Although political self‐efficacy is one of the most important determinants of political participation, little is known about the factors that boost its development or reduce structural differences between different social groups. This study tests three perspectives—socioeconomic background, social capital and supporting school environment—to explain why youth belonging to the Swedish‐speaking minority in Finland have significantly higher political self‐efficacy than those belonging to the Finnish‐speaking majority, despite their minority status. Using the data of 5274 15–16‐year‐old students in a multilevel OLS design, this study indicates that a more open classroom climate in minority schools is an important predictor of the higher political self‐efficacy of the minority youth. The results demonstrate the value of promoting classroom environments where students are encouraged to express their opinions and discuss political issues openly.
{"title":"Explaining the gap: Why do Swedish‐speaking minority youth have higher political self‐efficacy than Finnish‐speaking majority youth?","authors":"Venla Hannuksela","doi":"10.1111/1467-9477.12265","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9477.12265","url":null,"abstract":"Although political self‐efficacy is one of the most important determinants of political participation, little is known about the factors that boost its development or reduce structural differences between different social groups. This study tests three perspectives—socioeconomic background, social capital and supporting school environment—to explain why youth belonging to the Swedish‐speaking minority in Finland have significantly higher political self‐efficacy than those belonging to the Finnish‐speaking majority, despite their minority status. Using the data of 5274 15–16‐year‐old students in a multilevel OLS design, this study indicates that a more open classroom climate in minority schools is an important predictor of the higher political self‐efficacy of the minority youth. The results demonstrate the value of promoting classroom environments where students are encouraged to express their opinions and discuss political issues openly.","PeriodicalId":509462,"journal":{"name":"Scandinavian Political Studies","volume":"126 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139839921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Although political self‐efficacy is one of the most important determinants of political participation, little is known about the factors that boost its development or reduce structural differences between different social groups. This study tests three perspectives—socioeconomic background, social capital and supporting school environment—to explain why youth belonging to the Swedish‐speaking minority in Finland have significantly higher political self‐efficacy than those belonging to the Finnish‐speaking majority, despite their minority status. Using the data of 5274 15–16‐year‐old students in a multilevel OLS design, this study indicates that a more open classroom climate in minority schools is an important predictor of the higher political self‐efficacy of the minority youth. The results demonstrate the value of promoting classroom environments where students are encouraged to express their opinions and discuss political issues openly.
{"title":"Explaining the gap: Why do Swedish‐speaking minority youth have higher political self‐efficacy than Finnish‐speaking majority youth?","authors":"Venla Hannuksela","doi":"10.1111/1467-9477.12265","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9477.12265","url":null,"abstract":"Although political self‐efficacy is one of the most important determinants of political participation, little is known about the factors that boost its development or reduce structural differences between different social groups. This study tests three perspectives—socioeconomic background, social capital and supporting school environment—to explain why youth belonging to the Swedish‐speaking minority in Finland have significantly higher political self‐efficacy than those belonging to the Finnish‐speaking majority, despite their minority status. Using the data of 5274 15–16‐year‐old students in a multilevel OLS design, this study indicates that a more open classroom climate in minority schools is an important predictor of the higher political self‐efficacy of the minority youth. The results demonstrate the value of promoting classroom environments where students are encouraged to express their opinions and discuss political issues openly.","PeriodicalId":509462,"journal":{"name":"Scandinavian Political Studies","volume":"27 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139780087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Growing worries over young people's lack of engagement in institutionalized political processes have been appeased by theories of young people's political preferences for alternative, more engaged political activities. However, young people's institutionalized participation is important for the quality of participation. Democratic innovations, institutions that are designed to increase citizen participation, have been suggested as one solution to bring young people back into institutionalized politics. However, in research, different forms of democratic innovations are often treated as a bulk measure and not examined separately—depriving us of knowledge of youth support for different types of participatory processes. This paper contributes to the literature by examining youth support for a direct versus talk‐centric democratic process in Finland. The results indicate that young people support both referendums and discussion forums more than older people do and that discussion forums are more popular than referendums. Additionally, democratic satisfaction has a reversed effect on support for discussion forums for young and old people.
{"title":"Youth support for direct versus talk‐centric democratic processes in Finland","authors":"Janette Huttunen","doi":"10.1111/1467-9477.12264","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9477.12264","url":null,"abstract":"Growing worries over young people's lack of engagement in institutionalized political processes have been appeased by theories of young people's political preferences for alternative, more engaged political activities. However, young people's institutionalized participation is important for the quality of participation. Democratic innovations, institutions that are designed to increase citizen participation, have been suggested as one solution to bring young people back into institutionalized politics. However, in research, different forms of democratic innovations are often treated as a bulk measure and not examined separately—depriving us of knowledge of youth support for different types of participatory processes. This paper contributes to the literature by examining youth support for a direct versus talk‐centric democratic process in Finland. The results indicate that young people support both referendums and discussion forums more than older people do and that discussion forums are more popular than referendums. Additionally, democratic satisfaction has a reversed effect on support for discussion forums for young and old people.","PeriodicalId":509462,"journal":{"name":"Scandinavian Political Studies","volume":"103 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140487586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What happens to the electorate of a populist radical right party when the party splits? Finland provides an excellent case for an analysis of this nature. In 2017, the Finns Party split due to an internal rift. Party leadership was taken over by members of the party's anti‐immigrant faction, who, in the election of 2019, succeeded in replicating the party's previous electoral successes in 2011 and 2015. At the same time, the moderate faction that split from the party was wiped out in the election. In the election of 2023, the party gained yet another victory. Using the Finnish National Election Studies (2011, 2015, 2019 and 2023), we examine whether the party's transformation to a more anti‐immigrant populist radical right party is reflected in the policy positions and sociodemographic composition of the party's electorate. Our findings show that the electorate came to reflect the change in leadership after the party split. Furthermore, we are able to demonstrate that the pattern prevails in the newest election of 2023 under the leadership of Riikka Purra.
{"title":"Can a change in the leadership of a populist radical right party be traced among voters? The case of the Finns Party","authors":"Peter Söderlund, Kimmo Grönlund","doi":"10.1111/1467-9477.12263","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9477.12263","url":null,"abstract":"What happens to the electorate of a populist radical right party when the party splits? Finland provides an excellent case for an analysis of this nature. In 2017, the Finns Party split due to an internal rift. Party leadership was taken over by members of the party's anti‐immigrant faction, who, in the election of 2019, succeeded in replicating the party's previous electoral successes in 2011 and 2015. At the same time, the moderate faction that split from the party was wiped out in the election. In the election of 2023, the party gained yet another victory. Using the Finnish National Election Studies (2011, 2015, 2019 and 2023), we examine whether the party's transformation to a more anti‐immigrant populist radical right party is reflected in the policy positions and sociodemographic composition of the party's electorate. Our findings show that the electorate came to reflect the change in leadership after the party split. Furthermore, we are able to demonstrate that the pattern prevails in the newest election of 2023 under the leadership of Riikka Purra.","PeriodicalId":509462,"journal":{"name":"Scandinavian Political Studies","volume":" 9","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139624236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}