Archive for History of Exact Sciences最新文献

Charles Sanders Peirce wrote the article ‘The probability of induction’ in 1878. It was the fourth article of the series ‘Illustrations of the Logic of Science’ which comprised a total of six articles. According to Peirce, to get a clear idea of the conception of probability, one has ‘to consider what real and sensible difference there is between one degree of probability and another.’ He endorsed what John Venn had called the ‘materialistic view’ of the subject, namely that probability is the proportion of times in which an occurrence of one kind is accompanied by an occurrence of another kind. On the other hand, Peirce recognized the existence of a different interpretation of probability, which was termed by Venn the ‘conceptualistic view,’ namely the degree of belief that ought to be attached to a proposition. Peirce’s intent on writing this article seems to be to inquire about the claims of the conceptualists concerning the problem of induction. After reasoning on some examples, he concluded on the impossibility of assigning probability for induction. We show here that the arguments advanced in his article are not sufficient to support such conclusion. Peirce’s thoughts on the probability of induction surely may have influenced statisticians and research scientists of the twentieth century in shaping data analysis.

Through an in-depth analysis of the notes that Leibniz made while reading Pascal’s manuscript treatise on conic sections, we aim to show the real extension of what he called “hexagrammum mysticum”, and to highlight the main results he achieved in this field, as well as proposing plausible proofs of them according to the methods he seems to have developed.

In this paper, we study the genesis and evolution of geometric ideas and techniques in investigations of movable singularities of algebraic ordinary differential equations. This leads us to the work of Mihailo Petrović on algebraic differential equations (ODEs) and in particular the geometric ideas expressed in his polygon method from the final years of the nineteenth century, which have been left completely unnoticed by the experts. This concept, also developed independently and in a somewhat different direction by Henry Fine, generalizes the famous Newton–Puiseux polygonal method and applies to algebraic ODEs rather than algebraic equations. Although remarkable, the Petrović legacy has been practically neglected in the modern literature, although the situation is less severe in the case of results of Fine. Therefore, we study the development of the ideas of Petrović and Fine and their places in contemporary mathematics.

In Résolution des quatre principaux problèmes d’architecture (1673) then in Cours d’architecture (1683), the architect–mathematician Nicolas-François Blondel addresses one of the most famous architectural problems of all times, that of the reduction in columns (entasis). The interest of the text lies in the variety of subjects that are linked to this issue. (1) The text is a response to the challenge launched by Curabelle in 1664 under the name Étrenne à tous les architectes; (2) Blondel mathematicizes the problem in the “style of the Ancients”; (3) The problem is reformulated and solved through the continuous drawing of the curve; (4) Blondel refutes the uniqueness of the curve by enumerating a variety of solutions (conchoid, spiral, parabola, ellipse, circle, hyperbola). This exuberance responds to an intention that does not coincide with the state of the art of mathematics at the end of the seventeenth century, nor with the taste for geometry of the Ancients, nor with any pedagogical project. This feature is explained by Blondel’s plan to found architecture on scientific bases. The reasons for his failure are analysed.

In this paper, we endeavour to give a historically accurate presentation of how Leibniz understood his infinitesimals, and how he justified their use. Some authors claim that when Leibniz called them “fictions” in response to the criticisms of the calculus by Rolle and others at the turn of the century, he had in mind a different meaning of “fiction” than in his earlier work, involving a commitment to their existence as non-Archimedean elements of the continuum. Against this, we show that by 1676 Leibniz had already developed an interpretation from which he never wavered, according to which infinitesimals, like infinite wholes, cannot be regarded as existing because their concepts entail contradictions, even though they may be used as if they exist under certain specified conditions—a conception he later characterized as “syncategorematic”. Thus, one cannot infer the existence of infinitesimals from their successful use. By a detailed analysis of Leibniz’s arguments in his De quadratura of 1675–1676, we show that Leibniz had already presented there two strategies for presenting infinitesimalist methods, one in which one uses finite quantities that can be made as small as necessary in order for the error to be smaller than can be assigned, and thus zero; and another “direct” method in which the infinite and infinitely small are introduced by a fiction analogous to imaginary roots in algebra, and to points at infinity in projective geometry. We then show how in his mature papers the latter strategy, now articulated as based on the Law of Continuity, is presented to critics of the calculus as being equally constitutive for the foundations of algebra and geometry and also as being provably rigorous according to the accepted standards in keeping with the Archimedean axiom.

It is well known that one of Poincaré’s most important contributions to mathematics is the creation of algebraic topology. In this paper, we examine carefully the stated motivations of Poincaré and potential applications he had in mind for developing topology. Besides being an interesting historical problem, this study will also shed some light on the broad interest of Poincaré in mathematics in a concrete way.

To solve the direct problem of central forces when the trajectory is an ellipse and the force is directed to its centre, Newton made use of the famous Lemma 12 (Principia, I, sect. II) that was later recognized equivalent to proposition 31 of book VII of Apollonius’s Conics. In this paper, in which we look for Newton’s possible sources for Lemma 12, we compare Apollonius’s original proof, as edited by Borelli, with those of other authors, including that given by Newton himself. Moreover, after having retraced its editorial history, we evaluate the dissemination of Borelli's edition of books V-VII of Apollonius’s Conics before the printing of the Principia.

The Mathematical Book in Nine Chapters, written by Qin Jiushao in 1247, is a masterpiece that is representative of Chinese mathematics at that time. Most of the previous studies have focused on its mathematical achievements, while few works have addressed the counting diagrams that Qin used as a writing system. Based on a seventeenth-century copy of Qin’s treatise (i.e., Zhao Qimei’s 1616 handwritten copy), this paper systematically analyzes the writing system, which includes both a numeral system and a linear system. It argues that Qin provided a new representation of mathematics in addition to textual procedures, detailed solutions, and operations carried out with counting rods. Moreover, this new representation was used to connect mathematical practices within and outside the text and should be understood in its textual context. Therefore, Qin’s writing system represents an intermediate phase in the textualization and symbolization of Chinese mathematics in thirteenth-century China.

Babylonian methods for predicting planetary phenomena using the so-called goal-year periods are well known. Texts known as Goal-Year Texts contain collections of the observational data needed to make predictions for a given year. The predictions were then recorded in Normal Star Almanacs and Almanacs. Large numbers of Goal-Year Texts, Normal Star Almanacs and Almanacs are attested from the early third century BC onward. A small number of texts dating from before the third century present procedures for using the goal-year periods to predict planetary phenomena. In addition, two texts, one dating to the late sixth century BC and the other to the late fifth century BC, contain planetary data which was probably predicted using these methods. In this article, I discuss a further example of a tablet dating from before the third century BC which contains planetary data predicted using the goal-year periods. I show that the planetary phenomena contained in this tablet can be dated to the twelfth year of the reign of Artaxerxes III (347/6 BC) and that they were predicted using goal-year periods without the application of the kind of corrections which were used in the third century BC texts in order to produce more accurate predictions.