Pub Date : 2023-08-31DOI: 10.1177/10659129231198248
James A. Piazza
As populist parties and politicians have grown in prominence in democracies, scholars have turned their attention to the causes, and consequences, of populist attitudes among citizens. Some preliminary research indicates that individuals with populist attitudes are more likely to express support or tolerance for the use of violence to achieve political objectives. In this study, I examine this relationship further by investigating factors that mediate the effect of populism on endorsement of political violence. Using an original survey of more than 1300 subjects in the United States, I evaluate four elements that theoretically mediate the relationship between populism and support for political violence: economic grievances; distrust of political institutions; perception that social and demographic changes in the United States are threatening; and preferences for politically illiberal or nondemocratic rule. I find that the effect of populism on support for political violence is mediated through fear of social/demographic change and preference for illiberal rule but not through economic grievances or distrust of political institutions. Taken together, over 50% of the effect of populism on support for political violence is mediated through heightened anxiety about social and demographic changes in the U.S. and illiberal attitudes.
{"title":"Populism and Support for Political Violence in the United States: Assessing the Role of Grievances, Distrust of Political Institutions, Social Change Threat, and Political Illiberalism","authors":"James A. Piazza","doi":"10.1177/10659129231198248","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129231198248","url":null,"abstract":"As populist parties and politicians have grown in prominence in democracies, scholars have turned their attention to the causes, and consequences, of populist attitudes among citizens. Some preliminary research indicates that individuals with populist attitudes are more likely to express support or tolerance for the use of violence to achieve political objectives. In this study, I examine this relationship further by investigating factors that mediate the effect of populism on endorsement of political violence. Using an original survey of more than 1300 subjects in the United States, I evaluate four elements that theoretically mediate the relationship between populism and support for political violence: economic grievances; distrust of political institutions; perception that social and demographic changes in the United States are threatening; and preferences for politically illiberal or nondemocratic rule. I find that the effect of populism on support for political violence is mediated through fear of social/demographic change and preference for illiberal rule but not through economic grievances or distrust of political institutions. Taken together, over 50% of the effect of populism on support for political violence is mediated through heightened anxiety about social and demographic changes in the U.S. and illiberal attitudes.","PeriodicalId":51366,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41271823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-25DOI: 10.1177/10659129231197207
A. Badas, Eric R. Schmidt
Extant research reveals that Americans hold politically consequential beliefs about the demographic composition of political groups and organizations—even when these beliefs are at odds with objective reality. In this article, we investigate the social imagery of the U.S. Supreme Court, with particular attention to beliefs about the Supreme Court Justices’ religious identities. In survey analysis, we find that evangelicals who believe there are more evangelical Christians on the Court grant the Court more legitimacy compared to non-evangelicals. Further, when evangelical Christians believe there are more atheists on the Court, they view the Court less legitimately than non-evangelicals. To rule out the potential of endogeneity, we conduct a conjoint experiment which demonstrates that evangelicals believe evangelical judges will increase the fairness of the Court and are more likely to support evangelical nominees compared to the average nominee. Likewise, they tend to believe out-group judges will harm the fairness of the Court and are less likely to support out-group judges. Our results have implications for diversity on the Court and how non-ideological factors can affect the Court’s legitimacy.
{"title":"Social Imagery and Judicial Legitimacy: Evidence From Evangelical Christians","authors":"A. Badas, Eric R. Schmidt","doi":"10.1177/10659129231197207","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129231197207","url":null,"abstract":"Extant research reveals that Americans hold politically consequential beliefs about the demographic composition of political groups and organizations—even when these beliefs are at odds with objective reality. In this article, we investigate the social imagery of the U.S. Supreme Court, with particular attention to beliefs about the Supreme Court Justices’ religious identities. In survey analysis, we find that evangelicals who believe there are more evangelical Christians on the Court grant the Court more legitimacy compared to non-evangelicals. Further, when evangelical Christians believe there are more atheists on the Court, they view the Court less legitimately than non-evangelicals. To rule out the potential of endogeneity, we conduct a conjoint experiment which demonstrates that evangelicals believe evangelical judges will increase the fairness of the Court and are more likely to support evangelical nominees compared to the average nominee. Likewise, they tend to believe out-group judges will harm the fairness of the Court and are less likely to support out-group judges. Our results have implications for diversity on the Court and how non-ideological factors can affect the Court’s legitimacy.","PeriodicalId":51366,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47255461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-25DOI: 10.1177/10659129231196566
A. Clarke, C. Volden, Alan E. Wiseman
Does joining a party faction in Congress enhance or undermine a member’s lawmaking effectiveness? Prior research suggests that factions can help members electorally in signaling their distinct ideological positions to potential political supporters. By contrast, we examine the nine largest ideological caucuses over the past quarter century to test three hypotheses about the conditional lawmaking benefits of faction membership: (1) that benefits from faction membership are limited to those in the minority party; (2) that members of ideologically centrist factions gain the greatest benefits; and (3) that sizable factions exploit their pivotal positions to help their members achieve legislative victories. We find support for only the first of these three conjectures, consistent with the argument that factions offer valuable resources to those in the minority party and that majority-party leaders counter the proposals arising from their own party’s factions. The fact that faction membership offers no significant lawmaking benefit to majority-party legislators challenges conventional wisdom.
{"title":"The Conditional Lawmaking Benefits of Party Faction Membership in Congress","authors":"A. Clarke, C. Volden, Alan E. Wiseman","doi":"10.1177/10659129231196566","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129231196566","url":null,"abstract":"Does joining a party faction in Congress enhance or undermine a member’s lawmaking effectiveness? Prior research suggests that factions can help members electorally in signaling their distinct ideological positions to potential political supporters. By contrast, we examine the nine largest ideological caucuses over the past quarter century to test three hypotheses about the conditional lawmaking benefits of faction membership: (1) that benefits from faction membership are limited to those in the minority party; (2) that members of ideologically centrist factions gain the greatest benefits; and (3) that sizable factions exploit their pivotal positions to help their members achieve legislative victories. We find support for only the first of these three conjectures, consistent with the argument that factions offer valuable resources to those in the minority party and that majority-party leaders counter the proposals arising from their own party’s factions. The fact that faction membership offers no significant lawmaking benefit to majority-party legislators challenges conventional wisdom.","PeriodicalId":51366,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49436061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-17DOI: 10.1177/10659129231195079
Anjali Thomas, J. Darsey
Why do public works programs in developing democracies often experience implementation failures at the local level? Building on the literature on political business cycles, our study sheds light on a key explanation. We argue that electoral cycles undermine the completion of public works projects because of incumbents’ difficulties in reaping electoral rewards for following through on projects proposed just prior to an election. Analyses based on project-level data from a nation-wide public program in India supports the argument. We find that projects proposed close to an upcoming election are less likely to be eventually completed than projects proposed at other times. We further find that incumbent turnover exacerbates the effect of electoral cycles and that this modifying effect is plausibly causal. The results suggest that new incumbents have reduced incentives to follow through on projects proposed by their predecessors due to the difficulties involved with claiming credit for such projects.
{"title":"How Electoral Cycles Shape the Implementation of Public Works Programs: Evidence From India","authors":"Anjali Thomas, J. Darsey","doi":"10.1177/10659129231195079","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129231195079","url":null,"abstract":"Why do public works programs in developing democracies often experience implementation failures at the local level? Building on the literature on political business cycles, our study sheds light on a key explanation. We argue that electoral cycles undermine the completion of public works projects because of incumbents’ difficulties in reaping electoral rewards for following through on projects proposed just prior to an election. Analyses based on project-level data from a nation-wide public program in India supports the argument. We find that projects proposed close to an upcoming election are less likely to be eventually completed than projects proposed at other times. We further find that incumbent turnover exacerbates the effect of electoral cycles and that this modifying effect is plausibly causal. The results suggest that new incumbents have reduced incentives to follow through on projects proposed by their predecessors due to the difficulties involved with claiming credit for such projects.","PeriodicalId":51366,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45255937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-17DOI: 10.1177/10659129231194641
Laura S. Antkowiak
Political scientists have long expressed concern about citizens who focus their civic activity on community service, seemingly treating it as a substitute for political involvement. Proposed explanations for this phenomenon portray it as popular among young adults. They also speculate that a politics dominated by two ideologically polarized, uncivil, and chronically gridlocked parties may cause citizens who do not feel they have or want a place on those partisan teams to avoid the arenas in which they fight. Few large and representative studies, however, examine how citizens allocate their civic activity between service and political action. Using the 2016 American National Election Study, I find that signs of alienation from the country’s major political parties increase the likelihood that citizens limit their activity to service, making a substitution scenario plausible. More commonly, however, rising partisan alienation predicts a shift in political involvement from electoral to non-electoral forms. Younger citizens are surprisingly less likely than their elders to specialize in service.
{"title":"Who Substitutes Service for Politics? Assessing the Roles of Youth and Partisan Alienation in Americans’ Forms of Civic Engagement","authors":"Laura S. Antkowiak","doi":"10.1177/10659129231194641","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129231194641","url":null,"abstract":"Political scientists have long expressed concern about citizens who focus their civic activity on community service, seemingly treating it as a substitute for political involvement. Proposed explanations for this phenomenon portray it as popular among young adults. They also speculate that a politics dominated by two ideologically polarized, uncivil, and chronically gridlocked parties may cause citizens who do not feel they have or want a place on those partisan teams to avoid the arenas in which they fight. Few large and representative studies, however, examine how citizens allocate their civic activity between service and political action. Using the 2016 American National Election Study, I find that signs of alienation from the country’s major political parties increase the likelihood that citizens limit their activity to service, making a substitution scenario plausible. More commonly, however, rising partisan alienation predicts a shift in political involvement from electoral to non-electoral forms. Younger citizens are surprisingly less likely than their elders to specialize in service.","PeriodicalId":51366,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45574001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-07DOI: 10.1177/10659129231193425
Philip Petrov
This essay applies existing research in new institutional economics to early modern European political theory so as to offer an interpretive proposal. Using Hobbes, Hume, and James Madison as examples, the essay proposes that understanding early modern European political theorists as inhabitants of developing countries (in a particular sense of that term) can benefit contemporary readers in interpreting some of these theorists’ normative prescriptions. Early modern political theorists faced significant risk of large-scale violence, political instability, and state repression in polities that still struggled to accomplish goals such as implementing rule of law, protecting property rights, and widely distributing material resources using impartial criteria. By contrast, many contemporary readers of these writers live in the developed and liberal-democratic West. Contemporary readers are thus liable to normalize their own conditions and to underestimate the political-economic constraints under which early modern political theorists wrote, thereby misreading some of the latter’s normative prescriptions. By interpreting early modern political theorists as writers who faced institutional constraints that have significantly receded in today’s West, contemporary readers can enrich their understanding of these writers’ objectives.
{"title":"Political Development and Political Thought","authors":"Philip Petrov","doi":"10.1177/10659129231193425","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129231193425","url":null,"abstract":"This essay applies existing research in new institutional economics to early modern European political theory so as to offer an interpretive proposal. Using Hobbes, Hume, and James Madison as examples, the essay proposes that understanding early modern European political theorists as inhabitants of developing countries (in a particular sense of that term) can benefit contemporary readers in interpreting some of these theorists’ normative prescriptions. Early modern political theorists faced significant risk of large-scale violence, political instability, and state repression in polities that still struggled to accomplish goals such as implementing rule of law, protecting property rights, and widely distributing material resources using impartial criteria. By contrast, many contemporary readers of these writers live in the developed and liberal-democratic West. Contemporary readers are thus liable to normalize their own conditions and to underestimate the political-economic constraints under which early modern political theorists wrote, thereby misreading some of the latter’s normative prescriptions. By interpreting early modern political theorists as writers who faced institutional constraints that have significantly receded in today’s West, contemporary readers can enrich their understanding of these writers’ objectives.","PeriodicalId":51366,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43008402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-28DOI: 10.1177/10659129231191780
Amy Friesenhahn
This paper examines the conditional effects of legislator gender, party, and key district-level characteristics on patterns of roll-call votes. I propose and test a theory of legislative freedom conceptualized as a member of Congress’s ability to defect from their party in roll-call votes. I argue that women members of Congress (MCs) will be more able to exercise legislative freedom in women-friendly districts. I expect both Democratic and Republican women MCs representing women-friendly districts will be more likely than those representing districts that are less women-friendly to defect from party and that the women-friendly district effect will be stronger for Republican women MCs. To test these hypotheses, I use roll-call voting data, women-friendly district data (Palmer and Simon 2006), and original data collected on members of the U.S. House beginning with the 103rd Congress. In this paper, I further explore the proposed theory of legislative freedom to examine recent high-profile cases of women MCs defecting from the Republican party and the conditions in which they exercise this freedom.
本文考察了立法人员性别、政党和关键地区特征对唱名投票模式的条件效应。我提出并检验了一种立法自由理论，这种理论被概念化为国会议员在唱名投票中脱离本党的能力。我认为，女性国会议员将更有能力在对女性友好的地区行使立法自由。我预计，代表女性友好选区的民主党和共和党女议员都比那些代表女性不那么友好选区的女议员更有可能退党，而且对共和党女议员来说，女性友好选区的影响会更大。为了验证这些假设，我使用了唱名投票数据、女性友好区数据(Palmer and Simon 2006)，以及从第103届国会开始收集的美国众议院议员的原始数据。在本文中，我进一步探讨了提出的立法自由理论，以研究最近高调的女性议员从共和党叛逃的案例以及她们行使这种自由的条件。
{"title":"At the Intersection of Gender and Party: Legislative Freedom","authors":"Amy Friesenhahn","doi":"10.1177/10659129231191780","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129231191780","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the conditional effects of legislator gender, party, and key district-level characteristics on patterns of roll-call votes. I propose and test a theory of legislative freedom conceptualized as a member of Congress’s ability to defect from their party in roll-call votes. I argue that women members of Congress (MCs) will be more able to exercise legislative freedom in women-friendly districts. I expect both Democratic and Republican women MCs representing women-friendly districts will be more likely than those representing districts that are less women-friendly to defect from party and that the women-friendly district effect will be stronger for Republican women MCs. To test these hypotheses, I use roll-call voting data, women-friendly district data (Palmer and Simon 2006), and original data collected on members of the U.S. House beginning with the 103rd Congress. In this paper, I further explore the proposed theory of legislative freedom to examine recent high-profile cases of women MCs defecting from the Republican party and the conditions in which they exercise this freedom.","PeriodicalId":51366,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47565763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-27DOI: 10.1177/10659129231192943
Shane P. Singh, Judd R. Thornton
We examine if increased salience of partisan competition causes affective polarization in the United States during presidential elections. To do so, we leverage the random and quasi-random timing of survey interviews conducted during election campaigns. We conduct three separate studies. In Study 1, we utilize the 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES), in which random survey interview timing allows for a credible causal estimate of salience on affective polarization. In Study 2, we employ American National Election Studies (ANES) data from 1980 to 2016, again leveraging survey timing to assess the effect of salience on affective polarization. In Study 3, we examine changes in affective polarization as a result of increasingly salient partisan competition using NAES and ANES panel data from 1980 to 2008. Across the three studies we identify a meaningful increase in affective polarization toward candidates, but not toward parties, as a result of heightened partisan competition.
{"title":"Does the Salience of Partisan Competition Increase Affective Polarization in the United States?","authors":"Shane P. Singh, Judd R. Thornton","doi":"10.1177/10659129231192943","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129231192943","url":null,"abstract":"We examine if increased salience of partisan competition causes affective polarization in the United States during presidential elections. To do so, we leverage the random and quasi-random timing of survey interviews conducted during election campaigns. We conduct three separate studies. In Study 1, we utilize the 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES), in which random survey interview timing allows for a credible causal estimate of salience on affective polarization. In Study 2, we employ American National Election Studies (ANES) data from 1980 to 2016, again leveraging survey timing to assess the effect of salience on affective polarization. In Study 3, we examine changes in affective polarization as a result of increasingly salient partisan competition using NAES and ANES panel data from 1980 to 2008. Across the three studies we identify a meaningful increase in affective polarization toward candidates, but not toward parties, as a result of heightened partisan competition.","PeriodicalId":51366,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42937186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-20DOI: 10.1177/10659129231189759
M. Peffley, O. Yair, Marc L. Hutchison
A growing literature finds that social identity attachments to ideological and partisan groups often generate mistrust, hostility, and prejudice toward opposition groups. Yet, there are no studies of whether attachments to ideological groups (i.e., left, right, liberal, and conservative) contribute to political intolerance—defined as an unwillingness to extend basic liberties to groups one opposes—a widely studied and politically consequential form of outgroup hostility. Using both observational and experimental data, we examine how social identity attachments to left–right groups in Israel influence Jewish Israelis’ political intolerance of disliked domestic groups, that is, least-liked groups and Arab citizens. In contrast to other studies—mostly in the US—that find roughly parallel levels of political and social prejudice toward opposition groups, we theorize and find that more strongly attached rightists and leftists in Israel become more polarized in their levels of political tolerance toward disliked groups. Among rightists, stronger identities decrease tolerance, whereas among leftists, political tolerance increases. Thus, outside the US, identity strength can actually be a protector of democratic values, leading some groups (i.e., Jewish leftists) to become more tolerant.
{"title":"Left-Right Social Identity and the Polarization of Political Tolerance","authors":"M. Peffley, O. Yair, Marc L. Hutchison","doi":"10.1177/10659129231189759","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129231189759","url":null,"abstract":"A growing literature finds that social identity attachments to ideological and partisan groups often generate mistrust, hostility, and prejudice toward opposition groups. Yet, there are no studies of whether attachments to ideological groups (i.e., left, right, liberal, and conservative) contribute to political intolerance—defined as an unwillingness to extend basic liberties to groups one opposes—a widely studied and politically consequential form of outgroup hostility. Using both observational and experimental data, we examine how social identity attachments to left–right groups in Israel influence Jewish Israelis’ political intolerance of disliked domestic groups, that is, least-liked groups and Arab citizens. In contrast to other studies—mostly in the US—that find roughly parallel levels of political and social prejudice toward opposition groups, we theorize and find that more strongly attached rightists and leftists in Israel become more polarized in their levels of political tolerance toward disliked groups. Among rightists, stronger identities decrease tolerance, whereas among leftists, political tolerance increases. Thus, outside the US, identity strength can actually be a protector of democratic values, leading some groups (i.e., Jewish leftists) to become more tolerant.","PeriodicalId":51366,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46174378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-19DOI: 10.1177/10659129231190614
B. Giray, J. T. Chatagnier
Peacekeepers play a vital role in enforcing agreements and promoting stability after a civil war, but participation is costly. While troop-contributing countries may appreciate the material and diplomatic benefits that come with performing this task, they also want to minimize the associated costs and potential downsides of the mission. We examine troop contributions in post-civil war peacekeeping missions, determining which countries are most prone to withdrawal and when. Drawing from a domestic audience cost perspective, we argue that those countries that are most exposed to political risk from scandals or fiascoes are most apt to flee, viewing post-war elections as identifiable exit points. Using data on more than 50 peacekeeping operations between 1996 and 2017, we analyze troop contribution dynamics for over 155 different countries to determine whether and when post-war elections prompt peacekeepers to exit. We find evidence that democratic states are more likely either to withdraw completely from UN missions or to reduce their contributions by removing peacekeepers from the front lines in the wake of host country elections.
{"title":"Election Accomplished: Democracies and the Timing of Peacekeeper Drawdowns","authors":"B. Giray, J. T. Chatagnier","doi":"10.1177/10659129231190614","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129231190614","url":null,"abstract":"Peacekeepers play a vital role in enforcing agreements and promoting stability after a civil war, but participation is costly. While troop-contributing countries may appreciate the material and diplomatic benefits that come with performing this task, they also want to minimize the associated costs and potential downsides of the mission. We examine troop contributions in post-civil war peacekeeping missions, determining which countries are most prone to withdrawal and when. Drawing from a domestic audience cost perspective, we argue that those countries that are most exposed to political risk from scandals or fiascoes are most apt to flee, viewing post-war elections as identifiable exit points. Using data on more than 50 peacekeeping operations between 1996 and 2017, we analyze troop contribution dynamics for over 155 different countries to determine whether and when post-war elections prompt peacekeepers to exit. We find evidence that democratic states are more likely either to withdraw completely from UN missions or to reduce their contributions by removing peacekeepers from the front lines in the wake of host country elections.","PeriodicalId":51366,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45609015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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