Pub Date : 2022-12-29DOI: 10.3368/le.99.3.022422-0017r
Daniel Osberghaus, Martin Achtnicht, N.D. Alimov
After the 2021 flood events in Germany, the introduction of compulsory flood insurance was debated. However, insurance coverage for private buildings and belongings may undermine the willingness to pay for municipal flood protection. We use a discrete choice experiment (N = 5,940 participants) to analyze the effects of compulsory insurance on the preferences for public flood protection. The demand for municipal flood protection is associated with its effectiveness and cost and varies plausibly with numerous covariates but is unaffected by compulsory insurance. Hence, there is no empirical indication that compulsory flood insurance would undermine citizens’ support for public flood-risk reduction.
{"title":"The Demand for Public Flood Protection under a Compulsory Private Flood Insurance Scheme","authors":"Daniel Osberghaus, Martin Achtnicht, N.D. Alimov","doi":"10.3368/le.99.3.022422-0017r","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.99.3.022422-0017r","url":null,"abstract":"After the 2021 flood events in Germany, the introduction of compulsory flood insurance was debated. However, insurance coverage for private buildings and belongings may undermine the willingness to pay for municipal flood protection. We use a discrete choice experiment (N = 5,940 participants) to analyze the effects of compulsory insurance on the preferences for public flood protection. The demand for municipal flood protection is associated with its effectiveness and cost and varies plausibly with numerous covariates but is unaffected by compulsory insurance. Hence, there is no empirical indication that compulsory flood insurance would undermine citizens’ support for public flood-risk reduction.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":"99 1","pages":"380 - 396"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48885313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-23DOI: 10.3368/le.99.3.123121-0152r
F. Song, L. Hou, Fang Xia
This study uses a difference-in-differences approach to investigate the effect of county wind power development on grassland quality in China. We find robust evidence that increasing wind power capacity density by 0.02 megawatt/km2 leads to a 0.5% reduction in the normalized difference vegetation index from its mean value. Excluding economic activities as a transmission channel, heterogeneous effects suggest that higher latitude areas with shorter night hours in the growing season are less affected by the negative externality, supporting microclimate effects as the main mechanism. In addition, scarce wind resources and abundant precipitation may weaken the negative effect.
{"title":"Evaluating the External Effect of Wind Power Development on Grassland Quality","authors":"F. Song, L. Hou, Fang Xia","doi":"10.3368/le.99.3.123121-0152r","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.99.3.123121-0152r","url":null,"abstract":"This study uses a difference-in-differences approach to investigate the effect of county wind power development on grassland quality in China. We find robust evidence that increasing wind power capacity density by 0.02 megawatt/km2 leads to a 0.5% reduction in the normalized difference vegetation index from its mean value. Excluding economic activities as a transmission channel, heterogeneous effects suggest that higher latitude areas with shorter night hours in the growing season are less affected by the negative externality, supporting microclimate effects as the main mechanism. In addition, scarce wind resources and abundant precipitation may weaken the negative effect.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":"99 1","pages":"364 - 379"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49141118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-23DOI: 10.3368/le.99.3.112321-0139r
Neel Ocean, P. Howley
We presented six novel farming vignettes to U.K. farmers that describe trade-offs between pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits. What farmers would choose corresponds with what they think would make them happier, which supports the use of subjective well-being as a proxy for decision utility in agricultural research. Where a disparity between choice and well-being exists, farmers seem willing to trade happiness for pecuniary benefits. Our results also suggest that farmers often trade pecuniary gains for nonpecuniary benefits. The utility derived from nonpecuniary benefits may help explain farmer behaviors, such as unsubsidized environmental improvements and reluctance to adopt efficiency-enhancing technologies.
{"title":"Which Benefits Would Make Farmers Happier, and Which Would They Choose?","authors":"Neel Ocean, P. Howley","doi":"10.3368/le.99.3.112321-0139r","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.99.3.112321-0139r","url":null,"abstract":"We presented six novel farming vignettes to U.K. farmers that describe trade-offs between pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits. What farmers would choose corresponds with what they think would make them happier, which supports the use of subjective well-being as a proxy for decision utility in agricultural research. Where a disparity between choice and well-being exists, farmers seem willing to trade happiness for pecuniary benefits. Our results also suggest that farmers often trade pecuniary gains for nonpecuniary benefits. The utility derived from nonpecuniary benefits may help explain farmer behaviors, such as unsubsidized environmental improvements and reluctance to adopt efficiency-enhancing technologies.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":"99 1","pages":"458 - 476"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49608401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Although solar energy receives broad support in general, utility-scale solar arrays can be contentious because at the siting stage, it becomes a land use issue replete with potential disamenities and trade-offs. We conduct a choice experiment survey to estimate preferences for attributes of utility-scale solar arrays in Rhode Island, United States. Our results suggest that the largest indicator of solar development approval is prior land use, with residents willing to pay an additional $10–$21 in monthly utility bills for developments in commercial, industrial, brownfield, and covered landfill areas, and $13–$49 to avoid developments on farm and forest land.
{"title":"When Energy Issues Are Land Use Issues: Estimating Preferences for Utility-Scale Solar Energy Siting","authors":"Vasundhara Gaur, Corey Lang, Gregory Howard, Ruth Quainoo","doi":"10.3368/le.99.3.111221-0130r1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.99.3.111221-0130r1","url":null,"abstract":"Although solar energy receives broad support in general, utility-scale solar arrays can be contentious because at the siting stage, it becomes a land use issue replete with potential disamenities and trade-offs. We conduct a choice experiment survey to estimate preferences for attributes of utility-scale solar arrays in Rhode Island, United States. Our results suggest that the largest indicator of solar development approval is prior land use, with residents willing to pay an additional $10–$21 in monthly utility bills for developments in commercial, industrial, brownfield, and covered landfill areas, and $13–$49 to avoid developments on farm and forest land.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":"99 1","pages":"343 - 363"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42195434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Contingent behavior (CB) trip data, eliciting intended trip decisions with hypothetical scenarios, has been popular in recreation demand models. Unlike other stated preference methods, the temporal reliability of CB data has not been examined in recreation demand models, especially in a Kuhn-Tucker (KT) framework. This article assesses the temporal reliability of CB trip data collected over three years in KT models. We find that coefficient and welfare estimates are largely reliable over time. Our findings add confidence in using CB trip data to model demands within and beyond recreation contexts and provide insight into the broader application of KT models.
{"title":"Temporal Reliability of Contingent Behavior Trip Data in Kuhn-Tucker Recreation Demand Models","authors":"Lusi Xie, W. Adamowicz","doi":"10.3368/le.030521-0025r","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.030521-0025r","url":null,"abstract":"Contingent behavior (CB) trip data, eliciting intended trip decisions with hypothetical scenarios, has been popular in recreation demand models. Unlike other stated preference methods, the temporal reliability of CB data has not been examined in recreation demand models, especially in a Kuhn-Tucker (KT) framework. This article assesses the temporal reliability of CB trip data collected over three years in KT models. We find that coefficient and welfare estimates are largely reliable over time. Our findings add confidence in using CB trip data to model demands within and beyond recreation contexts and provide insight into the broader application of KT models.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":"99 1","pages":"182 - 202"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42326011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Brenna Jungers, J. Abbott, P. Lloyd‐Smith, W. Adamowicz, D. Willard
Externalities from recreation scale at the extensive and intensive margins of resource interaction. Recreators have differentiated demands for these margins, so unbundling the prices of access and intensive depletion could improve on traditional management. We use choice experiment data from U.S. Gulf of Mexico recreational headboat anglers to estimate structural models of trip and red snapper retention demand, then simulate aggregate harvest across a range of trip and harvest tag prices. In our simulations, the red snapper harvest tag market equilibrates at $15 per tag and generates $760,000 in management revenues per year while more efficiently allocating harvest.
{"title":"À la carte Management of Recreational Resources","authors":"Brenna Jungers, J. Abbott, P. Lloyd‐Smith, W. Adamowicz, D. Willard","doi":"10.3368/le.112421-0140r","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.112421-0140r","url":null,"abstract":"Externalities from recreation scale at the extensive and intensive margins of resource interaction. Recreators have differentiated demands for these margins, so unbundling the prices of access and intensive depletion could improve on traditional management. We use choice experiment data from U.S. Gulf of Mexico recreational headboat anglers to estimate structural models of trip and red snapper retention demand, then simulate aggregate harvest across a range of trip and harvest tag prices. In our simulations, the red snapper harvest tag market equilibrates at $15 per tag and generates $760,000 in management revenues per year while more efficiently allocating harvest.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":"99 1","pages":"161 - 181"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46706477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-27DOI: 10.3368/le.98.4.090919-0130R1
Mark D. Agee, T. Crocker
We propose a static three-stage incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, execution-contingent mechanism for a regulator to allocate biodiversity-protection responsibilities across a landscape mosaic with multiple value-interdependent owners. The mechanism motivates owners to truthfully report their opportunity costs of protection to the regulator and comply with their assigned habitat protection responsibilities.
{"title":"Three-Stage Tradable Set-Aside Requirements, Interdependent Values, and Biodiversity Production on Private Lands","authors":"Mark D. Agee, T. Crocker","doi":"10.3368/le.98.4.090919-0130R1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.98.4.090919-0130R1","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a static three-stage incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, execution-contingent mechanism for a regulator to allocate biodiversity-protection responsibilities across a landscape mosaic with multiple value-interdependent owners. The mechanism motivates owners to truthfully report their opportunity costs of protection to the regulator and comply with their assigned habitat protection responsibilities.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":"98 1","pages":"690 - 699"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47881649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Subsidizing homeownership decentralizes cities, as Muth (1967) suggested over half a century ago. This article focuses on the related question of whether repealing a homeownership subsidy recentralizes cities. This question is relevant today, given the ubiquity of homeownership subsidies. We provide a first quasi-experimental test of a subsidy repeal’s spatial effects by examining Germany’s 2005 homeownership subsidy reform. We find that repealing the subsidy contributed to recentralizing Germany’s cities. Since recentralization helps abate carbon dioxide emissions, repealing a homeownership subsidy also helps mitigate climate change.
{"title":"Homeowner Subsidy Repeal and Housing Recentralization","authors":"Alexander Daminger, Kristof Dascher","doi":"10.3368/le.081821-0095r","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.081821-0095r","url":null,"abstract":"Subsidizing homeownership decentralizes cities, as Muth (1967) suggested over half a century ago. This article focuses on the related question of whether repealing a homeownership subsidy recentralizes cities. This question is relevant today, given the ubiquity of homeownership subsidies. We provide a first quasi-experimental test of a subsidy repeal’s spatial effects by examining Germany’s 2005 homeownership subsidy reform. We find that repealing the subsidy contributed to recentralizing Germany’s cities. Since recentralization helps abate carbon dioxide emissions, repealing a homeownership subsidy also helps mitigate climate change.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":"99 1","pages":"283 - 301"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45393937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-22DOI: 10.3368/le.030521-0024r1
Dietrich H. Earnhart, L. Friesen
According to the standard enforcement model, key deterrence components are punishment certainty and severity. Theory predicts the relative efficacy of certainty versus severity, but empirical and experimental evidence are mixed. Our study is the first to systematically compare the effects of certainty and severity in the environmental protection context. Our empirics examine wastewater discharged by chemical manufacturing facilities permitted under the Clean Water Act. We find that when enforcement certainty and severity are high, both components effectively deter pollution, with certainty being more effective. In contrast, certainty and severity increases prove counterproductive when certainty and severity are low.
{"title":"Certainty of Punishment versus Severity of Punishment","authors":"Dietrich H. Earnhart, L. Friesen","doi":"10.3368/le.030521-0024r1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.030521-0024r1","url":null,"abstract":"According to the standard enforcement model, key deterrence components are punishment certainty and severity. Theory predicts the relative efficacy of certainty versus severity, but empirical and experimental evidence are mixed. Our study is the first to systematically compare the effects of certainty and severity in the environmental protection context. Our empirics examine wastewater discharged by chemical manufacturing facilities permitted under the Clean Water Act. We find that when enforcement certainty and severity are high, both components effectively deter pollution, with certainty being more effective. In contrast, certainty and severity increases prove counterproductive when certainty and severity are low.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":"99 1","pages":"245 - 264"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48358203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-22DOI: 10.3368/le.061121-0060r1
Sharaban T. Anica, L. Elbakidze
Using data from the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System compliance and the Clean Water State Revolving Funds (CWSRF) for wastewater treatment plants in nine states between 2010 and 2018, we examine (1) the effect of noncompliance on the distribution and size of awarded CWSRF loans, and (2) the effects of the CWSRF provision and award size on postfunding compliance. We observe that funded facilities have poorer compliance records than the unfunded ones and that funded facilities decrease violations within two years after receiving financial support. On average, a $50 million CWSRF loan decreases violations by one count within two postfunding years.
{"title":"Financial Assistance and Environmental Compliance","authors":"Sharaban T. Anica, L. Elbakidze","doi":"10.3368/le.061121-0060r1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.061121-0060r1","url":null,"abstract":"Using data from the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System compliance and the Clean Water State Revolving Funds (CWSRF) for wastewater treatment plants in nine states between 2010 and 2018, we examine (1) the effect of noncompliance on the distribution and size of awarded CWSRF loans, and (2) the effects of the CWSRF provision and award size on postfunding compliance. We observe that funded facilities have poorer compliance records than the unfunded ones and that funded facilities decrease violations within two years after receiving financial support. On average, a $50 million CWSRF loan decreases violations by one count within two postfunding years.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":"99 1","pages":"222 - 244"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47612527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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