test the plausibility of this approach by analyzing the implementation of the Ramsar Wetlands Convention. My findings debunk the myth about the negative effects of multilevel structures on the implementation of international agreements. I show that states in which subnational decision-makers can act autonomously from the central level are better placed to produce implementation measures in the area of environmental conservation.
{"title":"Federalism, Decentral Governance, and Joint Decision-Making: Bad News for the Implementation of International Environmental Agreements?","authors":"Johannes Müller Gómez","doi":"10.1093/publius/pjae003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjae003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 There is a lingering myth in the international compliance literature that domestic multilevel structures have a negative impact on the fulfilment of international commitments. This article argues that this literature has failed to understand multilevel structures as a multi-layered concept. Instead of viewing multilevel governance as a one-dimensional concept or a mere system of veto-players, I propose to study the effects of the individual components, i.e., federalism, decentral governance, and joint decision-making. I test the plausibility of this approach by analyzing the implementation of the Ramsar Wetlands Convention. My findings debunk the myth about the negative effects of multilevel structures on the implementation of international agreements. I show that states in which subnational decision-makers can act autonomously from the central level are better placed to produce implementation measures in the area of environmental conservation.","PeriodicalId":507126,"journal":{"name":"Publius: The Journal of Federalism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139781814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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