Journal of the History of Biology最新文献

This article explores the early biogeographical debates that shaped the beginning of limnology, focusing on the differences of opinion concerning the origins of pelagic fauna between two pioneering scientists: Pietro Pavesi and François-Alphonse Forel. The study examines how Pavesi's hypothesis of a marine origin for pelagic fauna contrasts with Forel's theory of passive distribution, situating their arguments within a broader Darwinian framework. The first part of the paper provides a historical overview of Italian limnology, highlighting Pavesi's contributions and interpreting Forel's writings to underscore the significance of discovering pelagic fauna in conceptualizing lakes as microcosms. The second part compares Pavesi's and Forel's hypotheses, emphasizing their impact on the scientific understanding of freshwater ecosystems. The importance of this discovery, in both historical and scientific contexts, lies in recognizing the presence of plankton in lakes as a crucial element for the mature formulation of ecological concepts, such as the ecosystem.

Agnes Arber (1879-1960) was a British plant morphologist, historian of botany, and philosopher of biology. Though now largely forgotten, her work offers valuable insights into morphological as well as philosophical issues. This paper focuses on Arber's work on teleology in plants. After providing a brief overview of her life and distinct style of work, two notions of teleology are presented, which become apparent in Arber's morphological and philosophical work. The first notion, labeled final teleology, is based on Aristotle's final cause and deals with adaptation-based explanations in biology. The second is labeled formal teleology. It is grounded in the Aristotelian formal cause and deals with the inherent directiveness of developing structures and the actualization of potentialities in organisms and their parts. Whereas Arber showed a reserved and skeptical attitude towards final teleology, she was very sympathetic to formal teleology, building her general morphological framework on it. Two examples from Arber's work are then given, which illustrate how formal teleology informed her theorizing: the partial-shoot theory of the leaf, and parallelism in evolution as a counter-proposal to natural selection. Finally, Arber's teleological interpretation of plant morphology is historically contextualized and connected to recent research developments in evolutionary biology and plant morphology.

This paper explores the control of visiting "foreign scientists" at the Charles Darwin Research Station (CDRS) after it was established in the Galápagos Islands in 1959. Scholarly accounts of the creation of the Galápagos National Park and of the field station have emphasized their place in an international "land grab," as leading scientists and conservationists sought to control nature in places around the world that seemed less "civilized" to European thinkers. The actual administrative labor in the early years at this scientific field station, however, in practice struggled to control people widely taken to represent "civilization" in its highest form-European and American scientists. At the research station, European and American (but not Ecuadorian) scientists were the focus of a delicate choreography of discipline and acquiescence, as scientists were courted and refused, welcomed and limited, chastised and supported. Meanwhile CDRS fund-raising appeals promised that the station would control island residents, fishing crews, and invasive species. Such appeals did not mention controlling elite field scientists. Existing historiography has stressed how Western scientists were privileged actors in non-Western nature reserves and parks, their privileges coming at the expense of local communities. But scientists too faced new (quietly implemented) constraints as post-war conservation programs developed, and achieving their compliance with these new rules involved a process I call here "civilizing" elites.

This article revisits the question of Alfred Russel Wallace's relationship to eugenics and explores the basis of Wallace's consistent rejection of attempts to label him a eugenicist. Whereas some scholars have identified an 'ambiguity' or 'tension' between Wallace's hereditarianism and his libertarianism and maintained - despite Wallace's statements to the contrary - that he was, in some senses, a eugenicist, this article argues that Wallace's oft-repeated claims he was not a eugenicist are fully justified. By exploring Wallace's relationship with Francis Galton using a hitherto neglected correspondence between the two concerning the establishment of a proposed laboratory, and Wallace's criticism of non-Darwinian evolutionary mechanisms in the writings of William Bateson and others, this article situates Wallace's opposition to eugenics in his broader ultra-Darwinian agenda. The article concludes by arguing that it is misleading to characterise Wallace as a eugenicist, and that doing so tends to obscure and confuse our understanding of his thought.